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GREAT MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (1660-1919)

By
H. MOYSE-BARTLETT
M.A.(OXON)



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PREFACE

THIS book is an attempt to fill a long-felt want : an account in a *single* volume of the principal movements in European history between 1660 and 1919. The period is that set for the two parts of the Civil Service Commission for special entry to the Royal Navy and for entry to Sandhurst, Woolwich, and Cranwell, to the Metropolitan Police College, and to the Executive Branch of the Civil Service. The work also covers the popular modern period laid down for the European history section of the School Certificates and Higher School Certificates of most of the universities. The aim has been to provide a much fuller account than that of the customary school text, thus relieving the examination candidate of the necessity for consulting large works of reference and weighty biographies in order to obtain his material.

Since the movements must be studied principally in their relation to British history, that aspect has been stressed throughout. For example, the chapter entitled "The French Revolution and First Empire," while containing the complete story from the French point of view, deals in particular with the influence of sea-power, the Continental System, and Wellington's campaigns.

Each chapter is followed by a summary from which the student may refresh his memory by seeing at a glance the complete framework of the whole ; by a list of those aspects with which examination questions usually deal ; and by a carefully selected bibliography, from which the reader may, if necessary, amplify the information he has just gained in accordance with his own needs.

My thanks are due to Mr F. E. Woodall, M.A., for his many helpful criticisms and for the loan of books, and to Miss Joyce Green, for her painstaking work in the preparation of most of the maps and diagrams.

H. M.-B.

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CHAPTER I

THE DECLINE OF THE POWER OF HOLLAND

DURING the seventeenth century the small country which we now call Holland ranked in Europe as a first-class Power. Geographically it consists of little more than the low-lying country ('nether lands') surrounding the deltas of the two great rivers Rhine and Scheldt, much of which had in former times been reclaimed from the sea. Neither industrially nor agriculturally has Holland ever been rich, but commercially—*i.e.*, from the point of view of trading in commodities as apart from manufacturing or growing them—Holland possesses great advantages. The ownership of great river-mouths in a civilized country usually means possession of great ports, suitable for naval bases as well as commercial harbours. More important still, a continental river, such as the Rhine, flows through more than one country, and forms an unrivalled medium for the transport of bulky goods; three hundred years ago this was especially important. A country so situated, therefore, even though small in area, can, if its people are thrifty, industrious, and disposed to take kindly to the sea, rise in favourable political circumstances to a position of considerable wealth and importance. But it would be subject to three serious weaknesses. In the first place, another Power capable of challenging its maritime supremacy could blockade so small a strip of coast-line in a manner very damaging to its overseas trade, the principal source of the national revenue, especially if that trade first has to pass through a restricted passage, like the Straits of Dover. Secondly, a country small in size is quickly overrun if it provokes the hostility of a strong military Power. Both these disasters were suffered successively by the Dutch within a very short space of time. And, finally, the recuperative powers of a country small in population and without great natural resources of its own are comparatively feeble.


The Rise of Dutch Power. During the first half of the sixteenth century, at the time when Henry VIII occupied the throne of England, the Netherlands, comprising the two countries now known as Holland and Belgium, were a rich and important part of the vast dominions of the Emperor Charles V, master of the Habsburg territories in Central Europe and in Italy, and of Spain and the Spanish possessions overseas. In 1555, wearied with his lifelong struggle to hold this unwieldy empire together and to combat the rising forces of Protestantism, Charles V

resigned the throne of Spain (with which he included the Netherlands) to his son, Philip II, husband of the English Queen Mary.

During the next decade a rebellion broke out, and although the Spaniards were at first successful in crushing it, and managed to persuade the Catholic (Belgian) provinces in the south to return peacefully to the Spanish allegiance, it was far otherwise with the Protestant states in the north. These were seven in number—Holland, Friesland, Zeeland, Gelderland, Utrecht, Gröningen, and Overijssel. By far the wealthiest and most important of these was Holland, and it was for this reason that Dutchmen were usually referred to abroad as ‘Hollanders.’ The first five of these states (joined later by the other two) bound themselves together in 1579 by the Union of Utrecht, determined to prosecute at all hazards their war of liberation against Spain. Their leader was Prince William of Orange-Nassau, who is better known to history as William the Silent. Under him, and after his death in 1584 under his son Maurice, the Dutch continued their war against Spain. Their chances of success in so unequal a struggle did not at first appear to be great, and in a desperate bid for the help of England the Dutch even promised to make Elizabeth their queen. With her usual caution she refused to offer such a direct provocation to the powerful Philip II, though in 1585 she sent Leicester to the Netherlands with a small army. However, the conflict between England and Spain, so often hardly averted, came at last. The defeat of the Armada in 1588 did much more than save England from invasion: by rendering their sea communications unsafe it seriously weakened the position of the Spaniards in the Netherlands. In 1596 a Triple Alliance was formed between Holland, France, and England, by which the two latter countries recognized Dutch independence. At last, on April 9, 1609, Spain concluded a twelve-year truce with the United Provinces, and it is from this date that we number those provinces among the sovereign states of Europe. They were banded together under a civil magistracy known as the Stadholderate, which remained for many years in the possession of the house of Orange. Usually this office carried with it the posts of Admiral-General and Captain-General of the Union.

When the struggle was resumed in 1621 it may properly be considered a war between two countries, rather than a rebellion of the Dutch, who by this time were much more powerful, especially on the sea, while Spain was declining rapidly. The Dutch fleet under Martin Tromp¹ defeated the Spaniards in English territorial waters at the Battle of the Downs in 1639, much to the annoyance of Charles I, who had his own reasons for disliking the Dutch, and had done his best to prevent this violation of English neutrality. The war came

¹ Martin Harpertzoon Tromp (1597–1653) made his first voyage to the East Indies at the age of eight, and entered the Dutch Navy in 1624.



HOLLAND AND THE ENGLISH EAST COAST PORTS

to an end in 1648 by the Peace of Münster, when Spain at last recognized the complete independence of Holland. By the terms of the treaty the Dutch secured important trading rights with the colonial possessions of Spain and Portugal.

The Rise of Hostility between Holland and England. It is said that modern wars arise from economic causes alone—the necessity for securing new markets or new sources of supply, or for safeguarding those already in existence. English history shows that English wars have almost invariably been fought for such causes, even at a time when other nations were still quite satisfied with dynastic quarrels. By the beginning of the seventeenth century the great maritime and colonial struggle between England and Spain had passed its peak, and the rising power of England abroad and on the sea was confronted by another rival—Holland. A struggle for supremacy was inevitable. The underlying questions at issue were fishing rights and the spice trade of the East Indies. It was of little use for the respective Governments to attempt treaties and agreements until these matters had been fought out on the spot; to reach decisions in London or The Hague was one thing, to enforce them on the other side of the world quite another. Hence it came about that economic quarrels led eventually to political deadlock, and so to war.

Under the early Stuarts Englishmen had a hearty respect for the capability of the Dutch, and a hearty jealousy of their obvious prosperity. In 1603 we find Sir Walter Raleigh bemoaning the fact that the Dutch could sail their vessels more efficiently than the English with the aid of very much smaller crews. Another English authority estimates the total Dutch tonnage at 900,000, which, he says, was nearly double the English. Travellers brought back stories of the weekly dispatch of five hundred trading vessels from the Texel, and it was said that the Dutch kept a fleet of eighty vessels of war on the high seas. The people of Holland were sober and industrious; the country was the storehouse of Christendom; prizes and booty, in addition to legal trading, helped to augment the national wealth, and the great Bank of Amsterdam made that city a veritable treasure-house. The herring fishery was particularly important. Thousands of families were employed in it, one-fifth of the population, in fact, and Amsterdam was “built on the carcasses of the herring.” In addition to this the Dutch began whaling in Arctic waters, and set up a shore factory at Spitzbergen.

Under Cornelius Houtman a Dutch fleet first set out for the East Indies in 1595. Gradually ousting the Portuguese, the Dutch soon had the pepper and spice trade entirely in their hands, for, while under the Portuguese *régime* it had been necessary for other nations to fetch these commodities from Lisbon, the Dutch shipped them to any port in

Europe. The English East India Company was incorporated in 1600, and the Dutch one in 1602. Thus the struggle for commercial rivalry in the East began early, and soon rose to a pitch of great intensity. The Dutch Company, which possessed the right to erect forts, maintain armed forces, and make treaties or war with the natives, had a great advantage over the English, as it was closely connected with the home Government, while the English merchants experienced considerable difficulty in procuring active support from the Stuarts. Added to this, the size of the fleets and the number of soldiers kept by the Dutch in the East Indies greatly exceeded those of the English.

In 1609 James I, claiming sovereignty over the waters on the east coast of England, announced his intention of restricting the liberty of fishing, except by licence from himself. The Dutch were so furious at this that the restriction was not enforced until 1616. Two years afterwards the Dutch sent a special embassy to London to discuss the dyed-cloth trade, the herring fishery, the Spitzbergen fishery, and the position of the rival trading companies in the East Indies, which were now competing for mastery in the Banda group of the Moluccas, where the rarer kinds of spice were to be found. The fishery question was left unsettled, but in 1619 a partial agreement was reached over the East Indian trade. This, however, proved of little use, for although the English and Dutch fleets in the East Indies dressed ship and saluted each other when they heard the news, they soon continued to fight as before. On the renewal of the struggle between Holland and Spain in 1621 the Dutch, anxious for the help of England, made a further attempt to settle the Eastern question. Agreement was reached between the two Governments in 1622; whether any lasting settlement could have resulted is extremely doubtful, but in any case the 'Amboyna massacre' of the following year undid the work of the negotiators at home. Eighteen Englishmen at Amboyna, in the Banda Islands, were accused of a conspiracy to murder the Dutch residents. They were put to the torture by fire and water, and eventually ten of them were most unwarrantably executed. The English East India Company clamoured loudly for compensation for this crowning outrage on its servants and property, but they found James unwilling to take a firm stand with the Dutch. His Spanish marriage project for Prince Charles having fallen through, he was now on the point of assisting Holland against Spain.

Relations between England and Holland did not improve during the following reign. Charles I renewed the fishery toll and endeavoured to enforce it with his fleet. The result was numerous small skirmishes on the fishing banks. Defeated in their attempts to capture a share of the spice trade, the English turned their attention to India. Nevertheless the memory of Amboyna still rankled, as English literature and

drama of the period amply prove. The Battle of the Downs was considered another example of Dutch insolence to the English. Then Charles became so fully absorbed in his struggle with Parliament that for some years Holland had little to fear from her rival. The house of Orange, now connected by marriage with the Stuarts, was naturally royalist in sympathy, and the English Parliamentary envoys were refused admission to the States-General, as the Federal Assembly of the United Provinces was called. But in 1649 the English monarchy was replaced by the Commonwealth, and in the following year, on the death of William II of Orange, the Stadholderate was abolished and the Dutch Republican party came into power. It was hoped now on both sides that better relations would ensue between the two Protestant republics; such, however, was not to be the case.

The new Dutch Government recognized the Commonwealth, though its envoys received anything but an enthusiastic reception. Suggestions were made for an alliance between the two countries, the English demanding as one of their terms the expulsion of all royalist refugees from Holland. The Dutch replied with a request for trading concessions and the relaxation of the English fishery regulations. Negotiations broke down, and the English Parliament passed a stringent Navigation Act in 1651, limiting trade with English ports to English shipping, or vessels carrying the produce or manufactures of their own countries. This Act was a great blow to the carrying trade, and particularly to the Dutch, since it prevented them from bringing tropical produce to English ports. All the old grievances were raked up—Amboyna, fishing rights, claims and counter-claims for alleged damage to shipping—English privateers began seizing Dutch ships on suspicion of their carrying French goods, and a large Dutch fleet put to sea to prevent this practice. The result was a collision between Blake and Tromp in May 1652, followed by a formal declaration of war in July.

With the exception of those engaged in the Baltic trade, Dutch merchantmen were forced to run the gauntlet of the English Channel, and it was the task of the Dutch fleet to see that this was accomplished in safety. Tromp therefore engaged Blake in a running fight off Dungeness in November, inflicting a defeat on the English and allowing a Dutch convoy to slip through. But in the following year Blake and Monk¹ succeeded in turning the tables. Tromp was defeated off Portland Bill, and lost seventeen ships of war and fifty merchantmen. A few months later Tromp was defeated near Harwich, and then again off Scheveningen, in which battle he lost his life. By this time the Republican John de Witt² had become Grand Pensionary of the States of Holland. Although only twenty-seven years of age, he was a man

¹ George Monk (1608–70), created Duke of Albemarle after the Restoration.

² John de Witt (1625–72) had since 1650 been Pensionary of Dort.

of marked ability, and his influence in foreign affairs carried more weight in the States-General than that of any other man in Holland. Cromwell, who became Lord Protector of England in the same year, was anxious for peace with Holland, and by the Treaty of Westminster, signed in April 1654, the First Dutch War came to an end. The Dutch agreed to salute the British flag in the narrow seas, and to pay compensation for the Amboyna massacre and other claims. The Navigation Act remained unmodified, and there was nothing to prevent a situation precisely similar from arising in the future.

During the next six years the Dutch rose to the height of their power. They had expelled the Portuguese from Ceylon and from Malacca. They possessed forts and factories all over the East Indies, and on the mainland of India as well. In 1652 they established a naval station at the Cape of Good Hope, as a half-way house for the refreshment of their Eastern fleets. In the West they had Curaçoa and settlements on the Hudson river, though their hold on Brazil, obtained from the Portuguese, was once more slipping from their grasp. Stations for the supply of slaves to the West Indies had been set up on the Guinea Coast.

Such, in brief, was the situation when in 1660 Charles II was restored to the English throne, and the long story of the decline of Dutch power began.

The Second Dutch War. In the sphere of internal politics all was not well with the United Netherlands. The province of Holland tended more and more to take the lead in foreign affairs. Since it was by far the wealthiest of the seven, and therefore the chief contributor towards the national fleet and the national revenue, the First Dutch War had served to enhance its importance still more. Hence the rise to power of the Republican party in 1650 and the exceedingly influential position of the Grand Pensionary John de Witt, the Republican leader, after the war was over. Meanwhile the house of Orange, which tended rather to represent the federal interests of all the provinces, had suffered eclipse. Prince William, son of the English Mary Stuart and the late Stadholder William II, had been born a week after his father's death, and was not yet ten years old. The Republican party had passed a special Bill to exclude him from office.

Charles II of England had little reason to like the Dutch. Their Republican Government had made friends with the Commonwealth; he himself had not received the asylum he might have expected but for the downfall of the Orange party; and the prospects of his nephew in Holland did not appear good under the present *régime*. When, however, he became King of England in fact as well as in theory the Dutch made endeavours to win his friendship. His departure for England was an elaborate affair, and soon afterwards the Dutch Government

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presented him with the first yacht ever to sail in English waters. The Act excluding the house of Orange from the Government was rescinded, though the young Prince William was not given any official appointment. After his marriage with Catherine of Braganza Charles acted as mediator in the colonial quarrel between Holland and Portugal, with the result that the Dutch at last gave up all claim to Brazil, in return for a money payment. But Charles's marriage gave the Dutch some cause for jealousy. It brought him the possession of Tangier, a strategic point on the Strait of Gibraltar that gave the English a stranglehold on the important Dutch trade route to Smyrna; and the island of Bombay, which in 1668 Charles made over to the English East India Company.

John de Witt hoped to persuade the new English Government to abolish, or at least relax, the Navigation Act of 1651. He was very soon undeceived. During the first few years of Charles's reign the Navigation Laws were re-enacted and amended in a way that affected the Dutch more adversely than ever. It cannot be said that Charles himself was anxious for war with Holland, but before long all the old economic causes were coming to a head once more, and Parliament began to agitate for another war to protect English commerce. The island of Pularoon, in the East Indies, which had been taken by the Dutch in the reign of James I, should have been restored to England after the First Dutch War, but in spite of a renewed promise made in 1662 this was not carried out. By 1664 the English were making claims against Holland totalling as much as £800,000 in respect of Dutch depredations against their trade and shipping in the East Indies and in West Africa, where an English company, incorporated in 1662, had established posts on the Gold Coast and the Gambia river in an endeavour to capture the Dutch slave trade with the British sugar islands, Barbados and Jamaica. Heedless of the inevitable consequences, the English Government decided on an unofficial war overseas. In October 1663 Captain Robert Holmes sailed for West Africa, where he attacked and captured the Dutch posts at Cape Coast Castle and Goree, and inflicted much damage on their shipping. In March of the following year a patent was granted to the Duke of York for the settlement of the country between Connecticut and the river Delaware. This would include the colony of New Amsterdam, which the Dutch had settled on the Hudson river, and an expedition was accordingly prepared to take it. Aided by the Governor of Massachusetts, the attack was successful, and the former Dutch settlement was renamed New York.

It was not long before De Witt retaliated. The Dutch Admiral De Ruyter,¹ who had been stationed in the Mediterranean to guard

¹ Michel Adriaanzoon de Ruyter (1607-76) entered the Dutch naval service in 1640.

against the possibility of an attack from Tangier on the Dutch Smyrna fleet (an attack which materialized in December 1664), was sent post-haste to the Guinea Coast, where, in January 1665, he retook Goree and other places that had fallen into English hands (though not Cape Coast Castle), and in his turn inflicted as much damage as possible on the English forts and ships. Crossing to the West Indies, he then made attempts on Barbados and New York, which he might have repeated but for the fact that his presence was by then urgently needed at home. In March 1665 Charles II had declared war on the United Provinces.

The Second Dutch War, fought on both sides purely for the defence of overseas trade, proved once more a trial of maritime strength. The land operations were soon over. Charles II succeeded in enlisting the help of the Bishop of Münster, who was anxious to enforce a claim to the district of Borkelo, and therefore invaded Holland with an army of 18,000 men. He was very soon defeated and forced to make peace, for the Dutch received the assistance of French troops. At this stage it had not occurred to John de Witt that France was to prove the principal enemy of Holland and the real menace to her independence, and he had made a treaty of alliance with Louis XIV. Now, at the beginning of the Second Dutch War in 1665, Louis was just about to begin the 'War of Devolution,' the first round in his series of campaigns to extend the French frontiers to the Rhine. He was not sorry to see England and Holland engaged in a war of their own while he laid his plans, and his declaration of war against England in 1666 did not carry behind it any intention of wasting his strength on active operations against England herself. Thus the two principal combatants were left to fight out their quarrel at sea.

The first object of the naval strategy on both sides was to cripple the enemy's commerce. In the absence of De Ruyter the Dutch placed their fleet under the command of Admiral Opdam, who began operations by attempting to stop naval stores from reaching England from the Baltic. On June 3, 1665, the first major action took place between the two fleets near Lowestoft. The English, who had begun to adopt stereotyped tactics for the conduct of naval battles under the Commonwealth 'generals' of the First Dutch War, approached their enemies in close-hauled line ahead. Both sides began to skirmish for the wind, an advantage that Opdam lost, thus presenting his enemy with the chance of giving battle as and when he thought fit. The Dutch, in the leeward position, also suffered the disadvantage of the clouds of smoke that drifted down upon them from the enemy's broadsides, obscuring the view of their own gunners. As was usual in the seventeenth century, the battle soon became a series of isolated duels, of which that between the two flagships was particularly notable. Opdam in the *Eendracht* hammered fiercely at the Duke of York in the *Royal Charles*. Three

nobles standing near the Duke were blown to bits, and a bone from one of them wounded the Duke himself. Eventually the *Eendracht* blew up, and the Dutch withdrew from the conflict. During the night the English followed, for the Duke was not lacking in personal courage. Apparently, however, some irresponsible person, afraid for the Duke's safety, gave orders to shorten sail, and the battle was not renewed.

The battle of Lowestoft was a bitter pill for the Dutch burghers to swallow. About fourteen of their vessels had been sunk, nearly 5000 men killed, and many taken prisoner, against a loss to England of only one ship and 250 men killed. Cries of treachery and negligence arose on all sides; Admiral Evertzen, the Dutch second-in-command, was thrown into the water as a fitting reward for his services, and four captains were shot. Every one longed for the return of De Ruyter, who had fought so well in a subordinate position during the previous war. When at last the great man did arrive his first task was to convoy home a merchant fleet that had been unsuccessfully attacked by the English at Bergen.

Until the following summer De Ruyter virtually kept the mastery of the seas, for the Great Plague had for the time being crippled the activities of the English. Altogether things looked well for the Dutch in 1666, for Louis XIV had promised to assist them with a fleet. It was true that he never intended to do any such thing, but the English felt obliged to guard against this new menace, and the Duke of Albemarle, who was now in command, received orders to detach a portion of his fleet under Prince Rupert. The main Dutch fleet therefore outnumbered Albemarle by two to one. It did not appear that anything could go wrong for the Dutch this time, and to make sure that matters were prosecuted with the necessary energy John de Witt himself took ship with De Ruyter.

On June 1, 1666, the encounter known as the Four Days Battle began when Albemarle gallantly attacked the Dutch left wing off Dunkirk. Next day sixteen more ships arrived to reinforce the Dutch, and after essaying another attack Albemarle decided to draw off towards the English coast. De Ruyter followed, and the third day of the battle found the English line drawn up to cover their damaged ships as they laboured towards home. Renewing the conflict, the Dutch succeeded in capturing the *Royal Prince*, which they burnt when Rupert appeared in view with the rest of the English fleet. With this addition to his forces, Albemarle felt justified in opposing De Ruyter again on the fourth day, though he still had only fifty effective ships against the Dutch seventy. Before long, however, his fleet was surrounded, and he was forced to break through and make his escape. The Dutch confidence in De Ruyter had been justified, for they had taken twenty prizes against a loss to themselves of seven warships and a few fireships. The

battle served, however, to reveal to De Witt the courage and tenacity of the English fighting ships. Things had changed very much since the earlier years of the century, and Holland could no longer fancy herself really the mistress of the seas.

By this time the English were finding difficulty in manning their fleet, and were even forced to ship soldiers. It was nearly two months before they could get to sea again, this time with a fleet of ninety ships. De Ruyter had been at sea long before, and was now blockading the mouth of the Thames. Determined to avenge their previous losses, on July 25 the English under Albemarle launched a furious attack. Young Cornelius Tromp,¹ more zealous than discreet, got separated with the rear division from the rest of the fleet while the battle was in progress. De Ruyter found he was getting the worst of the contest, and decided to break off, a manœuvre which he executed with great skill. This battle of St James's Day had cost the Dutch about twenty ships all told, and 7000 casualties, against an English loss of one ship. Albemarle followed to the Dutch coast, where a force was landed on Schelling Island, and 160 merchantmen were captured or burnt in the Vlie.

By this time the English in the West Indies had taken Eustatia, Santa Saba, and Tobago from the Dutch. But they did not have it all their own way, for the Dutch attacked and captured the small colony on the Surinam river, which had been settled by the Governor of Barbados, while their French allies got hold of Antigua and Montserrat. In 1666 the Dutch strengthened their position on land by a defensive alliance with Denmark, Brandenburg, and Brunswick-Lüneburg. Louis XIV's aims in the Spanish Netherlands, which he was claiming as his wife's share of the Spanish dominions on her father's death, were now becoming apparent, and the possibility of finding Antwerp and the Scheldt in French hands filled the Dutch with alarm. In the spring of 1667 the French invaded Flanders with a large army, and, keen to forestall opposition from one quarter at least, began negotiating for English assistance. Thus John de Witt became very anxious to end the naval war, and, as the impecunious Charles II was also ready, negotiations began at Breda in May.

The English Government was finding it increasingly difficult to finance the fleet. Unable to obtain their pay, seamen had been deserting in large numbers, and since peace seemed now almost in sight the larger rates of warship were laid up at the King's order, much to the alarm and annoyance of Albemarle and Rupert. As many of these vessels were at Chatham, Sheerness was to be fortified to protect them and the other shipping in the Medway. The task, however, had not been fully carried out.

The result of this policy was a blow at English sea-power by De

¹ Cornelius van Tromp (1629-91), second son of Martin Tromp.

Ruyter and De Witt's brother, Cornelius, that was destined to live in the minds of Englishmen for many a long year. On June 10, 1667, the Dutch entered the Thames with thirty fireships and over sixty warships. After an unsuccessful attempt to get up the river to London they attacked Sheerness, which replied gallantly but feebly with the fifteen guns available for its defence. The Dutch intention was obvious; Albemarle arrived in haste, and on the following day he threw a boom across the Medway and sank five ships to block the channel. All proved useless. The Dutch got through, rammed the boom and broke it, and began to attack the anchored warships. Amid the derisive cries of English sailors, who had deserted to the Dutch, the famous *Royal Charles* was captured. On the following day Albemarle hurriedly scuttled the *Royal Oak*, *Loyal London*, and *Royal James*, the upper works of which, as they still remained above water, were burnt by the Dutch. By this time reinforcements of artillery were arriving on the river-bank, and De Ruyter withdrew. Altogether he had taken or destroyed some sixteen vessels. For weeks he remained blockading the Thames, while the English were powerless. In July a Dutch force landed to attack the Landguard Fort, and another landing was effected at Felixstowe, though on this occasion the Dutch were forced to re-embark with some haste.

On July 31, 1667, peace was made by the Treaty of Breda. It cannot be said that either side had really gained the advantage, and the peace terms were therefore a compromise. It was agreed that England should keep New York and the settlements round it, while Holland retained Pularoon, Surinam, and Tobago. At the time this arrangement was held to favour the Dutch, so they agreed once more to salute the English flag in the narrow seas. The Navigation Laws remained in force, but a concession was granted with regard to goods from Southern Germany and the Southern Netherlands, which the Dutch were allowed to carry between their own and English ports. With these terms the second round of the contest between the two maritime rivals came to an end. Politically John De Witt's power seemed to stand higher than ever. But the strain of the war had been tremendous. Taxation in Holland was very high, and the Government had to face a heavy debt.

The Triple Alliance (1668). The establishment of peace between Holland and England paved the way for a temporary reversal of alliances and a change in the outlook of Dutch policy. The supposed friendship between Holland and France was based on no real foundation. Louis himself had no liking for the Dutch people, and despised their money-grubbing ways. Colbert's economic policy offended them by restricting their trade. Above all, the French depredations in the Spanish Netherlands were filling De Witt with increasing alarm, since

it was obvious that Louis aimed at nothing less than the establishment of a French port on the Scheldt. France was all very well as a friend, but Holland had no wish to find her a neighbour. The alliance with the small German princes hardly formed a powerful combination, so Holland was not strong on land. There was thus good reason for enlisting the sympathy of the old enemy, England.

The fall of Clarendon made things easier. Sir William Temple, whose sympathies lay with the Dutch as against French aggression in the Netherlands, was sent to The Hague. A treaty was drawn up between England and Holland, and ratified on January 13, 1668, which, on the accession of Sweden, became the basis of a Triple Alliance. It provided for the defence of Holland against attack by land and sea, and aimed also at settling the war in the Spanish Netherlands. Faced with this combination, Louis rapidly overran Franche-Comté, and then consented to negotiate. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed on May 29, 1668, he surrendered Franche-Comté, but retained most of the fortresses he had conquered in Flanders and Hainault. For the time being the situation was saved, but Louis now saw quite clearly that the main obstacle to the realization of his aims in the Spanish Netherlands was the opposition of Holland. From now onward he was her implacable enemy, determined, as soon as opportunity offered, to have his revenge.

Unfortunately for the Dutch, they could not count on the good faith of the English Government. The influence of Louis over his cousin Charles II was naturally strong, and within a very short time the latter had revealed to France the terms of his treaty with the Dutch. With the aid of flattery, promises, and bribes, Louis at last persuaded the Emperor, the German princes concerned, and the Swedes to remain neutral in the event of another war. By the Treaty of Dover, drawn up in May 1670, it was agreed that Charles II should assist France in a war against Holland, in return for a handsome subsidy (to render the King independent of the strongly Protestant English Parliament), Louis's help in the re-establishment of Catholicism in England, and the promise of the cession of the island of Walcheren to England, with Flushing and Cadsand. A British officer was to command the combined fleet against the Dutch.

A regular tariff war now began between France and Holland. De Witt tried hard to avert the inevitable conflict, foreseeing that if it came he would no longer be able to keep the young Prince William and the Orange party from power. But all his efforts were unavailing. In March 1672 an English fleet attacked the Dutch merchant convoy homeward bound from Smyrna, and a few days later England declared war on Holland. France followed suit in April.

The Third Dutch War. Since the war with England came to an end four years before peace was made with France, it will be convenient

to describe in the first place the course of the conflict at sea. In character it was military rather than commercial, the English aiming at a landing of their troops to help the French rather than at the mere destruction of Dutch shipping. De Ruyter had hoped to prevent the junction of his enemies, but illness in his ships forced him to return home, and when next he made contact with them he discovered the fleet in Solebay (now called Southwold Bay) in three squadrons. Two were English, under the command of the Duke of York, and the third, consisting of about thirty ships, was French, under Admiral d'Estrées.

The battle of Solebay, the first of the two great naval actions of the war, was fought on May 28, 1672. It was the first battle in which the English soldiers on shipboard were referred to as 'marines.' Immediately on sighting his enemies De Ruyter came sailing to the attack down an easterly wind. The two English squadrons hurriedly got to sea on the starboard tack; the French squadron, however, went to sea on the port tack, which carried it away from the English, who were now hotly engaged. De Ruyter attacked the English centre, and before long the flagship *Royal James* was in flames. Twice the Duke of York had to shift his flag as, deserted by the French, he strove to restore the losing battle. Actually the Dutch did not succeed in taking any ships, but from the strategic viewpoint they gained their objective. Fog prevented pursuit by the English and French when the latter at last regained the scene of action, so that De Ruyter was able to reach his own coast and take up his station to guard the mouth of the Scheldt, having successfully frustrated the projected landing of English troops. It was now that the outcry against De Witt rose to its height, and William III of Orange became supreme in Holland. Soon afterwards the command of the English fleet passed to Prince Rupert, the Catholic Duke of York having to resign on account of the Test Act.

In the summer of 1673 the rival fleets were once more seeking an engagement. English troops were massed in the eastern counties, waiting until command of the sea could be established. Holland was already hard pressed on the landward side, and De Ruyter well knew how much depended on him. Twice he consented to fight small, indecisive engagements. Eventually the news that English transports were actually collecting on the east coast led him to fight the battle of the Texel on August 11. The Dutch fleet of sixty vessels, which had gone into the Texel for repairs, was opposed to a combined fleet of fifty English and thirty French ships. Once more the French did little, while the Dutch and English fought out the battle between them. Cornelius Tromp engaged in a tremendous duel with Sir Edward Spragge, at the end of which the latter was drowned; a fierce battle then raged round the *Royal Prince*, though the Dutch could not capture her. At last the French squadron showed signs of taking an active part in the conflict,

and De Ruyter withdrew. Once again without capturing any ships he had prevented his enemies from gaining command of the sea. By this time the English were heartily sick of the supposed co-operation of the French. In September, as the season was too far advanced for a landing on the coast of Holland, the French squadron withdrew.

In 1674 England and Holland came to terms. Charles II was not over-anxious to continue the struggle against the new Dutch leader, his nephew : moreover, Louis was unable to spare him any more money, and Parliament, which thoroughly disapproved of a war fought apparently for the benefit of France, refused to grant any subsidies. Holland agreed to restore the colonies on the Hudson river, which had been retaken in 1673, and once more acknowledged the 'right of the flag.'

De Ruyter was now free to command a small fleet in the Mediterranean, where a French fleet was attacking the Spanish possession of Naples. Here, in a battle near Agosta, he was mortally wounded, and died soon after being carried ashore. His death was a great blow to the Dutch, and the fleet which he had led was decisively beaten.

Even as the First Dutch War had called the energetic John de Witt to power, so the Third led to his downfall and replacement by William of Orange. Notwithstanding the latter's youth, the Dutch people, dissatisfied with the Republican party, the policy of which appeared to have led them into a dangerous conflict with France, demanded that William should be restored to the offices of his ancestors. He was made Captain-General of the Union, and in June 1672 became Stadholder of Zeeland and of Holland. As he rose to power the anger and resentment against John de Witt and his brother Cornelius increased. Attempts were made to assassinate them both, and eventually Cornelius was imprisoned, charged with a plot against the life of William. Before long the crowning tragedy occurred. John went to visit his brother ; a hostile crowd collected, broke into the prison, dragged them both out, and tore them practically to shreds, hanging the remains upside down from a lamp-post. In such manner Holland rewarded two of her most famous sons. There is no evidence that William was directly involved in this action of his supporters, but he certainly made no effort to punish the offenders afterwards. Cold, taciturn, and capable, the future King of England and arch-enemy of France now found himself the virtual dictator of the Seven Provinces, with the office of Stadholder made hereditary in his family.

As a general William was by no means the equal of the great French marshals to whom he was opposed. Holland, however, had certain natural advantages, since it was possible by opening the dikes to flood large tracts of country to a depth of a few feet, and to maintain small ships of war on the canals and waterways. William took command of a small, disorganized army of 30,000 men, which by prodigious efforts

of Louis. He gave James asylum at the Palace of Saint-Germain, granted him a large pension, and was soon actively assisting him in his effort to regain the English throne by a campaign in Ireland. William meanwhile had insisted that he should be crowned joint ruler of England with his wife, Mary, and after some hesitation the English Parliament had agreed. The new King of England now endeavoured to persuade his subjects that it was no more to their interest than to that of the Dutch to find France in possession of a naval and mercantile port on the Scheldt, but it was really the fear of a Catholic king, restored by the help of France, that turned the scale. Thus the continental War of the League of Augsburg is known in this country as the War of the English Succession. By July 1689 the Grand Alliance, which had arisen from the original League of Augsburg, was complete.

France was determined to get command of the sea. A fleet of seventy ships under Admiral Tourville¹ was in the Channel, greatly outnumbering the combined English and Dutch squadrons, since many vessels had to be employed on the campaign in Ireland. But Admiral Herbert, now raised to the peerage as Lord Torrington, received direct orders from Mary that he was to attack if the wind proved favourable. Accordingly a battle took place near Beachy Head on June 30, 1690, in which the Dutch squadron, misunderstanding Torrington's tactics, became so closely engaged that it was attacked on both sides and suffered severely. The turning of the tide enabled the Allied fleet to anchor, while the French were carried away. Torrington then escaped to the Thames, burning ten of his ships on the way to prevent capture. He was put in the Tower, and never again employed by William, who was furious and suspicious, since the Dutch losses were so much greater than the English. In Ireland, however, all had gone well. The day after Beachy Head James had been defeated at the battle of the Boyne, and had returned to France.

It was not long before the appointment of Dutchmen to high positions of State gave rise to great dissatisfaction in England. Admiral Russell (now in command of the fleet) and John Churchill began to intrigue for James's return. Thinking this a favourable moment for an invasion of England, Louis collected transports and troops at La Hogue in 1692, and Tourville was again instructed to get command of the sea. But a French invasion did not suit Admiral Russell. With a greatly superior fleet he resisted Tourville's attack at the battle of Barfleur on May 19, doubling on his centre and rear. This time the English ships bore the brunt of the fighting. Tourville was defeated; his fleet was scattered, part of it taking refuge under the guns of La Hogue. The English followed, and on May 23 and 24 boat-loads of

¹ Anne-Hilarion de Cotentin Tourville (1642-1701) previously served in the French squadron co-operating with the English during the Third Dutch War.

men attacked and burnt the French warships and transports under the eyes of James and his army of invasion. England was safe, and William had command of the sea for the transportation of troops to Holland.

In the Netherlands all had not gone well for the Allies. The Emperor's forces had been defeated in 1690 at Fleurus, and the war was dragging on in a series of sieges. In August 1692 William was badly routed at Steinkirk, and again in July 1693 at Neerwinden. Luckily for the Dutch he excelled in the art of covering up a defeat. During that summer the Anglo-Dutch fleet was engaged in convoying home the merchantmen from Smyrna, many of which were lost in the process, as the French at sea were now confining themselves to attacks on merchant shipping. The next year found William still campaigning in Flanders, but it was not until 1695 that he took the offensive and captured the important town of Namur, lost earlier in the war.

The war had proved a serious drain on the resources of France. Neither side appeared able to gain much advantage, or even to make definite use of victory, so by 1697 Louis was ready to make peace. By the Treaty of Ryswick, signed on September 10, he agreed to give up nearly all his encroachments and conquests since the Treaty of Nimuegen. William III was recognized as King of England, with Anne as his successor. A number of important fortresses on the French side of the Netherlands was to be garrisoned by the Dutch, who also secured a commercial treaty. Shortly afterwards Louis made peace with the Emperor, restoring his captures, though not Strasburg, the most important of them all.

Holland had borne the chief burden of the war. Once again she had been forced to subsidize her continental allies. Dutch troops had performed most of the fighting on land, for William found it difficult to persuade the English Parliament that its interests lay in opposing Louis in the Netherlands once the danger of an invasion was over, and his popularity in England had steadily waned since the death of Mary in 1694. At sea Holland was no longer a great naval Power, for she could not support a large army and navy at the same time. Dutch commerce had suffered terribly, and although the English had also been subjected to the attacks of French privateers, they were actually gaining the ground that the Dutch had lost. Yet, in spite of all efforts, the peace was still only a truce, and within five years Holland was once more at war.

The War of the Spanish Succession. The feeble condition of Charles II of Spain and the fact that he had no direct heirs gave Louis his final excuse for attempting to gain control of the Spanish Netherlands. The full story of his claim and the war that followed belongs properly to the next chapter. It is sufficient to note here that William and Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, in drawing up the

two partition treaties with Louis, would have placed the Spanish Netherlands in the hands of Austria, a Power from which Holland had nothing to fear. When, on the death of Charles in 1700, Louis accepted the Spanish dominions on behalf of his grandson, Philip, it still appeared for a time that peace might be preserved. Neither England nor the States of Holland was at all anxious to go to war. But Louis obtained for France the sole right of trading with the Spanish colonies ; he captured the Dutch barrier fortresses, holding the garrisons as hostages, and sent French troops to occupy the Spanish Netherlands. Then, on the death of the exiled James II in 1701, he recognized the 'Old Pretender' as King of England, thus breaking the agreement made at the Treaty of Ryswick. William set to work to reconstruct the Grand Alliance, and his untiring diplomacy, in which he was ably assisted by Marlborough, eventually brought in the Emperor (fighting on behalf of the Habsburg claim set aside by Louis), Prussia, Denmark, the Palatinate, Hanover, Hesse, and other German states, besides England and Holland. The States-General of the latter country, although doubtful whether its own interests were really at stake, was persuaded by the Province of Holland to follow William's leadership. On February 20, 1702, the latter, while out riding, met with an accident that brought about his death on March 8, two months before war was declared. With him the direct line of the house of Orange came to an end, and the Provinces reverted once more to a republican form of government. Marlborough, who was in command of the English Army, became ambassador at The Hague and Deputy Captain-General of the Dutch forces.

Once more a Dutch squadron joined the English Navy, now under the command of Admiral Rooke. It was engaged in most of the naval actions of the war, and fought particularly well at the taking of Gibraltar and at the battle of Malaga. On land Marlborough was often hampered rather than aided by the presence of the Dutch troops, for the States-General was desirous that its army should be used only for the defence of its own frontiers. On his departure for the Danube to assist the Emperor in 1704 he had to pretend that he was moving up the Moselle to attack the French in Flanders. The victory of Oudenarde in 1708 might have resulted in the invasion of France, had the Dutch deputies been willing, and most of the casualties of the costly victory at Malplaquet were due to the blundering attack of the Prince of Orange. Nevertheless the Dutch refused overtures for a separate peace, and it was not until after the loss of a whole division of 12,000 men at Denain in 1712 that they consented to treat.

The war was ended by the Treaty of Utrecht, peace between France and the States-General being signed on April 11, 1713. France surrendered all the territory she had conquered in the Spanish Netherlands,

to be handed over later to the Habsburgs. A commercial treaty was also drawn up, and by a separate treaty with Spain in 1714 Holland was again granted favourable trading terms, except in the Spanish South American colonies. But the most important safeguard was supposed at the time to be the separate Barrier Treaty. This gave Venloo to Holland, together with the right to garrison Namur, Tournay, Menin, Furnes, Warneton, Ypres, and Knoque, with a joint garrison at Dendermonde, in what was now the Austrian Netherlands. Certain revenues were set apart to maintain the 35,000 Dutch troops needed for the purpose, and England agreed in the case of a French attack to furnish additional troops. Holland had no natural frontiers on the south, but it was thought that this arrangement would at last make her safe from aggression. These fortresses remained in Dutch hands until the French took them when Holland entered the War of the Austrian Succession in the middle of the century.

Reasons for the Decline of Holland. With the Treaty of Utrecht Holland ceased to be reckoned a first-class Power. The strain of her wars by land and sea had proved too much, and the age of her great men was past. During the course of the eighteenth century her mercantile prosperity declined. The herring fishery sank to half its former value. Overseas Holland had 'backed the wrong horse,' for while the virile colonies planted by England on the American seaboard grew and expanded, the value of the precious spices got steadily less. The Dutch East India Company, which at the time of the war of 1665 possessed 150 merchantmen, 40 warships, and 10,000 soldiers, and was paying dividends of 40 per cent., had suffered severely during the time of William III, and although the number of its ships and men actually increased during the eighteenth century, its fortunes did not properly recover. During the last two wars, in which the Dutch had been allied with England, they had had to do most of the fighting against the French in India, and although they were supreme in the islands after the English abandoned their factory at Bantam in 1683, they were gradually ousted from the mainland by the English and French, especially after the reorganization of the English Company in 1708. The commercial advantages which the Dutch gained at the Peace of Utrecht did not prove of the same value as the *Assiento* and territorial acquisitions of England. For long the credit of the United Provinces remained high, and they were still in a sense the bankers of Europe, but the wars had left them with a crushing debt amounting to over 180 million guilders.

In fact, it was only a particular combination of circumstances in Europe during the seventeenth century that ever permitted Holland to rise to so important a position. With the Spanish Empire in decay, England torn by the struggle between Parliament and Crown, and France not yet strong overseas, the way had lain open for the full

exploitation of the Dutch commercial genius. Now, however, France and England were coming to their full strength at home and abroad, and the eighteenth century was to witness another series of struggles for supremacy overseas.

SUMMARY

(1) *The Rise of Dutch Power*

- (a) 1579. Union of Utrecht ; Protestant Netherlands bound themselves to resist Spain.
- (b) 1609. 'Twelve years' truce made Holland virtually independent.
- (c) 1648. Peace of Münster ; Spain recognized Dutch independence.

(2) *The Rise of Hostility between Holland and England*

- (a) Commercial rivalry between London and Amsterdam.
- (b) English restrictions on herring fishery.
- (c) Continual quarrels in East Indies (Amboyna, 1623).
- (d) Navigation Act of 1651, resulting in First Dutch War.

(3) *The Second Dutch War (1665-67)*

- (a) Causes : Amendments to Navigation Act ; Tangier and the Smyrna fleet ; Pularoon ; attacks on Dutch in West Africa and the New Netherlands.
- (b) Course : 1665. Dutch defeat at Lowestoft.
1666. Dutch victory in Four Days Battle ; defeat at battle of St James's Day.
1667. Dutch in the Medway.
- (c) Louis XIV and War of Devolution made Dutch anxious for peace ; by Treaty of Breda they kept Pularoon, but surrendered New Netherlands.

(4) *The Triple Alliance*

- (a) 1668. England, Holland, Sweden ; for defence of Holland against Louis, who therefore made Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.
- (b) 1670. Treaty of Dover between Louis and Charles reversed the English alliance ; war deliberately provoked in consequence.

(5) *The Third Dutch War (1672-74)*

- (a) Battles at Solebay (1672) and Texel (1673) prevented landing of English troops.
- (b) John de Witt replaced by William of Orange.
- (c) France did not make peace till 1678 (Treaty of Nimuegen).

(6) *The War of the League of Augsburg (1688-97)*

- (a) 1686. League of Augsburg, following French depredations on the Rhine.
- (b) 1688. Louis invaded Germany ; William King of England.
- (c) 1689. William completed the Grand Alliance ; England joined in the war.
- (d) War in Ireland ; Beachy Head, Barfleur, and La Hogue at sea ; stalemate in the Netherlands.
- (e) 1697. Treaty of Ryswick : Louis recognized William as King of England and gave up his conquests, except Strasburg.

- (7) *The War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13)*
- (a) 1701. Louis invaded Netherlands for his grandson and recognized the Old Pretender.
 - (b) 1702. Death of William; Marlborough led Anglo-Dutch army, and Rooke Anglo-Dutch navy.
 - (c) 1713-14. Peace of Utrecht: Dutch got commercial concessions from France and Spain, and made Barrier Treaty with Austria.
- (8) *Reasons for the Decline of Holland*
- (a) Too small in size and population to resist Great Powers and maintain large overseas empire.
 - (b) Navigation Act crippled carrying trade.
 - (c) Naval wars replaced Dutch maritime supremacy by English.
 - (d) Land wars against France exhausted the national resources.
 - (e) Value of herring fishery and spice trade declined.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The debt of Holland to John de Witt.
- (2) The achievements of William III in resisting Louis XIV.
- (3) The underlying reasons for the decline of Dutch power.

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CHAPTER II

THE AMBITIONS OF LOUIS XIV

THE decline of the power of Holland cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the motives that led Louis XIV to prosecute his relentless series of wars in the Netherlands and along the Rhine. The present chapter must therefore be read in conjunction with the foregoing, in order to understand what precisely were the aims of the 'Grand Monarque' in foreign policy, and the claims on which his frequent acts of aggression were based.

The Treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees. Louis was born at Saint-Germain on September 5, 1638, the first son of Louis XIII and his queen, Anne of Austria. At the age of five he became King of France, his mother acting as Regent. At that time the Thirty Years War, the great religious struggle that spread havoc in Central Europe during the reigns of the first two Stuarts in England, was at its height. The Queen Mother had agreed to leave the control of affairs in the hands of the great Minister Mazarin,¹ and the two were determined to prosecute the struggle against the Habsburg rulers in Austria and Spain with undiminished vigour. Mazarin, however, did not lack opponents in France itself. Shortly after the infant Louis ascended the throne political discontent in Paris culminated in the rebellions known as the Fronde ('Catapult'), in which both nobles and citizens took part. The impression left by these troubles on the young King's mind is said to have been responsible for his well-known dislike of Paris, and to have occasioned the subsequent removal of the French Court to Versailles.

Eventually Mazarin triumphed over his enemies at home, and meanwhile the famous French generals Condé² and Turenne³ were engaged in humbling the declining military power of Spain. In 1643 a great victory was gained over the Spaniards at Rocroy, and five years later, although peace with Spain was still far off, France terminated her struggle with the Austrian Habsburgs at the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in October 1648. This treaty ended the Thirty Years War. By

¹ Cardinal Jules Mazarin (1602-61), a Sicilian Jesuit who had become a naturalized Frenchman in 1639.

² Louis II de Bourbon, Prince of Condé (1621-86).

³ Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne (1611-75), was a grandson of William the Silent, and served in the Dutch Army until 1630, when he entered the service of France.

its terms France gained Alsace, a district lying along the western bank of the Upper Rhine, and separated from the rest of her territory by Franche-Comté (which still belonged to Spain) and the Duchy of Lorraine. In Northern Alsace stood the city of Strasburg, an important bridgehead on the Rhine, controlling one of the main roads into Central Europe. This city was not included in the French gains ; in fact, it was definitely stated that Strasburg was to remain under the suzerainty of the Emperor. The bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which had long been in French hands, were formally annexed to France, and also the fortress of Pinerolo, in Italy. The Treaty of Westphalia is particularly important, because France for the first time gained a restricted frontier on the Rhine. From then onward she has striven to increase the extent of this frontier northward towards the sea.

In November 1659 France made peace with Spain at the Treaty of the Pyrenees. Once more she gained important cessions of territory. Where the Pyrenees meet the Mediterranean she obtained Roussillon and Cerdagne, and with the acquisition of these districts she completed her permanent frontier of the Pyrenees, stretching from sea to sea. From the Spanish Netherlands she received Artois and the towns of Thionville, Landreecies, and Avesnes, her boundary on the North Sea culminating at Gravelines, and after 1662 at Dunkirk, which was purchased from the British. But more important even than these acquisitions of territory was the fact that the Treaty of the Pyrenees provided King Louis with a wife. It was agreed that he should marry Maria Theresa, elder daughter of Philip IV, King of Spain. A dowry of half a million crowns was to accompany her hand, and in return for this she renounced any claim to the Spanish throne on behalf of herself and her children. It was not certain that she would ever have any such claim, but the wording of the clause was such as to make it appear that certain rights of succession did exist, and that these were surrendered in return for the dowry. The fact that the dowry was never paid therefore gave some shadow of justification to the claims Louis hastened to put forward a few years later.

On March 9, 1661, Cardinal Mazarin died a pious death. From that day onward Louis XIV ruled as well as reigned in France. As a child his education in what were considered the kingly arts had proceeded greatly to the satisfaction of his tutors. Riding and dancing he had mastered to perfection ; from specially compiled text-books he had studied the classics and acquired a knowledge of mathematics. Unfortunately Mazarin had not seen fit to initiate him very deeply into the mysteries of the French governmental system ; in the matter of finance Louis was especially ignorant. However, the young King grew up much as his masters desired, the admiration and delight of all with whom he came in contact. He was handsome, and eminently sensible ; possessed

of "une politesse toujours grave, toujours majestueuse, toujours distinguée"; gracious, tactful, serious, and dignified; in short, he had acquired very thoroughly that invaluable quality of easy self-possession that looks so impressive to behold and usually means so little in reality. Even among his own brilliant Court he stood out as the unruffled master of every situation. Perhaps the best illustration that can be given of this is the fact that he was accustomed to consume several dishes of soup, a whole pheasant, a partridge, a great plate of salad, garlic, ham, and mutton, a dish of pastry, and round the meal off with fruit and hard-boiled eggs "so elegantly that no one even noticed it."

Yet, in spite of these kingly accomplishments, Louis was no genius. He could not originate, though he could, and did, utilize the instruments that lay to his hand. Coiner of the phrase *métier de roi*, he set himself to realize his own ideal of kingship, and when, on learning of Mazarin's death, he told his Ministers that they must now regard him as the great cardinal's successor he began a career of arduous and devoted toil that took him deep into the intricacies and details of all departments of the national policy, especially the question of foreign affairs. No king has ever so thoroughly personified the State; his own magnificence and that of his Court were part of a calculated system devised to that end, and all that was best in France gravitated towards and circulated round an orbit with Louis shining in its centre. As the reign progressed and the royal system flourished all Europe was in some degree drawn unwittingly towards it, and French taste, culture, fashions, and philosophy dictated to the civilized world. In many countries and in many ways the effects of this are still visible to-day.

The ambitions of Louis XIV were directed towards the territorial aggrandizement of France along her eastern frontier, and it is with the series of wars thereby entailed that we are principally concerned. But his energies might easily have been devoted towards a different object, for during the ten years following the death of Mazarin France seemed on the verge of founding a vast colonial and mercantile empire, strongly welded together with a growing mercantile marine and a powerful navy. The resources that Louis saw fit to squander instead on an aggressive and extravagant policy that kept him in a state of chronic friction with his neighbours were largely the outcome of the labours of his Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert,¹ the son of a draper of Rheims. As a young man Colbert had acquired some experience of banking and law, and, having attracted the notice of Mazarin, became the manager of his household and financial affairs. Soon after the Cardinal's death he was made responsible for the internal administration of France, and after the lapse of a few years he became Controller-General of Finance as well. While so many men of his time were absorbed solely in the pursuit of pleasure,

¹ Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-83).

Colbert was one of those interesting types who appear to be absorbed solely in the pursuit of business. A harsh-natured yet religious man, so grim and forbidding of aspect that he earned the nickname of "the North," he delighted in giving rein to his ambitious nature by scheming and organizing for the conversion of France into a state that should be strong and sufficient unto itself. The financial corruption of Mazarin's *régime* was swept away ; tax-gatherers and Government departments were compelled to render proper accounts ; the *intendants* who governed the provinces into which most of France was divided supervised the collection of taxes ; and the *taille*, which was the principal tax, was reassessed so that it pressed less heavily on those least able to pay. Financiers who loaned money to the Government were assured of non-preferential treatment when it came to repayment, and given guarantees for the security of their money. Most of the internal customs that hampered trade between the different provinces and towns were abolished, and the task of improving roads and constructing canals was begun, the most striking example of this being the 170-mile waterway designed to connect the Atlantic and Mediterranean, which was completed in 1681. Manufactures were encouraged, and especially those of lace and silk. So strict and so detailed were the regulations laid down for the government of factory life that workmen were only allowed to sing psalms (if they must sing at all), though Colbert's religious scruples did not prevent him from retaining galley-convicts after their sentences had expired, if the exigencies of State demanded it. Meanwhile the Government was gradually acquiring the control of various colonies that had hitherto been in the hands of private companies, and building for the defence of sea-borne traffic a navy that could compete with those of England and Holland. In 1683 Colbert died, and much of his work was undone ; but it was from the economic foundation that he so securely laid that Louis was able to draw the sinews of war. Unfortunately the King's policy tended to tear those foundations asunder, rather than build upon them the imperial structure they might so easily have borne.


The New Foreign Policy of France. It is often loosely asserted that the aim of Louis XIV's foreign policy was to gain the 'natural frontiers' of France. The truth is, however, that these frontiers had already been virtually gained by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. The Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Vosges not only made France secure on the south and south-east, but the possession of important passes through these mountains placed her in an advantageous position in case the necessity should arise of sending her armies beyond them. Mountain boundaries form natural barriers of the best kind, since they are truly barriers in the sense of being obstacles, and thus usually demarcate racial cleavages as well as political frontiers. For this reason the mountain

boundaries of France have, on the whole, proved lasting. On the north-east, however, the situation was very different. The only possible natural frontier that offers in this direction is the river Rhine, and, since rivers are easy to cross, this at best could only be a political frontier, and not a barrier. While possession of mountain frontiers means a struggle to obtain accessible passes, possession of a river frontier means a struggle for the most important bridgeheads ; and from the time of Louis XIV onward we find France engaged, both in the course of warfare and in the peace negotiations that followed, in the attempt to gain such strategic points.

When Louis XIV assumed control of French foreign policy in 1661 his eastern boundary bordered the Rhine only in the southern portions of Alsace. Between France and the remainder of the Rhine frontier lay the Duchy of Lorraine ; Franche-Comté, Luxemburg, and the Catholic provinces of the Netherlands, all of which belonged to Spain ; Strasburg, the Palatinate, and other territories owned by German princes and still nominally under the suzerainty of the Emperor ; and part of the Dutch United Provinces. Obviously if Louis's policy were to aim at possession of a frontier on the Rhine his reign could hardly prove other than a series of conflicts with Spain, Holland, and the Emperor ; such, in fact, would almost certainly be the case if his policy were aggressive at all, for the eastern frontier of France was the only one that permitted of easy expansion.

Louis wasted no time in showing Europe that he intended France to be second to none.¹ The marriage alliance with Spain did not mean friendship between the two countries, and he lost no opportunity of humiliating and embarrassing his father-in-law. An unseemly struggle between the French and Spanish ambassadors in London, in which the Frenchman was worsted, was followed by Louis with a threat of war that induced poor Philip IV to acknowledge French right of precedence in foreign capitals. To make matters worse, Louis secretly assisted the Portuguese in their struggle to shake off the Spanish yoke. High-handed action against the Pope followed an insult suffered by the wife of the French ambassador at Rome, and the Vatican was forced to offer a humble apology. In 1664 a French force was sent to assist the Emperor against the Turks, whom Louis had his own reasons for wishing to punish. Sensing the fact that a conflict with Spain for the possession of the Netherlands would not be long delayed, he had in 1662 made an alliance with the Dutch. Though he was not particularly fond of their republican form of government, Holland was under a debt of gratitude to France for assistance in the struggle for independence from Spain, and Louis saw no reason why he should not trade on this if it suited him.

¹ His ambassadors were instructed that it was their duty to assert " the rank and pre-eminence of the King over all other kings."



THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF FRANCE IN THE TIME OF LOUIS XIV

Thus the situation had already been prepared when the death of Philip IV of Spain in 1665 gave him the opportunity to put his policy of aggrandizement into practice.

The War of Devolution. As we have seen, the cleverly worded Treaty of the Pyrenees and the non-payment of the Queen of France's marriage dowry had led Louis to hope that he might eventually obtain a further share of Spanish territory. Before his death, however, Philip IV had taken steps to prevent such an occurrence. His first wife had borne him two daughters, of whom Maria Theresa was the elder; Margaret Theresa, the younger, had married the Emperor Leopold. By his second wife Philip had had a son, who now succeeded him as Charles II. Philip's will stipulated that if Charles died without male issue the Spanish dominions should go to the younger of the two sisters, thus cutting Maria Theresa out of the succession altogether. It seemed obvious to Louis that if he meant to claim anything at all he must do so at once.

The Second Dutch War was in progress between England and Holland, and in accordance with the terms of his treaty of alliance Louis declared war on England in 1666. In view of the new situation created by the death of Philip IV, however, his real interests now lay in a scheme for annexing the Spanish Netherlands, and Holland received relatively small assistance from her powerful ally. In fact, Louis went so far as to assure Charles II of England that his real feelings were far from unfriendly, and he even signed an agreement with England behind the back of the Dutch. Meanwhile an ingenious though preposterous claim to the Spanish Netherlands had been prepared. Louis had discovered that in Brabant the 'law of devolution,' which regulated the inheritance of private estates, laid down that daughters by a first marriage should inherit land before sons by a second. Of course, this had nothing whatever to do with the inheritance of dominions by a royal personage, but the excuse served Louis for the publication of an elaborate "Treatise of the Rights of the Most Christian Queen," and in pursuance of the claims set out therein an army of 35,000 men under Marshal Turenne invaded the Spanish Netherlands in May 1667. Very little effective opposition could be offered by the Spaniards, and Charleroi, Lille, and other important fortresses soon fell into French hands.

The invasion opened De Witt's eyes to the real character of Louis's policy. The result was the conclusion of peace between England and Holland and the formation of the Triple Alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden, signed in January 1668. The aim of this was to bring about peace between France and Spain before Louis's encroachments could assume more serious proportions, allowing him to retain the districts already conquered, or, if he proved refractory, using force to compel him to retire within his previous boundaries, as laid

down by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. The latter part of this treaty was secret, but its provisions were treacherously made known to France by the English King. The news determined Louis on a bold stroke. By a rapid winter campaign his armies overran the Spanish territory of Franche-Comté, and thus when he consented to make peace in May 1668 he was in a much stronger position to bargain for terms. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle between France and Spain Louis restored Franche-Comté, but was allowed to keep Charleroi, Tournai, Oudenarde, Lille, Armentières, Courtrai, Furnes, and several other strongholds of lesser importance. As was usually the result of his campaigns, he did not obtain anything like the prize for which he strove, but the War of Devolution greatly strengthened his frontier by securing to France a formidable chain of fortresses.

The year 1670 witnessed two important developments in French diplomacy. Louis occupied Lorraine with an army, following a dispute between him and the Duke, who throughout this period was placed in an impossible position by the proximity of so powerful a neighbour. Secondly, he brought about the collapse of the Triple Alliance by making the Treaty of Dover with England. Colbert's economic policy, and in particular the prohibitive tariff imposed on imports in 1667, was ruining Dutch trade with France, and it appeared likely that this cause alone would be sufficient to bring about a war between the two countries. Moreover, it was now evident that Holland would resist French aims in the Spanish Netherlands, and in any case Louis never felt at ease in treating with De Witt and the Dutch burghers, whose commercial outlook he despised and whose republican form of government he detested. Negotiations with his relative Charles II of England were far more to his liking. Charles admired the splendid Louis, and envied him the authoritative position he held in France, so different from his own dependence on the captious English Parliament. If only sufficient subsidies were forthcoming Charles might be able to do without a Parliament altogether, and in that case he was quite willing to throw in his lot with France.¹ The promise of a naval base for England at the mouth of the Scheldt completed the bargain and removed the last of Charles's scruples. It was a grave mistake on the part of both Charles and Louis to include the secret clauses about the reconversion of England to Catholicism, for it would have been almost impossible to discover any project more likely to arouse the hostility of the English people to the French alliance once the secret clauses leaked out, as they were bound to do.

The Franco-Dutch War (1672-78). By 1672 Louis was ready to teach the Dutch their lesson, and the war that was destined to bring

¹ "Ringling cash," the French ambassador wrote from England, "is more convincing here than all other arguments."

about the downfall of De Witt and the Dutch Republican party began. Flattery, bribery, and self-interest had temporarily won over the Emperor, the Elector of Brandenburg, Denmark, Sweden, and Brunswick to Louis's side, in addition to his active ally, England. Charles II began the conflict by declaring war on Holland in March. Meanwhile the French army, now a famous professional fighting force, thoroughly reorganized by the War Minister Louvois,¹ was collecting at its advanced base at Charleroi. Louis joined it, with his two famous warriors Condé and Turenne, and in May, without pausing to make a formal declaration of war, marched down the valley of the Meuse, gained the Rhine, and, advancing along the right bank, invaded Gelderland with 120,000 men. Here he was met by William of Orange, but Turenne succeeded in turning the Dutch position without fighting a pitched battle, for Condé crossed the Rhine at the ford of Tolhuys and constructed a bridge for the remainder of the French forces to follow. Judged by seventeenth-century standards, the campaign had been one of lightning rapidity, and it seemed that nothing could save Amsterdam from falling almost immediately into the hands of the French. But unaccountable procrastination on the part of Louis now came to the aid of the Dutch, who were just in time to play their final card and open the dikes. Amsterdam was soon cut off by miles of flooded fields, and the French attack was foiled.

Although De Ruyter was still holding his own at sea against the combined fleets of England and France, the Dutch were fully alive to the dangers of their position, and offered Louis handsome concessions if he would make peace. Louis's demands, however, were so preposterous that the Dutch elected to go on fighting, and it was then that William of Orange rose to power. As the autumn of 1672 approached the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg deserted the French cause and threw in their lot with the Dutch. Louis was therefore forced practically to abandon the occupied Dutch territory, and to concentrate his troops in Alsace for the defence of the Rhine frontier. During 1673 the army of Brandenburg was defeated by Turenne, and the Elector made peace. De Ruyter's battle off the Texel, however, made it apparent that no English troops were to be expected on the Continent, and, to make matters worse, Spain and the Duchy of Lorraine also entered the field against France. In 1674 the situation for Louis became more serious still. In spite of promises and liberal subsidies of money the remains of Louis's carefully constructed coalition collapsed like a house of cards. Denmark, the Palatinate, and Brandenburg all declared war, and Charles II, disgusted at French lack of naval co-operation, made peace with Holland. Only Sweden remained faithful

¹ François-Michel le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois (1641-91), succeeded his father as War Minister in 1666.

to the French alliance. Louis had unwittingly drawn upon himself a general conflict, for it seemed that all Europe had awakened to the danger of French dominance.

In these circumstances the French armies were forced to fight in 1674 a series of campaigns which, while maintaining the initiative, were really of a defensive character. William of Orange was temporarily checked by the encounter at Seneffe; for the second time Franche-Comté was occupied; Turenne invaded and laid waste the Palatinate. Even so the Rhine frontier in Alsace was temporarily lost, and Turenne had to fight a brilliant winter campaign in order to regain it, which he did by defeating the Brandenburgers at Colmar in December. While following up this success in July of 1675 Turenne's career came to a sudden end when he was killed by a cannon-ball at Sasbach.

It was now quite obvious that France could never be successful against such a ring of enemies. Condé restored the position on the Rhine frontier, within which Turenne's army had retired following the death of its leader, but he resigned his command later in the year. During the next two years siege warfare was continued in the Low Countries under Louis's own command, and as late as the summer of 1678 William of Orange was still prosecuting the war to the best of his limited ability. But the tactical victories that were now all the exhausted French could gain were unlikely to produce any lasting results, and Louis was quite ready to negotiate. At Nimuegen in 1678 Louis made peace with Holland and Spain, and early in the following year with the Emperor. Many of Colbert's tariff restrictions were removed, and Maestricht was restored to the Dutch. Louis was allowed by Spain to retain Franche-Comté, and Nancy and Longwy, in Lorraine, the remainder of which was theoretically restored to its rightful owner. France also received certain towns in the Netherlands, though Louis restored Charleroi, Courtrai, Oudenarde, and other fortresses which he had gained by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Emperor recovered the important stronghold of Philipsburg, in return for Freiburg, which was handed over to the French.

Three important points are worth noting in connexion with this war, which marks the beginning of a new epoch in European politics. In the first place, it taught Louis nothing. He appears to have derived no salutary lesson from the hornets' nest his unwarranted attack on the Dutch had stirred up, so the aggressive character of his foreign policy continued with hardly a check. Secondly, the nations of Europe possessing frontiers that marched with, or near to, those of France awoke to their danger. Thirdly, William of Orange stood forth from now onward as Louis's implacable enemy. A superficial comparison between the puny Dutch Stadholder and the magnificent Louis would appear to be all in favour of the latter, but William was one of those

men who excel in utilizing to the full such gifts and resources as they possess ; to them singleness of purpose becomes a source of strength that in the end usually triumphs, even over opponents endowed with natural abilities of a much higher order.

The War of the League of Augsburg. Although we are only concerned directly with Louis XIV's foreign policy, brief mention must now be made of two domestic crises concerning the French Church that were not without their effect in helping to frustrate Louis's ambitions in wider fields. The first of these was a dispute with the Pope. In 1673 Louis ordered that the revenues from all vacant clerical benefices in the kingdom, known as the *régale*, should accrue temporarily to the Crown. This provoked opposition on the part of some of the French bishops and the Pope. Nine years later the quarrel came to a head, when an assembly of French clergy, convened by Louis, passed a series of resolutions denying in certain matters the absolute authority of the Papal supremacy. Innocent XI condemned these resolutions, and stopped the consecration of new bishops. Louis replied by a threat to annex Avignon, which he carried out in 1688. It was not until the accession of a new Pope a few years later that the quarrel was amicably settled.

In 1684, shortly after the death of Maria Theresa, Louis contracted a morganatic marriage with Madame de Maintenon, the governess of one of his illegitimate children. Her pious character is commonly supposed to have been partly responsible for the deepening of the religious side of Louis's character, a feature of his life that, strange as it may seem, had always been prominent. By this time he had begun an attempt to force the Huguenots back into the Roman Church, forbidding their employment in the service of the State, authorizing special missions for their conversion, and forbidding the emigration that inevitably followed. So strict were his measures that Protestant revolts broke out in the Cevennes, which Louis crushed for the time being by the 'dragonnades,' or quartering of dragoons on the suspected households. Finally, in 1685 he revoked the Edict of Nantes, which since 1598 had guaranteed religious freedom to the offending Huguenots. Despite all his efforts to prevent emigration, many of the persecuted French Protestants escaped to England, Holland, Brandenburg, and even the Cape of Good Hope—invaluable textile craftsmen who carried their skill and their industry to the service of Louis's enemies, and correspondingly impoverished France and the exchequer that was so vital a factor for the fulfilment of Louis's ambitions abroad.

From the religious viewpoint, therefore, it will be seen that during the ten years of troubled peace following the Treaty of Nimuegen Louis XIV succeeded in alienating the sympathies of both Catholics and Protestants in Europe. Meanwhile the character of his foreign

policy during this period became more blatantly aggressive than ever. Fresh claims, very similar in character to the 'devolution' idea, were devised for enlarging the extent of the territory Louis was to occupy under the recent Treaty of Nimuegen. In many cases exact boundaries had not been stipulated; Louis was to acquire certain towns "with their dependencies," and such vaguely worded phrases were admirably adapted to the carrying out of his intentions. Courts known as 'Chambres des Réunions' were set up to ascertain what territories did depend (or even had depended in the past) on the new French possessions, and as the result of their findings Louis became master of much more than had originally been intended. Lorraine and Alsace were the chief districts to suffer, practically all the latter passing into French hands. Colmar and Saarbrücken were occupied; Zweibrücken was taken from Louis's old ally, Sweden; by a separate arrangement Casale was acquired in Piedmont. But most important of all was the occupation of Strasburg. A certain amount of money changed hands before this could be effected, but by September 1681 the necessary bribery had been concluded, Strasburg had been taken over by the French, and Vauban¹ was ready to begin his task of strengthening the fortifications of the great strategic bridgehead. Three years later the fortress of Luxemburg was taken from the Spaniards, actual military operations being necessary before this could be accomplished.

The apprehensions evoked by these arbitrary annexations may well be imagined. During these years the policy of Louis was seen at its worst—domineering, avaricious, and quarrelsome. Most of the districts affected had previously been suzerain to the Emperor, under whose leadership some effort might have been made to curb French pretensions in 1682, when Spain, Holland, and Sweden joined him in alliance. A sudden threat to Vienna from a Turkish army, however, prevented any immediate action on the part of the German states, and Louis was able to proceed with his plans unchecked. It was not until after the taking of Luxemburg that the situation was temporarily stabilized by the Truce of Regensburg, or Ratisbon, with Spain and the Imperial Diet, signed in 1684. This agreement, which was to last for twenty years, virtually recognized all that Louis had done since the end of the previous war in 1678.

Any hopes of peace, however, were destined to be short-lived, for Louis's aggressions continued much as before. Already his war fleet, greatly improved and increased by Colbert's son, Seignelay, had bombarded Genoa and forced it to forsake the cause of Spain. The death of the Elector Palatine in 1685 gave Louis the feeble excuse to claim still more territory near the Rhine, merely because the dead man's

¹ Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707) joined Condé's regiment as a private soldier during the Fronde.

sister had been the second wife of Louis's brother. With such evidence of the continued trend of French policy in its old direction the time had evidently come for some lasting agreement between those Powers principally interested in the future action of France.

The result was the formation in 1686 of the series of alliances that came to be known as the League of Augsburg. All the Great Powers concerned in opposing France—the Emperor, Spain, Holland, Sweden—and many of the smaller Powers, such as Savoy, Bavaria, and other German states near the Rhine, eventually joined the League or identified themselves with its aims. When the fatal year 1688 dawned France was surrounded by a hostile ring of potential enemies.

Nevertheless it was Louis who took the fatal step that precipitated war. In May the Archbishop of Cologne, who was an Imperial elector, died. Louis was anxious to protract French influence by securing the election of a candidate of his own, Cardinal Fürstenberg, to the vacant office. But a candidate of the Emperor's was elected instead, with the approval of the Pope, and it was over so comparatively trivial a question that hostilities arose.

Now Louis was quite aware of the situation in England. Knowing full well that it was the English King rather than the English people who remained faithful to the French cause, he had no desire to witness the downfall of the Stuarts, least of all at the hands of William of Orange. But on the face of it there appeared little likelihood that William could accomplish such an event, or at any rate not without a prolonged struggle. If France were about to become embroiled with the Emperor once more it would be all to the good if William of Orange were employed elsewhere. Accordingly, having warned James II of what was impending, Louis issued a 'Declaration' in September 1688, announcing among the recital of various international grievances the reasons why he intended to support his candidate in the Palatinate by force of arms, and marched his armies towards the Upper Rhine. Simultaneously the Pope was punished by the annexation of Avignon.

The season was already too far advanced to accomplish much, but in 1689 the war began in earnest, when French troops brutally devastated the Palatinate. The sudden and overwhelming success of William of Orange, culminating in his joint occupation of the English throne, was a distinct setback to Louis's policy. Before the year was out he found himself at war not only with Holland and the Emperor, but with England as well; the latter, it must be remembered, having joined the war not because she shared the same ruler as the Dutch, but because she was determined to prevent Louis and his ally, James, from upsetting the precious Revolution Settlement. Anti-Catholic feeling ran very high in England in 1689, much higher than it did a few years later.

The naval events of the war have already been summarized in the previous chapter. After La Hogue the English had little interest in the succeeding campaigns, and William III's relations with Parliament grew rapidly worse. Holland, though still strongly pledged to the anti-French cause, was, as we have seen, finding the war a terrible strain on her already depleted resources. But this was no less the case with France. Along the course of the Rhine, in Flanders, in Spain, and in North Italy, Louis was forced to prosecute the war. Luxembourg,¹ who now commanded the French armies in the Low Countries, was not the equal of Turenne; on the other hand, in William III, without whose energy the general opposition to France might have collapsed much earlier, he had no very brilliant opponent. France owed much to Vauban, whose frontier fortresses saved her from undue fear of invasion, and provided a secure base for operations in the Spanish Netherlands. Namur was taken after a great siege; William's army was defeated at Steinkirk in 1692, and again at Neerwinden in the following year, when 15,000 of his men were taken prisoner. But as usual little practical advantage resulted from these victories, and meanwhile campaigns in the other theatres of war dragged on in similar desultory fashion. Both sides were anxious for peace; in France distress was rampant, with the *taille* mounting rapidly and the Treasury issuing debased currency in its effort to maintain the military operations. The loss of Namur in 1695 seemed like a portent that the military dominance of France was at an end.

In 1696 the first step towards peace was taken when Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, who had been getting much the worst of the campaign in North Italy, made a separate peace with France, by which Louis surrendered Pinerolo. In the following year negotiations became general, and the war at last came to an end, when the Treaty of Ryswick was signed in September. By its terms Louis retained Strasburg, but he had to return Luxemburg, Charleroi, Mons, Ath, and Courtrai to Spain, Freiburg and Philipsburg to the Emperor, and Zweibrücken to Sweden, while, after all, the French candidate did not become Archbishop of Cologne. For the first time, in a territorial sense, Louis XIV emerged from a war definitely the poorer, and distinctly and grievously humbled by having to agree to Dutch garrisons in the barrier fortresses, and to recognize William of Orange as rightful King of England.

The War of the Spanish Succession. The Treaty of Ryswick had hardly been signed before the dark menace of further conflict began to loom over war-weary Europe. From the very beginning of his reign the unlikelihood of the weakly Charles II of Spain having an heir


¹ François-Henri de Montmorency-Bouteville, Duc de Luxembourg (1628-95), a pupil and *protégé* of Condé.

to succeed him had been apparent. His death would therefore leave the houses of Habsburg and Bourbon to wrangle over their respective claims to the Spanish Empire. It was indeed an inheritance worth having, comprising (besides Spain) the Catholic Netherlands and Luxemburg, Naples, Sicily, the Milanese, and other possessions in North Italy, the islands of the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru, with their valuable mines, and all the rest of South America, with the exception of Guiana and Brazil. Little was to be feared from the dying power of Spain, which lacked both the energy and the means to derive renewed strength from her resources, but the matter would be far otherwise if such possessions fell into the hands of France or Austria. For this reason as early as 1668 Louis and the Emperor Leopold had made a secret agreement that in the event of the death of Charles II without an heir Louis should take as his share the Netherlands and Spanish possessions in Italy, with the exception of Milan, which, together with Spain and the rest of the Empire, was to go to Leopold. Charles II, however, lived on, and in the meantime the situation changed profoundly. In 1698 the state of his health once more made the Spanish succession question a matter of immediate interest.

The accompanying table (p. 51) has been prepared in simplified form to include no more than is necessary for an easy understanding of the respective claims. Although Maria Theresa, the elder of Charles II's two sisters, had, on her marriage to Louis XIV, renounced all claims for herself and her descendants to the Spanish dominions, we have seen in the War of Devolution what Louis thought about the validity of this renunciation; if, therefore, his opinion held good the Dauphin (or perhaps his second son, who was not in the direct line of succession to the throne of France) was the strongest claimant. The Habsburg case contained a strong element of justice also. Margaret Theresa, the younger sister, had not renounced her rights to the Spanish inheritance on marrying the Emperor Leopold, but her daughter, Maria Antonia, had done so on the occasion of her marriage to the Elector of Bavaria, and this appeared to impair the validity of the second claimant, Joseph Ferdinand, the Electoral Prince. The third claimant was Leopold himself, through his mother, Maria Anne, daughter of Philip III of Spain; no renunciations at all had been made to affect this claim. Leopold had determined to pass his claim to a descendant not in the direct line of succession, and it therefore devolved on the Archduke Charles, his second son by his marriage with Eleanor of Neuburg.

All the elements were therefore present for a first-class dynastic quarrel. Actually, however, the question of validity had to give place to practical considerations. It was not likely that a single claimant would be allowed to inherit the lot, since there was a certain

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amount to be said for every claim, and neither Louis nor Leopold would consent to see the other made paramount in Europe by such an accession of strength. Moreover, it was unlikely that the Dutch and English would agree to the Spanish Netherlands passing into French hands, or, for that matter, the trade of Spanish America. There would have to be a partition, giving the major portion to the Electoral Prince, who was only five years old and of whom nobody was afraid, and dividing the outlying Spanish territories between the other two claimants.

With these principles in view Louis opened negotiations with William III and Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland. Convinced at last that Louis was genuinely striving to forestall the possibility of warfare, and recognizing that Holland was not in a condition and England not in the mood for another conflict, William abandoned the Emperor's claim, which he had already promised to support, and in October 1698 agreed to the First Partition Treaty, drawn up between France, England, and Holland. It was arranged that the Electoral Prince of Bavaria should have Spain, the Spanish possessions in America, and the Netherlands: in this way the fears of England and Holland were allayed. By virtue of the French claim the Dauphin was to have Naples, Sicily, Guipuscoa, Finale, and certain ports on the coast of Tuscany. This left Luxemburg and the Milanese for the Archduke Charles, with which it was hoped the Emperor would be content. At any rate, he could not do much against the opposition of all the other Great Powers in Europe.

But when everything at last seemed agreed, and the danger of a major conflagration averted, the settlement was rendered useless by the death of the Electoral Prince from small-pox in February of the following year. Charles II had heard of the Partition Treaty, and had so far given it his sanction as to send for the Prince with the intention of bringing him up as his heir. This, however, did not argue that he was pleased at what had been going on behind his back, though he was annoyed not so much at having the question of the inheritance settled for him, as at the proposal to dismember his Empire, which he intended, if possible, to leave to the Electoral Prince intact. Now the whole scheme had come to nothing, and Charles was fully aware that another treaty would be drawn up without any reference to him whatsoever.

Louis immediately resumed negotiations, and soon discovered that England and Holland were now determined that Spain and the Netherlands must go to the Archduke Charles. After much argument Louis was forced to agree, and in April 1700 the Second Partition Treaty was signed, giving Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands to the Archduke Charles in addition to his previous share, except that Milan was

now to accrue to the Dauphin, on the understanding that he would exchange it for the Duchy of Lorraine, which could then be added on to the eastern boundaries of France. By this means Louis hoped to prevent the possibility of communication through North Italy between Austria and Spain. Notwithstanding the fact that the greater portion of the Spanish Empire would pass to the Habsburg claimant, the possession of most of Italy would make France the dominant power in the Mediterranean.

Since the death of his grandson, the Electoral Prince, an event which he did not regret in the least, the Emperor Leopold had determined to obtain the entire Spanish inheritance for his own claimant. He did not, therefore, give his agreement to the new Partition Treaty, in spite of the fact that its terms were so favourable from the Austrian point of view. His best chance of obtaining better terms now lay in his sister-in-law, the Queen of Spain, but as Charles II lay dying she was prevented from approaching the royal chamber. Accordingly Charles, anxious to the last to preserve his Empire intact, made on October 7, 1700, a will leaving it to Philip of Anjou, or, failing him, to his younger brother, the Duke of Berry. Only in the event of these two refusing the inheritance was it to go to the Archduke Charles. Three weeks after signing this will Charles II died.

It was now for Louis to decide whether to accept the will or to honour his signature to the Partition Treaty, which, after all, had been of his own seeking. At first he appears to have inclined towards the latter course, but the influence of the Dauphin was strongly in favour of accepting the will. After all, Louis had spent most of his long life in endeavouring at great cost to obtain some control over the Spanish Netherlands, and here they were, offered to his grandson as a gift. He knew that the Partition Treaties had been unpopular in England and Holland, and that the arch-enemy William III was by no means a despot in either country. The only conflict that acceptance would inevitably bring was a war with the Emperor, and this was quite likely to occur in any case. Finally, it was apparent that the Spanish Court itself preferred the French candidate.

Louis therefore decided to abandon any lingering scruples of honour and accept the will. On November 16, after an audience with the Spanish envoy, he entered the crowded gallery of his palace at Versailles accompanied by his grandson, and made public declaration of the fact. "Messieurs," he observed, "*voici le roi d'Espagne . . . c'étoit l'ordre du ciel : je l'ai accordé avec plaisir.*"¹

For several months it appeared likely that Louis's policy would succeed, and that the Habsburg cause would remain isolated, free to fight its own battles if it chose. William III was only too well aware

¹ Saint-Simon.

of his own limitations. In spite of the fact that French troops occupied the barrier fortresses in the Netherlands and took prisoner the Dutch garrisons, Holland recognized Philip V. In April 1701 England did the same. By the exercise of a little discretion all might yet have been well for France, and the final exhausting struggle avoided.

Then Louis seemed to throw discretion to the winds. He embarked upon a course of action that could hardly have been better calculated to revive against him the old hostile circle of alliances. The occupation of the barrier towns, flagrantly violating the Treaty of Ryswick, was bad enough, but Louis's declaration that Philip V had not relinquished his right to the French succession was even worse, for it was directly contrary to the terms of Charles II's will, and foreshadowed the possibility of a great state comprising all the Latin races of Europe. Louis now refused to withdraw the French troops from the Netherlands, or to give any guarantee of security to the Dutch, in place of the barrier fortresses. He obtained for France commercial concessions in the Spanish overseas possessions, but indicated plainly that the monopoly so jealously guarded by the Spaniards for so many years was to be broken down in the interests of France alone. As the summer of 1701 wore on opinion in England changed, and William found Parliament once more ready to support his policy. In September, on the death of James II, Louis crowned his folly by recognizing his son, the Chevalier de Saint-Georges, as James III of England. He should have known that if there were two causes which the English Parliament really had at heart they were the expansion of overseas commerce and the Protestant succession. Louis had now endangered both.

The result was the building of the Grand Alliance of The Hague, the final achievement of William III. England, Holland, the Emperor, Denmark, Prussia, Hesse, and other German states joined in the agreement to obtain guarantees for Holland, to wrest the Italian possessions from Spain on behalf of the Emperor, and to obtain a share in Spanish colonial trade for the English and Dutch, or else to capture and retain the American possessions themselves. The death of William in March 1702 did nothing to hamper the anti-French preparations, for Anne was more than willing that Marlborough should continue William's policy, with the details of which he was thoroughly conversant. In May England and Holland declared war.

But France was not entirely alone. An alliance with the Duke of Savoy allowed Louis's troops to prosecute the war against the Austrians in Italy; another with the Elector of Bavaria permitted direct access to the Danube, where Louis intended to make his chief effort against the Emperor; a third alliance with the Archbishop of Cologne would, it was hoped, separate Marlborough from his allies in Central Europe. Catinat had already entered the Milanese with a French army in 1701,

but he was surprised by Prince Eugene¹ with an Imperial army and forced into a retreat that led to his suspension and disgrace. He was replaced by Villeroy, who met with no better fortune, for early in 1702 Eugene defeated and captured him at Cremona. Operations had progressed thus far when the English and Dutch forces under Marlborough began to collect in the Netherlands. Before the end of the year, however, Eugene's luck had deserted him. Attacked by a French force from Naples, he was compelled to fall back behind the line of the river Adige.

When the campaigning season of 1702 opened operations became general in several theatres of war. One of the distinguishing marks of Marlborough's greatness as a general was his ability to visualize the war as a whole; but he was hampered by the individual aims that always characterize unwieldy coalitions, and especially by the natural insistence of the Dutch that the defence of their own frontier should remain his primary consideration. It is doubtful whether England has ever produced a general of such exemplary patience.

By this time the Spanish Netherlands were thickly dotted with strongly fortified towns. The free movement of armies was thus greatly hampered; any other type of campaigning but siege warfare was next to impossible. The valleys of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and, farther south, the Rhine and the Moselle, offered the natural routes for an invasion of France from the Netherlands, so it was upon these rivers that some of the strongest fortresses were situated. Moreover, the French army under Boufflers stretched right across them, from Antwerp to Kaiserswerth, very close indeed to the Dutch frontier. Marlborough therefore opened his campaign by attacking the French right flank, driving it for some distance up the valley of the Meuse, and capturing Venloo, Ruremonde, and Liège.

To reduce the Spanish Netherlands piecemeal would prove a very lengthy process, and Marlborough decided that his best course was to attempt a turning movement round the French flank by advancing up the Moselle. This would also have the advantage of bringing him nearer to his allies in Germany, and he accordingly opened the campaign of 1703 by an attack on the Archbishopric of Cologne. In May he captured Bonn, but was forced before long to return to the assistance of the Dutch, who were to co-operate by attacking the French left wing at Antwerp. This, even after Marlborough's return, they refused to attempt, and the season therefore ended with much less accomplished than Marlborough had hoped. Elsewhere, however, an excellent stroke of diplomacy resulted in the Methuen Treaty between England and Portugal, which alienated the latter from the French

¹ François Eugène, Prince of Savoy (1663-1736), a great-nephew of Mazarin. Refused a commission by Louis XIV, he entered the service of the Emperor.

cause and gave England the opportunity in the following year of conducting naval and military operations in Spain. In November the Duke of Savoy also deserted Louis and joined the Grand Alliance. This was a much more valuable acquisition to the Allied cause than might at first appear, for the French in North Italy had driven Eugene across the Brenner Pass into Austria, while another French army had crossed the Rhine at Strasburg to co-operate in a dual advance on Vienna. The adherence of Bavaria to the cause of Louis made possible the defeat of the Imperial army at Höchstädt.

By 1704 the position of the Emperor was therefore one of extreme danger. A French army under Marsin, assisted by the army of Bavaria, was marching along the valley of the Danube towards Vienna, while another army under Tallard was posted on the flank to guard against an attack from the north. To make the position safer still Villeroy was operating in the Netherlands with a third army, designed to keep Marlborough and the Dutch busy. Faced by this threat, and by a simultaneous rising of the Hungarians in his rear, the Emperor's sole hope lay in whatever assistance his allies could render.

Marlborough had no doubt that his first duty was to prevent the Emperor's defeat, but he was confronted by the difficult task of deceiving both his allies and his enemies as to his intentions. This he did by pretending to develop his scheme of the previous year for an attack on France *via* the valley of the Moselle, and to this the Dutch agreed, on condition that they were left to guard against an advance on Amsterdam from the other flank. Thus while Villeroy waited on the Moselle for the expected attack Marlborough, accompanied by the Prussians, marched up the Rhine, and then across to the Danube near Donauwörth, where on July 2 he defeated the Bavarians, while Prince Eugene and his army held up the French army under Tallard.

By this time Villeroy had discovered what was happening, and the arrival of his army on the scene allowed Tallard to join forces with Marsin and the Bavarians. Eugene thereupon effected a junction with Marlborough, and at Blenheim, on August 13, the great trial of strength took place. Drawn up behind the line of the Nebel, the Franco-Bavarian army occupied the two small villages of Blenheim and Lützingen with either wing, its centre protected by the marshy ground along the river-bank, and weakly held in consequence. Accordingly it was in the centre that Marlborough drove home his attack, breaking right through his opponents' army and capturing Tallard and the French right wing at Blenheim. The left wing, under Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria, thereupon broke off the engagement and retired in extreme haste. Marlborough's daring campaign had succeeded beyond his most sanguine hopes; the Emperor was saved, Bavaria cleared

of the French, and, most important consideration of all, Louis XIV's military pride was for the first time thoroughly humbled. Obviously the French army was not what it had been in the days of Louvois, Vauban, and Turenne.

Meanwhile the scene of hostilities had been extended to Spain. The capture of Gibraltar by Rooke in this year, though an event of much more lasting importance, was overshadowed in popular estimation by Blenheim, which immediately followed it. The friendship of Portugal having been secured by the Methuen Treaty, the Archduke Charles was able to use that country as an initial base for an attack on the forces of Philip V, and began operations with the assistance of an Anglo-Dutch army. In the following year the Earl of Peterborough arrived off the Peninsula with another English force, captured Barcelona, and made himself master of most of North-eastern Spain. At the same time there was a lull in the Netherlands campaign, for Marlborough was seriously weakened by a temporary cessation of hostilities on the part of the Imperial troops, following the death of the Emperor Leopold, and had to content himself with relieving Liège from a threat by Villeroy, and containing the French army behind the river Dyle.

The year 1706 witnessed Marlborough's second great victory. On May 23 Villeroy, who had left his lines to make a threat in the direction of Namur, was confronted by the Anglo-Dutch army. Taking up a position with his centre occupying the village of Ramillies, he awaited Marlborough's attack. The latter, deceiving his enemy by an elaborate feint towards the French left, skilfully transferred his attack to the opposite wing, drove in the French resistance, and then delivered a furious assault upon Ramillies itself. After a stubborn resistance the French gave way and began a disastrous retreat that did not end until they had been driven from the Spanish Netherlands and within the protection of their own fortresses. Shortly afterwards Eugene and the Duke of Savoy defeated the French near Turin, and this, coupled with a rising in Naples, forced Louis to withdraw all his troops from Italy. In Spain also the French cause suffered disaster, for Galway succeeded in occupying Madrid, where the Archduke Charles was proclaimed king.

But the Allied advantage was not maintained in the following year. By this time there was no doubt whatever that the bulk of the Spanish people preferred Philip as their ruler, and, faced with such national opposition, Galway had been forced to evacuate Madrid and effect a junction with Peterborough's army in Aragon. In April 1707, in the course of an attempt to repeat his exploit of the previous year, he was completely defeated at Almanza by the Duke of Berwick, an illegitimate son of James II. This was such a severe check to the Allies that they

were soon hard put to maintain themselves in the Peninsula at all. Meanwhile in the other theatres of war the campaigning season passed off without anything of definite value being accomplished, either from the direction of the Netherlands or across the Rhine.

In 1708 Louis made a determined effort to retrieve his fortunes in the north-east. Vendôme began an offensive that resulted in the occupation of Ghent and Bruges, taking up his position along the line of the Scheldt. In July Marlborough arrived to relieve the pressure on Oudenarde, which Vendôme was besieging, and a few miles from the town the third great English victory was gained, when a confused general engagement resulted in the rout of the French right wing and consequent retreat of the whole army. Driven back and cut off from their retreat across the frontier, the French army was kept at bay during the autumn months, while the Allies proceeded with the siege of Lille. While this was in progress the Jesuits are said to have made an effort to poison Eugene by sending him a paper covered with a doubtful-looking fluid, which soon proved fatal to an unfortunate dog that happened to be handy for a test. At last Lille fell, and although the season was now far advanced, for the second time there seemed nothing to prevent an advance on Paris. Another event of importance in 1708 was the capture of Minorca, which gave Britain a naval base at Port Mahon, better situated than Gibraltar for watching the French at Toulon.

The winter of 1708-9 was a bad one for France. Famine and misery were rampant ; it appeared impossible to raise either soldiers or money. At the same time signs of the approaching Tory reaction in England were weakening the power of Marlborough. In these circumstances there was no objection on either side to the opening of peace negotiations at The Hague early in 1709. With a little tolerance and foresight the Allies might have obtained excellent terms from Louis, for he was willing to give up Strasburg and most of Alsace, to restore the Dutch barrier, and even to desert the cause of his grandson in Spain. But when his enemies demanded that Louis should actually send French troops to force Philip V from his throne that was too much. He flatly refused ; France rallied behind him, and the war was resumed. Villars, now in command of the French army, was attacked by Marlborough and Eugene at Malplaquet, where the French army was so strongly posted that it could be dislodged only by a series of frontal charges so costly that no real advantage could be taken of the victory. This time the French troops drew off in good order, and the retreat did not become a rout.

That winter negotiations for peace began again, this time at Gertruidenberg. They were not finally broken off till July 1710. As before, deadlock was reached over the degree of assistance against Philip V de-

manded by the Allies from Louis. But by the time the year drew to a close it should have been obvious that the Allied cause in Spain was hopeless, for Vendôme, with a Franco-Spanish army, rounded up the English commander Stanhope at Brihuega and defeated the Imperial forces at Villa Viciosa.

So far as England was concerned the war virtually came to an end in 1711. In April of that year the whole political situation derived from the question of the 'balance of power' underwent a change when the Archduke Charles succeeded to his brother's throne as the Emperor Charles VI. Meanwhile Godolphin had fallen from power in England, and the new Tory administration had begun negotiations for peace behind the backs of its allies. Marlborough, with his political power and his influence with the Queen now a thing of the past, could undertake little, and on the last day of the year he was dismissed from his offices.

Prince Eugene, with the Imperial troops and the Dutch, continued the war throughout 1712, but he met with little success, for the French under Villars checked him at Denain in July. In Alsace during the following year Eugene fared no better, and the Emperor was at last forced to make peace at Rastadt in 1714, as his allies had already done at Utrecht in April 1713. England had deserted his cause in spite of the terms of the alliance, for Bolingbroke expressed very aptly the Tory point of view when he wrote that every one would be satisfied "except the Emperor, at whose expense the peace is likely to be made, as the war has been at ours."

By the treaties just named Philip V was confirmed as King of Spain, so that Louis came out of the war with much better terms than he might have expected at an earlier stage, although he had to agree to his grandson relinquishing all rights of succession to the throne of France. All hope of French dominance in the Netherlands had at last to be abandoned. Together with Naples, most of the Milanese, and Sardinia, they were given to the Emperor, subject only to the Dutch military control of the barrier fortresses. Sicily and part of the Milanese went to Savoy; various fortresses that had changed hands during the war were restored to their former owners. But the chief gainer, although this was hardly realized at the time, was England. From the Peace of Utrecht onward the two secure naval bases of Gibraltar and Port Mahon made her a Mediterranean Power; the Assiento, or trade agreement, with Spain that gave her the right to supply slaves and enjoy a strictly limited commerce with the Spanish colonies at last made a legal breach in the Spanish colonial monopoly; and in the acquisition of Newfoundland, Acadie, and the former French trading-posts on Hudson Bay the first step was taken towards the English control of the whole of North America. A newer and wider world was opening to the enterprise of the

peoples of Europe. Overseas Spain had sought for precious metals, and Holland for rare spices. Greatly to their detriment, that era was now past, and the far corners of the earth were about to become markets as well as sources of supply, infinitely more important to their possessors than a few extra square miles of battle-scarred Europe.

The War of the Spanish Succession had indeed brought France to her knees. She had no national bank like those of England and Holland, and consequently her credit arrangements for meeting situations of unusual expenditure were clumsy and productive of evil effects. Most of Colbert's work had by this time been nullified. Money had to be raised by such measures as the sale of ridiculous offices—'inspectors of *perruques*,' for example—and thousands of such sinecures came into being. New titles of nobility were created and sold in profusion; tax-farmers multiplied as the reign progressed; the wretched peasants and all others who could not escape taxation were forced to supply far more than ever found its way into the Treasury. Thus the foundation was laid for the tremendous debt that was to become one of the prime causes of the Revolution. Already a brilliant French writer¹ was comparing the constitution to an old, creaking machine, and hinting plainly that the King "should have his hands tied against evil."

By the summer of 1715 it was evident that the old King's reign was drawing to a close. Sciatica troubled him; he was nearly seventy-seven years of age, and his tremendous appetite was failing at last. When he supped in public for the last time it was noted that he partook only of liquid refreshment, and very little of that. Towards the end of August he grew rapidly weaker, and passed away at eight o'clock on the morning of September 1.

To assess the value of Louis's manifold labours on behalf of France is difficult. Historians are not agreed on the matter, and are never likely to be. No one can doubt that the reign was, in its own way, both great and glorious, or that the cultural eminence which the French nation then attained was richly deserved. Literature and the arts owed much to royal patronage; one cannot think of Molière, Racine, La Bruyère, and La Fontaine without visualizing at once the age in which they lived, and the debt which contemporary France owed to its monarch. But strangely enough, if we wish to discover lasting genius, it is always to others, and not to the 'Grand Monarque' himself, that we must turn: Colbert is another case in point. And the greatness of the reign was dying even before the seventeenth century was out. Louis's territorial gains, so inconsiderable after all, when measured against the vast drain of the national resources and the agricultural bankruptcy it had cost to procure them, did not really improve his frontiers, nor, without the

¹ Fénelon.

work of Vauban, would they have made France more defensible. They certainly created a train of suspicion, racial animosity, and military tradition that, unfortunately for the peace of Europe, still lives to-day.

When he knew that death would shortly overtake him Louis gave the following advice to the five-year-old boy who was to succeed him: "N'oubliez jamais les obligations que vous avez à Dieu. Ne m'imitiez pas dans les guerres, tâchez de maintenir toujours la paix avec vos voisins, de soulager votre peuple autant que vous pourrez, ce que j'ai eu le malheur de ne pouvoir faire par les nécessités de l'État."

If Louis really meant these words we can but infer that his ambitions had not been fulfilled.

SUMMARY

(1) *Introductory*

- (a) 1659. Treaty of the Pyrenees ; Louis married daughter of Philip IV of Spain.
- (b) Colbert encouraged industry and commerce.
- (c) 1661. Louis assumed control ; policy of territorial aggrandizement.

(2) *The War of Devolution (1667-68)*

- (a) Cause : claim to Spanish Netherlands on death of Philip IV.
- (b) Triple Alliance to oppose Louis ; Franche-Comté overrun, but restored.
- (c) By Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle Louis gained a number of frontier fortresses.

(3) *The Franco-Dutch War (1672-78)*

- (a) Naval assistance from England ; Amsterdam threatened.
- (b) Emperor, Brandenburg, Denmark, Palatinate, also made war on France.
- (c) By Treaty of Nimuegen Louis gained Franche-Comté, Nancy, Longwy, and towns in Netherlands, though forced to restore other fortresses.

(4) *The War of the League of Augsburg (1688-97)*

- (a) 1686. League of Augsburg (Emperor, Spain, Holland, Sweden) followed French occupation of Strasburg, Luxemburg, and parts of Alsace.
- (b) Capture of Namur ; victories of Steinkirk and Neerwinden.
- (c) By Treaty of Ryswick Louis gave up practically all his encroachments except Strasburg.

(5) *The War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13)*

- (a) First Partition Treaty gave Spain to Electoral Prince ; Second to Archduke Charles.
- (b) Louis accepted the will, invaded Netherlands, obtained trading privileges, recognized James III.
- (c) 1702. Operations in Netherlands against Marlborough ; in North Italy against Eugene.
- (d) 1703. Methuen Treaty between England and Portugal.

62 GREAT MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY

- (e) 1704. Blenheim campaign saved Vienna ; capture of Gibraltar by Rooke.
- (f) 1705. Capture of Barcelona by Peterborough.
- (g) 1706. Ramillies ; French driven from Netherlands and Italy.
- (h) 1707. Franco-Spanish victory at Almanza.
- (i) 1708. Oudenarde ; capture of Lille and Minorca.
- (j) 1713. By Treaty of Utrecht Philip V remained King of Spain, but France ceded Acadia, Newfoundland, and Hudson Bay posts to England.
- (k) 1715. Death of Louis XIV.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The territorial gains of France under Louis XIV.
- (2) The reasons why the policy of Louis XIV provoked the hostility of England.

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CHAPTER III

THE RIVALRY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE FOR COLONIAL EMPIRE

IN the train of the Reformation there swept across Europe a long succession of religious wars, leaving behind them a trail of ruin and devastation, until at the Treaty of Westphalia the worst of fanatical frenzy was effectively cooled. That type of warfare was replaced during the latter part of the seventeenth century by wars originating principally from economic causes, in which England, Holland, and France each bore a part. The Peace of Utrecht was succeeded by a lull. Holland was exhausted ; overseas the bulk of her possessions was retained, but she ceased to be progressive. France, however, although Louis XIV's policy had severely hampered the expansion planned by Colbert, began to challenge England in east and west, and upon the sea. Between these two nations the next round was therefore destined to be fought, in a series of conflicts that took place about the middle of the eighteenth century, and ended by securing for Britain a dominant position in India and America.


(A) IN INDIA

During the first fifty years of the East India Company's existence the fact that a voyage to the Spice Islands might return as large a profit as 234 per cent. led the Company to concentrate attention almost exclusively on the East Indian Archipelago. With the first two Stuarts, however, the Company was not over-popular, and, as we have seen, proved no match for its Dutch rival, which was securely established in the favour of a home Government only too well aware of the source from which the strength of the State was derived. By the middle of the seventeenth century, therefore, the English Company's chief interests had been transferred to India. By permission of the Great Moghul a factory had been established on the west coast at Surat as early as 1612. So successful did the continental trade become that in 1625 another settlement was made on the east, or Coromandel, coast, south of which a few years later a small weakly defended post called Fort St George was built (as Macaulay puts it) "on a barren spot beaten by a raging surf." Round this there grew,

“with the rapidity of the prophet’s gourd,” the town of Madras, which in the time of the Commonwealth was raised to the dignity of a Presidency, and soon became the most important of the Company’s Indian settlements. At Masulipatam, to the north of Madras, and at Fort St David, established in 1691 some sixteen miles south of Pondicherry, the English possessed subsidiary posts. A further settlement appeared in Bengal, on the river Hooghly.

Charles II materially aided the East India Company’s progress. Shortly after the Restoration he guaranteed it the sole rights of English trade in the East, granting the power to punish interlopers, to coin money, and to make war on native rulers. In 1669 he handed over the island of Bombay, part of the dowry received from Portugal on his marriage with Catherine of Braganza. Towards the end of his reign the seizure of Bantam by the Dutch completed the English tale of woe in the Archipelago, and led to some notable changes in the Company’s Indian settlements during the reign of James II. Bombay supplanted Surat as the chief centre of trade in the west; in Bengal the Company’s headquarters moved up the river to Calcutta, where Fort William was built in the following reign. At the same time the Company assumed independent jurisdiction within its own factories, collecting custom duties and raising fortifications. With the advent of the eighteenth century the power of the Great Moghul began to decline, and as the more distant portions of his empire steadily acquired greater independence the Company increased its military power and began to develop its claims in a civil and territorial sense. It is wrong, therefore, to imagine that the English dominion in India grew up entirely as the haphazard result of an effort aimed solely at the expansion of overseas trade. By 1740 the Company was definitely committed to a policy of territorial expansion at the expense of the disintegrating Moghul Empire, so far, at any rate, as certain coastal areas were concerned.

Meanwhile the French *Compagnie des Indes*, founded in 1664, had appeared upon the scene. During the Franco-Dutch War of 1672–78 settlements were effected at Trincomalee, in Ceylon, at Saint-Thomé, and at Pondicherry. In the course of succeeding wars these were lost, but Pondicherry (a French corruption of the original native name of ‘Puducheri’) was recovered by the peace of 1697. Shortly after the Treaty of Utrecht France occupied the island of Mauritius, where Port Louis grew into a useful station for her fleet. By 1740 the position of the French in India approximately equalled that of the English. In Bengal they possessed at Chandarnagore a factory near Calcutta; on the west coast they were established at Mahé; on the east at Karikal and Pondicherry. Of all these stations the last-named, which had grown into a flourishing town, was by far the most important.



INDIA, SHOWING THE FRENCH AND BRITISH SETTLEMENTS
IN 1740

Situated eighty-six miles south of Madras, it was flanked, like the latter, on the landward side by the now virtually independent province

of the Carnatic, a native state so unstable in its newly won freedom that both the rival European nations were anxious to increase their privileges and prestige while the opportunity was favourable. It was therefore along this strip of the eastern seaboard of India that the main struggle for supremacy was fought.

Operations in India during the War of the Austrian Succession. The conflict that ensued between France and Britain, when both took opposite sides in the War of the Austrian Succession, found the *Compagnie des Indes* far better prepared to defend its interests than the East India Company. Since 1735 the Île de France (Mauritius) and the Île de Bourbon had been under the governorship of a capable Breton sailor named La Bourdonnais,¹ a consummate seaman who had served in the French Navy ever since he was ten years old, and who soon proved himself an energetic administrator in addition. Under his *régime* these two small islands in the Indian Ocean became well-equipped naval bases, for La Bourdonnais was fully aware that war with England was at hand. On the mainland the most important Frenchman was Joseph-François Dupleix,² the wealthy son of a farmer-general, who had known India since his first voyage thither in 1715, and had risen in the service of the French Company to become Governor of Pondicherry in the autumn of 1741. From the start of his administration Dupleix cultivated close relations with Anwar-ud-din, the Nawab of the Carnatic, and in spite of the fact that his Company intimated in no uncertain terms that its real interests lay in trade, and trade alone, he was soon spending large sums on strengthening the fortifications and military dispositions of Pondicherry. Both in the improvement of his own private fortunes and those of the French power in India he entertained ambitions and schemes of a far-reaching character. He was not the man to let slip such an opportunity as war with the English would provide.

It was not until 1744 that news of the declaration of war between England and France reached India. Dupleix was informed that if possible he was to prevent the spread of hostilities to India; Morse, however, the English Governor of Madras, received news that a naval squadron under Commodore Barnett was on its way to Indian waters, and was thus forced to disagree when Dupleix, acting on his instructions, suggested neutrality. Dupleix therefore appealed to his friend the Nawab, who flatly forbade the two Companies to engage in hostilities on his territory. Had assistance from La Bourdonnais been immediately forthcoming Dupleix's tone might have been very different, in which case the English settlements would have been placed in a

¹ Bertrand-François, Count Mahé de la Bourdonnais (1699-1753), took his title from the town captured by him on the west coast of India.

² Joseph-François Dupleix (1697-1763).

perilous situation. As it was, the English squadron appeared first, but in view of the Nawab's prohibition did not attempt anything beyond the capture of a few French trading vessels off the coast. For the moment all danger was averted.

In the summer of 1746 La Bourdonnais arrived from Mauritius with a fleet of nine ships, manned by a force of over 3000 men. On July 6 the English squadron, now under Commodore Peyton, fought a desultory engagement at long range, after which the English ships departed to refit at Ceylon, while the French made sail for Pondicherry. Unfortunately for them the relations between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais were from the very first the reverse of cordial. The only assistance the latter could obtain took the form of a few cannon and a supply of germ-laden water. Nevertheless he determined to attack Madras while the English squadron was out of the way, and arrived off the town on September 15.

The fortifications of Madras were particularly weak. Some 200 soldiers only were available for its defence, and a desperate appeal to Anwar-ud-din to enforce neutrality produced no immediate result. La Bourdonnais landed about 2000 men, and began to bombard the town from land and sea. For a few days the garrison held out, but on the 21st Morse capitulated. It was agreed that the French should hold Madras till it was ransomed for a fair sum (later fixed at £440,000), and that in the meantime the English civilians and soldiers should remain upon parole.

These terms did not meet with Dupleix's approval at all. Now that hostilities had actually begun he intended to pursue his advantages to the full, in spite of the fact that he was personally jealous of La Bourdonnais's success. The latter, therefore, on his return to Pondicherry, found himself involved in a bitter quarrel with the Governor, who expressed his intention of setting aside the terms of the capitulation and retaining Madras at all costs. Eventually La Bourdonnais, finding himself caught off the coast by the monsoon, set sail for Mauritius, only to discover that he had been deposed from his position as Governor of the islands. On his way home to France he was captured by the English, and when at last he arrived in Paris he was imprisoned for over two years in the Bastille for his alleged mismanagement of the Company's affairs.

Meanwhile Madras remained in the hands of the French. The English inhabitants were eventually brought as prisoners to Pondicherry, whence some of them escaped in disguise and reached Fort St David, farther down the coast. But Dupleix was not destined to have things all his own way without encountering opposition from another quarter. The Nawab, furious at the foreign warfare that had been taking place on Indian soil, now demanded that Madras should

be handed over to him, and when Dupleix failed to comply sent a force of 10,000 men to take it. This army, however, was easily routed by a much smaller force of French troops and sepoys under Paradis at Saint-Thomé, a result that instantly established for the French arms a military prestige that proved of tremendous importance in succeeding years. After this Paradis entered Madras, where he assumed control on behalf of Dupleix.

Dupleix now determined to complete the downfall of the English by capturing Fort St David. A force nearly 2000 strong was dispatched to the attack, but the couple of hundred Europeans inside the fort successfully resisted all assaults, and towards the end of the year they even delivered a successful counter-attack, in conjunction with some Indian levies sent by the Nawab, who was anxious to take revenge for his previous defeat. In the spring of 1747 Dupleix tried again, but reinforcements from England were now at hand. A small squadron under Admiral Griffin was supplemented in July 1748 by another under Admiral Boscawen, who assumed command at sea. Meanwhile troops were arriving under the command of Major Stringer Lawrence, an able officer who had seen service at Culloden, and who was soon to make for himself a great name in Indian affairs. The tide had turned against the French, and Fort St David was saved.

The English were now in a position to attack Pondicherry. In August 1748 they began the siege, with nearly 3000 white troops and a fleet manned by a thousand sailors. Paradis was killed, but this advantage was unfortunately countered by the loss of Lawrence, whom the French succeeded in taking prisoner. The energy of Dupleix, his able leadership, and the skilful disposition of his troops and defence-works proved altogether too much for the English, in spite of the fact that they were greatly superior in man-power. Pondicherry did not fall, and in October the siege was abandoned.

In 1749 news reached India that peace had been concluded by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. By the terms of that treaty it was stipulated that Madras should be restored to the English in exchange for the fortress of Louisburg, at the mouth of the St Lawrence. Dupleix was loath to relinquish Madras, but eventually the French evacuated the town and the East India Company was able to resume possession. Thus the military operations in India came to an end with both sides in practically the same position as before. But Dupleix was far from satisfied. The prospects of a great French dominion in India had now been displayed before his lively imagination, and his military preparations were maintained on an active footing, ready for the opportunity that almost immediately arose.


The War of the Coromandel. In many influential quarters in England it was realized that the peace with France would not be of

long duration. During the eight years that intervened before the outbreak of the Seven Years War the English and French Companies in the Carnatic engaged in an unofficial conflict of their own, taking opposite sides in the native struggle that ravaged the unfortunate province throughout that period. Dupleix's reluctance to part with Madras and his ominous interest in the maintenance of a strong armed force obliged the English Company to model its own policy on similar lines. The process, however, was expensive, and when the former ruler of the state of Tanjore offered to pay for the loan of a portion of the East India Company's troops to assist him in regaining his throne, coupled with the promise of a fortress at the mouth of the river Coleroon in the event of success, the English Governor agreed. After an unsuccessful attempt Devi-Kottai, the fortress in question, was captured by Lawrence and retained, but the existing ruler of Tanjore was not deposed, and the Company was glad to retire from further participation in the struggle.

The affair gave Dupleix just the excuse that he needed, and he forthwith evolved an ambitious scheme that, if successful, would have made him the virtual ruler of the whole of Southern India. Since the death of the old Nizam of the Deccan (more commonly known as the Nizam of Hyderabad) in 1748 there had been two rival claimants for the throne—his son, Nasir Jang, and his grandson, Muzaffar Jang. The situation of open warfare that arose between these two princes soon gave rise to similar trouble in the Carnatic, which was a province of the Deccan, and a particularly troublesome one, its Nawab almost as independent of the Nizam as the latter was of the Great Moghul. In 1749 a certain Chanda Sahib, who had long been a *protégé* of Dupleix, attacked and defeated the Nawab of the Carnatic with French aid, Anwar-ud-din losing not only the battle, but his life as well. Chanda Sahib then joined interests with Muzaffar Jang, and Dupleix supported them both, determined to have his own nominees on the thrones both of the Carnatic and of the Deccan. In return he received a large grant of territory round Pondicherry.

In these circumstances it was natural that the opposite side, as represented by Nasir Jang and Mohammed Ali, son of the murdered Anwar-ud-din, should appeal to the British for aid, and that the Company's representatives, alarmed at the inevitable consequences to themselves should Dupleix's schemes succeed, were not slow in granting it. The operations of 1750, however, went all against the British interest. In September Mohammed Ali was defeated, and only escaped with great difficulty; in December Nasir Jang's army suffered a similar fate, and its leader was killed. To commemorate the part which his troops had played in securing this success Dupleix began to build a new city on the scene of the victory—'Dupleix Fatihabad,' the 'City

of the Victory of Dupleix.' Once again he was rewarded with a large increase of territory, and received the sole right to mint the currency of the Carnatic. The fame of his swollen fortune, his adoption of native titles and ceremony, and the pomp and arrogance that characterized all his dealings were a strange and alarming symptom in one who was still merely the Governor of a French trading-post. De Bussy, an able



THE COROMANDEL COAST

French soldier, was now sent to Hyderabad to ensure the security of Muzaffar Jang on his newly acquired throne, and although the latter was assassinated a few months later, De Bussy remained to support and advise his successor. It now only remained for Dupleix to complete the discomfiture of Mohammed Ali, and the success of his scheme would be assured. Early in 1751 that prince, assisted by an English force under Captain Gingens, met the French and their allies at Velconda, but he was completely defeated and fled to his last stronghold at Trichinopoli, taking the disheartened English troops with him. It appeared to the officials of Madras that all was lost; Major Lawrence

was in England, and the Company was at its wits' end to find a capable military leader or to evolve a plan of campaign. It was in these circumstances that the genius of Clive completely reversed the situation.

Robert Clive,¹ at this time a captain and commissary (or quartermaster) in the East India Company's military service, came of a very old Shropshire family. His stormy childhood had given his parents some cause to fear that the future could hold few good things in store for him. Moving constantly from school to school, hating the necessity of effort wasted, as he thought, in any endeavour to acquire scholarship, intractable and difficult, blackmailing the shopkeepers of Market Drayton, climbing the steeple of its church, fighting incessantly with his companions, in his restless energy he sought always to scheme new enterprises of his own imagining and to assume the leadership therein. In short, he was one of those characters for whom the calmer pleasures of life hold little attraction, and who thus find themselves doomed to an existence of wretched disillusion, if not of actual wrong-doing, unless the necessary opportunities arise to encourage their latent ambitions and direct them into useful channels. At first it appeared that young Clive was destined for the former type of life. Glad, for the time at any rate, to see the back of him, his father procured for him the post of writer in the East India Company's service, and in June 1744, after a long and tedious voyage, Clive reached Madras. It did not take long to convince him that he had merely changed his old life for another infinitely worse. Instead of finding himself a leader of exciting enterprises, there he was, a gloomy, corpulent little man of uncertain temper, checking bales and writing invoices for a salary of five pounds a year. Needless to say, he did not get on well either with his companions or his superiors, though several of the latter were quite ready to speak on his behalf when trouble arose. At one period the melancholia to which he was always subject so far overcame him that he attempted to take his own life.

However, enough excitement was soon at hand to take Clive's thoughts away from himself. After the capture of Madras in 1746 he was among those who escaped in disguise from Pondicherry and reached Fort St David. There, in the following year, he was appointed "Ensign of the Second Company of Foot Soldiers," and as such he saw service during the remainder of the war. In 1749, as a lieutenant, he had taken part in the Tanjore expedition, after which he returned to the invoices and ledgers. In 1751 he acted as commissary to Gingens's force at Velconda, and soon after that defeat he was promoted to captain, with seniority dating from the first day of the year.

Immediately on his reappointment to military rank Clive realized

¹ Robert, Lord Clive (1725-74).

that it was vital to the English cause to prevent the fall of Trichinopoly (which Chanda Sahib was now besieging with the help of 900 French troops) and the final defeat of Mohammed Ali. A reconnaissance of the siege operations convinced him that the best plan was to effect a diversion by seizing Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic which Chanda Sahib had left very inadequately garrisoned. Saunders, the Governor of Fort St David, agreed, and placed at Clive's disposal a force of 200 European and 300 native soldiers, with eight officers, most of them very raw and inexperienced. The approach of this dauntless little army, hauling its three pieces of artillery along the sixty-four miles from Fort St David through the blazing terrors of a violent tropical storm, produced such an effect on the defenders of Arcot that they fled forthwith, and on September 1 Clive took possession of the capital. Its defences were particularly feeble, with a partially drained moat and crumbling walls, but he proceeded to strengthen them as well as possible, in readiness for the inevitable attack.

Clive's action produced the desired effect. The siege of Trichinopoly was suspended while several thousand troops were detached under the command of Raja Sahib, Chanda's son, who, with the assistance of 150 Europeans from Pondicherry, began to besiege Clive in Arcot. The inadequate defences were subjected to a constant fusillade of rifle and artillery fire, but Clive, commander of his own army and carrying out his own scheme for winning the war, was in his element. The morale of his troops rose, and the situation was further improved by an offer of help from a Mahratta chief named Morari Rao. After several weeks Raja Sahib offered to negotiate, but Clive told him scornfully that his troops were a rabble, and that he would be foolish indeed to pit them against the defenders of Arcot.

On November 14 Raja Sahib launched his great assault. Elephants were driven at the gates, rafts were floated on the moat, and the attack was furiously and desperately pressed by a howling mob of Indians, intoxicated with alcohol and religious frenzy. But musket-fire from the walls soon put the elephants to flight; Clive himself worked one of his artillery pieces and destroyed a raft bearing seventy-five men, and everywhere the attack failed. Early on the following day the besiegers drew off. Clive's defence of Arcot, which had lasted for fifty days, had altered the whole aspect of the war, for his own losses had been negligible.

Clive now joined forces with some of the Mahrattas, and, leaving Arcot, sought out Raja Sahib's army, which he found at the village of Arni. Finding himself greatly outnumbered by the enemy, he drew up his troops as skilfully as circumstances permitted, and allowed Raja Sahib to attack him. The Mahrattas behaved with their accustomed courage; Clive's own troops had now been taught to *expect*

victory, and the upshot of the battle was that Raja Sahib lost 200 men and his treasure-chest. Only eight of Clive's men were killed. The battle was followed by the attack and capture of Conjeeveram, though the French garrison succeeded in escaping under cover of darkness. After this Clive returned to Madras, leaving some of his troops in possession of Arcot.

At the beginning of 1752 Clive went south to Fort St David, where he was employed in raising troops. For Dupleix the situation had become rather difficult. Since England and France were at peace he could not deliver a direct attack on the English settlements. But he could, and did, persuade his ally Raja Sahib to do so, and the approach of the latter's army to Madras led to the hasty recall of Clive, who was now placed in command of a much larger army, numbering 1300 Indian and nearly 400 European troops. With this force Clive sought his enemy, but for some time he failed to discover his whereabouts. Eventually, near the fortress of Kavaripak, he ran unwittingly into an ambush, apprised of its existence by a sudden roar of French artillery. Night came on before Clive was in a position to deliver his counter-attack, which took the form of a combined frontal and flank assault on the enemy's concealed position. Once again his troops were completely successful, and Raja Sahib's army was broken up for good. On March 11 Clive returned to Fort St David. Much of the Carnatic, including the capital, had now been restored to the influence of Mohammed Ali and the English, and the apparently imminent success of Dupleix's schemes prevented.

But the French Governor, though checked, was by no means disheartened. It appeared to him more important than ever that the languishing siege of Trichinopoly, which had never been entirely abandoned, should now be vigorously prosecuted to a successful finish. This task he had entrusted to Jacques Law, a courageous officer of Scots descent, who, in spite of his bravery, seems to have lacked the initiative and determination necessary for an independent command. With Law were 900 European soldiers, 2000 French-trained sepoys, and a considerable native army under Chanda Sahib.

It was evidently impossible for the English to withdraw their support from Mohammed Ali at this juncture. Clive's little army was immediately re-equipped for an attempt to raise the siege, but before its departure Major Lawrence arrived from England and assumed command. Clive accompanied him in a subordinate capacity, and the force set out for Trichinopoly. As it drew near, reinforced by some of Morari Rao's Mahrattas and troops belonging to Mohammed Ali, the way was barred by Chanda Sahib and a battery of French artillery. After a lengthy cannonade, however, the enemy withdrew, and Lawrence's army was able to march into Trichinopoly. Opposed by a

force so much stronger than he had expected, Law now made the mistake of withdrawing his army from its lines and occupying the small island of Seringham, close to the town. Here he was blockaded by a detached force of 1000 men under Clive, but instead of attempting to cut his way out he decided to wait until Dupleix could dispatch a force to his relief.

In the middle of April the French relieving force, about 600 strong, approached Clive's headquarters at Samiaveram, under the command of a cautious old officer named D'Auteuil. Clive went out to meet him, upon which D'Auteuil hurriedly retired. Clive accordingly returned to his headquarters. Meanwhile Law had hit upon the idea of attacking Samiaveram during the supposed absence of Clive and most of his troops. The attack was delivered on that same night: a number of sepoy and English deserters, now in French pay, succeeded in gaining entrance to the camp, where they began firing volleys into the quarters of the sleeping troops. A situation of extraordinary confusion arose, Clive's handling of which forms an excellent illustration of his coolness and capacity for leadership. Awakened by the noise, he rushed outside, thinking that the disturbance had somehow arisen among his own sepoy, an impression that was further strengthened by the presence of the English deserters. As he was attempting to restore order the arrival of six Frenchmen upon the scene apprised him of the true state of affairs. Although unsupported, Clive instantly called upon them to surrender; but together with the rest of the French troops they took refuge in a building, and did not give themselves up until after daylight. The native force fled, and was cut to pieces by the Mahrattas.

It was the end of May before D'Auteuil's little force, now slightly augmented, made any effort to come to grips with Clive. On the 29th of that month he attempted to withstand the English commander at Velconda, but was defeated by superior forces, and surrendered a few hours later. On June 3 Law, all hope of relief now vanished, and Chanda Sahib, with the remains of his rapidly melting army, surrendered to Major Lawrence. Chanda Sahib, although his safety had been guaranteed, was murdered. It was a great pity that the English had not supported his cause rather than that of his rival, for he was a man of much greater integrity than Mohammed Ali. The intrigues into which the latter had entered with his native allies now came to light, proving that after all he would not really be master of the Carnatic until his former friends had received satisfactory territorial rewards for their assistance. Accordingly a situation of some confusion arose, which convinced Dupleix that in spite of the disastrous failure before Trichinopoly, there might still be a chance to turn the tables.

Renewed menaces from Pondicherry convinced Governor Saunders that he must capture the small French forts of Chingleput and Covelong,

the strategic importance of which was out of all proportion to their size. Clive, whose health had suffered considerably during the recent campaigns, recovered sufficiently to assume command. In September he moved against Covelong, twenty miles south of Madras, with a force largely composed of raw recruits fresh from England, "the worst and lowest wretches that the Company's crimps could pick up in the flash-houses of London."¹ To conduct the siege with troops of such inferior quality proved a difficult matter: they were apt to run away at the slightest sign of resistance on the part of the enemy, and on a certain occasion one of Clive's sentries was discovered at the bottom of a well, where he had taken cover some hours previously, following a well-aimed shot from the beleaguered garrison. Eventually Covelong surrendered, just as Clive was about to open his bombardment. A French force that had been dispatched from Chingleput to force Clive to raise the siege was thereupon defeated, and shortly afterwards that fortress itself also surrendered.

The War of the Coromandel had now been so far settled in favour of the English interest that Clive was able to abandon soldiering and resume his career as a merchant. Before long he had acquired a moderate fortune. But his health was still poor, and accordingly in March 1753 he left Madras for England. Meanwhile Dupleix was finding it impossible to restore the fallen fortunes of the French. Although he had spent over a hundred thousand pounds of his own money, the trading dividends of the *Compagnie des Indes* had declined considerably, and it was two million francs in debt as the result of his schemes. It is small wonder that the Company's directors began to look upon his policy with increasing disfavour. Although he did not really despair of ultimate success, and would certainly have renewed his efforts at once if the means had been forthcoming, Dupleix began in 1753 to treat with the English. No agreement was reached on the spot, however, but at home the representatives of the two Companies, to say nothing of their respective Governments, were anxious to put a stop to this unofficial conflict. In August 1754 Dupleix was superseded by Godeheu, who concluded an agreement with Saunders under the terms of which Mohammed Ali was recognized as Nawab of the Carnatic, and the English and French Companies promised each other that in future they would not take sides in native wars or attempt to increase their territory by such means. At the beginning of 1755 the treaty was published. By that time a much-chastened and disillusioned Dupleix had left India for good, his proud titles, Oriental state, and handsome fortune things of the past. Though he was not a practical soldier, his capabilities as a diplomat, administrator, and organizer were of the highest order. But, as in the case of La Bourdonnais, his merits did not receive recognition

¹ Macaulay.

at home. Against all that he had accomplished in the past was set the indisputable fact that his policy had in the long run proved an expensive failure. He spent his remaining years in a fruitless endeavour to obtain recognition, and died in poverty in 1763.

India during the Seven Years War. The Godeheu-Saunders Treaty had hardly been signed before it became evident that a real war was pending between France and Britain. Maria Theresa's determination to recover Silesia from Frederick of Prussia, and the change of alliances towards which France and Britain were drifting, provoked in the breast of George II some lively apprehensions for the safety of his beloved Hanover. Moreover, the discovery of the French forts in the Ohio Valley was obviously leading towards open warfare in North America.

On paper the French in India still had, if anything, a slight advantage over the English. De Bussy maintained his position at Hyderabad, where he was supported by an army of 5000 well-trained troops, mostly sepoys. Certain territories in the Northern Circars had been granted to him for the upkeep of this army. In the Carnatic the French territory was somewhat in excess of the English, as was their proportion of native troops. Each side was possessed of European soldiers to the number of about 2000. In the event of the coming war spreading to India (which was hardly avoidable) a direct trial of strength would become possible, of a character totally different from that of the War of the Coromandel.

In 1755 Clive was commissioned by the King with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and appointed by the directors of the East India Company to the governorship of Fort St David. He set sail with three companies of artillery and a force of 300 infantry, and reached Fort St David on June 20, 1756—the very day on which the ghastly outrage familiarly known as the 'Black Hole' was perpetrated in Calcutta. Some two years were still to elapse before the real conflict between the French and English began, but the events that occupied Clive in Bengal during that time were not without their bearing on the outcome of the struggle.

Siraj-ud-daulah, the young Nawab of Bengal, like the Nizam of Hyderabad, was practically independent of his nominal overlord at Delhi. His capital was at Murshidabad, a city that, despite its greatness and wealth, was not sufficient to satisfy his greed for power and treasure. The rumours of pending warfare with France had caused the English merchants on the Hooghly to fortify their settlements, and, using this as his excuse, Siraj-ud-daulah fell upon Kasimbazar, the English factory near Murshidabad, took possession, and then marched upon Calcutta. Fewer than two hundred Europeans were available for the defence of Fort William; the Governor and commanding officer fled down the river, and after a siege lasting but four days the remainder

capitulated. One hundred and forty-six of the English, who had remained behind and were now forced to depend on the Nawab's promise for their safety, were imprisoned by his guard for the night in a room less than twenty feet square, with only a small grating for ventilation. Twenty-three of them came forth alive.

The news of the capture of Kasimbazar reached Madras in July, and Major Kilpatrick was promptly dispatched to Bengal with 230 white troops and some sepoy. When in the following month the loss of Fort William became known, and the true state of affairs was revealed in all its seriousness, the Madras Government was faced with the awkward decision of whether or not to deprive the Coromandel settlements of military forces which might at any moment be urgently required for their defence. Fortunately for the future of the British dominion in India it was decided to take the risk. A projected expedition against De Bussy at Hyderabad was abandoned, and Clive was sent to Bengal with 900 European and 1500 native troops. With him went the English squadron, now under the command of Admiral Watson.

The exact details of what followed do not directly concern us. Clive retook Calcutta and fought an engagement against the Nawab's troops that was followed by a truce. On March 23, 1757, having heard that war with France had now actually broken out, Clive and Watson attacked and captured Chandarnagore, which for the time being became the English headquarters. Over 400 European soldiers were taken prisoner. Meanwhile Siraj-ud-daulah had broken the truce and was intriguing for aid from the French at Hyderabad. The result was the battle of Plassey, on which occasion Clive's little army defeated a force of 15,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry, and 40 guns. Some 50 Frenchmen, armed with four field-pieces, under the command of M. Saint-Frais, assisted the Nawab's army. It was they who first began the action with an artillery duel, and were the last to offer resistance when most of the native troops had fled. The upshot of the battle was that Clive, by replacing Siraj-ud-daulah by Mir Jafar, a puppet ruler of his own, became the virtual master of Bengal.

Meanwhile in the Carnatic a few feeble military operations were in progress. D'Auteuil attempted to besiege Trichinopoly, and was driven off by the English without much difficulty. But the French Government had no intention of allowing the English to have matters all their own way in India. A squadron of nine warships was prepared, under the command of Admiral D'Aché, to challenge Watson upon the sea, and a land force of some 1200 regular troops was dispatched under the Comte de Lally.¹ This officer had served with distinction

¹ Thomas Arthur, Comte de Lally, Baron de Tollendal (1702-66), the son of Sir Gerard O'Lally, an Irish Jacobite who had followed James II into exile.

in the War of the Austrian Succession, and had been with the Young Pretender during the '45 rebellion. His courage and energy were beyond dispute, but unfortunately for the men under his command he was possessed of a violent, sarcastic temper and biting tongue. His overbearing manners made it impossible for him to gain the confidence of his subordinates, or to profit by the advice of men far better versed than himself in local conditions.

Owing to a series of delays Lally did not arrive at Pondicherry until April 1758. With extraordinary promptitude he opened the siege of Fort St David. Though strongly garrisoned, the place was unfortunate in possessing a weak commander, and some of the troops were badly disciplined and of poor quality. On June 2 it surrendered, and by Lally's orders the fortifications were entirely destroyed.

As the result of Lally's appearance in the Carnatic Clive was asked by the Madras Government to return some of the troops he had taken with him to Bengal. The request came at an awkward moment, for Mir Jafar was facing a threat of rebellion and was forced to rely on Clive for support. However, in October 1758 Clive dispatched 500 European and 2000 native troops to the Northern Circars under the command of Colonel Forde. During the course of the next six months Forde and his native allies retook that district from the French, and eventually the Nizam was persuaded to grant it to the English on similar terms and to accept their influence at his Court. This was made possible by the fact that Lally, anxious to concentrate his forces against Madras, had peremptorily recalled De Bussy from Hyderabad, much against that officer's will.

During the summer of 1758 D'Aché fought two indecisive engagements against the English fleet, after which he retired to Mauritius to refit. This seriously weakened Lally, but, flushed with his success at Fort St David, he determined to hurry on his preparations to take Madras. In December he began the siege, with a comparatively large army composed of 2700 European troops and 4000 sepoys. The English defenders had not nearly so many. They were unable to prevent the French from gaining access to the town, but within Fort St George itself the defence continued. Lally's guns pounded away at the walls, but his troops refused to storm the breach, and the appearance of the English fleet off the town in February 1759, under the command of Admiral Pocock, caused him to raise the siege. Needless to say, he blamed every one but himself for the failure. By that time his troops were almost in a state of mutiny.

In September the final engagement was fought between the rival fleets. D'Aché had eleven ships, two more than Pocock, but the action was indecisive, although the French succeeded in inflicting rather more damage than they received. It was D'Aché, however, who withdrew

from the battle, and made for Pondicherry. At the beginning of October he sailed for Mauritius, leaving the English in command of the sea, in spite of the fact that they had never defeated him. From then onward Lally's ultimate defeat became only a matter of time.

A few weeks after the departure of D'Aché from the coast Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre Coote arrived with the 84th Regiment of Foot. Before the end of November he had succeeded in capturing Wandewash. Lally determined to retake it, and, accompanied by De Bussy, who saw very clearly the foolishness of challenging the English forces in the open field, moved out of Pondicherry to the attack. On January 22, 1760, the engagement took place near Wandewash. The English had rather fewer than 2000 white troops, and the French slightly more, and between these forces the battle was fought out, the sepoys taking little part in the action. The gallant De Bussy, surrounded and fighting to the last, was taken prisoner; Lally, whose efforts had been no less courageous, escaped with difficulty and reached Pondicherry, leaving nearly 600 of his troops dead upon the field. The English losses were fewer than 200.

Town after town now fell into Eyre Coote's hands. Early in December he began the siege of Pondicherry. The departure of D'Aché had made it almost impossible to obtain supplies by sea, and before long the beleaguered garrison was reduced to great extremity. On January 16, 1761, Lally was accordingly forced to surrender. The English took possession, and the fortifications of Pondicherry were dismantled at last.

Thus ended the war, and with it the power of the French *Compagnie des Indes*. By the Treaty of Paris most of its Indian settlements were restored, though it was agreed that those in Bengal should not in future be fortified. For the first time a war had ended with the French in a position definitely inferior to that of the English, and they never regained their lost ascendancy in India. Lally was taken a prisoner to England, but was allowed to return to France on parole. There, after an imprisonment of fifteen months in the Bastille, he was executed for high treason, amid every circumstance of degradation and disgrace.

The deciding factor in the English success lay in their appreciation of the value of sea-power. The capacity of Dupleix, De Bussy, and Lally was probably in no way inferior to that of Clive, Lawrence, and Coote. But the position and strength of the French Company never equalled that of the English one, and from the naval viewpoint, in spite of the fact that D'Aché was not defeated, the French resources proved inadequate. Altogether France lost ninety-four ships during the Seven Years War. Her nearest naval base to the Indian coast was Mauritius, and in abandoning the contest at sea D'Aché deprived his countrymen of their last hope. Clive saw clearly the importance

of the war at sea when in January 1759 he wrote to Pitt: "The superiority of our squadron and the plenty of money and supplies of all kinds which our friends on the coast will be furnished with from this province [Bengal], while the enemy are in total want of everything, without any means of redress, cannot fail of wholly effecting their ruin in that, as well as in every other part of India." The position established by Clive in Bengal during this period was thus indirectly an asset of the greatest value to the English in the Carnatic. To have relied on England for supplies at a time when scanty naval forces only were available for the Indian war would have been hazardous in the extreme. Since our actual territorial possessions in the Carnatic were extremely meagre Saunders and Eyre Coote would have been at the mercy of the local native magnates, had they not been relieved from all anxiety on this score by Clive's control of Bengal and Forde's subsidiary conquest of the Northern Circars. Clive's later work in Bengal and his administrative reforms there consolidated the English position and established its permanence. Like so many of his famous contemporaries, both English and French, he was ill rewarded by his country, and died by his own hand in 1774.

The End of the Struggle. Although it was really the Seven Years War that put an end to the power of the French in India, they made repeated efforts to overthrow the British during the series of wars that followed. During the American War of Independence French agents intrigued with the Mahrattas at Poona and with Haidar Ali of Mysore, involving Hastings, the Governor-General, in a series of dangerous native wars, at a time when he could expect little assistance from home. Saint-Lubin was at Poona in 1777, before France had actually entered the war, and was negotiating for the cession of a port on the west coast as the price of a French alliance; soon afterwards a naval expedition from the Île de Bourbon was supplying Haidar Ali with warlike stores. By 1779, however, all the French settlements had fallen into British hands. The result was the appearance of a French squadron under Admiral De Suffren in 1781, which fought several indecisive engagements with the English fleet under Sir Edward Hughes. De Suffren was hampered by the lack of any adequate port on the coast for use as a base, and although several thousand French soldiers were brought to the aid of Haidar Ali and his son, Tippoo Sahib, with De Bussy in command, they were unable to accomplish much before the end of the war in 1783. Tippoo Sahib, who by that time had succeeded his father, then made peace.

When the French Revolutionary War began in 1793 the native states of Sindhia, Hyderabad, and Mysore all had in their service French officers, who lost no time in stirring up trouble for the English. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt aimed directly at menacing the British

power in India, and while he was at Cairo Haidar Ali proposed an alliance. Napoleon, however, soon had other matters of far greater moment to occupy his attention, and in 1799 Tippoo Sahib himself was defeated and killed at Seringapatam. As a result of his fall, the partition of Mysore between the British and the Nizam, and the capture soon afterwards of Mauritius and the Île de Bourbon by Abercromby, all opportunity for French intrigue in India was finally removed.

SUMMARY

- (1) *Situation of the French and British in 1740*
 - (a) British East India Company at Bombay, Madras, Fort St David, and Calcutta.
 - (b) French Compagnie des Indes at Mahé, Pondicherry, Karikal, and Chandarnagore ; naval base at Mauritius.
- (2) *The War of the Austrian Succession (1744-49)*
 - (a) 1746. La Bourdonnais captured Madras.
 - (b) Dupleix failed to take Fort St David.
 - (c) 1748. Boscawen and Lawrence failed to take Pondicherry.
 - (d) By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle Louisburg exchanged for Madras.
- (3) *The War of the Coromandel (1750-52)*
 - (a) Dupleix supported Chanda Sahib and assisted him in defeating Mohammed Ali at Velconda.
 - (b) 1751. Clive captured Arcot and defeated Raja Sahib at Arni and Kavaripak (1752).
 - (c) Lawrence and Clive forced the surrender of Law and Chanda Sahib before Trichinopoly ; Covelong and Chingleput captured (1752).
 - (d) Dupleix recalled ; Mohammed Ali recognized as Nawab of the Carnatic.
- (4) *The Seven Years War (1756-63)*
 - (a) 1757. Clive captured Chandarnagore and defeated Siraj-ud-daulah at Plassey.
 - (b) 1758. Lally captured Fort St David ; Forde overran the Northern Circars.
 - (c) 1759. Lally abandoned siege of Madras ; D'Aché's squadron left the coast.
 - (d) 1760. Eyre Coote defeated Lally at Wandewash.
 - (e) 1761. Pondicherry captured.
 - (f) By the Treaty of Paris the French agreed not to fortify their trading-posts in Bengal.
- (5) *The End of the Struggle*
 - (a) French aided Haidar Ali during the War of American Independence.
 - (b) Napoleon's threat to India ; Abercromby captured Mauritius and the Île de Bourbon.

SUBJECT FOR SPECIAL STUDY

The career of Clive.

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(B) IN CANADA

The Ohio Scheme. The activities of the French in North America began as early as 1534, when Jacques Cartier explored the St Lawrence and took possession of its shores in the name of the King of France. Little account, however, was taken of his discoveries until the beginning of the following century, when Samuel de Champlain established a fort on the precipitous promontory of Quebec, and began further investigation of the great system of waterways that finds outlet into the St Lawrence Gulf. At much the same time the English were establishing their first permanent settlements on the Atlantic seaboard, in 1608 at Jamestown, in Virginia, and twelve years later at Plymouth, in New England. Throughout the course of the seventeenth century the Stuarts continued to encourage the settlement of the Atlantic coast, either by the granting of new charters or by conquest from the Dutch. The religious troubles of the period greatly facilitated colonization, and ensured a steady flow of suitable settlers.

In 'New France' developments were not so rapid. Frenchmen have never been ardent colonists, and the severe Canadian winters did not encourage would-be settlers. Such Huguenots as crossed the Atlantic usually preferred the milder climate of Carolina to that of the Canadian lakes. In 1629 it was estimated that a single vessel could accommodate all the French in Canada. But the fur trade was lucrative, and for this reason French trappers began to penetrate the shores of Ontario and Erie, and even the lakes beyond. In spite of many ghastly experiences at the hands of the Indians they fraternized with them to a degree never attempted by the English, and even converted some of them to a semblance of Catholicism. The population of Quebec increased; Montreal was founded and grew even faster; but outside these towns and the settlement at Three Rivers the number of Frenchmen in Canada remained scanty in the extreme. Most of those hardy souls who elected to remain outside the towns were settled along the shores of the St Lawrence in *seigneuries* planned after the French model, or were scattered as trappers and hunters along the rivers and lakes. Government, as in France itself, was autocratic; it was directed from Paris, and hence, to use a modern phrase, it was

authoritarian and military. It was this fact that when the inevitable clash came made the position of the French in Canada so serious a menace to the English colonists, who from the first had exercised a good deal of control over their own affairs and were welded together by no kind of tie other than the vague one of a common nationality.

Towards the close of the seventeenth century La Salle¹ explored the system of the Mississippi, reached its mouth on the Mexican Gulf, and named the new territory Louisiana. There, in 1718, Bienville founded the city of New Orleans. This at once provoked the jealousy of the Spaniards, who began to settle in Florida and founded the town of Pensacola as a rival to the new French colony on the Mississippi. Until this time the continent of North America had appeared large enough for all, but with the advent of the eighteenth century it became evident that the question of frontiers would soon call for a definite settlement.

It was the Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, that first brought the matter up. France, by ceding to Britain the fur-trading posts on Hudson Bay, the French settlements in Newfoundland (subject to certain vaguely specified fishing rights), and the peninsula of Acadie (Nova Scotia) had admitted her great colonial rival to a footing on the northern part of the continent in a manner admirably calculated to provoke dissension in the future. It was not until the present century that the French fishing rights were properly defined, and the precise extent of Acadie, as intended by the treaty, was never exactly laid down. While the British contended that it included the whole peninsula up to the mouth of the St Lawrence the French held that it covered only the southern portion, and even there the French population refused to acquiesce in British rule. Moreover, France had retained the island of Cape Breton, where the great fortress of Louisburg arose to dominate Cabot Strait, and thus the entrance to Canada *via* the St Lawrence.

Beyond the Allegheny Mountains the English colonists had as yet penetrated only to trade, not to settle. Here lay the fertile valley of the Ohio, a vast region of forests and waterways peopled by the Five Nations of Indians, collectively known as the Iroquois. Though as yet little direct contact with them had been established, the Treaty of Utrecht had acknowledged the paramount influence of the British.

As the eighteenth century wore on isolated conflicts between the French and British in North America grew more frequent. This was especially so in the case of the colonists of New England, whose territories approached most nearly to those of the French. When England and France fought on opposite sides during the War of the Austrian


¹ René-Robert Caveller, Sieur de la Salle (1643-87), the founder of Forts Miami and Crèvecoeur.

Succession the conflict spread to America, where it was known as 'King George's War.' In 1745 Governor Shirley¹ of Massachusetts raised, with the help of New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, a force of militia which, under the command of Colonel William Pepperell, besieged and captured Louisburg. The colonists were highly delighted at this success, and correspondingly indignant when Louisburg was handed back at the peace, in exchange for Madras. So great a menace was the fortress considered by the New Englanders that Halifax was founded as an offset to its influence, and to act as a military station to control the rebellious Frenchmen in Nova Scotia.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was followed by a series of events that led, so far as the theatre of operations in America was concerned, to the Seven Years War. Gallissonière had already conceived the idea of fortifying the line of the Mississippi and settling a number of peasants along its shores, and now it was proposed to extend the scheme to the valley of the Ohio, and thus, by way of its tributary, the Allegheny, the head-waters of which rise close to Lake Erie, to link the French in Louisiana with their fellows in Canada. A force of 300 soldiers was accordingly dispatched by Bienville in 1749 to the Ohio Valley, where lead plates bearing the French arms and inscriptions were nailed to trees or buried in the soil. In the same year the English colonists were busy formulating a scheme for the extension of their territory into the same region. The formation of two companies was suggested, though owing to the rival claims of Virginia and Pennsylvania the proposal did not mature. None the less an increasing number of English traders began to cross the Allegheny Range, and the upshot was that the leaden plates were soon discovered. Both English and French were bent on colonizing the same region at the same time, and a race ensued as to which could get there first.

It appears now an ambitious project for some seventy thousand Frenchmen to imagine that they could debar two million English colonists from any further expansion westward. But, as has already been pointed out, the governor of a feudal state well equipped with military forces had a tremendous advantage over thirteen disunited and mutually jealous communities. Moreover, the colonies most concerned—Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland—appeared at first peculiarly unaware of their danger. In 1753 Duquesne, the Governor of Canada, proposed a line of forts to connect Lake Erie with the head-waters of the Allegheny; Fort Presqu'île accordingly appeared on the former, with Fort Venango farther south. In the following year, at the spot where the Allegheny and Monongahela meet to form the Ohio (a point of considerable strategic importance, since easy and rapid communication had perforce to be by water), a number of English-

¹ William Shirley (1694–1771) became Governor of Massachusetts in 1741.



THE OHIO SCHEME

French forts are indicated by a solid line, British forts by a broken line, beneath the name.

men who had endeavoured to establish a post were driven off by French soldiers, who thereupon took possession of the place and built a relatively strong fortress, which they named Fort Duquesne. It was obvious that this was the key to the whole system, so Robert Dinwiddie, a Scotsman who a few years previously had been appointed Governor of Virginia, decided to recover it at once. Young George Washington was sent to explain to the French that they were upon English territory. To add power to his arguments he was given a force of 300 colonists and some Indian auxiliaries. After a painful march lasting six weeks he was surrounded by superior numbers in a hastily dug entrenchment (Fort Necessity), and after a stout resistance was forced to surrender and withdraw to Virginia, leaving the French still in possession.

This was serious news. A general conference met at Albany, where efforts were made to keep the Indian chiefs of the frontier, and especially the Iroquois, within the British allegiance. It was decided to attack the French forts wherever they had encroached towards the English settlements, and since it was still impossible to rouse the colonists to a real sense of their danger, to appeal to the home Government for assistance. The result was the dispatch of General Braddock to Canada with two regiments of regular troops. In April 1755 Braddock began his march to Fort Duquesne with an army numbering about 1600 men, of which some 400 were colonials. In spite of warnings as to what would inevitably happen if he tried to apply the methods of the European battlefield to the American forests, he was completely confident of the outcome of his mission, moving slowly forward with his forces strung out in a long column of route, stopping "to level every mole-hill, to erect a bridge over every brook." On July 9, as he drew near to Fort Duquesne, he was ambushed in a narrow ravine by 700 Indians and a number of experienced French bush-fighters. For three hours his men, seeking what cover they could find, kept up a resistance against their hidden enemies, but the French soon inflicted nearly 800 casualties, Braddock himself being mortally wounded. Eventually the remainder were extricated and withdrawn by Washington, who had accompanied the expedition as a member of the General's staff.

The attacks launched against Fort Niagara and other French posts also broke down, though Fort Beauséjour, in Acadie, was captured. In that province it was decided that all Frenchmen who refused to take the oath of allegiance should be expelled forthwith, and about 6000 were driven from their homes into French Canada. Meanwhile open warfare with the Indians, who were now convinced that the French were the more powerful allies, was raging along the frontiers of the southern colonies. It was in these circumstances that the British

Government, convinced that war with France must now ensue, concluded the Treaty of Westminster with Prussia for the protection of Hanover. Thus the colonial struggle in America was fought out as a part of the Seven Years War.

The French Successes (1756-57). Even before the formal declaration of war in 1756 the French and English had met again and were continuing the struggle in the backwoods. Montcalm,¹ an extremely able and courageous soldier, reached Quebec in May with reinforcements of regular troops. Further English regiments were dispatched at about the same time to renew the attack in the Ohio Valley. At sea Admiral Boscawen captured two French vessels in a fog off the Newfoundland coast, and took them back to Spithead with about 1500 prisoners. Meanwhile Hawke was cruising in European waters, watching for French transports. The war had begun in earnest.

There were three ways of approach to the main seat of French power in Canada. The first, *via* the mouth of the St Lawrence, was the most strongly defended, for Louisburg had been greatly strengthened since 1748. General Loudoun, in command of the English forces at Halifax, set out with Admiral Holborne to capture it by a combined operation ; but the place appeared so formidable that he retired without making the attempt. The second route, *via* the Hudson Valley and Lake George, was guarded against French aggression by Fort William Henry, built on the shores of the lake ; and the third, up the Mohawk Valley towards Lake Ontario, by Fort Oswego. These two British outposts, thrust far inland from the coast, almost into the settled parts of Canada, were the first objects of the French attack, and it was round them that the initial operations of the war developed.

The tide of battle ebbed and flowed, through the dark wilderness between mountain heights. Red-coated, helmeted, pipe-clayed, pig-tailed English infantry, kilted Highlanders (for few concessions to comfort or climate were then made), blue-coated New England militiamen, rustic and democratic, electing their own officers, scouts, or rangers, in deerskin hunting-frocks and mocassins, a motley host, laboured backwards and forwards, in fleets of boats or by forest tracks, dragging artillery or supplies through the inhospitable wilds. On the French side was the same picturesque variety. The white-coated infantry of old France, the blue-clad regulars of the colony, the militia, with their homespun frocks and red sashes, and the Indians radiant in war paint and feathers. A strange flare of colour, and medley of various types of men and races, was thus struggling in imposing scenes of primeval nature, for as great a stake as men ever fought for, had they known it. . . . It was a novel war for British soldiers, officers and men.²

¹ Louis-Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm-Gozon (1712-59). Like Wolfe, he entered the Army at the age of fifteen.

² *Canada*, by A. G. Bradley.

But the war on the rivers and lakes went badly for the British army during the first two years. Montcalm, in spite of the fact that he did not get on well with his Governor, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, had little difficulty in capturing Fort Oswego during the summer of 1756, and Fort William Henry in August of the following year, after a siege lasting five days. At the latter place his drunken Indian allies massacred a number of the English prisoners. Meanwhile Admiral Holborne, cruising off Louisburg, refused to fight the relieving French fleet, because it had eighteen vessels to his seventeen. Altogether it appeared that the English cause in America was about to suffer eclipse. But in June 1757 Pitt was reinstated in the Government as War Minister. His confident pronouncement to the Duke of Devonshire (the nominal head of the Government), "I am certain that I can save the country, and that nobody else can," was indicative of the spirit in which he intended to tackle the problem. Fresh forces were equipped, and, more important still, fresh commanders selected, by a man who had a flair for choosing the best individuals for the work in hand. So far the supersession of Loudoun by Abercromby, as commander-in-chief of the British forces in America, had not proved a change for the better; but Pitt now had in view other commanders of more dashing calibre, and it was not long before the tide of battle turned.


Louisburg and the Operations of 1758. As the bitter Canadian winter softened to the spring of 1758 the plans that Pitt had matured during the previous year drew near to fulfilment. For Montcalm the situation had already changed. The English policy of naval blockade was having its effect; the prospect of further reinforcements of regular soldiers for Canada was becoming doubtful, and the French squadron based on Louisburg was now of small proportions. Moreover, the crisis of the war was approaching, for the English were about to attack Canada from every possible avenue of approach.

The chief operation was to be the siege of Louisburg. For this Pitt had chosen new leaders. Admiral Boscawen was in command of the fleet, and towards the end of May General Amherst¹ reached Halifax to take over command of the Army. His second-in-command, young Colonel Wolfe, had arrived some two months previously. This officer had had a meteoric career. Born at Westerham, in Kent, in 1727, the son of one of Marlborough's brigade-majors, he had been first commissioned in the marines at the age of fifteen, at the time when Frederick the Great was overrunning Silesia. To use his own description of himself after he had attained manhood, he was a "meagre, consumptive, decaying figure," and it is true that he was ugly and unprepossessing, with red hair and a turned-up nose. His restless energy, impatience against all forms of inactivity and slackness, and his habit of brooding

¹ Jeffrey Amherst (1717-97), created Baron Amherst in 1776.

introspection made him intensely critical of his superiors, but nothing seemed to check the rapidity of his promotion. Transferring to a regiment of foot, he was sent to the Low Countries when England entered the War of the Austrian Succession, became an adjutant at the age of sixteen, was promoted to lieutenant after the battle of Dettingen (at which he was present), and a year later obtained his captaincy. After serving at Falkirk and Culloden he returned to the Continent for a time. The end of the war found him again in Scotland, as major of the 20th Foot, and shortly afterwards, within less than ten years of his first commission, he had become a lieutenant-colonel.

At the beginning of June the English expedition arrived off Louisburg, thirty-nine warships with over a hundred transports containing



ENVIRONS OF LOUISBURG

a carefully selected force of 12,000 soldiers. Amherst and Boscawen were confronted with a formidable task. The great fortress lay across the peninsula that formed one side of the harbour, within which the French fleet of twelve battleships was anchored. In addition to the sailors who manned these ships, Drucour, the French Governor, had a force of over 3000 men, most of whom were regular soldiers. Outside the town strong batteries had been erected, and especially at the few inlets along the rock-bound coast where a landing might be possible. High winds, with their resultant surf, kept Amherst reconnoitring for several days, but on June 8 he decided to attempt a landing. The troops were embarked in boats, and in three separate divisions they made for different points along the wide, shallow indent known as Gabarus Bay, a few miles from Louisburg. Each party was supported by artillery fire from the fleet, to keep the French engaged at all points

and prevent them from realizing that only one party really intended to effect a landing. This was the division led by Wolfe. Notwithstanding the fact that several of its boats capsized as they neared the shore, the men began to scramble through the surf, and, led by their General, charged and captured the French batteries that opposed them. Seventeen abandoned guns were soon in Wolfe's hands. How, in the face of such difficulties, the feat was ever accomplished was a matter of surprise no less to the French than to Wolfe himself. The other divisions were now able to land at the same spot, and the French, in a panic, fled helter-skelter for Louisburg, abandoning all the positions they had taken up outside the fortress.

Amherst was now able to open his siege lines. Communication between ship and shore remained difficult and often impossible, for heavy weather continued, and many of the boats were smashed upon the hidden rocks. Wolfe, with a force of 1200 men, took possession of the point of land facing Louisburg across the bay, and from there his batteries silenced the French guns on the island that commanded the entrance to the harbour. This task completed, Wolfe returned with most of his force to the main body, where he assisted in mounting batteries ever closer to the town, until it was even possible to fire upon the French ships anchored in the harbour. Although these vessels had sacrificed their power of manœuvre by the position they had taken up, their artillery fire was of great assistance to the defenders, and since four of them had been sunk in the harbour-mouth it was impossible for Boscawen to force an entrance. But before the end of July complete disaster befell the French squadron. Two vessels got out to sea, only to be captured later; three were burnt as the result of an explosion; two more were captured by a gallant cutting-out expedition. By this time the French in Louisburg were thoroughly demoralized, and Drucour, convinced that he could not hold out much longer in face of the artillery fire from land and sea, surrendered unconditionally on July 26. On the following day the British marched in, and the entrance to Canada *via* the St Lawrence lay open. Two years later the defences of Louisburg, the "Dunkirk of the north," were destroyed. They have never been rebuilt.

Meanwhile General Abercromby, operating from his base at Albany, up the river Hudson, had attempted to invade Canada by way of Lake Champlain. Montcalm, however, aware of this intention, had constructed a series of strong fortifications at Ticonderoga, the southernmost French post on the lake, manned by 3000 men. Against the French stockades Abercromby hurled his 6000 regular troops and his colonial militia in vain. His artillery had been left out of reach; Howe, his brilliant young second-in-command, had been shot just before the engagement took place, and after losing nearly 2000 men Abercromby

was forced to withdraw. The news of his defeat left Amherst in some doubt as to whether he ought to move from Louisburg against Quebec, or to transfer at least some portion of his army to the scene of operations up the Hudson. His indecision evoked a characteristic outburst from Wolfe. "I am ready," he wrote to his commanding officer, "to embark with four or five battalions, and will hasten to the assistance of our countrymen." He was sent instead into the St Lawrence Gulf with a small expedition to destroy the French fishing stations and magazines of stores, while Amherst himself led a force of 3000 men to reinforce Abercromby.

Two more successful operations, smaller but far-reaching in effect, took place in 1758. Colonel Bradstreet, with a force of 3000 men, mostly colonial militia, crossed Lake Ontario and destroyed Fort Frontenac, capturing also the nine armed vessels that constituted the French naval force on the lake. The chain of French forts was thus effectively cut, and it became increasingly difficult for Governor Vaudreuil to maintain his distant outposts to the south. Consequently orders were issued for the evacuation of Fort Duquesne, and when Colonel Forbes arrived there in November of the same year, with a mixed force of Highlanders and militia, mostly drawn from the middle colonies, he was able to take possession and re-establish the settlement (now Pittsburg). The French garrison of over 400 men had retreated in two directions, some going down the Ohio and some northward towards Presqu'île and Venango. The line of French forts was thus severed once again.

Quebec and the Operations of 1759. In the autumn of 1758 Admiral Boscawen returned to England, taking Wolfe with him. The latter thought it probable that he might now see service in Europe, but Pitt was already busy with plans for the resumption of the Canadian campaign as soon as the approach of summer should permit, and it was in that theatre of war that he intended to employ Wolfe. A threefold advance was projected against the French—by way of Fort Niagara, the capture of which was entrusted to Brigadier Prideaux; by Lake Champlain, with Amherst in command in succession to the incompetent Abercromby; and, most important and most difficult of all, by way of the St Lawrence, a combined operation entrusted to Admiral Saunders and Wolfe, who was given the local rank of major-general on his acceptance of the commission. Amherst and Admiral Durell were informed of Pitt's intentions, and spent the winter and early spring in making the necessary preparations on the spot. In February 1759 a fleet of well-guarded transports left England with the necessary reinforcements of troops and stores, and shortly afterwards Saunders and Wolfe followed with the naval squadron.

The first rendezvous was at Halifax, for ice still rendered the St


Lawrence Gulf dangerous. There Wolfe assembled his force of rather fewer than 9000 men, and Saunders his squadron of twenty-two sail of the line, with their attendant frigates. Wolfe considered that the odds were heavily in favour of the French, at any rate so far as Quebec itself was concerned. He was not very impressed by his own army: it was smaller than had been originally intended; he thought the Colonial Rangers the "worst soldiers in the universe"; and his engineers—of great importance in siege operations—he described as "very indifferent." The French would naturally concentrate the greater part of their available force at Quebec, and it seemed improbable that the town would fall before the arrival of Amherst with his army of 12,000 men, by way of Lake Champlain and the river Richelieu. The bare possibility of such an event, however, had struck Pitt, who believed thoroughly that in Wolfe he had chosen the right commander for the task.

As the ice in the St Lawrence melted Durell failed to maintain the strictness of his blockade, and a number of French provision ships, bearing also a small reinforcement of troops, managed to get through. The Government at Paris had been made fully aware of the condition of affairs in Canada, but owing to the exigencies of the war in Europe and the blockade carried out by the English fleet it could do little more than instruct Montcalm to concentrate his forces as far as possible and to endeavour to maintain his hold over the St Lawrence at least, until the advent of peace in Europe should bring him relief. This reply to his appeal for assistance from home was discouraging enough, and Montcalm fully realized the desperate nature of the struggle that was about to begin. Concentrating his forces, to the number of about 20,000 to 25,000 men, he detailed 14,000 for the defence of Quebec, and placed most of the remainder at Montreal or upon Lake Champlain.

At the beginning of June the English army destined for the St Lawrence got to sea. On the 26th of that month, after a feat of navigation that astonished the French, who had not thought it possible to take a battle fleet unaided up the dangerous St Lawrence channel, from which all the marks had been removed, the expedition arrived off the inhabited island of Orleans, which the French promptly evacuated, without any attempt at resistance. There Wolfe landed his army. To the north and west of the island the river forms a wide sweep, into which several tributaries run their torrential courses. There the shore is shelving, or formed of low cliffs, and Wolfe had expected to make his actual attack on Quebec from this direction. But Montcalm knew where the weakness of his position lay; from Quebec to the river Montmorency the shore was lined with trenches and batteries, manned by nearly 12,000 men, by far the greater part of his force. In view of this the French position indeed appeared impregnable, for Quebec itself

stood on the craggy promontory formed by the St Lawrence and the St Charles rivers, the Upper Town high up on the cliffs, at an elevation far above that of the guns of the fleet, and the more accessible Lower Town clustering round the shore at its foot.

To blockade the town from the river only was futile, and Wolfe was not long in distributing his forces. Opposite Quebec the river narrows to less than a mile in width, a distance well within the compass of the artillery of the period. For this reason Saunders did not at first think it possible to force his way up the river beyond the town. Wolfe decided to occupy the southern shore, partly to prevent the French from doing so, and partly in order to establish a battery for the bombardment of Quebec. On June 29 Brigadier Monckton accordingly occupied Point Levi, to the west of which batteries were soon erected. A volunteer



ENVIRONS OF QUEBEC

force of Frenchmen and Indians, which crossed the St Lawrence higher up and advanced against this position, broke into a panic and retired in haste without actually threatening it. From that time onward Quebec began to suffer heavily from the English gunfire.

Soon afterwards Wolfe decided to occupy a position on the northern shore of the river, to the east of the Montmorency. His intention appears to have been an attack on Quebec from the rear, where he expected to find its defences at their weakest. Brigadiers Townshend and Murray were entrusted with the task of transporting 3000 men across the river, under cover of a diversion created by Monckton and Saunders. The operation was successfully carried out, leaving Wolfe's army in three divisions, their communications secured by Saunders's command of the river. Still, however, Montcalm refused to be drawn, but remained behind his defences, secure in the knowledge of his strength. Wolfe was little nearer to obtaining his objective than before.

On July 18 Saunders discovered that it was possible for ships to pass

up the river beyond Quebec without suffering appreciable damage from the French guns. Two days later a small force under Carleton carried out a raid on Point aux Trembles, eighteen miles above the town. In view of what happened later the success of this raid was significant. The extent of the English control over the river was becoming increasingly evident, and, apart from an attack by fire-ships, which the English sailors took in tow and beached safely out of harm's way, the French appeared unable to combat it.

The summer was wearing away, and so far little of note had been accomplished. Instead of Amherst arriving to assist in the siege of Quebec, it seemed probable that Wolfe after all might have to furnish indirect assistance to Amherst. It is a military axiom that when a commander is in doubt over what course to pursue the one solution inevitably wrong is to do nothing. Wolfe was too good a soldier not to realize that the initiative lay with him. He accordingly determined to attack the French lines at the place where their flank rested upon the Montmorency river. Here the enemy were separated from Townshend's camp by an impassable cataract, but between the falls and the St Lawrence the river was fordable at low water.

On July 31 Wolfe, with a strong force of Grenadiers and colonial troops, appeared off the north shore of the river. The day was sultry, and some time was spent in moving the boats from point to point in what was apparently an attempt to deceive the enemy, while some of Townshend's troops made a similar feint inland up the course of the Montmorency. Late in the afternoon, as the weather broke in a terrific thunderstorm, the landing was made at the agreed spot, only to meet with instant disaster. The Grenadiers, a thousand strong, broke completely from the control of their officers and dashed headlong for the French lines, before Townshend's troops could ford the Montmorency and allow Wolfe to make a properly concerted attack. Nearly five hundred men were shot down before the remainder could be called off and re-embarked, together with as many of the wounded as it was possible to rescue from the scalping-knives of the Indians. Townshend's men were ordered to retreat at the same time. The attack had proved a complete failure, and Wolfe was forced to issue a strong reprimand against the "impetuous, irregular, and unsoldierlike" conduct of his troops.

At the beginning of August General Murray was sent with 1200 men up the river beyond Quebec. It was the 24th before he returned, having made an unsuccessful attempt to effect another landing at Point aux Trembles. Meanwhile Wolfe had been suffering severely from an attack of fever, aggravated by the fear, now almost become a certainty, that his expedition was doomed to failure. At any rate, there was now nothing to be gained by keeping Townshend's brigade in its separate camp near

the Montmorency, so on September 3 it was withdrawn. Wolfe then withdrew most of his troops from the Isle of Orleans, and transferred them to the south shore of the St Lawrence, above Quebec. By using the fleet to create a diversion he could easily pass troops up the river ; but the distance to which he could go was limited by the French ships that had eluded Admiral Durell in the spring, and which now prevented any attempt at co-operation with Amherst.

It was an examination of the northern shore that led Wolfe to concentrate his attention on that particular break in the cliffs known as the Anse au Foulon (Wolfe's Cove), which for some reason was inadequately held by the French. Here he decided to make a landing on the night of September 12. With great skill the navy escorted the troops up the river, without anyone in Quebec discovering what was taking place. There was no moon and a mist was rising from the water as just before midnight the troops started to embark. Some two hours later, with Wolfe and his staff leading, the line of boats dropped down towards Quebec on the ebb tide. That night it so happened that a supply of provisions was due to reach Quebec by water, instead of by land, as was usually the case ; Wolfe knew of this, and thus, when challenged by piquets along the shore, a French-speaking officer in the English boats was able to allay suspicion. With extraordinary skill the cove was located in the darkness ; one party of volunteers scrambled up the cliff, was joined rapidly by another, and captured the French camp on top within a few moments, most of its occupants taking to their heels. Boat after boat put into the cove, returning to the ships, which had followed down the river, and bringing fresh troops from the southern shore also. Two French batteries, apprised of what was happening, now began to fire, but both were speedily captured. As the morning of September 13 dawned Wolfe was therefore able to occupy the Heights of Abraham with an army numbering between four and five thousand men, of whom rather more than three thousand were destined to take an active part in the coming battle. At last Montcalm would have to emerge from behind his entrenchments and fight in the open. Anxious to prevent the English from similarly fortifying the position they had just taken up, he elected to do so at once, without waiting for the arrival of Bougainville, who commanded a considerable force of French troops a little farther up the river.

The battle began with an attack by Montcalm's auxiliary skirmishers towards the English left, or landward, flank, where the nature of the ground afforded sufficient cover for the Indian sharpshooters. This was withstood by Townshend's brigade, and meanwhile Montcalm arrayed his troops and led them personally to the main attack. Shouting and firing, the French advanced until they were within forty paces, when Wolfe gave the order to fire. Such havoc resulted from

the English volleys that Montcalm was unable to rally his troops, who broke and fled into Quebec or through the woods and across the St Charles into their camp. Wolfe himself, struck in the wrist, in the groin, and finally in the chest, lived just long enough to learn that his plan had succeeded. His body was afterwards embalmed by order of Admiral Saunders, and taken to England. Once more Pitt's judgment had been vindicated; Wolfe, out of almost certain failure, had snatched a victory. With his tiny army, in a battle lasting no more than a few moments, he had sealed the fate of the French in Canada.

But Quebec did not immediately surrender, and despite its initial success the English army might easily have been placed in a perilous position. By the time the Indian and Canadian bush-fighters had been driven from the woods on the English flank it was found that the casualties amounted in all to between six and seven hundred men, of which number over fifty had been killed. Monckton, Wolfe's senior brigadier, had been wounded, and the command therefore devolved on Townshend, who made haste to fortify himself on the heights. But his position was not challenged; Governor Vaudreuil, his morale completely broken by the result of the battle, hastily abandoned the Beauport camp and withdrew up-river towards Montreal in great disorder. Bougainville, who was approaching to the relief of his countrymen, was therefore unable to accomplish anything, and Quebec was virtually abandoned to its fate. Inside the town the gallant Montcalm died of the wounds he had received in the battle, and was buried in a hole made by a British shell in the floor of the chapel of the Ursuline Convent. After this a council of war decided to surrender the town, and the news that Levis was approaching to its relief did not alter the decision.

When the British marched into Quebec they found its defences so battered by shell-fire that it was a matter of some doubt whether the place could really be made defensible, since the French were still able to attack in superior force. It was decided, however, that the attempt should be made, and that, instead of withdrawing, the winter should be spent in Quebec. Both Monckton and Townshend returned to England, leaving Brigadier Murray in command. In October Saunders departed with the fleet. Several of the French ships from up the river followed him, and succeeded in escaping before the river was closed by ice. Winter set in, and the English soldiers applied themselves vigorously to the tasks of repairing their defences, cutting timber for fuel, clearing away snowdrifts, and generally keeping warm.

It was fortunate for the British that Wolfe's expedition to Quebec achieved success before the autumn was too far advanced, for Amherst's operations on Lake Champlain were not sufficiently energetic to create

a diversion in its favour. During the early summer of 1759 Amherst had collected on Lake George an army of about 11,000 men, half of whom were regular troops. It was July 21 before these troops were embarked in boats and began their journey northward for a second attack on Ticonderoga. That fortification was now under the command of an officer named Bouchoulle, but the French had no intention of seriously contesting its possession. At the north end of Lake Champlain, where the waters of the lake debouch into the river Richelieu, the channel of the latter is split by the Isle-aux-Noix, and it was here that the French had determined to fortify a new position and bar the passage of the English in their coming attempt to force the Champlain—Richelieu—St Lawrence route. Accordingly only 400 men under Hébert were left at Ticonderoga, and on July 26, as the English army approached, the fortifications were blown up and set on fire. Crown Point was likewise evacuated, and Amherst was thus able to establish himself at this new headquarters without trouble and without loss.

At the Isle-aux-Noix Bouchoulle had about 3500 men, a strong force of artillery, and several armed ships. It was knowledge of the last-named that prevented the cautious Amherst from making a decisive effort to come to the assistance of Wolfe at Quebec. Instead he began as usual to consolidate his position with great care, constructing fortifications and roadways, exploring the surrounding countryside, and, most important of all, building a navy to put himself on equal terms with the French. It was not till the middle of October that a brig, a sloop, and a large floating battery were ready, but by that time the weather had broken; a series of autumnal gales drove the expedition from the lake, and Amherst was forced to recognize that the time for winter quarters had arrived.

Meanwhile, however, Amherst had initiated a further expedition that resulted in the capture of Fort Niagara. Brigadier Prideaux was sent to Lake Ontario *via* the Mohawk Valley. After leaving nearly half his force under Colonel Haldimand to rebuild Fort Oswego he himself proceeded to besiege Fort Niagara, near the head of the lake, which was held by some 600 Frenchmen and their Indian auxiliaries. An unfortunate accident—the premature bursting of one of his own shells—caused the death of Prideaux, but the siege was continued under Johnson, who repelled a relieving force of French bushrangers and Indians. The news of this engagement caused the commander of the garrison to surrender Fort Niagara in July. Once again the line of forts had been cut, and in consequence Presqu'île, Le Bœuf, and Venango were all abandoned. Amherst now sent Gage with instructions to penetrate the St Lawrence from the direction of Ontario, but on arrival the new commander considered this course impracticable

for the time being, and the season drew to a close without any further movements being attempted.

The Fall of French Canada (1760). The spring of 1760 found the French still preparing to resume the offensive. Quebec was full of spies, and Vaudreuil was quite aware that scurvy and hardship had played such havoc with the English troops that the hospitals were full to overflowing and not more than 3000 men were fit for duty. In April, therefore, General Levis, with several naval vessels that had wintered up the river, and a force that by the time he neared Quebec amounted to nearly 9000 men, advanced against the city, prepared either to do battle in the open or to begin a siege that it was hoped would meet with success before the English fleet could arrive with stores and reinforcements.

On the morning of April 27 Levis's advance-guard came into action against an English outpost at the village of Sainte-Foy, near the Heights of Abraham. Murray, in Quebec, heard what was happening from a French sergeant found floating among the broken ice that the ebb of the tide was sweeping past the promontory. With a relieving force he therefore made haste to Sainte-Foy, where he succeeded in withdrawing his outpost in safety. Apprised by this time of the extent and purpose of the French threat, he decided that a battle in the open offered his best chance of success, since the fortifications of Quebec were too weak, yet too extensive, to defend with his attenuated army, and the ground outside, though covered with mud and melting snow, was still too hard to entrench quickly. Accordingly on April 28 the Heights of Abraham once more witnessed French and English armies in battle order, though this time with positions reversed. Murray led his little force of 3000 men to the attack, supported by twenty pieces of artillery. The execution of the latter led to the retirement of the French left, a movement promptly followed up by Murray. But when his infantry moved beyond the support of the guns, which were difficult to move forward through the mud and in any case soon ran out of ammunition, both flanks were overwhelmed by the superior length of the French line and forced to retire. Murray was able to withdraw in good order to Quebec, but over a third of his force suffered casualties.

There was nothing to do now but strengthen the defences of Quebec as well as possible, and endeavour to hold out until the fleet should arrive. With six warships in the river and his army entrenched along the heights, Levis began the siege. But his operations were too slow to meet with success. On May 9 the English frigate *Lowestoffe* appeared in the river, to be followed within a week by several other warships, which attacked and defeated the French vessels. Thereupon Levis withdrew his army in the direction of Montreal, leaving behind him a number of cannon and a quantity of stores.

The plan for a threefold advance in the direction of Montreal was now at last put into operation. On July 15 Murray left Quebec with 2450 men and proceeded up the river. It was now that Louisburg was dismantled, and some 1300 troops from that fortress were therefore released to follow Murray. Just below Montreal the expedition anchored to await the arrival of the remainder of the English forces. Bougainville, now in command at the Isle-aux-Noix, had nearly 2000 troops with him on the island, but when he was attacked by Haviland, who commanded over 3000 men, and his little navy succumbed to the English vessels built in the preceding year, he evacuated his position and retired. Haviland followed, and was soon in touch with Murray near Montreal.

On August 10 Amherst embarked on Lake Ontario an army of 10,000 white and 700 Indian troops. The expedition started from Fort Oswego, and had soon left the lake and begun the perilous task of shooting the rapids of the upper St Lawrence. A number of the boats were overturned, and altogether eighty-four men were drowned; but the French made no serious attempt to hinder the English advance, and eventually Amherst landed his army about nine miles above Montreal. Murray now landed below the city, and Haviland on the southern shore of the river. For some time past the French Canadians had been deserting their Governor in large numbers and making their peace with the English, and Vaudreuil, surrounded by an army of about 17,000 men, realized that further resistance was useless and surrendered Montreal on September 8.

With the fall of Pitt and the subsequent war with Spain we are not directly concerned. The preliminaries of the Peace of Paris between England and France were drawn up by Bute in November 1762, and ratified in the following year. It had been the hope of the French Government that some footing at least might have been maintained in Canada till the end of the war, but the total loss of the colony had made its cession inevitable. Britain received all the former French possessions in Canada, including Cape Breton Island and the recognition of the British claims to Acadie and the Ohio Valley. France retained only New Orleans and the district surrounding it (now further weakened in importance by the cession of Florida to England by the Spaniards), and the two small fishing islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, which she was not allowed to fortify.

SUMMARY

(1) *The Ohio Scheme*

- (a) Treaty of Utrecht ceded Acadie to Britain and acknowledged her suzerainty over the Ohio Indians.
- (b) Louisburg captured and restored during 'King George's War.'
- (c) 1749. Bienville took possession of the Ohio Valley.

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- (d) 1753-54. Duquesne built forts on the Allegheny.
- (e) 1755. Braddock's defeat near Fort Duquesne.
- (2) *The French Successes (1756-57)*
 - (a) 1756. Montcalm captured Fort Oswego.
 - (b) 1757. Pitt became War Minister; Montcalm captured Fort William Henry.
- (3) *Louisburg and the Operations of 1758*
 - (a) Amherst and Boscawen attacked Drucour at Louisburg; landing by Wolfe at Gabarus Bay; capitulation after siege (July 26).
 - (b) Abercromby failed to take Ticonderoga.
 - (c) Bradstreet destroyed Fort Frontenac.
 - (d) Forbes occupied Fort Duquesne.
- (4) *Quebec and the Operations of 1759*
 - (a) Wolfe and Saunders attacked Montcalm at Quebec; failure at landing near Montmorency; victory on Heights of Abraham (September 13).
 - (b) Amherst occupied Ticonderoga and Crown Point.
 - (c) Johnson captured Fort Niagara.
- (5) *The Fall of French Canada (1760)*
 - (a) Levis defeated Murray on the Heights of Abraham, but Quebec held out till arrival of fleet.
 - (b) Murray from Quebec, Haviland from Lake Champlain, and Amherst from Lake Ontario converged on Montreal; Vaudreuil capitulated on September 8.
 - (c) By the Treaty of Paris (1763) France ceded all her possessions in North America except New Orleans, Saint-Pierre, and Miquelon.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The situation of the British and French in North America in 1756.
- (2) The career of Wolfe.

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CHAPTER IV

FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE RISE OF PRUSSIA


FREDERICK II of Prussia, better known as Frederick the Great, was one of the few extraordinary characters that the history of Europe has so far produced. Many rulers have conceived vast enterprises; some have directed them; few have conceived, planned, directed, and executed to the extent that always seemed possible to Frederick's lively brain and boundless energy. What writer of fiction would sketch as hero a skilful general, hardened by many years of difficult campaigning, flogging his kidnapped troops to enforce the harshest discipline then known to a harsh age, yet weeping copiously and unashamedly when things went wrong; farming, trading, and travelling when peace succeeded war, rising at four in the morning, and often earlier, to keep his directing finger upon the pulse of every artery of the State; dirty, untidy, boorish often, and coarse in speech and joke, yet possessed of the wit and intelligence to appreciate the best in philosophy, poetry, and music? Such complexity shows not one, but many Fredericks. Yet there was no diversity of purpose in this life of incessant toil. The guiding hand was everywhere; Frederick had far more reason than Louis XIV to call himself 'the State.' The State, with its well-being, aggrandizement, and strength, was indeed his goal. He made his kingdom a first-class Power, ruthless to all that stood between him and his object. The greatness of Prussia begins with him, but the method of its accomplishment and the spirit that is associated in history with the name of his house belong to an earlier time. Frederick was the builder, but the foundations that bore his structure had already been slowly and painstakingly laid.

The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia. In A.D. 928 an outpost for the defence of Christendom and the civilization for which it stood was established by Henry the Fowler¹ against the heathen Wends in the country lying between the rivers Elbe and Oder. It was called the Nordmark, or North March, and by gradual extensions of territory it eventually became the Margraviate of Brandenburg, taking the name from a fortress situated within its boundaries, and the designation from

¹ Henry I, Duke of Saxony (876?-936), was chosen as German king in 919, though his authority outside Saxony was merely nominal.

the title 'margrave' given to the man who ruled such marches. Beyond the Oder territory, known as the Newmark, was incorporated.

A development of considerable importance came in 1351. In that year Brandenburg was made an electorate, its ruler being admitted to



THE DOMINIONS OF PRUSSIA (1740-72)

the select body of princes, lay and ecclesiastical, who had the right of electing the Holy Roman Emperor, nominal successor of Charlemagne. During the course of the next century a new dynasty, destined to become the most famous in German history, appeared in the person of Frederick of Hohenzollern, Burgrave of Nuremberg, in Franconia, who was invested as Elector of Brandenburg in 1417.

Away on the shores of the Baltic, between the kingdom of Poland

and the sea, lay the wild and dreary country of marshes and forests known as Prussia. In 1231 this region had become the home of the Teutonic Order of Knights, which, soon after its settlement in Prussia, founded the city of Königsberg. In 1466 Prussia was divided into two parts, West Prussia becoming a part of Poland, thus giving that kingdom an access to the sea not unlike the 'Polish Corridor' re-created after the Great War of 1914-18. East Prussia still remained under the Teutonic Knights, who held it as a fief of the Polish Crown. This duchy of East Prussia in 1618 fell to the lot of John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg. Originally held under the suzerainty of Poland, it became an independent duchy under the Electors of Brandenburg in 1660.

By this time Prussia was not the only outlying portion of the Hohenzollern dominions. Frequent intermarriage among the German ruling houses had always been productive of a complicated series of claims and counter-claims to the insignificant states of which Central Europe was composed, and the house of Hohenzollern claimed rights of succession in a group of duchies and counties, Cleves, Jülich, Berg, Mark, Ravensberg, and Ravenstein, that lay scattered about the valley of the Rhine. The claim to Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg was practically established in 1614, a few years before the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, and became really effective in 1666. The vague rights of succession to the other three were by no means abandoned, and remained to form one cause of the great conflict between Hohenzollern and Habsburg in the eighteenth century.

The religious struggles of the Thirty Years War, which came to an end at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, left Brandenburg-Prussia the strongest Protestant state in Germany. Frederick William, the 'Great Elector,' who ruled from 1640 to 1688, was the first great exponent of the policy that was to become the typical Prussian contribution to the science of statecraft. All things were subordinated to the power and aggrandizement of the State; government was by bureaucracy, supported by military power, for the Great Elector multiplied the tiny Prussian army of 4000 men until it numbered nearly 30,000. At the Peace of Westphalia his territory was increased by the acquisition of a part of Pomerania, and, more important still, the Great Elector began to augment his scanty population by encouraging the immigration of Protestants who sought refuge from religious persecution in their own countries.

The next reign was destined to see the ruler of Brandenburg-Prussia elevated to the dignity of kingship. The new Elector, Frederick III, now head of a state vastly increased in military, and therefore in political, importance, took part in the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-97) against Louis XIV. During the few uneasy years of peace that preceded the renewal of the conflict in the War of the Spanish Succession,

which began in 1702, the Emperor was anxious to gain Frederick III's support for the Austrian candidate to the Spanish throne. The result was the 'Treaty of the Crown,' by virtue of which on January 18, 1701, the Elector was allowed to crown himself at Königsberg with the title of 'Frederick I, King *in* Prussia.' Although taking this title because Prussia lay outside the boundary of the Empire, Frederick I was nevertheless king in his other possessions as well. But he could not style himself King *of* Prussia, since the western part of that country still remained in Polish hands. In return for the Treaty of the Crown the Emperor and his allies were once more supported by the Prussian army in the renewed struggle against Louis XIV. The result was the cession of a portion of Gelderland to Prussia by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, which was signed two months after Frederick I's death.

Frederick William I (1713-40). The second King in Prussia, unlike his father, was no lover of pomp and display. His accession to the throne was the signal for the introduction of a new *régime* of rigid economy and Spartan simplicity. The royal establishment was reduced to the absolute minimum; costly furniture and fittings disappeared, and with them all that savoured of French elegance and French influence, things particularly abhorrent to the new King. It became evident that the policy of the Great Elector was about to receive a new and intensified lease of life; that bureaucratic control was to become still more highly centralized; that the subordination of everything to the power of the State was to be the principal object of the new ruler; and that that power was to be based upon an army even larger and more efficient than before.

Notwithstanding the long and exhausting wars of the previous reign, Frederick William immediately joined the campaign against Sweden which began in 1713. As a wartime general he was not famous, and, indeed, was not disposed to use his army for securing ends that could be obtained by more peaceful (and therefore cheaper) methods, but the Northern War ended in 1719 with the final deposition of Sweden from a position of European importance. A part of Eastern Pomerania (Stralsund and the island of Rügen) alone remained of her former possessions on the southern shores of the Baltic, and Prussia, of course, obtained her share of the conquered territory by the acquisition of Stettin and part of Western Pomerania.

For the administration of his kingdom Frederick William developed a General Directory of five departments, covering most of the activities of State. From the Ministers in control of each he could obtain direct reports, and, such was his personal energy, would issue direct orders in return. The inevitable result was increased power for the King and his paid officials, at the expense of the Privy Council and the constitutional assemblies, such as they were. The towns also lost many of their

privileges, notably that of controlling their own finances. Taxation was, indeed, a very important factor in the new administration, for Frederick William intended that Prussia should support an army out of all proportion to its size, and eventually three-quarters of the total revenue was devoted to this purpose.

At the beginning of the reign the Army numbered nearly 40,000 men. For the size of the kingdom this number was already over-large, but before twelve years had passed Frederick William had made it more than half as large again. His special pride was the Life Guard of 'Potsdam Grenadiers,' recruited from men of unusual height and trained to a degree of parade-ground efficiency unequalled in Europe. In 1733 a form of conscription was introduced by dividing Prussia into 'cantons,' each of which supplied theoretically the number of men needed to keep a particular regiment up to strength, though recruiting in other European countries and the employment of mercenaries still continued as before. By such means Frederick William had by the end of his reign increased his Army to close on 90,000 men, of which over 70,000 were effective field troops. In military strength the comparatively small Prussian state was in 1740 inferior only to France, Russia, and Austria; in training the Army was in many ways superior to any of these countries. A new drill-book had been prepared with the help of Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau,¹ and the precision and discipline gained by this means were to prove of inestimable advantage in the field, when coupled with the long campaigning experience of the next reign.

Frederick William's foreign policy centred round his relations with the Emperor Charles VI, to whom on the whole he remained a loyal ally. Throughout the whole course of his reign Charles was deeply concerned with the succession to his dominions and to the Imperial throne, which had for generations remained with the house of Habsburg. To secure and safeguard the settlement he desired Charles VI therefore issued his Pragmatic Sanction, a decree of a particularly binding character adopted from the later Roman law, and often used in matters affecting succession to the throne. When it was first issued in 1713 Charles laid down that his territories were to pass without division to his male heirs, or, failing that, to his daughters, the aim being to prevent disintegration of the patchwork mosaic that the Habsburgs had gradually built into the Austrian Empire. In 1720 Charles's only son died, leaving him with two daughters, of whom the elder, Maria Theresa, was at that time three years old. In view of the Salic Law it therefore became more important than ever to obtain support for the Pragmatic Sanction, which now had to be republished, guaranteeing the Habsburg dominions to Maria Theresa. By 1724 the component parts of the

¹ Leopold I, the 'Old Dessauer' (1676-1747), became a Prussian general in 1712, the year of Frederick the Great's birth.

Habsburg Empire had agreed, and Charles began to secure support from abroad. Eventually Spain, France, Russia, England, Prussia, and other German electorates agreed, though Bavaria withdrew her support later. In 1736 Maria Theresa married her cousin, Francis of Lorraine,¹ and it became the Emperor's further object to secure for his son-in-law the succession to the Imperial throne.

Naturally foreign nations did not agree to the Pragmatic Sanction without expecting some concessions in return. England, for example, always anxious about her overseas trade, persuaded the Emperor practically to suppress the Ostend East India Company. Frederick William promised his support in return for Austrian assistance in the matter of Jülich and Berg. This was guaranteed him by the Treaty of Wüsterhausen, signed in 1726 and ratified again in 1728. In view of this Frederick William joined Austria against France in the War of the Polish Succession, but when peace was made in 1738 he found, to his rage and chagrin, that Charles VI had never really intended to support him in the matter, and, in fact, rather preferred the cause of another claimant, who was a Catholic. The result was that Frederick William, bitterly denouncing the Austrian treachery, signed in 1739 a secret agreement with his old enemy, France.

The old 'drill-sergeant' King was now drawing very close to his end. He had not been a lovable character ; in fact, during the fits of ungovernable rage that shook him at frequent intervals he appeared little short of insane. As a father his lack of sympathy and insight did not augur well for the upbringing of his son ; but as a king he had at least very definite ideas on the necessary training for a crown prince. Between the two his infant son had rather a difficult time.

The Crown Prince Frederick was born in 1712, the year before his father came to the throne. As he grew from infancy to boyhood it became evident that this was no chip off the old block. Undeterred by this, Frederick William set out to mould his son into a successor capable of perpetuating the Prussian system as he himself saw it. The Crown Prince was to be taught the details of civil and military administration, the intricacies of law and commerce, anything that would fit him eventually to control the workings of the bureaucratic machine that had within its grasp all the affairs of the new and rising monarchy. To Frederick William's utilitarian soul philosophy and the arts were pastimes deserving the utmost contempt. Yet, strangely enough, his son's inclinations seemed to lie wholly in these directions, and the young Prince's acquisition of such knowledge progressed, though not without some difficulty. Always handy with his stick, the King would fly upon the offending tutor who dared to instil such rubbish

¹ Francis I (1708-65), Duke of Lorraine in 1729, which he exchanged for reversion of Tuscany in 1735. He became Holy Roman Emperor in 1745.

as Latin grammar, while the terrified pupil cowered trembling beneath the table. Yet in spite of such handicaps, and much personal chastisement, productive of so lively an impression that Frederick in later life admitted that the terrors of punishments received at his father's hands were still a constantly recurring nightmare, the young Prince, who had been taught French and adopted that language for preference, read widely in philosophy and poetry, became proficient on the flute, and, as was only natural in one of his tastes, began to try his hand at writing and composing. "Flute-blower and rhymester!" said his father contemptuously.

In 1726 the Crown Prince entered the Army, but the hard military training of a Prussian soldier, at a time when he was still a mere boy, proved no more to his taste than his previous life had been. Eventually he made up his mind to escape to his uncle, George II of England, and in 1730 the opportunity came when he was on a journey with his father in South Germany. Two friends, Katte and Keith, were in the plot. But Frederick never even started, for his intentions were discovered, and he and Katte were both arrested, though Keith succeeded in getting away. The passion of Frederick William, with his watch-words of duty and obedience, may well be imagined. In spite of the more lenient recommendations of the court-martial that tried the offenders, the King actually insisted that both should be condemned to death. The Courts of Europe were horrified at the news; strong pressure was brought to bear, and Charles VI pointed out that as a prince of the Empire Frederick's life could not be taken without the sanction of an Imperial diet. But nothing could save poor Katte. He was executed in the fortress of Küstrin, while Frederick's head was forcibly held at the window by a group of weeping grenadiers. This last refinement of cruelty was too much for the youth of eighteen, and he fainted.

The events of 1730 appear to have been the turning-point of Frederick's career. Although his literary and artistic occupations remained his principal source of pleasure till the end of his life, from now onward his energies were bent on fitting himself to carry out the task of kingship in the manner his father desired. For over a year he was kept at Küstrin, working in the Department of War and Domains. Eventually his diligence brought about a reconciliation with Frederick William; the Crown Prince's military rank was restored, and shortly afterwards he was appointed colonel of a regiment of infantry. In 1733 Frederick married a princess of Brunswick-Bevern,¹ and although he did not love his wife, the possession of an establishment of his own at Rheinsberg, where he could enjoy peacefully the pursuits dear to his heart, did much to further his own happiness and to improve his

¹ Elizabeth Christina, a cousin of Maria Theresa.

relations with his father. It cannot be said that real affection ever existed between the two, but the King's efforts had at last been rewarded in producing from unpromising material the kind of successor he desired—rewarded, in fact, to a far greater degree than he can ever have realized. As for Frederick, in later life he acknowledged freely the immense debt that both he himself and the country he ruled owed to the old King.

The Seizure of Silesia. Frederick William I died on May 31, 1740. Before the end of the year the unexpected had come to pass, and the Prussian parade-ground army was in the field.

The new reign did not inaugurate a period of culture and peaceful development, as it might have done if Frederick II had been left to pursue his own devices unchecked in early life. Instead he showed himself from the very start a Hohenzollern of the Hohenzollerns, prepared to continue and improve upon the policy of his father and the Great Elector. It is true that music and the stage now found an ardent patron in the King, but the Army was immediately increased by another 16,000 men, and taught that efficiency in the field rather than on the parade-ground was now to be the justification for its existence. Frederick meant to use it.

If Prussia were to seek further expansion of territory one might have thought that the first step would be to make good the claim to Jülich and Berg. But the increase of Prussian influence in the valley of the Rhine would almost certainly provoke the hostility of France, and fate was about to place in Frederick's path an easier and more attractive prey.

On October 20 the Emperor Charles VI died; Maria Theresa succeeded to the Habsburg dominions, and the value of the Pragmatic Sanction was at last put to the test. Few of the signatories were particularly concerned with the ethics of the matter; Bavaria, Saxony, and Spain all had claims to parts of the Austrian Empire. Spain was already at war with England over the affair of Jenkins's Ear; Bavaria had resumed her old friendship with France, and it appeared likely that the latter country would rather see Charles Albert of Bavaria elected to the Imperial throne than Maria Theresa's husband, Francis of Lorraine. For the moment, however, none of these nations had determined on what action to take, if any. But with Frederick of Prussia the case was far different.

Immediately on learning of the Emperor's death Frederick decided that the moment was ripe to avenge the Austrian treachery over Jülich and Berg. He revived a claim, dating from the time of the Great Elector, to the duchies of Liegnitz, Wohlau, and Brieg, all situated in Silesia, and added also a further claim to the duchy of Jaegerndorf. The details relating to these claims are extremely complicated, but it appears

evident that Frederick had no shadow of right on his side. No doubt it is true that if Prussia needed extra territory the valley of the Oder, with its linen industry and iron-ores, offered an excellent chance for expansion ; perhaps also there was a danger that the Elector of Saxony, who was also King of Poland, might conceive the idea of linking the two parts of his dominions. But such arguments as these can hardly be considered a justification of Frederick's policy.

In November Frederick mobilized his army, and informed Maria Theresa that he meant to occupy the parts of Silesia to which he laid claim. In return he offered her an alliance against any similar action on the part of other nations. He met with a spirited refusal, and the First Silesian War began. Eighteenth-century generals did not often indulge in winter campaigns, but Silesia at the moment was practically undefended, and Frederick wanted to take advantage of the fact. As it was, he did not move quickly enough to prevent the principal towns from organizing a hasty defence.

In mid-December the Prussian army of 27,000 men began to move up the river Oder. Glogau was blockaded, and the advance continued towards Breslau. Meanwhile another force, under Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, remained in the west to guard against a possible attack from Hanover, for George II of England was strongly inclined to honour his signature to the Pragmatic Sanction by actively assisting Maria Theresa. In January 1741 Frederick occupied Breslau ; in March Glogau fell. So far the subjugation of Silesia was proving easy. The inhabitants were mostly Protestants, and Frederick had announced his intention of continuing the religious toleration of his predecessors. The invaders did not, therefore, provoke the opposition of a nationalist sentiment, for the Protestant province of Silesia had not been entirely happy under the Catholic Habsburgs.

By this time an Austrian army was approaching under General Neipperg, confident that its practical experience of campaigning would ensure success against the untried Prussian army. In April Frederick opposed it at Mollwitz with 22,000 men. The Austrian army was about equal in size, but superior in cavalry by more than two to one. Hence it came about that, charging upon both flanks, the Austrians drove the Prussian cavalry from the field, and turned to charge the right wing of their infantry both in flank and in rear. But by a fortunate chance, for which Frederick himself can claim no credit, three battalions of infantry on the right wing had already been forced to form front to a flank, and the repeated cavalry charges of the Austrians were successfully resisted. Eventually the Prussians, under Marshal Schwerin,¹ were able to attack

¹ Kurt Christoph, Count von Schwerin (1684-1757), a native of Pomerania who took service with the Prussian Army in 1720. He was made Field-Marshal and Count by Frederick.

in their turn, whereupon the Austrian army retired hastily from the field.

The sterling qualities of the Prussian infantry had gained the day. But where was Frederick? Miles away with his terrified cavalry, firmly convinced that all was over! "I thought I had lost it, and I retired. I could not allow myself to be taken," was the way he put it to his Swiss reader, Henri de Catt, when describing the battle many years later. But at all events Frederick knew how to profit by experience. The improvement of his cavalry arm began to occupy his attention from that time forward.

The Austrian failure at Mollwitz was the signal for the general European conflict known as the War of the Austrian Succession. It appeared that after all there was a reasonable chance of making good a claim to parts of the Habsburg Empire, and the hesitation of France vanished. Louis XV decided to support the candidature of Charles Albert of Bavaria to the Imperial throne, and if possible to gain for France the Austrian Netherlands. Since Maria Theresa, in spite of English efforts to persuade her that such would be the wiser course, still refused to sacrifice any part of Silesia to Prussia, Frederick made the Treaty of Breslau with France, by which he promised his vote for Charles Albert, and relinquished his claims to Jülich and Berg, on the understanding that he should be allowed to keep Breslau and the northern part of Silesia when the war ended. Maria Theresa was therefore faced with a formidable combination, since Prussia, France, Bavaria, and Saxony now all took the field against her.

A combined Franco-Bavarian army moved eastward into Austrian territory. For the time being England had promised neutrality, so no help was to be expected from that quarter. Maria Theresa's only available army for the defence of Vienna was that of Neipperg, which was still in Silesia. It was necessary, therefore, to buy off Frederick for the time being, and, strange as it may seem, he was actually willing to come to an arrangement behind the back of his new ally, France. Frederick never scrupled to dishonour an agreement that had ceased to serve his immediate purpose, and he was already alarmed at the success of his allies' invasion, and apprehensive as to their probable demands if Austria were too easily crushed. The outcome was the secret Convention of Klein Schnellendorf, by which it was agreed that the great fortress of Neisse, in Upper Silesia, should, after a pretended siege, be allowed to fall into Prussian hands, and that in return Frederick should suspend further operations while Neipperg marched away to face the Franco-Bavarian army.

So far as Frederick was concerned the Convention worked excellently. But the Austrian army, now under the command of Maria Theresa's husband, Francis, arrived too late to prevent the French and

their allies from taking Prague. However, Bavaria itself now lay exposed to attack, and a second Austrian army was raised to carry the war into the enemy's territory. This movement was so successful that Frederick decided that the moment had come to resume active operations on behalf of his allies. At the Imperial election he carried out his promise to vote for Charles Albert, who was duly crowned as the Emperor Charles VII in February 1742, and in the same month the Prussian army moved south from Silesia into the Austrian province of Moravia. Frederick's purpose seems to have been an attack on Vienna, and he actually got within forty miles of his objective. But his line of communication was too long, and the approach of Hungarian troops forced him to retreat. At Chotusitz, on May 17, 1742, part of the Prussian army was caught by the Austrians under Prince Charles of Lorraine; and Frederick, returning hastily after the battle had actually begun, was forced to fight his second great engagement. Once again the Austrian cavalry proved superior to the Prussian, but Frederick's attack drove in the Austrian left and centre, and he was left in possession of the field. However, his losses were almost as great as those of his enemy; he was unable to follow up his advantage, and the Austrians were allowed to resume their operations against the French unmolested.

England had now abandoned her policy of neutrality. At the beginning of the year the peace-loving Walpole had at last fallen from power, and both Carteret and George II were in favour of active intervention on behalf of Maria Theresa. Anxious to concentrate the combined energies of English, Hanoverian, and Austrian armies on defeating the French, English diplomacy at Vienna was all in favour of an agreement being reached between Austria and Prussia. For his part Frederick was quite willing to desert his allies for the second time and to conclude a separate peace, provided his original demands were substantially met, and this Maria Theresa was prevailed upon to do. By a preliminary agreement made at Breslau in June 1742, and embodied on July 28 in the formal Treaty of Berlin, Silesia (with the exception of a strip of territory round Troppau and Teschen) and the County of Glatz were ceded to Prussia, and Frederick withdrew from the war. Though he had proved himself an able commander, he had not as yet shone particularly as a general, and the success met with at Mollwitz and Chotusitz had been due primarily to the excellence of his infantry. But he had already shown himself a master of unscrupulous diplomacy, using the presence of the French in Bohemia to secure his own ends in Silesia.

For nearly two years Prussia was at peace, while the War of the Austrian Succession continued to rage in Europe. There was much for Frederick to do at home. A new administrative system had to be organized to cover Silesia, and that province itself had to be put in a

better state of defence, for Frederick was well aware that Maria Theresa did not intend matters to end with the Treaty of Berlin. Meanwhile Berlin was improved by the erection of some notable buildings ; royal patronage was extended to the new Opera House and the Academy of Sciences ; a canal was begun, to link the rivers Elbe and Oder.

It was not long before the situation abroad began to cause Frederick some anxiety. The military operations of France and Bavaria were ending in total failure ; Bavaria was overrun by Austrian troops, and the French were driven out of Germany. To crown everything, in September 1743 Austria, England, Holland, and Sardinia allied themselves in a powerful group of states by the Treaty of Worms. In the following month France and Spain drew up the Treaty of Fontainebleau, and it became evident that the conflict was to continue. Frederick was in no doubt as to the reason why Maria Theresa was so bent on protracting the war now that the original threat to her dominions from France and Bavaria had been frustrated. She was determined to recover Silesia, or other territory in lieu thereof. Accordingly Frederick decided to throw in his lot with France and Bavaria once more, hoping with them to partition Bohemia, and in May 1744 he re-entered the war. By the Union of Frankfort he secured the help of some of the smaller German princes, the ostensible object being to support the cause of the Emperor Charles VII.

The year 1744 brought Frederick an important success and a lucky escape. In the same month that he resumed the war the French invaded the Austrian Netherlands, where for a time they carried all before them. But this move was eventually countered by an Austrian invasion of Alsace, which drew off the bulk of the French army. Now was the opportunity for Frederick to assist his allies by attacking Austria in the rear. Within a very short space of time 80,000 Prussian troops had invaded Bohemia, and after a short siege had captured Prague, the capital. Encouraged by this success, Frederick hastened to cut across the path of the Austrian army, now on the retreat from Alsace. Had the French co-operated by pursuing and attacking the Austrians from the east, this move might have been very successful. They did not, however, and since the Hungarians once more rallied to the Austrian cause it was Frederick who soon found himself in an awkward position. An Austrian army under Marshal Traun,¹ steadily refusing to be drawn into a premature engagement, cut him off from Prague and the north, and both the main Prussian army and the force left behind in Prague were forced to retire eastward into Silesia with more haste than dignity. Winter quarters followed.

In January 1745 the Emperor Charles VII died, and with him went

¹ Otto Ferdinand, Count von Abensberg und Traun (1677-1748), won a great military reputation in Italy, whence he was withdrawn for service in the present war.

Frederick's excuse (though not, of course, his real reason) for waging the present war against Austria. Since the Elector of Saxony, despite the promised support of France and Prussia, refused to offer himself as the next candidate for the Imperial throne, it appeared likely that Maria Theresa's husband, Francis, would be elected Emperor after all. With the arrival of spring the Austrian cause was still further brightened by a sudden attack on Bavaria, so completely successful that the new elector was forced to make peace at last, and even to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction as well.

On the last day of May the Austrian army under Charles of Lorraine took the offensive against Frederick in Silesia. The Prussian position was now serious; no help was to be expected from the French, who since the Bavarian defeat had been cut off from the war in Central Europe and had turned their attention once more to the Austrian Netherlands. To make things worse, Saxony had joined Austria and had sent troops to serve in Charles of Lorraine's army. But Frederick rose to the occasion. On June 4 he met his enemies near Hohenfriedeberg, routed the Saxons before their Austrian allies could arrive, then attacked the exposed left flank of the latter and drove their army from the field, inflicting some 9000 casualties, besides taking a number of prisoners. Too exhausted to undertake an immediate pursuit, the victorious Prussian army eventually followed the Austrians into Bohemia, but they were checked by an action fought at Königgrätz, and, finding their communications insecure, retired once more in the direction of Silesia. Frederick was never able to maintain the war in the enemy's territory for long.

On September 13 Francis of Lorraine was elected Emperor Francis I. Frederick had agreed, by the Convention of Hanover with George II, not to oppose the election of Francis if the possession of Silesia were secured to him, and hoped that in view of this concession George II would be able to persuade Maria Theresa to agree to his terms. Actually Frederick did not vote at the election at all.

On September 29, before the Prussian army could reach Silesia, it was surprised by the Austrians at Sohr. With commendable celerity and skill Frederick and his army formed up to meet the attack, captured a hill from which the Austrian artillery was inflicting signal damage, and after a fierce general engagement compelled the Austrians to retire. As a result of this battle the Prussians were able to reach Silesia in safety. A winter campaign followed in Saxony, where Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau defeated a Saxon army at Kesselsdorf and occupied Dresden.

Saxony was thus forced to make peace. The Treaty of Dresden, signed on Christmas Day, 1745, ended the war so far as Prussia was concerned, for Maria Theresa, with her new ally out of the war, the

French successful against her in the Netherlands and in Italy, and, finding the assistance she had expected from Russia not forthcoming, was at last reluctantly compelled to agree to the loss of Silesia and Glatz. When the War of the Austrian Succession came to an end by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 Prussia was once more guaranteed possession of her new territories. None the less Frederick was well aware that Maria Theresa did not intend to let the matter rest. The acquisition of Silesia had been made possible by the fact that Austria had been forced to defend herself against the simultaneous attacks of several rapacious enemies. If the chance came to isolate Frederick, or to fight him with the aid of a ring of powerful allies, Maria Theresa would not hesitate to attempt recovery of her lost province, and Frederick knew that her efforts would now be directed towards bringing about the favourable situation she desired.

Ten Years' Peace and the Diplomatic Revolution. Meanwhile a great outlet for Frederick's energies was awaiting him at home in the field of internal administration. The task of improving the defences of Silesia was resumed once more, and besides this Frederick now had another new acquisition to claim his attention. One of the considerations that had induced the Great Elector to abandon his claims to the Silesian Duchies, so successfully but unwarrantably revived by Frederick himself, had been the recognition of the Hohenzollern claim to the reversion of East Friesland, at the mouth of the river Ems. On the death of the ruler of that province in 1744 Frederick had promptly forestalled other claimants and annexed it, and he now devoted himself to improving its port of Emden and to reclaiming land from the sea.

The Army once more occupied a great deal of Frederick's attention. The battle of Sohr, in particular, had shown the tactical superiority of thoroughly disciplined troops when caught at a disadvantage and forced to act suddenly in an emergency. Strategically Frederick had on several occasions escaped from awkward situations by the superior mobility of his troops; nor did he fail to realize that the dilatoriness of some of the Austrian commanders was often the chief factor in accounting for their missed opportunities. Hence he laboured incessantly to teach his troops to reproduce the movements of the parade-ground in field manœuvres. During the Second Silesian War the Prussian cavalry had again proved itself inferior in quality to the infantry, and Frederick tried hard to remedy this state of affairs. The Army was now kept at the incredibly large peace footing of 135,000 men, and a vast reserve of military stores was accumulated.

Frederick administered his country very much after the manner of his father. To the General Directory he added two new departments, one for war and one for industry and trade. Acting, with the assistance of a group of secretaries, as his own chief Minister, he found time to

influence the work of every department, no matter how small the question concerned. The needs of his large army constituted a tremendous drain on the treasury. To ensure a constant supply of revenue he was determined that Prussia should support as large a population as possible, and that that population should be prosperous. Immigrants were encouraged by offers of complete religious liberty and advantageous terms of citizenship. Travelling constantly to all parts of his kingdom, Frederick supervised the afforestation of his sandy wastes, the draining of the marshes that bordered the Oder, the digging of canals, and the improvement of harbours.

From 1747 Frederick lived in a small, newly built palace called Sans Souci, situated in the park at Potsdam. Here, in spite of his incessant labours as first servant of the State, his unflagging industry enabled him to engage for long hours in those pursuits that had always been his particular delight. Surrounded by paid readers (or perhaps 'listeners' would be the better term), critics, philosophers, scientists, and musicians, he would pass his leisure hours in the writing of history and the memoirs of his house, or indifferent poetry, to say nothing of the composition of music, since the flute was still his constant companion, especially when he wanted to think. For three years the great Voltaire was at his Court, but the streak of maliciousness that was inseparable from Frederick's character ended the friendship between the two, and Voltaire was not sorry to leave Prussia behind him for good in 1753.

Throughout this period Frederick was keeping an anxious eye on foreign affairs. He was particularly interested in what was happening in Austria. No sooner had the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle been signed than Maria Theresa began to reform her army, basing it largely on the Prussian system. In 1753 she found a new Chancellor in the person of Kaunitz,¹ whose ability was in marked contrast to that of the advisers on whom she had formerly been forced to rely. In conjunction with him Maria Theresa brought about a complete reversal of the Austrian system of alliances. The new policy aimed at putting an end to the old feud between Bourbon and Habsburg, weaning France from her friendship with Prussia by granting territory in the Netherlands to Louis's son-in-law. This would, of course, mean the loss of England as an ally, but Maria Theresa was far from pleased with the way in which George II had constantly pressed her to cede Silesia to Frederick and make peace with Prussia in the previous war. With this object in view Kaunitz went to Paris as ambassador in 1750, and remained there for the next three years. Both he and his royal mistress were careful to court the favour of the powerful Madame de Pompadour.

¹ Wenzel Anton, Prince von Kaunitz-Rietburg (1711-94), represented Austria at the peace conference of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Thus when it became evident in 1755 from the turn events were taking in Canada that war between England and France was brewing once more George II found it unlikely that he could count on the assistance of Austrian troops for the defence of his beloved Hanover.

It was at this point that Frederick once more entered the European drama. He had long been aware of the hostility of the neighbouring state of Saxony, and in 1753 one of his spies at the Saxon Chancellory had revealed news more startling still. From this source Frederick learned that under the terms of the treaty signed between Austria and Russia in 1746 both those nations were prepared to wrest Silesia from him if he attacked either of them. In addition to this, the Tsarina Elizabeth¹ of Russia was nursing against him an intense personal animosity. Frederick's Court was by no means the place to respect a lady's reputation, and he himself had not hesitated to use his scathing wit on the amply justified rumours that floated round Europe concerning the Tsarina's character. Perhaps the particularly offensive nickname by which he called her may have reached her ears. Men, even when they are sovereign rulers, can usually be talked over, but with women in control of the destinies of Austria and Russia Frederick felt that he had at least two implacable enemies from whom only the worst could be expected. In short, it was evident that war was impending, and that Prussia was already surrounded by a ring of enemies.

At least one dependable ally was a necessity before matters came to a head. Was France still likely to act in that capacity? Frederick thought not, because he knew that France was anxious to strike at England on land by attacking Hanover. This would mean that under the terms of a treaty between George II and the Tsarina Russian troops would be used in its defence. Frederick had no particular wish to find Russian forces on both his flanks, and therefore endeavoured to persuade France against an attack on Hanover. At the same time he began to improve his relations with England. George II, well aware that war with France was imminent and that the old Anglo-Austrian friendship was rapidly cooling, welcomed the overtures of Prussia. On January 16, 1756, the Convention of Westminster was signed between the two countries, guaranteeing each other's possessions and agreeing to oppose the invasion of Germany by a foreign army. The first definite step in bringing about the Diplomatic Revolution had been taken.

But the previous system of alliances had not as yet been broken. England still hoped to retain the friendship of Austria, together with that of Prussia, and thus to place France in a very dangerous position. To prevent this from happening France acceded at last to the suggestions

¹ Elizabeth Petrovna (1709-62), a daughter of Peter the Great, much of whose genius she inherited.

of Kaunitz and Maria Theresa. The Diplomatic Revolution was complete when on May 1, 1756, France and Austria signed the Treaty of Versailles, embodying a defensive alliance between the two countries. It was agreed that if France would assist in the recovery of Silesia and Glatz, Austria would desert her former ally, England. To this arrangement Russia also acceded, the Tsarina agreeing that so far from assisting George II in the defence of Hanover, she would attack Prussia with an army of 80,000 men. Sweden was also involved, on the understanding that she should regain Pomerania from Prussia on the conclusion of peace.

To Frederick the situation certainly appeared threatening. In June his spy at the Saxon Chancellory produced evidence of the intentions of Russia and Saxony. Frederick mobilized his armies, and requested Austria to assure him that he was not to be attacked. Maria Theresa answered that the military preparations she was making were the result of Frederick's own policy, a reply that struck the latter as hardly reassuring. He determined to take the offensive himself without further parley, and by so doing brought France into the war against him, under the terms of her treaty with Austria. On August 29 Frederick invaded Saxony with 70,000 men, and the Seven Years War had begun.

The Seven Years War. Frederick the Great's reputation as a general rests principally upon his conduct of the Seven Years War. Throughout the long campaigns of those years the genius of one man, his unflagging courage in collecting his scattered forces after defeat and disaster, and his cool tactical skill on the field of battle kept his harassed and war-stricken state steadily opposed to the overwhelming odds that constantly threatened to swamp Prussia by sheer weight of numbers. For Frederick's resources were strictly limited ; it was vital to prevent concerted action on the part of his enemies. Hence the long series of marches and counter-marches that filled up most of the time during the seven years of warfare. It is true that Frederick had the advantage of operating on interior lines : without this it is difficult to see how he could have avoided disaster for long. As it was, no sooner had his jaded troops checked the menace in one direction than they were forced to hasten away to meet fresh enemies advancing from another.

No major operations on the part of France and Russia were to be expected before the following year, so Frederick determined to attack the enemy nearest at hand. The original plan was for an invasion of Bohemia. Marshal Schwerin with one army was marching thither from Silesia. Saxony was not as yet a declared enemy, but Frederick's knowledge of her secret diplomacy determined him not to leave a Saxon army between himself and Berlin. Hence his invasion of Saxony in person, which was followed by a demand that the Saxon army should join him

in the campaign. This was, of course, refused, and the Saxon forces, nearly 20,000 strong, retired to a defensible position in the hilly country near Pirna to avoid awkward complications. Meanwhile Frederick occupied Dresden, and then began the task of blockading the Saxon army, which was very inadequately supplied. In view of this fact an Austrian army under General Browne¹ advanced to its relief, and Frederick was forced to give battle.

The engagement took place near Lobositz, on which Browne had based his right wing. Once again the Prussian cavalry, this time after an initial success, was driven off by the Austrian, but this was countered by a Prussian success in the capture of Lobositz itself. The Austrian main army then retired, having failed in its purpose of relieving the Saxons, though Frederick's casualties were the greater. A further attempt by the Austrians to assist the Saxon army was so badly muddled that it served Frederick's purpose for him. The Saxons got into such a hopeless position that they were forced to surrender at once, and Browne then retired, leaving them to their fate. Most of them were forcibly incorporated in the Prussian army, and thus the campaign of 1756 came to an end, with Frederick in possession of Saxony and a number of allied regiments of very doubtful loyalty.

It was quite evident that the summer of 1757 would see the Prussian resources strained to the utmost. By the Second Treaty of Versailles, signed exactly a year after the first, France made a definite offensive alliance with Austria and agreed to dispatch an army against Frederick. In view of her war with the English in Canada France also planned an attack on Hanover. Meanwhile Austrian representations at the Tsarina's Court succeeded in obtaining a promise of active support from Russia, and Sweden also agreed to attack Prussia from the north. The only bright spot so far as Frederick was concerned was the news that George II was massing an army on the Prussian flank for the defence of Hanover, which was likely to keep the forces of France well occupied.

While these diplomatic arrangements were in course of settlement Frederick, after some hesitation, had resolved on resuming the offensive in Bohemia, leaving 20,000 men in East Prussia to check the Russian advance whenever it should materialize. The rest of his army, over 100,000 strong, began in April to converge in several columns for an attack on Prague. Instead of taking advantage of this separation of forces, the Austrian army, under the cautious Prince Charles of Lorraine, stood on the defensive, and offered battle just to the eastward of Prague. Frederick was thus able to unite his army with that of Schwerin, and, moving round to the right of the Austrian position, on

¹ George, Count de Browne (1698-1792), son of an Irish exile, entered the Imperial service and was created a Count.

May 6 he forced his enemy to engage at a disadvantage. Although the resulting battle cost him nearly as many casualties as he inflicted, the Austrian army, demoralized by the temporary loss of its leaders—Prince Charles had a fit, and General Browne was wounded—gave way and retired into Prague. Frederick settled down to a siege.

Meanwhile another Austrian army was collecting under General Daun.¹ To meet this danger Frederick moved out with a part of his army to Kolin, and on June 18, although outnumbered by his enemy, decided to attack. As in the previous battle, he attempted to move across the Austrian front to attack their right flank, but this time, owing to a series of blunders and to the fact that in Daun he had a much more able opponent, the attack resulted in complete failure. The Prussian army lost 14,000 men and forty-five guns; Frederick was forced to retire from the field and even to abandon the siege of Prague. Had Charles of Lorraine seized his opportunity he might have cut Frederick off, and prevented him from reaching Saxony again.

The month of July witnessed the arrival of a Russian army in East Prussia. In August the Prussian General Lehwaldt engaged it at Gross Jaegerndorf, and succeeded in preventing a further advance for the time being, since the Russian commanders were far from enterprising. As it was, Lehwaldt was able to move against the Swedes and confine them to their own territory in Stralsund. But in the west all was going badly for Prussia. Cleves, Mark, and East Friesland fell into the hands of the French, and on July 26 they defeated the Duke of Cumberland's Anglo-Hanoverian army. The result was the Convention of Klosterseven, by which Cumberland saved his army by promising neutrality on the part of Hanover. In October, however, George II refused to ratify this agreement, determined not to desert the Prussian cause. He could easily have done so by confining his attention solely to the defeat of the French in Canada and India.

In the meantime the menace from France had become so threatening that Frederick determined to march westward across Saxony to meet it in person. The French army, under Soubise,² had effected a junction with an Imperial army from the Southern German states. The approach of the Prussian army checked the French advance for the moment, but an Austrian cavalry raid on Berlin distracted Frederick's attention, and Soubise resumed the offensive. When Frederick, finding that his enemies had left Berlin, was able to return to Saxony the Franco-Imperial army retreated once more beyond the river Saale. The position they took up was so strong that Frederick decided against an attack, and occupied a position with his left wing resting on Rossbach. This so

¹ Leopold Joseph, Count von Daun (1705–66), was created Field-Marshal in 1754, and undertook the reorganization of the Austrian Army.

² Charles de Rohan Soubise (1715–87), appointed to this command through the influence of Madame de Pompadour.

encouraged his enemies that they made a foolhardy move that resulted in Frederick's winning one of his most sensational victories.

The battle of Rossbach was fought on November 4. The Franco-Imperial army, emboldened to attempt a circling movement round Rossbach to cut off the Prussian retreat, was caught in column of route and subjected to a sudden attack on the flank. The Prussian cavalry, under Seydlitz, threw the Allied cavalry, which was endeavouring to cover the march, into confusion ; a Prussian battery of guns prevented the disorganized French and Imperial infantry from forming into an effective battle array, and the attack of Frederick's infantry completed the victory. The Prussian army of 22,000 men in this manner secured a signal success over an enemy at least 46,000 strong, taking 5000 prisoners and 67 guns. Nowhere is the excellent discipline and training of the Prussian army better illustrated than in this battle.

Meanwhile the Austrians had advanced against the Prussian forces left to defend Silesia. By the end of November the great fortress of Schweidnitz and even Breslau itself had fallen into Austrian hands. To make matters worse, the Prussian commander Bevern had been captured, and there only remained in Silesia a dispirited army of 18,000 men under General Zieten. Frederick heard the news as he was returning from the scene of his victory at Rossbach, and began a strenuous forced march of sixteen miles per day. On December 5, having effected a junction with Zieten's force, he found the Austrian army drawn up with its centre resting on Leuthen, barring the approach to Breslau. Prince Charles was in command.

At Leuthen Frederick won his second outstanding victory of the war. Once more he was heavily outnumbered, but so desperate was the position that he had already made up his mind to attack the Austrian army wherever he found it. Addressing his officers, he made it clear that death was the only alternative to victory. At dawn he began his attack on the Austrian position, assisted by a ground-mist and the fact that his movements were practically concealed by broken ground. Thus by a feint launched against the Austrian right wing he was able to deceive Prince Charles into strengthening that flank with his reserves, while all the time the main Prussian attack was advancing in oblique order against the Austrian left. In consequence after a sharp engagement the Austrian left wing was driven in, forcing Prince Charles to form a new front behind Leuthen. Frederick now attacked the Austrian right as well, and as darkness fell his enemies were retiring in utter confusion from the field. In all, their losses amounted to 27,000 men, a casualty list more than four times as great as the Prussian. On this occasion Frederick was able to follow up his victory. Breslau and Liegnitz were retaken, and the whole of Silesia was recovered, with the exception of Schweidnitz. Thus the brilliant campaign

of 1757 came to an end. It had shown Frederick at his best, both as a tactician and as a leader of men. But it must be remembered that the campaign had cost him the flower of his army and the life of Marshal Schwerin, his best general, who had been killed at the battle near Prague. Although the battle of Rossbach had cost the Prussians only a few hundred men, Frederick's other successes had been at a price he could ill afford. And still the enemy showed no sign of coming to terms.

The year 1758 therefore found Frederick ready for fresh efforts. Even in winter quarters it was his habit to rise not later than six in the morning, and as the time for action approached he would begin rising at five, then at four, and sometimes even earlier, to accustom himself gradually to the change of routine. With his depleted army it was not likely that he could effect any spectacular success, but at any rate he was determined to keep his foes at bay. "If I cannot beat them," he is reported to have said during the course of the year, "at least I will sting them and exasperate them as much as I can." Although he had at first refused the offer of a subsidy from England, he now realized that he could not continue the war for much longer without financial aid. A new treaty between England and Prussia was therefore signed in April. Both George II and Pitt were determined to repudiate the Treaty of Klosterseven. It was agreed that England should pay Frederick a subsidy of £670,000 a year, and that a new Hanoverian army of 50,000 men, later augmented by 9000 British troops, should operate against the French in Hanover, under the command of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick.¹ Both parties to the treaty promised not to make a separate peace. Pitt persuaded Parliament to find the necessary money by his famous words about winning America on the plains of Germany, but he could not provide a fleet to operate in the Baltic as Frederick wished, for the Admiralty already found its resources somewhat strained in maintaining the blockades of Brest and Toulon, and in supporting operations in Canada and India. However, the closer co-operation with England assured by this new treaty put a brighter aspect on the situation for Frederick. The French at any rate were fully occupied, so his right flank was safe, leaving him free to devote his attentions to the Austrians and Russians.

At the beginning of the campaign Marshal Daun replaced Prince Charles as commander of the Austrian army in Bohemia. Before he was ready to act Frederick had taken the initiative. One Prussian army of 30,000 men remained in Saxony, while Frederick in command of another began the siege of Schweidnitz in earnest. War could at times be a leisurely affair in the eighteenth century, and Frederick

¹ Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick (1721-92), one of Frederick's generals, who had served with him throughout the previous campaigns.

found time to read extensively in Bacon, Cæsar, Tacitus, and Plutarch before Schweidnitz fell. Then, with the whole of Silesia once more in his hands, he invaded Moravia with two columns and began to besiege Olmütz, which he confidently expected to take before Daun could move against him. But the siege dragged on for several weeks; Olmütz was cleverly defended, and Frederick found he could make no progress without reinforcements. Towards the end of June a convoy numbering more than 3000 wagons, bearing food, munitions, and stores of all kinds, with over 1000 horses and 8000 troops, was on its way to join him. The continual harassing of his line of communication, always the principal difficulty when the Prussians carried the war into Austrian territory, might have warned Frederick of the dangers threatening this force. But he took no adequate steps to assist it, and the entire convoy, with the exception of about 200 wagons, fell into the hands of the Austrian General Loudon.¹ On the same night that the news reached him Frederick determined to raise the siege of Olmütz and to evacuate Moravia. Finding his retreat to Silesia threatened, he marched into Bohemia and was securely entrenched at Königgrätz when, towards the end of July, the news that the Russians were threatening Brandenburg set the Prussian army moving at the rate of fifteen miles a day on another of its famous forced marches to meet this new danger. Frederick read Cicero as he went.

The Russian army had entered upon the campaign of 1758 with instructions to prosecute the war much more vigorously than in the preceding year. Under its new commander, Fermor, it had advanced from East Prussia to Posen, and was now attacking Küstrin, where Frederick had suffered imprisonment as a young man. Uniting with another Prussian force under General Dohna, Frederick was able to oppose an army of 37,000 men to Fermor's 42,000. In cavalry he was much superior, and consequently manœuvred to the east of the Russian army in order to engage on the open plains near Zorndorf.

The battle of Zorndorf was fought on August 25. The village itself had been set on fire by the Cossacks, and this interfered considerably with the infantry attack of Frederick's left wing, which he launched after an artillery bombardment against the Russian right. The attacking force became dangerously extended, and a counter-attack by the Russians sent it reeling back in confusion, but the pursuers followed too far and were almost annihilated by the Prussian cavalry. Frederick then attacked with his right, and a particularly fierce encounter followed. Some of his regiments were beaten back in flight, but he renewed the attack, and eventually the Russian left wing was driven in by the superior Prussian cavalry. At eight o'clock that

¹ Ernst Gideon Loudon (1717-90), whose family was of Scottish origin. He had once applied for service under Frederick, and had been refused.

night the battle came to an end, with the Russian centre still maintaining its position, but with both flanks in utter confusion. Frederick had inflicted much greater casualties than he himself suffered, and had captured 103 guns, though he was in no condition to follow up the victory. However, his work had been done : the Russian army withdrew, made an ineffectual attempt to reduce Kolberg, and caused Frederick no more anxiety for the remainder of the year.

But 1758 was not to end without a Prussian defeat. Austrian forces were now threatening the Prussians in both Saxony and Silesia, so Frederick hastened away from Zorndorf to meet them. At Hochkirch, in spite of the warnings of his generals that the ground was unsuitable for forming in battle order and that the position was commanded by the Austrian army under Daun, Frederick pitched his camp, feeling certain of security when opposed to so unenterprising a commander. But for once he was deceived : Daun made his preparations under cover of darkness, and very early on the morning of October 14 he launched his attack. Amid the morning fog and smoke of the blazing village a fierce battle raged round the surprised Prussian army, which was eventually driven from its camp, with the loss of over 8000 men and nearly all its artillery. Frederick was lucky indeed to make good his retreat and rally his scattered forces, which Daun as usual permitted him to do unimpeded. Frederick was therefore able to retire to Neisse and to prevent that fortress from falling into Austrian hands, while Daun merely occupied himself with an attempt to round up the Prussians left in Saxony and to take Dresden, a task in which he met with no success. The campaign thus came to an end with Prussia and Silesia still practically intact, and Frederick went into winter quarters at Breslau. But the process of attrition was gradually wearing Prussia down, and by now Frederick's original army had ceased to exist.

It was not surprising, therefore, that for the first time Frederick failed to take the initiative when the campaigning season came round once more. He was now forced to act on the defensive, and a really energetic enemy might have placed him in a serious position. But Daun, who was still in command of the Austrian army, lay in Bohemia throughout the early summer months of 1759 with a much stronger body of troops than the force of 50,000 men that now constituted Frederick's main army. The Austrian plan, excellent in theory, was to combine forces with the Russian General Soltikov, whose army was collecting near Posen. It was July, however, before Soltikov was ready. On the 20th of that month he invaded Brandenburg, and three days later heavily defeated the Prussian corps that tried to bar his progress under General Wedel. Before the end of the month Frankfurt was in Russian hands.

It was high time for Frederick to arrive on the scene in person, more especially as nearly 20,000 Austrian troops under General Loudon had outmarched him and joined the Russians on the right bank of the Oder. Frederick therefore left Prince Henry to watch the main Austrian army under Daun, and hurried away towards Frankfurt with most of his troops to join Wedel's dispirited force. Then, greatly to the delight of his enemies, on August 12 he was foolish enough to attack the strong position they had so carefully fortified near Kunersdorf. Frederick's army numbered rather fewer than 50,000, while the combined army of the Russians and Austrians was not far short of 67,000 men. Even against these odds Frederick scored an initial success. The attack delivered by his advance-guard on the Russian left wing drove it from its position on the high ridge known as the M \ddot{u} hlberg. A second attack drove the Russians still farther, but Frederick, determined to secure a complete victory, tried to take the new enemy positions with exhausted and inferior troops, while the Russian centre and right were as yet hardly touched. The result was a shattering charge of Austrian cavalry, which drove the Prussian horsemen from the field and took a dreadful toll of the Prussian infantry. The day ended with an Allied counter-attack that recovered the lost ground and guns, and put the Prussian army completely to flight. Never had Frederick suffered such a reverse. It was true that the losses he had inflicted equalled his own, but his army was so shattered and demoralized that all discipline had vanished, and only a handful of men remained under his control. He hesitated whether or not to swallow the opium pills that always reposed in a small gold box on a ribbon beneath his shirt; but, luckily for him, his enemies failed as usual to take any effective steps after their victory. Within a very few days the disordered Prussian troops were rallying about their leader, whose spirits rose again to their normal level. The energy with which he set about reorganizing the defences of Brandenburg at this period of greatest danger shows Frederick at his best.

Daun, with the main Austrian army, was no more enterprising than Soltikov. The virtual evacuation of Saxony by the Prussians had meant that most of it, including Dresden, had fallen to the Austrians, but a move towards Dresden by Prince Henry was quite sufficient to put an end to any idea of further co-operation between the Austrian and Russian armies, and Daun determined to concentrate on covering Dresden. The Russian army, after a feeble move in the direction of Glogau, departed for Poland to take up winter quarters, and Frederick, now as jaunty as ever, decided on an effort to threaten Daun's communications with Bohemia and, if possible, to cut off his retreat. To effect this a column of cavalry and infantry under General Finck, 14,000 strong, moved on Maxen. But it is an axiom of war that an

army cut off from its base constitutes a particularly dangerous enemy. Prince Henry and the other Prussian generals repeatedly warned the over-confident Frederick of the awkward position in which Finck and his weak column stood. On November 20 Finck was attacked from three directions, overwhelmed, and forced to surrender with his entire force and sixty-six guns. To make matters worse, in the following month the Prussian General Diericke lost 1400 men to the Austrians at Meissen.

The campaign of 1759 had thus been a bad one for Frederick, and his reputation suffered. For his English allies, however, it proved a year of brilliant victories. The fall of Quebec and the naval battles of Lagos and Quiberon Bay had spelt disaster for the French cause in Canada, and, more important still from the Prussian point of view, Ferdinand of Brunswick's victory over the French at Minden on August 1 enabled that skilful commander to send a column to Frederick's relief towards the close of the year. Had matters been reversed and the French been successful in Hanover Frederick's position would have been desperate indeed after the disaster of Kunersdorf.

Once more in 1760 Frederick was forced to resume the wearisome series of campaigns. All this time the Swedes had been threatening Prussia from the north, but their inefficiency had enabled Frederick to hold them with comparatively few troops. From Poland the Russians were preparing to advance on Breslau ; Daun was still in Saxony with the main Austrian army, but the campaign was opened by Loudon, who in June invaded Silesia with an army of 40,000 men and heavily defeated the Prussians under Fouqué at Landshut. Much marching and manœuvring for position followed on both sides. Daun joined Loudon ; Frederick attacked Dresden, and thus drew Daun back to Saxony, after which Frederick returned to Loudon, who had captured the fortress of Glatz, and fought a successful engagement near Liegnitz in which Loudon lost one-third of his troops. In view of the Austrian failure to make any definite headway the Russian co-operation came to nothing, and was abandoned in favour of a raid on Berlin, which was carried out successfully by a combined force of Russians and Austrians. Frederick's capital was forced to surrender, and for four days it remained in enemy hands, at the cost of a heavy tax that was levied on the unfortunate inhabitants. Frederick marched to their relief, but, finding that the raiders had left the city, he followed Daun into Saxony, and on November 1 he attacked him at Torgau. The Austrian army outnumbered the Prussian by about 14,000 men, and had the further advantage of a very strong force of artillery. For this reason Frederick's initial attacks were beaten off, but a further attempt by Zieten's corps, delivered late in the day, was more successful, and the Austrians retired in some confusion, with the loss of 16,000 men. The battle, however,

did not prove of much value to Frederick. His losses exceeded those he had inflicted, and this prevented him from assuming the initiative again, though he was able to winter in Saxony.

The Allies' plan of campaign for 1761 was a repetition of that of the previous year. Daun remained in Saxony, watched as before by a weak Prussian force under Prince Henry, while Loudon in Silesia effected a junction with the Russians. This combined army missed an excellent chance of defeating Frederick, who had entrenched his army near Schweidnitz. The Russian commander Buturlin was well aware that the Tsarina Elizabeth was almost at death's door, and that her nephew and heir, the Grand Duke Peter, was a great admirer of Frederick, and strongly opposed to the war against Prussia. Accordingly in September the Russian army slipped away, and Loudon, left to himself, moved against Schweidnitz, which he captured towards the end of that month. A further disaster befell Frederick in Pomerania, where Kolberg fell to a Russian attack vigorously prosecuted by land and sea.

Frederick was now practically at the end of his resources, and the dismissal of Pitt by the new English King, George III, in October 1761 meant the end of the policy of defeating France by subsidizing Prussia. No English money was forthcoming from Bute to assist Frederick in the campaign of 1762. But the French in Hanover had met with no substantial success during the past year, and the Austrian resources were also by now severely strained. Then, on January 5, 1762, the turning-point came for Prussia with the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth. Frederick and his reader Catt had had a bet on that subject, which Frederick lost. Catt expected his master to be generous, but all he got for winning the wager was an epitaph on the late Tsarina, written by Frederick himself. The new Tsar, Peter III,¹ made peace in May, and voluntarily evacuated East Prussia. Sweden followed suit in the same month.

In Saxony Prince Henry once again took up his post, watching the Austrian army. Meanwhile Daun, with another Austrian force, was in Silesia. Frederick, assisted by a Russian corps placed at his disposal by Peter III, moved to attack the Austrian lines at Burkersdorf. The Prussian cavalry officers, and even Frederick himself, wore white plumes to enable their savage Cossack allies to recognize them in the heat of battle, but after all the Russian forces did not engage. In July Peter III was murdered, and his wife, Catherine,² who succeeded him, had no intention of lending Frederick any active assistance, though he managed to persuade the Russian commander not to withdraw till after the battle had been fought. After the engagement at Burkersdorf, in which the

¹ Peter III (1728-62) was a person of very limited intellect. He always referred to Frederick the Great as "the King my master."

² Catherine II, 'the Great' (1729-96), able, ambitious, and unscrupulous.

Prussians got the better of him, Daun retreated, and Frederick recovered Schweidnitz in October. In the same month Prince Henry caught and defeated the army of the Empire at Freiberg.

With this campaign the Seven Years War came to an end. England and France were on the point of making peace, and with a heavy heart Maria Theresa was forced to recognize that she could not wrest Silesia from Frederick unaided. On February 15, 1763, the Peace of Hubertusburg was signed between Prussia and Austria. Frederick promised to vote for the Archduke Joseph, Maria Theresa's eldest son, as the successor to his father. The French had already evacuated the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, and the Austrians were now forced to leave Glatz, which, together with Silesia, was once more guaranteed to Prussia, leaving matters precisely as they had been at the end of the previous war.

Many subsidiary factors combined to bring about this extraordinary Prussian success against so formidable a coalition : the inactivity of the Austrian generals (to which Loudon was a notable exception), the timely death of the Tsarina, the ability of Ferdinand of Brunswick, and the assistance of the English subsidy. Frederick never forgave George III for leaving him in the lurch, though it must be remembered that England did not make peace without insisting that the French should evacuate Cleves and Mark. All this, however, does not detract from the brilliant performance of Frederick himself. Always eager, sometimes, in fact, foolhardy, in his desire to take the offensive, wearied by the strain of responsibility and the imminence of disaster in the face of overwhelming odds, the King remains the principal factor in ensuring the safety and success of Prussia. While the generals pitted against him often owed their cautiousness to the fear of political consequences at home, Frederick had the advantage of commanding his own army and of directing the entire policy of his state. For this reason he was able to take a comprehensive view of every theatre in which the war was being fought. "The man who only makes small plans will never succeed," he is reported to have said. "The half-plan man has little ambition, and very great ambition is needed to make great plans in great things."

The Partition of Poland. The condition of Prussia when peace came at last may well be imagined. The population had decreased by half a million ; in East Prussia and in Silesia particularly the peasantry was well-nigh ruined. With characteristic energy Frederick set about the work of reorganization. Surplus Army stores and horses were distributed to tide the peasantry and landowners over the distressful aftermath of war ; demobilization sent 30,000 soldiers back to the soil, and by every means in his power Frederick strove once again to encourage immigration. In this he was assisted by the fact that outside his

borders, in Bohemia and in the unfortunate state of Saxony, conditions were even worse than in Prussia.

For many years the Hohenzollerns had coveted the Polish province of West Prussia, the acquisition of which would link East Prussia with Pomerania and Brandenburg. Chance now played into Frederick's hands and enabled him, by the exercise of a little unscrupulous diplomacy, to augment his dominions once more, this time without the expense and risk of a war. Since 1697 the crown of Poland had been worn by the Electors of Saxony, but shortly after the conclusion of the Seven Years War Augustus III died, followed three months later by his heir. This left the throne of Poland vacant, for the new Saxon elector was only a child. Eventually Catherine of Russia secured Poland for a discarded lover of hers named Stanislaus Poniatowski, and in this she received the support of Prussia. Left without a friend in Europe, Frederick was anxious to maintain a friendly footing with Russia, though it must not be supposed that he was particularly anxious to see Russian influence too strong in Poland. However, even that was better than to have the Polish throne occupied by a nominee of his late enemy, France, or of the angry Maria Theresa. In 1764 he made an alliance with Russia, promising his support in the event of war.

Within a few years Russian troops were operating in Poland in an endeavour to settle the civil war that had broken out over a series of religious disputes. The action of these troops led to a war between Russia and Turkey, and the attitude of Austria became distinctly threatening. Fearing a further advance of Russian territory at the expense of Poland or Turkey, Austrian troops occupied the county of Zips, formerly belonging to Poland, though territorially a part of Hungary, and it looked as though war between Russia and Austria would ensue.

This was Frederick's opportunity to propose a solution satisfactory to all parties—except Poland. Maria Theresa's son, Joseph,¹ had become Emperor on the death of his father in 1765; Frederick arranged a meeting with him, and discovered an Austrian whom he was able to influence. The proposal was for a partition of Polish territory between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. This, Frederick urged, would buy off Russia from annexing the Turkish Danubian principalities, which she was on the point of overrunning, and would give an increase of territory to Austria 'in compensation,' while Frederick himself was to be similarly satisfied by the annexation of West Prussia. It took Joseph a long time to persuade his mother to agree to this arrangement, for Maria Theresa still hinted that she could be much better compensated by the return of Silesia and Glatz. But there was no hope of persuading

¹ Joseph II (1741–90), Holy Roman Emperor, was like Frederick, a "benevolent despot."

Frederick to agree to any such thing, and eventually Maria Theresa reluctantly consented to the proposed partition. It was evident that Catherine and Frederick intended to put the plan into operation, whether she agreed to take her share or not.

Thus by the terms of a treaty signed between Russia and Prussia in August 1772, which Austria joined a few weeks later, there came about the piece of shameless land-grabbing known as the First Partition of Poland. Austria took Galicia, and Russia most of Lithuania. But the chief benefit accrued to Prussia, the originator of the scheme. Although Frederick did not get the port of Danzig, he now joined East Prussia to the rest of his dominions by the acquisition of nearly all West Prussia, including Pomerellen, Marienburg, and Ermeland—an indefensible but thoroughly characteristic action, made possible by the weakness of a harassed and unfortunate state.

Hohenzollern versus Habsburg. Up to the time of his death Frederick the Great's foreign policy aimed at preventing any further aggrandizement of the Habsburg dominions. Maria Theresa did not die until 1780, but long before this the practical control of Austrian policy had passed into the hands of Joseph, ably assisted by Kaunitz, for on most matters the two thought alike. It was not long before their schemes received a definite check at Frederick's hands.

In 1777 the Elector of Bavaria died without an heir. Austria had long sought an extension of territory to the westward at the expense of Bavaria, and the house of Habsburg had certain claims to Lower Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, which it was now thought proper to bring forward. Joseph even went so far as to consider exchanging the Austrian Netherlands for the whole of Bavaria, and at the beginning of 1778 he sent troops to the Upper Palatinate. This provoked the opposition of a party in Bavaria, and Frederick seized the opportunity to protest against a stroke of policy of a nature very similar to his own seizure of Silesia. Neither Russia nor France was inclined to support Joseph's actions; negotiations between Austria and Prussia continued for several months, and eventually Frederick declared war.

The War of the Bavarian Succession was a pitiful sequel to the great campaigns of the Seven Years War. As usual, Frederick invaded Bohemia, but neither he nor his enemy was anxious to risk a general engagement, and eventually, finding the Austrians in a strong position at Königgrätz, he retired without accomplishing anything. Negotiations still continued, until Austria, despairing of gaining Bavaria without the help of her former allies, made peace by the Treaty of Teschen in May 1779. By this agreement she received the strip of territory known as the Inn Quarter, and agreed not to oppose Frederick's claim to Anspach and Baireuth.

But the Peace of Teschen did not see the end of the matter. In

1781 Joseph succeeded in renewing his alliance with Russia, for Catherine was anxious for Austrian support in her claims to Ottoman territory on the Black Sea. In 1784 affairs in the Netherlands gave Joseph the opportunity of proposing once more an exchange of that province for Bavaria. The new Elector was not a Bavarian himself, and viewed the proposal with favour, but his heir to the Bavarian electorate refused to agree. The latter could never have taken so positive a line if it had not been for Frederick, who had again promised his active support in defeating the scheme. Prussia was now able to raise the cry that the rights of the German princes must at all costs be protected against the Emperor, and in July 1785 Frederick began the formation of a *Fürstenbund*, or 'league of princes,' to defend those rights. The first signatories were Brandenburg, Hanover, and Saxony, and it was agreed to prevent by force the Austrian designs on Bavaria. One by one the majority of the German princes joined the *Fürstenbund*, and Joseph was obliged to abandon the idea. Once more the Hohen-zollern influence had successfully met and frustrated the Habsburg. Detailed examination of the facts shows that Frederick's motives were not really altruistic, nor was he in any sense trying to unite Germany under the hegemony of Prussia. Nearly a century was to elapse before that result could be achieved, when the final struggle for supremacy was fought out by another great Prussian statesman.

Prussia at Peace and the Death of Frederick. The Seven Years War had aged Frederick greatly, but the coming of peace found him once more ready to devote himself to the administration of his kingdom. Clad in his dirty uniform, liberally bedaubed with the stains of Spanish snuff, the King resumed his interminable task of attending to the details of State, and his frequent journeys to all parts of his dominions. The task of land reclamation proceeded, and added in all nearly 1500 square miles of productive territory to his kingdom. 'Father Fritz,' as the peasants called him, had their welfare truly at heart, though only as a secondary consideration, because it meant the welfare of the State. For it must be admitted that the peasants' lot was far from happy. They had to provide the conscripts for the Army, to perform duties of a feudal nature for their landlords, and to find a quite undue proportion of the revenue. The nobility escaped comparatively lightly from the burden of taxation. Frederick introduced a new system of tax-farming on the French model, known as the *Regie*. Neither it nor the French officials who helped to administer it were popular, but the annual revenue of Prussia grew to 22 million thalers, and by the end of the reign Frederick had accumulated a reserve fund of 51 millions.

Much of this revenue was of industrial origin. Frederick held to the old mercantile system, endeavouring to make his state self-

supporting. The Government owned a monopoly in salt and coffee, and tried the growing of tobacco. Strenuous efforts were made to produce sufficient corn to make Prussia independent of Polish grain imports; a census was even taken of hens, to see whether there was really any need for importing foreign eggs. Porcelain, linen, woollen, silk, and other industries were created and fostered by the State. But the prohibitive duties by which Frederick sought to protect these industries led to a system of smuggling that he was unable to suppress.

The Army, which had done so much for Prussia, had, from the time of the Seven Years War, been the especial pride of its country. All was not well with it, however, in the latter years of Frederick's reign. Many of the lowly born officers of whose services he had been glad to avail himself during the war lost their commissions at the peace, and his new system of Army inspectors, often men of junior rank, caused some heartburning among the *Junker* officers who remained. Foreign enlistment still provided a large number of the recruits, and, as in the time of Frederick William, parade-ground efficiency stultified the effects of practical training. The Army did not show up well during the brief campaign of the Bavarian Succession War, and a bitter lesson was in store for the Prussians when they met Napoleon on the field of Jena in 1806.

Frederick did much towards codifying the existing system of laws. The number of judges was reduced, and the quality of those that remained was raised to a higher standard. Frederick also increased the number of elementary schools, though he was not really interested in the work of his 'Consistorium,' which looked after both education and religion.

When the spring of 1786 approached the old King was seen to be nearing his end. Gout and dropsy were troubling him; he slept with difficulty, and then only in an upright position. But still he insisted upon performing his labours on behalf of the State, rising even earlier than usual, since he felt that his time was growing short. In this condition he lingered on into the summer, until very early on the morning of August 17 he died, supported in his chair by his faithful valet when he had lost even the strength to sit upright.

Frederick was not a lovable character. He was the champion of German Protestantism, yet with no religious convictions of his own. He did what he thought was best for his country rather than for his people. He could pose as the champion of German liberty, but only so far as this suited his ends as King of Prussia. None the less he deserves the title of Frederick the Great, for he made Prussia a first-class Power, and the aim which he set before himself as the first servant of the State was a worthy ideal. Perhaps his career may best be summed

up in his own words : " Nothing is nearer akin to death than idleness. It is not necessary that I should live, but it is necessary that while I live I should be busy."

SUMMARY

(1) *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia*

- (a) 928. Establishment of the Nordmark.
- (b) 1351. Brandenburg an electorate.
- (c) 1417. Hohenzollern invested with Brandenburg.
- (d) 1614. Acquisition of Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg.
- (e) 1618. Acquisition of East Prussia.
- (f) 1648. Acquisition of part of Pomerania.
- (g) 1701. Prussia became a kingdom.

(2) *Frederick William I (1713-40)*

- (a) 1719. Acquisition of Stettin and part of Pomerania.
- (b) Development of the General Directory.
- (c) Prussia became fourth military Power.
- (d) Signature of the Pragmatic Sanction.
- (e) Training of the Crown Prince ; his attempted escape in 1730 ; his accession in 1740.

(3) *The Seizure of Silesia (1740-45)*

- (a) Capture of Breslau ; victory of Mollwitz.
- (b) Alliance with France ; victory of Chotusitz.
- (c) Peace of Berlin.
- (d) War again : capture of Prague ; victories of Hohenfriedeberg, Sohr, and Kesselsdorf.
- (e) Peace of Dresden ; renewed cession of Silesia and Glatz.

(4) *Ten Years' Peace and the Diplomatic Revolution*

- (a) Improvement of East Friesland, annexed in 1744.
- (b) Personal administration ; land improvement ; canals ; immigration.
- (c) 1746. Alliance between Austria and Russia.
- (d) 1756. Convention of Westminster between Prussia and England (January).
- (e) 1756. Treaty of Versailles between Austria and France (May).

(5) *The Seven Years War (1756-63)*

- (a) 1756. Occupation of Saxony ; victory of Lobositz.
- (b) 1757. Invasion of Bohemia : victory east of Prague, but defeat at Kolin ; victories over French at Rossbach and Austrians at Leuthen.
- (c) 1758. The English subsidy ; invasion of Moravia ; victory over Russians at Zorndorf ; defeat by Austrians at Hochkirch.
- (d) 1759. Defeat by Austrians and Russians at Kunersdorf ; surrender of Finck at Maxen.
- (e) 1760. Defeat at Landshut ; victories at Liegnitz and Torgau.
- (f) 1761. Loss of Schweidnitz, Kolberg, and the English subsidy.
- (g) 1762. Death of Tsarina Elizabeth ; victories of Burkersdorf and Freiberg.
- (h) 1763. Peace of Hubertusburg.

(6) *Hohenzollern versus Habsburg*

(a) 1772. Partition of Poland ; acquisition of West Prussia.

(b) 1778-79. War of the Bavarian Succession.

(c) 1785. The *Fürstenbund*.(d) The *Regie* ; State monopolies and State industries ; justice and education.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

(1) The work of Frederick's predecessors.

(2) The increase of Prussian power by territorial acquisition under Frederick.

(3) Frederick's measures in peace to increase the power of the State.

(4) Frederick as a general.

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CHAPTER V

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND FIRST EMPIRE

HISTORIANS usually date the 'modern' era of political thought from the year 1789. All the movements described in the subsequent chapters of this book either originated in, or were deeply affected by, the French Revolution. But although 1789 has aptly been described as a watershed in time, although a little thought will suffice to show that we are indeed living in a world that owes its basic social outlook to that great upheaval, we must beware of supposing that the significance of the movement was generally appreciated, or even apparent, at the time. The Revolution culminated in a military dictatorship that led in its turn to a determined effort to crush the new ideas before they could produce similar results elsewhere. We shall be concerned in this chapter mainly with the part played by England in this task, which brought her naval supremacy to its highest peak, and restored her military reputation in Europe.

Causes of the Revolution. As the feudal system grew obsolete it was imperceptibly modified and supplanted by fresh institutions, until fragments only of the former order survived. In England society grew out of its ancient shell in a form that on the whole proved healthy and vigorous. The nobility remained for long enough something like a true aristocracy—*i.e.*, a class of the ablest and best. It became the custom for politics and administration to provide the natural outlet for the energies of the upper classes, not only in the case of the central Government, but in local affairs as well. From the time of Elizabeth especially it was, for example, an honour rather than a burden to dispense local justice from the magistrates' bench. Tasks such as this could be shared with, or delegated to, the smaller landed gentry or the more prosperous merchants of the towns. There was no hard dividing-line between these men and the members of the nobility themselves; the latter did not form a caste apart. By virtue of their position they naturally retained some privileges, but in finance, the mainspring of the modern state, they shouldered their burdens equally with every other citizen. In fact, the English noble played his part in the task of government, and if to him were accorded certain rights not enjoyed by others he generally made at least a show of earning them.

In France and Central Europe the outcome of decaying feudalism

took a very different form. The noble almost everywhere lost his usefulness, while retaining all his privileges, especially exemption from the more onerous forms of taxation. This explains why a revolution broke out on the Continent, and not in England. Over the greater part of France a new, centralized system of government grew up within the folds of the old one, placing power in the hands of professional administrators controlled from Paris. This system was cumbrous, inefficient, and slow, subject to infinite overlappings and variations, an easy prey to the wit and imagination of whoever could wield a forceful pen. Meanwhile the country was growing prosperous, and trade and commerce were expanding. The townsmen became rich, and peasants were fast becoming the owners of the soil. In many ways the lot of the people was better than that of their fellows elsewhere in Europe. Yet because of this fact the educated classes were anxious for the reality of political power, ready to listen to those who taught them that they should possess it as a right, eager to grasp still greater advantages when the Government showed signs of increasing benevolence, and capable of seizing their opportunity when it arrived. These are the reasons why the Revolution came in France rather than in Germany.

France was divided into provinces of two kinds—*pays d'états* and *pays d'élections*. The former, of which Brittany, Languedoc, Burgundy, Artois, and Béarn were the chief, were few in number and situated on the frontiers or the coast. There the old estates of the three orders, nobles, clergy, and commons, still sat, though their powers were strictly limited by the central administration. The assessment of taxation was fixed and reasonably fair. The nobles, especially in the district of La Vendée, usually lived on their estates and took part in the conduct of affairs. It is not surprising in consequence that the counter-revolutions which the British endeavoured to support with money and armed forces broke out in these districts only.

The *pays d'élections* formed the greater part of France. Here the central Government reigned supreme in most administrative matters. At the head of all was the King's Council at Paris. Under the Controller-General, the Minister responsible for internal affairs, the provinces were ruled by officials called *intendants*, who acted through subordinates known as sub-delegates. All power really lay in the hands of these administrators, though so-called representative assemblies still existed. It was the *intendants* who assessed and collected the central taxes, raised the militia, were responsible for maintaining order, and saw generally to the execution of the laws. Each parish had a *collecteur*, who raised the requisite quota of the taxes, and a *syndic*, who represented the sub-delegate in public works. These men were chosen from among the villagers, but were controlled entirely by the central authority. From

the administrative viewpoint the *seigneur* was of no importance whatever. From the time of Louis XIV onward he had, if he could afford it, spent his time and his money at the glittering Court of Versailles. To the peasant on his estate, to the *bourgeois* in the neighbouring town, his usefulness was patently nil. His greed alone was obvious, exercised, very often, through the medium of an uncontrolled and rapacious steward. His feudal rights were intact, and particularly galling to a peasantry that by 1789 had already become owners of nearly two-thirds of the soil. The *cens*, an inalienable tax on certain lands, the *lods et ventes*, a tax on the sale of copyhold, the *servage*, attached to a serf personally or the land he held, were examples of feudal taxes still collected by the nobles. Other relics of feudalism were the *banalités*, or monopolies of such things as the village mill and winepress, and the *péages*, or toll rights on bridges, fords, or roads. Even the right to hunt, fish, or keep doves was denied to all who were not of noble birth, and woe betide the villager who sought to protect his crops from game in the only effective way. It was small wonder that the peasant sought above all to free the soil from its encumbrances, and was ready to lend an ear to anyone who promised reforms with such an end in view. But he was not interested in political rights as such.

Within the secular state, owning valuable privileges, controlling great areas of land, and administering vast revenues of its own, stood the mighty corporation of the Catholic Church. As a body it was able to secure special immunities from taxation. Many of the higher clergy were nobles themselves, enjoying all the benefits accruing to them as temporal princes and maintaining establishments of great costliness and splendour. The lower clergy, however, were often practically illiterate, and forced to live under conditions of real poverty. It is easy, therefore, to understand why the Church did not show a united front towards the principles of the Revolution.

The administrative class, although possessed of the reality of power, was not necessarily content. Like all those of non-noble birth, its members found the highest offices of State closed to them. The same grievance was felt by the middle classes in the towns. Men of wealth, position, and ability naturally resented this limitation to their ambitions, and came to desire equality of opportunity for all—*la carrière ouverte aux talents*. Napoleon was at any rate voicing a half-truth when he said that it was vanity, and not liberty, that had made the Revolution. But the *bourgeois* could count on certain privileges by virtue of offices in the guilds, corporations, and *parlements*. These latter were really courts of appeal, on the registers of which all edicts of the Crown had to be entered before they could be enforced. An opportunity was thus offered to hold up the administrative work of the *intendants*, and thereby to increase the general confusion. Even without this check the course of

administration by so highly centralized a system was cumbrous in the extreme. Such simple matters as the repair of a church, which in England would have been taken in hand at once by the local authority, had to be referred *via* the sub-delegate and the *intendant* to the Controller-General in Paris, where the department was perpetually choked by business of a similar nature. Years sometimes passed before such requests received the necessary permission. Louis XVI's Minister Turgot said that the trouble with France was that she had no national constitution. What he really meant was that she had no rational organization.

To criticize a system so full of anomalies and absurdities was easy; to suggest that it was the result of haphazard growth from a political theory basically wrong was obvious. Historians differ widely over the degree of influence exercised by political writers in bringing about the Revolution, but it is at least certain that these writers convinced the privileged classes of the impossibility of retaining their immunities much longer, and destroyed any lingering faith that they might have felt in the *ancien régime*. The ideas of the English philosopher John Locke,¹ as embodied in the *Treatise on Government* written by him late in the seventeenth century, found a ready acceptance in France. Having witnessed the collapse of the Stuart theory of Divine Right, Locke taught that the authority of the ruler comes from the governed, and not from above, and based his arguments on reason rather than on custom. These ideas penetrated to the Continent, and early in the eighteenth century the lawyer Montesquieu² began his criticism of the French monarchy. In 1748 there appeared his best-known work, *Esprit des Lois*, in which, with painstaking thoroughness, he robbed French institutions of the veil of respect by which they had hitherto been obscured, and pointed out the fundamental advantages of the constitution that was then evolving in Britain. Shortly after the middle of the century a group of writers known as economists (a section of which, the physiocrats, exercised considerable influence) began to demand practical reforms. They too insisted that government was a science, based on reason, natural law, and economic principles. Trade and industry should be freed from internal customs and other shackles: *laissez faire, laissez passer*, was their watchword. But they thought little of liberty and free institutions. France had to be awakened to a desire for such things by other voices than theirs. Some of these economists were contributors to the famous *Encyclopédie*, the first volume of which appeared in 1751. This work naturally gave scope for the expression of the new interest in Governmental forms, and among the number of contributors

¹ John Locke (1632-1704).

² Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu (1689-1755).

on this subject whose works were embodied perhaps Diderot¹ was the most famous.

As the century advanced the new ideas spread and achieved an amazing popularity. For this two men were mainly responsible. One was Voltaire,² whose chief contribution lay in the brilliance, wit, and sarcasm by means of which he made the *ancien régime* appear so ridiculous and the sanity of his own theories so obvious. One of his principal objects of attack was the Church, and in this way he did much to undermine the Frenchman's inherent respect for tradition. He, more than any other writer, was responsible for the intense scorn with which the whole system came to be regarded in France. The second writer was Rousseau,³ who, among many works on a variety of subjects, produced in 1762 his *Contrat Social*, the 'Bible of the Revolution' and the book on which the constitution-builders of France attempted to base a new order. Rejecting the lessons and experience of the past, Rousseau claimed that man in his natural state had been free and virtuous, each individual on an equal footing with his fellows. But co-operation could only be attained by every one surrendering part of his natural right to do exactly as he pleased, and submitting to the collective authority thus formed, which alone was competent to carry out the general will. Executive power could then be delegated to a Government, which, if it exceeded its powers and began to usurp authority on its own account, could, and should, be promptly overthrown by the people as a whole. "Mankind is born free, and everywhere he is in chains," ran the opening words of Rousseau's book. "Our natural sovereignty has been taken from us, no expression is given to the general will, we are being governed by a small class for its own advantage, and therefore we ought to rise and resume our authority," was the conclusion to be drawn from his theory. Small wonder that Frenchmen imbibed these doctrines with avidity, without stopping to consider whether men ever can be either free or equal, or to wonder whether man in his natural state was necessarily virtuous.

So far we have said nothing of the financial system of pre-revolutionary France. It was here that the *ancien régime* was seen at its worst, for the burden of a crushing weight of taxation fell upon the very class that was least able to bear it. The sacred rights of privilege protected the rich, and thus indirectly oppressed the poor. The taxes were either farmed out to private companies, which collected far more than ever found its way into the Treasury, or assessed and collected by the *intendants*, through their agents and the village *collecteurs*. The principal tax was the *taille*, an impost on income or property, from

¹ Denis Diderot (1713-84).

² François-Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694-1778).

³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), son of a Geneva watchmaker.

which the nobles and Church were almost entirely exempt. It varied from year to year and from district to district, often in most arbitrary fashion, and if the wretched *collecteur* could not produce his quota his own goods were forfeit. The peasants were naturally afraid to show any outward sign of prosperity, with the result that such capital as they had was not reinvested in improving their holdings. The poll-tax and the *vingtième*, both of them taxes dating from the time of Louis XIV, should have been paid by every one, but the privileged classes could usually secure at least a partial exemption, not only for themselves, but for their servants as well. Yet in spite of all the noble class continued to become poorer. Among indirect taxes the most unpopular was the *gabelle*, or salt-tax. Salt was a Government monopoly, and under the terms of this tax every citizen over the age of seven was forced to buy at least seven pounds a year for his own use. A survival from medieval times was the *franc-fief*, a tax paid by commoners holding noble land. This increased rapidly during the eighteenth century, and exercised a most pernicious effect on agriculture. When the *corvée*, or forced unpaid labour on public works, was abolished, a road-tax was substituted that merely replaced one grievance with another, though the intention was to make the nobles contribute. It has been calculated that sometimes these taxes, together with feudal dues and church tithes, took from the peasant as much as 80 per cent. of his total income.

If the financial condition of France had improved during the eighteenth century these burdens might have been borne in the hope that better times would follow. But the country drifted steadily towards bankruptcy, and the situation grew ever worse. The costly wars of Louis XIV, his great palace at Versailles, and his general extravagance had left the country in serious straits by the end of his reign. No check was placed on the spendthrift Court by Louis XV, who, moreover, participated in the Wars of the Polish and Austrian Successions and the Seven Years War, in which he gained little credit, met with scant success, and sent the French debt soaring to new levels. Louis XVI, who ascended the throne in 1774, lacked the force of character necessary for the carrying out of the drastic reforms which alone could have prevented national bankruptcy. There were in France 270,000 *privilégiés*, and unless these could be made to pay their full share of taxation there was little hope of averting it. It must not be imagined that Louis was totally lacking in character; he had courage, was sincerely religious, and was anxious to do what he could to reform abuses. But he was slow, simple, without imagination or insight, impossible as a military commander, and too much under the influence of his imperious Queen, the Austrian Marie Antoinette, a woman totally devoid of understanding of the French and the new movement

that was permeating all ranks of society. In spite of his financial situation Louis had been only four years on the throne before he joined the American colonists in their War of Independence against England. The influence on France of a war fought for the cause of liberty was perhaps not very great, but it brought bankruptcy a step nearer. National prosperity was actually increasing, and the Government was beginning to exhibit 'humanitarian' principles at home of quite a tender nature, but so far from removing the danger of revolution, this merely increased it. As prosperity advanced, so did the public discontent. The most dangerous moment for a despotic Government is the moment in which it decides to reform, and Louis was therefore accelerating rather than checking the revolutionary movement.

Meanwhile, in spite of the fact that the assessments of the *taille* were constantly increased (the *ferme générale* rose from 37 millions in 1697 to 180 millions in 1789), the Government was forced to stave off its creditors by raising loans, and then to raise fresh loans in order to pay the interest on the old. In 1789 the State owed 600 millions to private creditors, and had for years been shamelessly irregular in the payment of interest. As a result of this the significant fact arises that the monied class, comprising mostly the wealthy *bourgeois* of the towns, the principal bulwark that protects any Government from a revolutionary movement, was in 1789 actually anxious to see the end of the old system. Thus the noble, influenced by the new political theories, the merchant, hampered in his financial dealings, the administrator, debarred from the higher ranks of service, and the peasant, impoverished by the restrictions attaching to himself and the land he farmed, all actively desired, or at least were prepared to admit, some radical reform in the chaotic jumble of public affairs which we refer to collectively as the *ancien régime*.

At length, with national bankruptcy imminent, the King was advised in 1787 to summon an Assembly of Notables to discuss the situation. This body was as a whole naturally averse from any surrender of privilege, in spite of the fact that no other measure could render the Treasury effective assistance. The *Parlement* of Paris now took up the cry of Governmental inefficiency and corruption; the movement was repeated all over France, where new elective assemblies had just been set up alongside the *intendants* and sub-delegates, robbing those administrators of much of their power, giving voice to the popular discontent, and increasing confusion to such an extent that the Government appeared to be faced with imminent danger of rebellion. It was in these circumstances that Necker,¹ a Swiss financier who earlier in the reign had met with some success in sorting out the national accounts, advised his master to summon the States-General, an assembly

¹ Jacques Necker (1732-1804).

of lords, clergy, and commons that had not met for nearly two centuries.

Throughout the winter of 1788-89 preparations for the election of deputies went on. Generally speaking, the representatives of the nobles and clergy were chosen by direct, and those of the commons by indirect, election, with all men over twenty-five as primary voters for the commons, the deputies of which were to number 600, equal to the two privileged estates together. In accordance with ancient custom the deputies brought with them *cahiers des plaintes et des doléances* detailing their grievances. These 'memorials,' as they are sometimes called, show clearly the different viewpoints from which the Government and the people approached the questions at issue. While Louis and his Ministers thought primarily of averting the threatened bankruptcy, the deputies were bringing with them demands for constitutional government, a settled and regular system of laws to which all must submit, and the abolition of privilege in taxation. It is noteworthy that even the deputies of the nobles and clergy agreed in the main with these demands. When, on May 5, 1789, the States-General was opened at Versailles by the King all the necessary elements were therefore present for a determined clash between the Government and the assembly it had called into being.

The First Stages of the Revolution (May-October 1789). Without some guidance from those in authority the States-General was little better than a leaderless mob of 1200 men, split into three divisions. The members of the Third Estate, drawn mainly from the middle class and containing a high percentage of lawyers, were nearly all strangers to one another. They were idealists, however, well intentioned, and determined to give France a sound and lasting constitution. To their dismay and irritation they discovered that the Court party and many of the nobles were just as determined to stand in their way, and that the King, despite half-hearted demonstrations of sympathy, was too easily swayed by the Queen and by his brother, the Comte d'Artois. Very few of the deputies had had any experience of administration; they were theorists, much given to protracted discussion over abstract principles. The populace, led to expect the prompt advent of the millennium, grew angry and suspicious, and began to take matters into its own hands. Thus during the summer months of 1789 the preliminary step towards what seemed like a new era in French history changed into a movement of revolutionary tendency, fraught with dangerous possibilities.

If the three houses sat and voted separately the commons could always be outvoted by the other two, and its double representation would be reduced to a farce. The deputies of the commons therefore came to Versailles determined that all public business must be performed

in a single assembly. In his opening speech the King gave no directions on the matter, but contented himself with referring to the financial crisis, and issuing a warning that rash innovations would not be tolerated. For nearly six weeks the commons debated and quarrelled with the other two orders over the all-important question of a united assembly. The nobles refused to agree, basing their stand upon legal precedent as against the 'illegal' political theory of the commons, but by the middle of June some of the clergy had consented. On the strength of this the commons declared itself a 'National Assembly,' elected a president, and proceeded to deal with the question of taxation. This was the first act of a definitely revolutionary character. Most of the remaining clergy now joined the new Assembly.

By this time the commons had found a leader in the person of the Comte de Mirabeau,¹ a noble of doubtful character but powerful intellect, and possessed of great oratorical powers. On June 20 the doors of the building where the Assembly held its sessions were found locked by the King's orders, for Louis was planning an attempt to regain control of affairs before matters got completely out of hand, and preparations were in progress for the holding of a Royal Session. The deputies decided to hold their meeting in a tennis court near by, where they took an oath not to disperse until they had given France a constitution. Three days later the King held his session of the three estates, ordering them in all constitutional matters to meet separately for the future. When he left the chamber the commons and some of the clergy remained seated, in defiance of the royal dismissal. Louis sent them an order to close the session and retire, but Mirabeau returned the angry answer that nothing short of bayonets would drive the people's representatives out.

The King's reaction to this open defiance was typical. "Well, let them stay," was his reply to the unwelcome news, and he offered no opposition when most of the nobles went over to the new Assembly. It was a notable victory for the political theorists, but the fact is that Louis was becoming doubtful of his ability to appeal in the last resort to force. Some of his troops, including the famous French Guard, were showing a sympathy with the popular cause that in certain cases amounted to open mutiny. The Government began to concentrate round Paris a number of the foreign regiments in French pay. Characteristically Louis hesitated to use them, and their presence only served as an argument for the mob orators, such as the journalist Desmoulins,² who constantly sought to influence the thronging Parisian crowds against the King and his advisers. The news that Necker and other Ministers had been dismissed in favour of more reactionary advisers

¹ Honoré-Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau (1749-91).

² Lucie-Simplice-Camille-Benoist Desmoulins (1760-94).

was all that was needed to set the mob of semi-starved workmen, unemployed, and vagabonds in motion. On July 13 they raided the Hôtel des Invalides and obtained a store of arms. On the following day an attack was made on the great fortress of the Bastille; the gaolers were overwhelmed and slain, and the whole place was sacked.

To France the fall of the Bastille symbolized the overthrow of despotism. The provinces had for so long been accustomed to look to Paris for leadership that up to now their attitude had been an expectant waiting for news. Here at last was a sign of the turn events were taking, an example that could be followed. Economic strictures and failing harvests had already brought about a condition of great distress, and rioting became widespread all over France. As usually happens, the middle class rose to defend itself against this new menace. In Paris the electors of the deputies had already set up a National Guard, or type of militia for the defence of life and property, an example that was now followed by other big towns throughout France. The command of the Paris Guard, which eventually numbered 30,000 men, was entrusted to the Marquis de La Fayette,¹ a wealthy nobleman who had fought for the colonists in the American War of Independence. Owing to the indecisive character of the King the control of force was evidently passing from the Government to the people, a fact that soon made La Fayette the most powerful man in France. Louis now adopted conciliatory measures, dismissed his troops, recalled Necker, and allowed himself to be invested with the *tricolor* (the red and blue of Paris added to the royal white).

On August 4 all exemptions from taxation, forced labour, and feudal dues were abolished, with the proviso that in the case of the last-named a redemption should be paid. This, it was hoped, would put an end to the pillaging and burning of *châteaux* that was taking place all over France. At last men were equal before the law, and feudalism was at an end.

One crowning act of violence was still to come before the insurrection died down for a time. Early in October the Paris mob, led by several thousand women, made its way to Versailles. What exactly prompted this action is still something of a mystery, but various events appear to have convinced the people that the Assembly was losing its revolutionary character and that the King was plotting to overthrow its work. Moreover, there was a growing idea that if both Assembly and King were at Paris the capital itself would be politically and economically better off. The mob therefore broke into the palace, killed some of the Guards, insulted the Queen, and forced the royal family to return with it to Paris. The arrival of the National Guard under La Fayette

¹ Marie-Jean-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de la Fayette (1757-1834).

probably prevented something worse from occurring, but the latter appears to have had some idea of turning the affair to his own account. A few days later the Assembly followed the King, and Paris now supplanted Versailles as the centre of affairs.

The Constituent Assembly (October 1789–September 1791). The Constituent Assembly, as it was now called, took up its quarters in the riding-school attached to the Palace of the Tuileries, where the royal family was lodged. Before examining the much-vaunted Constitution, which took two years to make and was not accepted by the King until September 1791, we must describe some of the influences at work upon the Assembly, and show how profoundly mistaken was its policy in relation to the Catholic Church.

Before long certain men who were possessed of dominating personality or unusual ability began to make their presence felt in the Assembly, and attracted to themselves groups of admirers who usually followed their lead. There were at first many such groups, but, broadly speaking, the Assembly soon resolved itself into three main bodies. The Right, consisting mainly of nobles, desired the maintenance of privilege and was opposed in principle to anything beyond the minimum of reform. The Centre was the great reforming party, itself subject to an infinite number of subdivisions and conflicting opinions. La Fayette and Mirabeau can be counted as members of this group, and also the Abbé Sieyès¹ and Talleyrand,² Bishop of Autun, two shrewd and able Churchmen of whom more will be heard later. The third party was that of the Left, a group of violent democrats, small at first, but destined at a later stage of the Revolution to wield tremendous influence and power. Of this party Robespierre became the most famous.

One serious disability against which the Assembly proved unable to contend was its susceptibility to outside influence. Its debates were open to the public, and since it was usually the more violent section of the Paris mob that crowded the galleries, it soon became difficult for moderate opinions to gain a hearing. Outside the Assembly the crowds were harangued daily by such men as Marat,³ a distinguished physician who edited the *Ami du Peuple*, a revolutionary journal that first appeared in 1789; and Danton,⁴ a lawyer gifted with a wonderful power of swaying the crowd by his speeches. Marat suffered from a terrible skin disease, and it has been suggested that he was hardly sane. The invective, suspicion, violence, and bitterness of his views had a most sinister effect upon those who listened to him or read his journal.

¹ Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès (1748–1836).

² Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754–1838).

³ Jean-Paul Marat (1744–93).

⁴ Georges-Jacques Danton (1759–94).

Another influence was that exercised by the political clubs. The most famous of these had been started by a group of Breton deputies at Versailles. In Paris these deputies took possession of a part of the old Convent of the Jacobins in the Rue Saint-Honoré, and began to admit all thoroughgoing revolutionaries to membership. Most of the deputies of the Left eventually joined this 'Jacobin Club.' Another club, joined by many of the poorer class of street politician, was the Cordeliers, founded by Danton and Desmoulins. The unity of purpose and the opportunity given for the dissemination of propaganda and opinion by these clubs soon made them very powerful, and branches of the Jacobins began to appear all over France.

During the deliberations of 1790 the two outstanding personalities in the Assembly were La Fayette and Mirabeau. Had they co-operated wholeheartedly the Assembly might have produced a workable form of government for France. But the powerful La Fayette disliked and distrusted Mirabeau, repelled his advances, and thereby was largely instrumental in preventing the establishment of the constitutional monarchy at which Mirabeau was aiming. At this juncture Mirabeau was the one statesman in France who could have checked the Revolution. He saw that to make a complete break with the past could only lead to general confusion, and that the one hope lay in persuading the King to head the moderate reformers as against the extreme democrats. Through the medium of a nobleman named La Marck, Mirabeau was able to make his views known to the King. From the spring of 1790 he was in constant communication with Louis, who paid his debts and gave him an income of 2000 francs a month in return for the inside information that he was able to supply. At length, convinced that the Assembly could never deliberate fairly and freely until delivered from the influence of Paris, Mirabeau tried to persuade the King to leave the capital, summon the Assembly to continue its task in some distant province, and concentrate all the trustworthy troops for its protection. This course might lead to civil war, but Mirabeau was convinced that nothing else could check the leftward trend of the Revolution. Louis, however, took no notice of the advice, for he never really trusted Mirabeau. The latter died in April 1791, and the chief, because the cleverest, obstacle to revolutionary progress was removed.

In the autumn of 1789 it was essential that some arrangement should be made to supply the Government with money, for the public debt was increasing, many of the taxes had been abolished, and conditions in France did not facilitate the collection of those that still existed. Talleyrand suggested that the property of the Church, the income from which alone amounted to forty million pounds, should be confiscated. This was done, and upon the value of the Church-lands thus acquired a paper currency of notes called *assignats* was based. The

first issue was in April 1790, but in the following September and in June 1791 further issues were made, for the Government's needs were as pressing as ever, and people were not in those days so alive to the perils of depreciated paper-money. Thus the value of the *assignats* inevitably declined; prices rose, and further distress followed.

During 1790 the Assembly made the fatal mistake of applying the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people to the Catholic Church by passing the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The dioceses were reorganized, the clergy were required to take an oath of obedience to the State, bishops were in future to be elected by the priests, and the priests by their parishioners. No act could have been better calculated to fill Catholics with horror than this blow at the authority of the Pope. Pius VI condemned the Civil Constitution, withdrew his representative from France, and promised excommunication for all who adhered to the arrangement. Only a few bishops took the oath. The Civil Constitution greatly offended the devout Catholic peasantry, shocked the King, and convinced him that after all he would be doing God's will in opposing the reformers instead of co-operating with them. Furthermore, it drove most of the clergy into opposing the Revolution, and so led at last to their persecution and an attempt to de-Christianize France altogether.

In the spring of 1791 the number of noblemen who had left France had grown to considerable proportions. Most of these *émigrés* were just over the frontier, living in the cities of the Rhine Valley. Yielding to the importunities of the Queen, Louis determined to join them, and on June 21 the royal family escaped from Paris in disguise. The King's intention may have been to place himself at the head of the considerable body of troops quartered near Metz, and with these, the *émigrés*, and possibly with the help of Austrian troops, to return to the capital and overthrow the Revolution. But the party was recognized at Varennes, and sent back to Paris under escort. For the first time the idea of a republic became prominent, with Danton as its principal advocate, and it was largely on account of this threat to the monarchy that Louis accepted in September the position assigned to him by the long-delayed Constitution.

Parts of the Constitution of 1791 had already been in force for some time. As early as November 1789 it had been agreed that Ministers must not be chosen from the members of the Assembly. This separation of the legislative and executive powers prevented the members of the former body from gaining any practical experience of affairs, and enabled suspicion and distrust of the Government to grow and deepen in the Assembly. Consequently the Constitution imposed severe restrictions on the executive power, at the very time when a strong Government was essential for France. The King was not allowed to veto, but only to suspend, the passing of laws. His Ministers were

made responsible for their actions, and could be held accountable at law. But the principal factor in weakening the executive lay in the extraordinary orgy of local elections that split France into a number of tiny self-governing bodies, over which the central Government could have little or no control. The country was divided into eighty-three departments, named generally after rivers or natural features. These were subdivided into districts, cantons, and communes. Of the last-named there were about 44,000, and they were in effect little autonomous republics. In addition to the parish priests, all officials, magistrates, and administrators, even of the humblest kind, were to be chosen by election. "The disorganization of the kingdom could not have been better planned," wrote Mirabeau, for this matter was decided upon before his death.

The members of the Assembly ended up by voting themselves ineligible for the new legislative body. Thus all the experience of affairs they had gained was thrown away. Rousseau had said that sovereignty lay in *all* the people, but by the time the Constitution was promulgated the Assembly had become suspicious of the influence of the uneducated, or rather unproductive, classes, and the power of voting for the members of the new Assembly was given only to those who paid the amount of three days' labour in direct taxes, less than five million primary voters in all. The result was the rule of the middle class at a time when the democrats were only too ready to adopt a new war-cry. They began to persuade the working classes that the Revolution had not yet fulfilled its purpose, and must continue. Frenchmen were not accustomed to voting; very few could read or write; very few could spare the time to make themselves honestly acquainted with the local and national questions at issue. Consequently only a very small percentage of the electorate exercised its privilege, and elections fell more and more into the hands of a dangerous class of politician, generally members of one of the Jacobin clubs, of which there were reputed to be over twenty thousand branches in France. Given conditions of quiet and goodwill at home, a moderate economic prosperity, and freedom from the threat of foreign aggression, and the Constitution might just have worked. As it was, the effort to put it into effect merely increased the general chaos and gave fresh impetus to the sentiments of the ultra-revolutionaries.

The Fall of the Monarchy (October 1791–January 1793). The new Assembly met on October 1, 1791. Although comparatively few electors had exercised their right of voting, it was evident that the country as a whole was willing to give the new Constitution a fair trial. The middle-class reformers had rallied to the side of the King, and Danton's republicans had been forced to lie low for a while. Nevertheless the influence of the Left had greatly increased. Robespierre, who

under the new rule was now excluded from membership, had come very much to the fore since the death of Mirabeau, and his influence in the Jacobin Club was stronger than ever. In the Assembly itself the strongest group of the Left was the party known as the Gironde, from which district most of its original members came. This party, under its leaders, Vergniaud and Brissot, was at first allied with the more extreme democrats, who represented above all the opinions of the Parisian 'sections,' or electoral wards. Most of these democrats were Jacobins, as also were many of the Gironde.

By the spring of 1792 revolutionary France was at war. It was this catastrophe that ensured the final collapse of the new Constitution, the abolition of the monarchy, the death of the King, and the rise to power of the extreme republicans, who never represented more than a small minority of the French people.

Although the despots of Central Europe naturally detested the sentiments and actions of the French reformers in principle, they were not altogether displeased at the weakening of their powerful neighbour by such prolonged internal dissension. The Emperor Joseph II and his brother, the Emperor Leopold II, who succeeded him in February 1790, were particularly concerned for the fate of their sister, Marie Antoinette, and for the feudal rights of certain of their suzerain princes who owned territories in French Alsace. These rights had all been swept away, and offers of compensation were refused. As the Revolution progressed the number of *émigrés* in the Rhine valley increased. The King's brothers had set up their Court at Coblenz, and for some time the Comte d'Artois had been visiting German Courts with the object of securing aid. Over 6000 French Army officers had crossed the frontier, and something like an army was beginning to collect, with the avowed intention of invading France and destroying the Revolution altogether. But Leopold hesitated to give his assistance, largely because he was expecting another partition of Poland, and did not trust the designs of the Tsarina Catherine of Russia. However, in August 1791 Leopold had a meeting with the King of Prussia at Pillnitz, whence the two monarchs issued a joint declaration to the effect that the Revolution concerned Europe generally, and that both were willing to interfere on behalf of Louis if the rest of Europe would join them. Naturally that was as far as matters went, and as far as they were intended to go; and after Louis had accepted the Constitution in September Leopold considered he had done his duty, and was not called upon to interfere further.

But the Girondist party was determined on war. In the first place, its members believed the danger from without to be much more pressing than it really was. Secondly, they were liberal enthusiasts, and honestly desirous of spreading the doctrines of the Revolution beyond

the borders of France. This viewpoint gained ground, in spite of the fact that the Jacobins opposed it strenuously, realizing that a war, whether won or lost, would inevitably strengthen the power of the Crown. Louis realized this also. To the King of Prussia he wrote begging him to back a European Congress with armed force; to the Emperor he explained that he must support the French war party in the hope that "the nation may find its only resource in its troubles by throwing itself into my arms." These intrigues, and the influence of the Queen in directing them, were suspected in the Assembly, where the Court was contemptuously referred to as the 'Austrian Committee.'

In March 1792 Leopold was succeeded by his imperious young son, Francis II. In the same month, following repeated attacks by the Assembly, Louis's Ministry fell and was replaced by a new one that included several of the Girondist leaders. Dumouriez, an able and ambitious adventurer who allowed himself to be controlled by the Girondists, became Minister for Foreign Affairs. From both sides, therefore, relations between Austria and France took on a sharp, uncompromising tone, and on April 20 France declared war. Prussia decided to throw in her lot with Austria, having been assured by Russia of a share in the second partition of Poland. A combined army began leisurely to assemble on the frontier of France, under the command of the Duke of Brunswick.

The French army was in no condition for war. The place of most of the former commissioned officers had been filled by promotions from the lower ranks. Numbers of men had deserted; discipline had been largely destroyed. The presence of revolutionary volunteers who elected their own officers had not improved the morale of the regular troops. Only 80,000 men were available, and even these were lacking in arms and equipment. To the great disgust of the Girondins the force that set out enthusiastically to conquer the Austrian Netherlands retired in confusion at the first sign of opposition. The news caused an outbreak of bitter attacks in the Assembly against the intrigues of the Court. Louis dismissed the Girondists in consequence, and Dumouriez resigned. This was the signal for another popular insurrection.

On June 20 a mob of 8000 persons invaded the Tuileries, found the King, and bombarded him with insults for several hours, until he was released by the arrival of the National Guard. For the moment this demonstration, which had not been the work of the recognized political leaders, produced a reaction in the King's favour. La Fayette, now in command of an army near the frontier, returned to Paris to support Louis, but the latter refused his advice, and, finding that his influence at Paris had declined, La Fayette returned to his army. But the Paris mob was not yet satisfied with its work. Federal volunteers

from all over France began to converge on the capital, some ostensibly to celebrate the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. Six hundred of them, the last to arrive, reached Paris from Marseilles at the end of July, dragging their cannon behind them and singing the revolutionary marching song now known as the *Marseillaise*. Just before their arrival the popular rage against the monarchy had once more been influenced to white heat by the news of a manifesto, issued by the Duke of Brunswick, declaring that the Allies intended to restore the *ancien régime* unconditionally, and warning the people of Paris that if any harm came to the royal family the city would be given over to 'military execution.' Instead of safeguarding the royal family as intended, this manifesto, parts of which had been secretly suggested by Marie Antoinette, had exactly the opposite effect.

On August 10 all was ready. Under the leadership of Danton the 'Sections' of Paris set up a Revolutionary Commune at the Hôtel de Ville. The Commandant of the National Guard was summoned and murdered. Trusting that the Guard would now be paralysed, the mob, strengthened this time by the bands of *fédérés* from the provinces, once again marched upon the Tuileries. Several thousand men defended the Palace, including the famous Swiss Guard, but eventually, the frontal attack having failed, the building was successfully outflanked and every man within it slain. A young officer named Bonaparte watched the ghastly scene that was taking place in the Tuileries gardens. It made a profound impression on him that lasted all his life. Meanwhile the royal family had taken refuge with the Assembly, the members of which were thoroughly cowed by the events without. They saved themselves by a piece of panic-stricken legislation that suspended the King and made arrangements for the election of a National Convention, to be chosen by the votes of all citizens without qualification. The royal family were then imprisoned in the Tower of the Temple, a fortress near the outskirts of Paris. La Fayette made a movement to come to the rescue, but he failed and fled abroad.


For the time being the Revolutionary Commune did much as it pleased in Paris. Danton became chief of a new Ministry, and he set with great energy about the task of assuming control in France and prosecuting the war with vigour. On August 19 France was invaded, and a few days later the fortress of Longwy fell to the enemy. This news still further tightened the hold of the extremists at Paris. Once more the capital extended its strangling grasp over the provinces. Agents of the Commune were sent to every department; all over France thousands of suspected counter-revolutionaries were placed under arrest. On September 2 yet another outburst of terrorism was occasioned by the news that Verdun was about to fall. In Paris a group of brutal cut-throats went round dragging the political prisoners

from the gaols and murdering them in cold blood. Similar horrors were being enacted elsewhere. For four days this dreadful work continued, instigated chiefly by Marat and unchecked by Danton, who apparently sanctioned it as necessary for the safety of France. At the same time the elections were in progress for the National Convention. Most of the populace were too terrified to vote at all.

On September 20 the Convention met. Danton (who resigned his post in the Ministry), Robespierre, and Marat were the leaders of a party of Jacobins known as the 'Mountain,' because its members sat on the high seats to the President's left. The Gironde was back again in force, numerically much superior to the Mountain, though not so well organized. The bulk of the deputies occupied an intermediate position between these two parties. All combined, however, to accomplish the task for which the Convention had really been called into existence: a resolution, from which there were no dissentients, was immediately passed declaring France a republic.

On the very same day that the Convention met and put an end to the Bourbon rule in France there took place one of the most peculiar, and in its effects far-reaching, little battles in the whole course of military history. On September 2 Verdun had fallen to the Allies, and since they were now through the Moselle gap and in possession of the fortress blocking the high road to Paris, it seemed that the best chance the French had of stemming the invasion was already lost. The Allies had still, however, to cross the wooded line of the Argonne hills, which, although only 300 feet in height, were so steep on the eastern edge, so thickly wooded, and so churned into sticky clay by recent heavy rains that the army was able to travel only by the three roads that ran across them, and even then with considerable difficulty. The skilful Dumouriez, who now commanded the French army, had been instructed to base his defence on this position. At the pass of Les Islettes, on the main road from Verdun, he held up the Allied advance. So strong was his defence that the enemy decided to out-flank him, and Prussian and Austrian troops crossed the hills by the other two roads to the north. Dumouriez, now joined by an army from Metz under the command of Kellerman, was completely cut off from Paris and hemmed back against the western side of the hills. His defeat should have been certain, and even now no one really knows why it did not come about. On September 20 the French army was drawn up near a windmill in front of the village of Valmy, where for several hours it withstood the bombardment of the Prussian and Austrian artillery. The well-disciplined Prussian troops then advanced to the attack, but either because of the steadiness of the French fire, or because of some unexplained difficulty known only to the Prussian command, or merely because—as it appeared to many who witnessed

it—the soldiers stuck in the mud, the charge was never pressed home. The Prussians retreated, the battle was broken off, and to its unbounded astonishment the French army was left in possession of the field. The most exaggerated military enthusiasm was the result, both in the army and at Paris. Meanwhile the Allies feared to continue their advance upon the capital while the French at Les Islettes threatened their roundabout line of communication. Dysentery was taking its



THE BATTLE OF VALMY (SEPTEMBER 20, 1792)

toll of their forces, and as delay made the position worse instead of better, they agreed, after negotiations, to withdraw. Within a few weeks they had evacuated French territory entirely.

The conflict now became a war of conquest rather than defence. Dumouriez persuaded the Government at Paris to sanction an attack on the Austrian Netherlands, the inhabitants of which were known to be ripe for rebellion against the Emperor. The frontier was crossed near Mons, and on November 6 a real victory was gained by the French at Jemappes, where they forced their way across the river Haine in the face of the Austrian army. On November 14 Brussels was occupied, and before long the Austrians were driven out altogether. Another French army reached the Rhine and captured Mainz. So elated was

Paris at this success that the Convention passed a "Decree of Fraternity" on November 19, to the effect that "France will grant her help to all peoples who desire to recover their liberty." The former Austrian Netherlands were given republican institutions, and early in the following year they were annexed to France.

Meanwhile a bitter quarrel grew up in the Convention between the Gironde and the Mountain. The members of the former, mostly of a more refined middle class, disliked the uncouth leaders of the Mountain party, and particularly the expression given by the latter to the wishes of the Paris Commune, which was still largely under the influence of the insurrectionary elements of the Sections. But the fundamental cause of the quarrel was a matter of principle. Briefly put, the Gironde wanted a liberal republic, in which the provinces should have a large measure of self-government; the Mountain stood for the leadership of Paris, and therefore for the principle of centralization. It was because the latter was vitally necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war that the Mountain won, in spite of its smaller numbers.

It was partly in order to weaken the Gironde that the Mountain brought about the trial of the King. There was no lack of evidence that Louis had plotted with the *émigrés* and with foreign nations for the downfall of the Constitution, though strictly speaking he should not have been held accountable at law for acts committed before his so-called abdication. After he had been found guilty most of the Girondists would have voted against the death penalty had they dared. A motion for respite having been lost, Louis was publicly guillotined on the morning of January 21, 1793. It was the last of many occasions on which he was called upon to display his kingly courage, which did not fail him now.

With the overrunning of the Austrian Netherlands and the guillotining of the King the domestic aspect of the Revolution may be said to be fairly at an end. The Decree of Fraternity alone, backed by the rise of a crusading military zeal in France, was sufficient to make it a question of immediate import for all the Governments of Europe. So the Revolutionary War began in earnest.

The Formation of the First Coalition. Nearly four years had passed since the summoning of the States-General. Towards the end of this period the attitude of the English Government had undergone a somewhat sudden change. The Younger Pitt, who had been Prime Minister for the past nine years, was interested mainly in his domestic reforms and the task of reorganizing the nation's finances after the American War. One of the results of this conflict had been the partial loss of a great overseas market. Pitt had to make good this loss if prosperity were to be regained, and it was partly on this account that he made

a commercial treaty with France shortly before the Revolution broke out. It was his desire, as a peace Minister, to maintain these friendly relations, and the fact that the French were endeavouring to secure for themselves a democratic constitution seemed at first to enhance rather than impair Pitt's prospects of success.

But there were other politicians with more extreme views. On the one hand, C. J. Fox, leader of the Whig opposition, uttered extravagant praises of the action of the Paris mob in storming the Bastille ; on the other, Edmund Burke, the Whig philosopher, expressed in his *Reflections on the French Revolution* some very grave doubts as to the direction in which events were trending, forecasting accurately that before long the rest of Europe would be involved. At first Pitt's viewpoint was midway between these two, and he was very slow in abandoning his attitude of cautious, friendly neutrality. It was the attack on the Tuileries and the suspension of the French monarchy on August 10, 1792, that finally wrought a change. The British ambassador was recalled from Paris, and M. Chauvelin, the French ambassador at the Court of St James's, was refused recognition as envoy of the republic. Even then, however, Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Minister, did not think it necessary to join Austria and Prussia in making war on France. But the Government was strongly in favour of the traditional policy of not allowing the Netherlands, with their great river-mouths, commercial sea-ports, and easily defended naval harbours to fall into the hands of France. The French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands was at once a challenge and a menace. The estuary of the Scheldt, which is situated in Dutch territory, had for years been closed by Holland to navigation in order to prevent the establishment of Antwerp as a commercial rival to Amsterdam, and treaties agreeing to this action had been endorsed by Britain and France. But two days after the fall of Brussels the French declared the Scheldt open, on the grounds that the 'laws of nature' permitted free access to the sea. Pitt protested at this violation of treaty rights, though in vain, and began to assert his determination that France should not be permitted unconditionally to make herself master of the Low Countries. The Decree of Fraternity did nothing to improve matters. It is easy to argue that there was no danger of a similar revolution in England, since similar conditions did not exist ; but the fact was that the Industrial Revolution, while making England commercially prosperous and financially strong, two factors that were to be of prime importance in compassing the overthrow of France, was at the same time producing hardship, squalor, and poverty of a type hitherto unknown, and crowding the population into dense areas that might prove difficult to control. There was no organized police force, and very few troops. In suppressing the communications of the English 'Corresponding

Societies' and 'Constitutional Clubs' with the French revolutionaries, and in subjecting the movements of foreigners to supervision by his Aliens Act, Pitt was taking measures that must not be condemned as unnecessary simply because they proved effective. Many members of the Opposition, including Burke, now rallied to the support of Pitt, and Fox was soon left with no more than a handful of followers.

After the execution of Louis, M. Chauvelin was given eight days in which to leave England. Pitt realized that the French were now planning an attack on Holland, where a republican party of 'Patriots' was anxious to overthrow the house of Orange. Many people thought he should not have remained neutral for so long, and, indeed, he could hardly have retained office had he persisted in maintaining his peace policy further. On February 1, 1793, the Convention declared war on Holland and England.

Called upon to formulate a war policy, Pitt's instincts naturally reverted to the policy of his father, Chatham, who, while subsidizing Prussia to keep the Seven Years War going in Europe, had stripped France of valuable possessions overseas. Herein lay the foundation of his Coalition policy—the cementing of anti-French alliances by grants of money from the British Exchequer. Early in March the Convention declared war upon Bourbon Spain, and France soon found herself ringed with enemies—England, Holland, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, Spain, and Portugal. It seemed to Pitt better to supply Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia with money to carry on the war and to raise fresh levies than to attempt the creation of a large army of his own. Between April and August Pitt made treaties with Sardinia, Spain, Naples, Prussia, and Austria, which formed the basis of the first real attempt at concerted action against France. But as financial retrenchment in peace-time is usually carried on at the expense of the country's armed forces, the English Army had perhaps never been so ill-prepared. The establishment had been limited to 50,000 troops in England and 12,000 in Ireland. A large proportion of the first-named figure was employed in garrison duty abroad. Pay was so low that recruiting was practically at a standstill, and most regiments were under strength. The Navy was in a rather better state, though the establishment of ships and men had been drastically curtailed during the years of peace. One great source of weakness was the lack of an efficient manning system. In December the establishment was raised to 20,000 seamen and 5000 marines. Even this was only a quarter of the number on the muster rolls during the War of American Independence. Many more were needed when war actually began, and because these had to be supplied largely from the mercantile marine mobilization was necessarily slow. Britain at that time had one hundred and fifteen ships of the line, and over two hundred vessels altogether. Her Dutch allies

had forty-nine ships of the line, most of them small and of shallow draught.

Formidable as were the land forces now arrayed against France, certain elements of weakness were inherent in most of them. Austria could bring into the field 400,000 men, and Prussia 250,000 ; but the Austrian troops had behind them a long tradition of failure, and the Prussians were inclined to rely too much on the glories of the past. The Sardinian army was reasonably good, but it was small and lacked experience ; the Spaniards were practically useless, and the Dutch in the last stages of inefficiency. On the other hand, despite the disorganization of the past four years, the French Army still retained a certain soundness of structure that dated from the years just prior to the Revolution, when it had been easily the best in Europe. The organization of permanent divisions of all arms, and the system of manœuvring in column as well as in line, proved their worth as soon as the practice of campaigning restored the necessary discipline.

Within a very few weeks the French army was driven out of the Netherlands. The projected invasion of Holland had hardly begun before a strong force of Austrians under Coburg appeared on the scene. Dumouriez retreated, was brought to bay at Neerwinden on March 18, and suffered a heavy defeat. Before the end of the month Belgium was practically clear of the French, and on April 8 Dumouriez, after a futile attempt to persuade his army to overthrow the Convention and restore the monarchy, deserted to the enemy. Meanwhile the Prussians were investing the French troops in Mainz and driving the supporting army under Custine back across the Rhine.

The Austrians were now confronted with the task of reducing the frontier fortresses of Maubeuge, Condé, and Valenciennes before marching on Paris ; the Prussians with the task of reducing Mainz and driving Custine from the lines of Wissembourg, where he had taken up his position. Once this had been accomplished France would be invaded, and a twofold advance on Paris would follow. The situation was indeed desperate, for six nations instead of two were now at war with France, the Convention was racked by internal quarrels, and, to make matters worse, a serious counter-revolution that had been simmering for some time broke out in the west and south of France. Economic distress and the persecution of the clergy were the principal causes, but the immediate occasion was an attempt to raise 300,000 troops by a measure of conscription. The district of La Vendée, near the mouth of the Loire, was the main seat of the rebellion, but before long it had spread throughout Normandy and Brittany as well.

Thus blow after blow was struck at the Girondists. Their effort to stand by the King had set the republican sentiment of Paris against them ; the traitor Dumouriez had been their associate ; many of the

provinces whence they drew their strength were in open revolt. They themselves seemed to realize that their policy could never save France. In April the Convention appointed nine men to form the first Committee of Public Safety. Danton was its leading spirit, and he immediately resumed the task of organizing France for war. The Committee became the real executive, and its agents were sent out to establish control in the provinces. A Committee of General Security and a Revolutionary Tribunal were set up to discover and punish conspirators against the State. The Girondists arraigned Marat before the Tribunal, but he was acquitted. At last, secretly encouraged by the Committee of Public Safety, the Sections of Paris once again elected an insurrectionary Commune, and on June 2 marched on the Convention with a strong force of artillery, blockaded all the exits, and forced that body to place twenty-two of the leading Girondists under arrest. To this number others were added before the guillotine did its inevitable work.

The immediate results of the events of June 2 were ominous in the extreme. Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Toulon all rose in revolt, and a Norman girl named Charlotte Corday journeyed to Paris and stabbed Marat to death, for it was seen that the victory of Paris meant the victory of the mob, and that with the fall of the Gironde the influence of the middle classes was passing away. But the immediate effect of these risings was merely to concentrate power more closely than ever in the hands of a small group in Paris, that in its desperate need for unity and power was soon maintaining its authority by the system we know as the Terror. It will be convenient here to trace the progress of that system to its end, together with the closing phases of the Revolution, before describing the victorious campaigns that brought about the collapse of the First Coalition.

The Terror, the Thermidorians, and the Directory (July 1793–October 1795). After the fall of the Gironde the Jacobins hastily completed and published the new Constitution that had been in preparation since the fall of the monarchy. It was intended to give direct effect to the sovereignty of the people, with members of the Assembly elected by universal suffrage, and subject to recall if they failed to carry out the wishes of their constituents. Even the executive was to be chosen by popular election. But such a constitution could hardly be adopted during a period of warfare and rebellion. It was suspended at once for the duration of the war, and, in fact, never came into force at all. Instead the extremists proceeded at once to consolidate their power.

On July 10, 1793, a reorganized Committee of Public Safety assumed the reins of government. This time Danton was not a member, for his grip on affairs appears to have failed him, and he retired to the country. The new Committee was given a free hand to prosecute the war. It

began to organize France, like a vast besieged city, for one purpose only—victory. The danger from without, and, more important still, the danger from the rebellious provinces within, made the Committee ruthless in its determination to crush at once all opposition to its aims and methods. The result of this policy was the Reign of Terror, that aspect of the Revolution which in the minds of most people overshadows and characterizes the whole.

After the Terror began the members of the Convention became very quiet indeed: even the talkative Sieyès was hushed. The Committee was represented in the Convention by Barère. Other members had different tasks allotted to them, to which they applied themselves with notable energy. Carnot¹ and Prieur of the Côte d'Or organized the great campaigns and remodelled the Army. By the end of 1793 France had 600,000 men in the field, divided into ten separate armies. Industry was mobilized for the manufacture of munitions, clothing, and military stores. Food was rationed, corn was stored, and imports and exports were controlled. By the Law of the Maximum the prices of food and other necessities were limited, and savage penalties were imposed on those who disregarded this order. For omitting to sow corn, or for exporting bullion, the death penalty could be enforced. One unfortunate inn-keeper who charged tenpence for a glass of wine was actually fined 40,000 francs. Representatives on mission accompanied each army, keeping a close watch on the actions of the military commanders, and in some cases taking a part themselves in the direction of strategy. Meanwhile Jean Bon Saint-André was endeavouring to reorganize the Navy. But he met with very much less success than Carnot. He found the Navy seriously weakened by the Revolution. Nearly all its former officers had been driven out, and its corps of trained gunners disbanded, on the grounds that it was a privileged body. It was not easy for a civilian Government to realize that a ship and its guns form a single weapon, and that promoted seamen and merchant service officers are not the men to deal with a ship's company infected with revolutionary principles. A tin cap of liberty at the masthead, a guillotine on the forecastle, and unlimited enthusiasm do not make a navy. "If the tone of the seamen does not change," wrote a French admiral in March 1793, "we can expect nothing but reverses in action, even though we be superior in force." And this type of superiority was unlikely to be attained, for the French Navy mustered less than eighty ships of the line.

The men who really organized the Terror throughout France were Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois. In Paris the procession to the guillotine began—the Girondins, the Queen, suspects of all classes,

¹ Lazare-Nicolas-Marguèrite Carnot (1753–1823), military engineer and expert on fortification.

men who had evaded the Maximum Laws, ordinary criminals. In the provinces the representatives of the Committee organized similar systems, though with greatly varying severity. The original attack on the Catholic Church was now followed by an attack on Christianity itself. Worship of the 'Goddess of Reason' was inaugurated with great ceremony at Notre-Dame, and at many other churches throughout France. This was largely the work of a journalist named Hébert, one of the leaders of the Paris Commune, which at this time was supporting the Committee.

But not all members of the Committee were practical administrators. A group of idealists, who based their theories upon Rousseau's teaching, now saw their opportunity to create a new order in France. Couthon and Saint-Just were among the number, but by far the most important was Robespierre.¹ He alone of all the Committee had been before the public eye since the Revolution began. His absolute sincerity, his real belief in the principles which he professed, his incorruptible character—no description of Robespierre would be complete without that adjective—and his frequent expatiation upon his own virtue caused the Parisian public to believe in him more than in any other man in France. Since he sanctioned the Terror, obviously it must be necessary, and even, in some peculiar way, good. It was in the exercise of this influence that the importance of Robespierre really lay, for as an administrator he was thoroughly incompetent.

By the winter of 1793-94 the military situation had so far improved that a party of opposition to the Terror raised its head, believing that the continuance of the system was no longer necessary. In March 1794 the violence, irreligion, and licence of the Hébertists so disgusted the virtuous Robespierre that he secured their denunciation before the Revolutionary Tribunal and their death by the guillotine. Danton, whose influence had always been on the side of statesmanlike conciliation, now returned to public affairs and sided with Robespierre, being more or less forced into the leadership of the growing opposition to the Terror. But no position could have proved more dangerous, as Danton soon found to his cost. Robespierre deserted him, Collot d'Herbois rushed to the defence of his system, and on March 30, 1794, Danton, Desmoulins, and fourteen of their supporters were arrested. Even then it proved no easy matter to procure the condemnation of the famous revolutionary leader, but the methods of terror prevailed upon the court, and Danton and his followers were executed on April 5.

For the next few months Robespierre was easily the most prominent man in France. Historians, however, are by no means agreed as to the position that he really occupied. The orthodox viewpoint, that Robespierre deliberately engineered the fall of Danton in order to make him-

¹ Maximilien-François-Marie-Isidore de Robespierre (1758-94).

self supreme, that as the master of the Committee he intensified the Terror as a means of exterminating all who did not agree with his ideas of virtue, religion, and political doctrine, and that the Terror collapsed at his death because he himself had been personally responsible for its continuance, has recently been challenged. It has been asserted that Robespierre's betrayal of Danton was merely the action of a weak man following the lead of others with more decided personalities than his own, that the Terror was used by the Committee purely for military reasons, and that Robespierre's reputation was merely the mask to obscure the real nature of its activities. But whatever the true extent of Robespierre's influence, it is indisputable that the Terror reached its height during the early summer of 1794, and that Robespierre was largely responsible. On June 8 he organized a great Festival of the Supreme Being, to inaugurate the reign of 'virtue.' Hymns were sung, incense was burnt, and Robespierre declared his belief in the immortality of the soul. Two days later this strange being, still to all appearances at the height of his popularity, succeeded in passing the Law of the 22nd Prairial, by which the Revolutionary Tribunal was empowered to try prisoners in batches, using any kind of document as proof of guilt, without the necessity of calling witnesses. Death was to be the only punishment awarded. During the next seven weeks 1366 people were condemned—more than all those who had fallen under the Reign of Terror in Paris up to that time.

Reaction was inevitable. The renewed successes gained by the armies of France during the spring and summer of 1794 had rendered the country secure beyond all doubt, and the necessity for such drastic methods of supporting arbitrary government had disappeared. Moreover, matters had reached the stage where no one could consider himself safe. The climax came on July 26, when Robespierre uttered vague threats in the Convention against the opposers of his policy. No one was named, so all felt unsafe, and, irrespective of party, drew together in a common cause. Next day Robespierre was amazed to find himself greeted with shouts of "Down with the tyrant!" The Convention ordered his arrest, but the attempt to imprison him failed, for the Commune of Paris, where his influence was still supreme, rushed to his support. That night Robespierre and his followers were at the Hôtel de Ville, planning a fresh insurrection of the Sections against the Convention. In the early hours of the following morning (July 28, or 10 Thermidor) a body of armed men, dispatched by the Convention, burst into the room. A pistol-shot wounded Robespierre in the jaw. Together with a number of his supporters he was seized and guillotined on the evening of the same day.

By their prompt action the members of the Convention had saved themselves from destruction. They now resumed their powers, re-

modelled the Committee of Public Safety, and put an end to the Terror. The Law of 22nd Prairial was repealed, the Revolutionary Tribunal became an ordinary law-court, the Commune of Paris was abolished, Billaud-Varenne, Collot d'Herbois, and other Terrorists were forced out of office, and the Jacobin Club was closed, all before the end of the year. But the 'Thermidorians,' as the new reformers in the Convention were called, were themselves in a difficult situation. The establishment of a constitution could not now be delayed, but it was obvious that the democratic measure drawn up in 1793 was unsuitable, for the Revolution itself, as exemplified in the dangerous temper of the Paris mob, was not quite over. Among the poorer classes distress was acute, largely occasioned by the fall of the *assignats* to 1 per cent. of their nominal value, and the situation thus occasioned was seized upon by the disbanded Jacobins for their own purposes. On April 1, 1795, an insurrection broke out that was easily suppressed, but another movement on May 20 was much more serious, and took the form of a determined attack on the Convention. For a time the deputies were forced to temporize, but eventually they succeeded in bringing up troops, and the attack was beaten off. Many prominent Jacobins, Collot d'Herbois among them, were arrested and exiled.


On September 23, 1795, the Constitution of the Year III was proclaimed. It showed marked distrust of the people and jealousy of the powers of any one body in the State. Under its terms only taxpayers could vote. The legislative power was vested in a Council of Five Hundred, and a right of veto was exercised by a second body, known as the Ancients, the members of which had to be over forty years of age. The executive power lay in the hands of a committee of five Directors, chosen by the legislature.

One more attempt at revolution was still to come. To perpetuate its power and ensure security from reprisals the Convention decreed that two-thirds of the new Council of Five Hundred should be chosen from among its own members. This was too much for the Sections of Paris. On October 5, 1795 (13 Vendémiaire), they rose in revolt again, and marched upon the Convention. But the deputies had made thorough preparations. A strong force of artillery under the direction of Napoleon Bonaparte soon scattered the mob, and Paris learned at long last that the new masters must be obeyed. In November the Directory, of which Carnot was a member, assumed control. It had already discovered that in the last resort it must depend upon the Army, now a splendid fighting force with victories to its credit on every frontier.

The Collapse of the First Coalition (1793-97). As previously related, the spring of 1793 witnessed the expulsion of the French armies from the Netherlands, leaving the Austrians under Coburg

faced with the task of reducing the fortresses of Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge in order to clear the way for their advance upon Paris. This was the situation when Coburg was joined by a number of Dutch levies, and by some 7000 English and 10,000 Hanoverian troops under the command of the Duke of York. Most of the English regiments were hopelessly under strength, so that an astonishing number of different uniforms was seen in the composition of the Duke's little army.

While Coburg's army proceeded with its task the French were consolidating their scattered forces into an army of the north. On July 10 the fortress of Condé fell, and the Allies invested



FRONTIER FORTRESSES BLOCKING THE ALLIES' ADVANCE (1793)

Valenciennes. As their total force had increased considerably since the opening of the campaign they have often been blamed for not disregarding the remaining fortresses and advancing direct upon Paris before the Committee of Public Safety had had time to consolidate its position and to suppress the rebellion in La Vendée, but Coburg was merely giving effect to the principles of judicious generalship in first securing the safety of his line of communication. On July 28 he captured Valenciennes, and moved his forces forward to the attack on Maubeuge. It was now that the organizing ability of Carnot began to take effect.


At this moment the English decided to undertake a separate operation, the capture of their old possession Dunkirk. Coburg, who appeared to possess more than sufficient troops to effect his immediate purpose, lent some of them to the Duke, thus raising the latter's force to about 36,000 men. This number appeared to be perfectly adequate, for the defences of Dunkirk were in a deplorable state. The small bodies of French troops encountered on the way thither were of such poor quality that they were easily brushed aside. On August 20 York divided his army, marching himself to the sea-coast in order to approach Dunkirk from the east, and leaving the Austrians under Freytag on the landward side to guard against any attempt at relief.

Four days later York was close to Dunkirk and ready to begin the siege. But he was now separated from Freytag by a large tract of marshland, which the French promptly flooded.

This factor proved decisive. A French army under Houchard, larger than that of the Austrians, but much inferior in quality, drove Freytag back upon the village of Hondschoote and defeated him there on September 8. York's communications were threatened, and he at once retired, with the loss of nearly all his heavy artillery. The English army might have been surrounded and captured had Houchard pursued his advantage with a little more vigour; his lack of initiative cost him his life, in spite of the victory. But the relief of Dunkirk had a tremendous effect upon the failing morale of his troops.

A further success was soon to follow. On September 28 the siege of Maubeuge began in earnest. Carnot saw at once that only a rapid concentration of all available troops could save it, and put Jourdan in command with orders to carry this policy out. By means of an extraordinary succession of forced marches—one body of troops covered seventy miles in three and a half days—the concentration was effected. On October 16 the left wing of the Austrian army that was covering the siege was overwhelmed at the village of Wattignies, and driven from its position before it had time to realize that the bulk of the French forces had been massed during the night against that particular flank. The siege of Maubeuge was raised, and the relieving French force marched in amid the rejoicings of their comrades.

Meanwhile Hoche and Pichegru were reorganizing the Army of the Rhine. The third partition of Poland was imminent; Prussia meant to have her share, and the Poles were in such a state of unrest that the presence of a considerable body of troops would undoubtedly be necessary if the matter were to be successfully carried through.



THE SIEGE OF DUNKIRK
(SEPTEMBER 1793)

For this reason, and in spite of repeated protests from the British Government, the Prussian army on the Rhine showed little signs of activity. Without much difficulty the French drove it back from Weissemburg and Landau. By the end of the year, therefore, France had been cleared of invading armies, with the exception of a small strip of territory along the Netherlands frontier.

In naval affairs the year 1793, for reasons already detailed, did not witness much activity on the part of Revolutionary France. Nor were the English efforts productive of lasting results. It was the middle of July before the Channel fleet, to the number of fifteen sail of the line, got to sea. Lord Howe,¹ now over sixty-seven years of age, was in command, and, as was only to be expected, his policy proved to be the safe one of maintaining his fleet in good condition rather than exposing it by lengthy periods of cruising in heavy weather. However, it patrolled the French coasts between the Channel and Cape Finisterre, and before the end of the year it had been increased in size by the commissioning of ten additional line-of-battle ships. Pitt's alliances with Sardinia and Naples necessitated the presence of a fleet in the Mediterranean, and the command fell to Hood.² In August he appeared off Toulon, and the Government of that city, which had revolted against the Convention and declared for the Bourbons, decided to enlist his help. On the 28th the British fleet was admitted to the harbour. There Hood discovered thirty large warships, seventeen of which were already in commission. English, Spanish, and Neapolitan troops now set about the task of defending Toulon from the army of the Convention, for Pitt hoped to make this the base for a determined onslaught against Paris from the south. But the effort was doomed to failure. The Spanish Government was disappointed in its hope of appointing the commander-in-chief, and the uneasy alliance between Spain and Britain suffered in consequence. A promise from Austria to send 5000 troops from the province of Milan never materialized. The presence of royalist *émigrés*, with their avowed aims of restoring the *ancien régime* in full, sowed discontent and suspicion among the French. Within a few weeks an army 25,000 strong had collected round Toulon, and the capture of the forts commanding the harbour soon made the position untenable for the British fleet. On December 19 the town was evacuated, so hurriedly that fifteen of the French ships of the line were left behind intact, very much against Hood's original intention.

Meanwhile a squadron of seven sail of the line had left England in March for the West Indies. Not finding the two large French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe prepared to declare for the Bourbons, this fleet was reinforced during the following winter by another under

¹ Richard, Earl Howe (1726-99), entered the Navy in 1740.

² Samuel, Viscount Hood (1724-1816), entered the Navy in 1741.

Sir John Jervis, who brought with him 7000 troops. This dispersal of the English forces, so fatal a principle to the successful conduct of a major war, was largely the work of Henry Dundas, to whom Pitt entrusted much of the conduct of the war. It must be remembered, however, that the commercial value of the West Indies was very much greater in those days than in these, though such a method of waging war upon France was, as Edmund Burke observed, "a terribly round-about road" towards victory in the main theatre of war. During the next few years the British succeeded, at the cost of many lives, in capturing all the important French islands, though Guadeloupe was subsequently lost. When Holland and Spain also became enemies of Britain, Demerara, Essequibo, and Trinidad were added to the British conquests in this region.

During the year 1794 the French armies assumed the initiative. At the start of the campaigning season, however, the strength of the Allies appeared to be improving. In April the Emperor arrived in the Netherlands. The Duke of York's army was constantly increasing in size. During 1793 Pitt had raised twenty-two fresh battalions of infantry; during the course of 1794 he was to raise fifty-four. But the French armies collecting under the command of Pichegru and Jourdan numbered over a quarter of a million men.

Lack of effective co-operation, which led to a fatal dispersion of forces on the part of the Allies, was the cause of the first French victory. The Duke of York and the Archduke Charles, whose army lay along the course of the river Scheldt, planned an attack on a large French army scattered about the village of Turcoing. Simultaneously an Austrian force under Clerfayt was to assail the French from the north. On May 17 the action began, with the arrival of the Allied centre under the Duke of York at Turcoing. But the fact that both wings failed to make their objectives left him in a dangerously advanced position. On the following day he was attacked in front and on both flanks; retreat was inevitable, and it soon became a rout, the Duke himself narrowly escaping capture. Movements by Clerfayt and the Archduke Charles were too late to be of any assistance, and the entire Allied army was forced to give way. The keen watchfulness and superior marching-power of the French had once again proved too much for their enemies.

Shortly after the battle of Turcoing the Emperor returned to Vienna. The Austrian commanders naturally took this as a hint that he had lost interest in the Netherlands, and intended rather to devote his energies to securing a share in the fourth partition of Poland. The Prussians, who in April had secured from Britain a subsidy of £1,600,000 in return for guaranteeing an army of 62,000 men, refused to leave their position on the Rhine. As a result Turcoing was followed by the loss of the fortress of Charleroi and the defeat of Coburg's army, which

was approaching to relieve it, at Fleurus. This battle, which was fought on June 26, had decisive results. The Austrians retreated towards the Rhine, uncovering the Duke of York's flank and thus forcing him to retire into Holland. The fortresses taken from the French with the loss of so much valuable time in the preceding year were one by one recaptured, and on July 10 the French army again entered Brussels. Clerfayt, who now superseded Coburg, retired behind the Rhine in October, and the resistance of the Dutch, who were too terrified or too lethargic to help themselves, soon collapsed. Prussia alone could have saved the situation, but, using a temporary stoppage of the British subsidy as an excuse, Frederick William refused to order his army to move, and later excused himself on the plea that he was already engaged in a war in Poland. The French accordingly crossed the Rhine and occupied Coblenz and Bonn. Holland was overrun, and the Duke of York was obliged to make a terrible winter march into Hanover. Thus Pitt's policy of subsidized alliances failed, owing to the mutual jealousies and suspicions of Austria and Prussia. None the less it must in justice be remembered that the decisive factor was the growing military superiority of the French armies. During 1794 they won eight battles, capturing 90,000 prisoners and nearly 4000 cannon.

In naval affairs the year 1794 witnessed what was for England something of a novelty—an outstanding victory at the beginning of a campaign. The rebellions, conscription laws, and general turmoil of 1793 had left France deficient in home-grown food, and the Government was accordingly forced to buy five million francs' worth of corn from the United States. This consignment, in a great convoy numbering nearly 150 ships, left Chesapeake Bay early in April. It was vitally necessary that it should reach France, and the Brest fleet was ordered to sea to ensure its safe arrival. Villaret-Joyeuse was in command. At one bound he had reached the rank of admiral from that of lieutenant; nine of his captains had been merchant service officers, and three years previously one had been a boatswain and another an able seaman. Jean Bon Saint-André accompanied the fleet as representative on mission, sailing in the flagship *Mountain*. It is recorded that when the battle was joined he departed hurriedly for the hold, in spite of the fine exhortation he had delivered just before.

On May 19 the British fleet under Lord Howe discovered that the French had left Brest. Making all sail to the westward in pursuit, Howe sighted his enemy on the morning of the 28th—twenty-six sail of the line, a number equal to his own. Unable to bring on a general action that day, he succeeded only in crippling the three-decker *Révolutionnaire*, at the cost of a similar fate to a much smaller English vessel. On the 29th Howe surrounded several vessels at the rear of

the enemy's line, and accounted for four of them. During the next two days, when thick fog prevented a renewal of the battle, Villaret-Joyeuse was joined by four more vessels, which again made his total equal to that of the English. It was not until Sunday, June 1, that the main action was fought.

Just after eight o'clock on the morning of that day Howe's fleet bore down slowly upon the enemy, approaching at a slant in order to make use of the power of its entire broadside. As they had the weather gauge the plan was to pass separately between the French ships, and to engage them on the lee side, thus checking any attempt to stand off and fight at a distance. The manœuvre was only partially successful, some half-dozen vessels getting through, but, whether on one side or the other, nearly all the ships of both fleets were soon furiously engaged. Before two o'clock the battle was over. Twelve of the French ships were crippled, though five of them were rescued later by Villaret. The action was pursued no further, for the ageing Howe had had no sleep for five days and was thoroughly exhausted. Both fleets now made for their home ports.

This action, referred to by the British as the 'Glorious First of June,' since it was fought three or four hundred miles from the nearest land, nevertheless left the French with some cause for congratulation, as the corn convoy slipped through in the fog and reached Brest on June 12. This circumstance was lucky for Villaret-Joyeuse, who had been informed that the guillotine awaited him if the convoy did not arrive.

In 1795 Holland, Prussia, and Spain withdrew from the First Coalition and made separate treaties of peace. Holland, indeed, had little option. On January 17 the Prince of Orange fled to England, and two days later the French entered Amsterdam. The Dutch 'Patriots' thereupon abolished the Stadholderate, set up a republican form of government, and in May signed a treaty of alliance with France that was directed particularly against Britain. In September the Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope was captured by a British naval force, before the French had time to consolidate their position there.

The fourth partition—and extinction—of Poland, arranged early in the year, provided Prussia with the extra territory she had so long been seeking. On April 5 she made peace with France at the Treaty of Basle, regaining her lost territory to the east of the Rhine, but surrendering to France all she had formerly owned on the west bank.

The Spanish military campaigns against France had gone badly. Already, by the beginning of 1795, French troops had crossed the Pyrenees. Figueras and Rosas were invested and captured. The Bourbon Court at Madrid was under the influence of the all-powerful

Minister Godoy, whose anti-British sentiments were strengthened successively by the quarrels at Toulon, a British attack on Haiti, and the occupation of Corsica, an operation conducted by the Mediterranean fleet in order to provide itself with convenient harbours for watching the French and Italian coasts. Accordingly Spain made peace with France at Basle on July 11. She received back the territory occupied by France south of the Pyrenees, but surrendered her possessions in the island of Haiti. Godoy was awarded the title of 'Prince of the Peace' by his grateful sovereign.

Of the First Coalition only Britain, Austria, and Sardinia now remained actively at war with France. Pitt had no intention of making peace while the Netherlands remained under French control. In the autumn of 1795 he made a further treaty of alliance with Austria and Russia. Great hopes were expected of the latter, but although the Tsarina Catherine sent twelve ships to co-operate with the British Navy, the usual arguments over subsidies prevented her participation on land. In the following year Catherine died, and her successor, Paul, renounced her policy.

Both in naval as well as in military operations the year 1795 witnessed a pause. In March fifteen sail of the line, accompanied by several frigates and smaller vessels, left Toulon in an attempt to recapture Corsica, but the British Mediterranean fleet, now under the command of Admiral Hotham, fought a successful action that led to the French abandoning the idea for the time being. Hotham, however, was not an energetic commander, and did little to harass the French communications along the coast-road between the Alps and the sea, which, according to Nelson, and the Austrians as well, he might easily have done more effectively. Meanwhile Lord Bridport, Howe's successor in command of the Channel fleet, captured three of Villaret-Joyeuse's ships near the Île de Groix. On the Rhine front the Austrians succeeded in separating the armies of Pichegru and Jourdan, and even compelled the latter to retire. An armistice between the French and Austrians was signed in September, and lasted until May of the following year.

If 1795 had nothing stirring to offer in the way of military exploits the year 1796 more than made up for it. Carnot was now free to plan a concerted attack on Austria. There were two directions from which she could be assailed: from the valley of the Rhine, by way of the Danube to Vienna, where an attempt was to be made by armies under Jourdan and Moreau; and by an attack on her province of Milan. The plains of North Italy were protected by a combined army of Austrians and Sardinians, numbering in all over 50,000 men. The French Army of the Alps had long sought to drive these forces from their mountain positions, but although some of the passes had been


captured, so far little progress had resulted. It was here that Bonaparte began his career as a general, with such sudden and astonishing success that Italy became the scene of operations in which the remnants of the First Coalition were smashed into fragments.

Napoleon Buonaparte (as he spelt his name up to the period of which we are now writing) was born at Ajaccio on August 15, 1769, the son of a member of the lesser Corsican nobility. He had four brothers: Joseph, who was older than himself, and Lucien, Louis, and Jerome, who were younger. Corsica having become a French possession just over a year previously, it was to the military schools of Brienne and Paris that young Napoleon was sent when he decided to adopt the career of a soldier. Apart from a decided brilliance in mathematics, he did not exhibit any outstanding qualities, while his sallow, foreign appearance, coupled with a stern, unsociable nature, by no means endeared him to his fellows. He attained manhood just as the Revolution was beginning. In theory his sympathies lay sincerely with the revolutionary cause, but the ineptitude of the nation's leaders and the insolence of the Paris mob surprised and disgusted him as the movement developed.

It was not until 1793 that Bonaparte attained prominence as a soldier. In that year he was made commandant of artillery in the army sent to retake Toulon, and it was largely his organization of a park of 200 cannon and his quick perception that if a promontory occupied by the English were once captured the harbour would become untenable that led to the French success. Bonaparte was rewarded with the rank of brigadier, and given command of all the artillery of the Army of Italy. Within a few months of this his career suffered an unexpected check, probably on account of his supposed connexion with the supporters of Robespierre. On the collapse of the Terror the Thermidorians ordered Bonaparte's arrest; he was acquitted, but on refusing a command in La Vendée was deprived of employment. However, his outstanding ability and the part he played in overthrowing the Paris insurrection of October 1795 once more brought him to the fore, Carnot in particular recognizing his genius. For long Bonaparte had occupied his leisure in designing a plan of campaign for expelling the Austrians from the province of Milan. In March 1796, at the age of twenty-six, the Directory gave him command of the Army of Italy, and he had the opportunity of putting his ideas into practice.

Bonaparte found the French army, rather less than 40,000 strong, holding an extended position with its left in possession of the passes of Tenda and Ormea, and its extreme right in an advanced position at Voltri. It was opposed by some 20,000 Sardinian troops, most of which were holding the line Coni—Ceva—Millesimo, with their base at Turin, and 30,000 Austrians, commanded by General Beaulieu,

on the line Sassello—Ovado—Votaggio. The real base of the Austrians lay on the Brenner Pass, communicating with Vienna. Bonaparte's instructions had ordered him to concentrate his attention on expelling the Austrians from Italy, informing him that if necessity arose they



BONAPARTE'S SEPARATION OF THE SARDINIAN AND AUSTRIAN ARMIES (APRIL 1796)

would not hesitate to desert the Sardinians in order to save themselves. Bonaparte, who possessed in full measure the statesmanship of the born general, realized at once the significance of this information. The place of junction between two armies operating from divergent bases will always, where the alliance is weakened by self-interest, be

the most vulnerable point, for if either army is defeated it will tend to cover its own lines of communication, and hence to separate from the other. Bonaparte therefore determined to concentrate his attack in the region of Montenotte, and in the event of success to disregard his instructions, crush the weaker Sardinian army first, enforce a treaty of peace that should give him control of the western Alpine passes between France and Sardinia, and then turn against the Austrians at his leisure. Helped by an Austrian concentration against Voltri, which served still further to weaken the junction of the Allied armies, Bonaparte on April 10 delivered his attack round Montenotte, and within two days he had forced the Allied centre back upon Aquì, thus separating the main armies. Turning westward upon the Sardinians, he drove them in quick succession from Ceva and Mondovì, back along the road to Turin. Cut off from all hope of succour, the King of Sardinia therefore made peace on April 28, allowing the French to keep Savoy and Nice, his possessions to the west of the Alps, ceding the fortresses of Alessandria, Tortona, and Coni, and allowing the French to use the Mont Cenis pass for their coming attack on the Austrians. Bonaparte's manœuvre had been entirely successful, ending in little over a fortnight the stalemate that had persisted for so long on the passes of the Alps. He was to attempt a similar operation in his last plan of campaign at Waterloo, with less happy results for himself.

The task of driving the Austrians from the Milanese now began. The North Italian plain is cut by a series of rivers, all running southward from the Alps into the river Po. In its retreat eastward the Austrian army tried successively to defend the lines of these rivers. First it was outflanked and forced to retire from the banks of the Ticino; then, with Bonaparte himself helping to lead the charge of a picked column of troops across the bridge of Lodi, it was driven from the banks of the Adda. Milan was occupied; the Austrians fell back behind the Mincio, and the siege of Mantua, greatest stronghold of all, now began. While it was in progress Bonaparte passed through some of the most critical moments of his military career. The Italian people, inclined at first to welcome the ragged French soldiers as liberators, were growing restive under the constant requisitions made by Bonaparte, with whom it was a cardinal principle to make warfare pay for itself by living upon occupied territory. The situation of the French was therefore extremely critical when they were subjected to determined attacks from two Austrian armies sent to relieve the fortress. But at Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli these armies were defeated, and Mantua itself fell on February 2, 1797.

It was not only the Austrians who felt the weight of Bonaparte's hand. Parma, Modena, and the Pope were compelled to pay crushing

indemnities, and to surrender many precious treasures of art and literature. A new state called the Cisalpine Republic, based as usual on the French model, appeared in Northern Italy. The Pope was compelled to yield some territory in the north of his dominions to form a part of it.

Bonaparte was now able to cross the Alps, approach Vienna, and dictate preliminaries of peace at Leoben. While his Italian campaign had been in progress Jourdan and Moreau had crossed the Rhine to carry out their part of the combined attack on Austria. But the very able Archduke Charles¹ had defeated the former and compelled him to retire behind the Rhine again, whither Moreau had perforce to follow. Early in 1797 the attack was renewed by Hoche, but the news of Leoben arrived before it had proceeded very far.

On October 17, 1797, the formal treaty of peace was signed between France and Austria at Campo Formio. Austria acquiesced in the loss of Belgium and the west bank of the Rhine to France, and of Milan to the Cisalpine Republic. In compensation she received the greater part of the ancient Venetian Republic, which had striven desperately to maintain neutrality during the war. The idea originated with Bonaparte, who found the necessary excuse for partitioning Venetia in a rising at Verona that had resulted in the murder of some wounded French soldiers. That part of Venetia west of the river Adige went to the Cisalpine Republic. France took the Ionian Islands, for Bonaparte already had his eyes upon Egypt and was anxious for a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Treaty of Campo Formio marks the end of the First Coalition. Great Britain alone remained, unable to fight with any prospect of success, except upon the sea. There followed in consequence what is perhaps the most remarkable period in British naval history.

The Navy in Victory and Rebellion (1796-98). By the time Bonaparte was appointed to command the Army of Italy the French Government, abandoning all attempts to gain control of the sea, was limiting its naval enterprise to the task of destroying British commerce. Ocean-going merchant fleets had therefore to sail in convoys, and retaliatory measures were adopted by British cruisers against the French coastal trade. On the success of these efforts depended very largely the immobilization of the Brest fleet, which could only be properly supplied with the heavier naval stores by sea. At this time—*i.e.*, before the appointment of Lord St Vincent to the Admiralty—Brest was not subjected to a close blockade. The wide Iroise Channel, leading to the harbour, is bounded to the north and south by dangerous ground, and was accordingly watched by a few fast frigates inside the Channel, with a small squadron sailing outside in the neighbourhood

¹ Karl Ludwig, Archduke of Austria and Duke of Teschen (1771-1847).

of Ushant. The main body of the Channel fleet remained in safety at Spithead, over two hundred miles away. This cautious policy, as practised by Howe and his successor, Bridport, allowed the French fleet to escape for an unknown destination late in 1796.

Quite early in that year the Irish agitator Wolfe Tone was in communication with the French Government. Ireland was on the brink of rebellion. It seemed likely that the presence of a strong force of French soldiers would provide the necessary incentive to a widespread rising, and soon place the southern harbours of Ireland in French hands. General Hoche¹ was therefore given command of an expedition numbering nearly 20,000 men, to be convoyed in transports by seventeen ships of the line and many smaller vessels. On December 15 this fleet assembled in the roads outside Brest, driving off Sir Edward Pellew, the commander of the British frigates stationed in the Iroise Channel. On the following day the expedition started, its destination being the anchorage of Bantry Bay. The weather was heavy, and the crews inexperienced. Morard de Galles, the French admiral, countermanded his original order to leave the Channel by the dangerous south entrance near the coast, and decided to run straight out to sea instead. The result was hopeless confusion, only six vessels following his lead, while the main fleet continued on its original course. The general turmoil was increased by Pellew, who, by firing rockets and burning blue lights, did his best to render the French signals unintelligible.

In spite of this separation from its commanders—for Hoche was in the same ship as the admiral—the main French fleet reached the neighbourhood of Bantry Bay, only to find that in the strong easterly gale then prevailing it could not be worked to the intended anchorage. After spending some days upon the coast it returned to Brest, half a dozen vessels falling a prey to the British on the voyage. Meanwhile Hoche and Morard in the *Fraternité* ran so far to the west that they never got near Bantry Bay at all. Eventually, hearing what had occurred, they made their way to Rochefort. The whole incident reflected credit neither on the seamanship of the French Navy nor on the efficiency of the British system of blockade, for in better weather an unopposed landing in Ireland would undoubtedly have been made, perhaps with serious results.

By the time that Napoleon was starting on his victorious Italian campaign Hotham in the Mediterranean had been replaced by Sir John Jervis,² a stern, severe, merciless disciplinarian who, although sixty-one years of age, was still in the full vigour of a career that had begun at the siege of Quebec in 1759. It had long been realized that

¹ Lazare Hoche (1768–97).

² John Jervis, Earl St Vincent (1735–1823), son of a solicitor to the Admiralty.

if the small states of Italy were to be kept free from the dominance of France the maintenance by Britain of her status as a Mediterranean Power must be proved by the presence of a fleet. The British task in that sea was therefore twofold : to watch the Toulon fleet and to keep the Italian states, and especially Naples, friendly to the Allied cause.

But Napoleon's lightning success in 1796 rendered the task impossible. During May and June Parma, Modena, Naples, Tuscany (with its important naval harbour of Leghorn), and the Pope were all forced to make terms with him, while Jervis, with fifteen sail of the line, forming the main part of his fleet, was watching Toulon. Towards the end of August Spain made an alliance with France, and shortly afterwards she declared war on Britain, complaining of British naval encroachments in the West Indies and the Mediterranean. Although her naval *personnel* was extremely inefficient and ill-trained, Spain possessed fifty well-built warships. This made the odds against Jervis overwhelming, especially when his subordinate commander, Admiral Mann, sailed for home with his squadron of seven sail of the line entirely on his own initiative. When news arrived that a Spanish fleet had joined the French in Toulon it was obvious that Corsica and Elba (which the British had occupied not long before) could no longer be held. By the beginning of 1797 both islands had accordingly been evacuated, and, deprived of all friendly harbours within the Mediterranean itself, Jervis lay at Gibraltar, ready to make a concentration in the Atlantic, in case Britain should be threatened with invasion.


The Directory now decided that the moment was ripe for a great concentration of naval force, as a preliminary to the invasion of the British Isles. Five ships of the Toulon fleet passed through the Straits and reached Brest in safety, Jervis being unable to prevent them, since his fleet had been badly damaged in a storm. Meanwhile the Spanish fleet at Toulon was making its way by stages to the same destination. On February 1, 1797, it left Cartagena under the command of Admiral Cordova, bound for Cadiz. An easterly gale drove it far into the Atlantic, and it was on its way back to the coast when at dawn on the morning of St Valentine's Day, February 14, the English fleet sighted it off Cape St Vincent.

Jervis still had no more than fifteen sail of the line. As the Spaniards loomed into sight twenty-seven sail were counted, among them being the famous *Santissima Trinidad*, the largest vessel, and the only four-decker, then afloat. But Jervis did not hesitate for a moment. He knew how vital it was to lay the Spanish bogey without delay. "A victory," he said, "is very essential to England at this moment." Seeing that the enemy was sailing without orderly formation, in two divisions some miles apart, he decided to interpose his fleet, and by

dealing with each division separately, to reduce the odds against him as much as possible.

The Spaniards tried at first to close the gap, but with no more than partial success. When the English fleet slipped between them eighteen vessels lay upon one side and nine upon the other. Jervis decided to engage the larger body first. At half-past eleven Troubridge in the *Culloden* opened fire, an example followed by the rest of the English ships as they passed the Spaniards. Both fleets then tacked, the English endeavouring to head their enemy off, a manœuvre that might have failed but for Nelson's initiative in leaving his place in the line in order to throw his ship, the *Captain*, across the head of the enemy's column. Had it not been for this timely action the two Spanish divisions might have effected a junction in rear of the British.

By four in the afternoon the battle was over. The rear ships of the enemy's larger division had been severely handled; the *Santissima Trinidad* had lost two of her masts, and four ships had been taken. Most important of all, the inferior quality of the Spanish Navy had been amply demonstrated, a fact that accounts for the reluctance of the Spanish Government to render



THE BATTLE OF ST VINCENT
(FEBRUARY 14, 1797)

further naval assistance to its new ally. Jervis, now created Lord St Vincent, with his fleet increased to twenty-one sail, began the long blockade of Cadiz, whither most of the Spanish fleet had escaped.

The summer of 1797 witnessed the culminating stages of Bonaparte's success in Italy, and found Britain passing through one of the most perilous periods of her history. At the very moment when the final collapse of the First Coalition left her without effective allies her vital first line of defence, the fleet in home waters, mutinied at Spithead and the Nore. Luckily most of the grievances, being genuine in character, were capable of redress. The question of pay was the chief. Since the time of Charles II the pay of the able seaman had been

standardized at 22s. 6d. a month, while that of the equivalent merchant-service rating, subject to no such restriction, had gone up with the cost of living to three times as much. Moreover, the naval seaman's money was subject to deductions for time spent in sick-bay, irrespective of the cause that kept him there, and was not paid until the end of his vessel's commission, possibly a matter of several years. He then received a 'ticket' which could be cashed only at the Navy Pay Office in London. Circumstances usually forced him or his wife to turn it into money locally at a heavy discount. A further grievance was the failure to supply fresh food in port, resulting, as the seamen complained, in the prevalence of much preventible scurvy. The food in any case was bad enough, and, in accordance with ancient custom, was always issued short—e.g., the rations of six men to a mess of eight. Another particularly annoying restriction was the refusal to grant leave in home ports. The reason for this was to prevent desertions, a very common occurrence resulting from the fact that a high proportion of the ship's crews was serving by compulsion. In 1793, and again when the war was resumed in 1803, nearly 40,000 men were required to man the fleet, and the British Government had devised no adequate scheme of recruitment. The numbers actually obtained by the press-gang have probably been exaggerated, owing to confusion on the musters between men entered as 'prest' (ready) for the King's service, and men 'pressed' against their will, but the method was extremely unpopular, especially with the merchant service, in which the principal depredations took place. So hard were the naval conditions of the time that the offer of bounties to volunteers had little effect. The Government therefore passed a Quota Act, by which each county or seaport was required to furnish so many men in proportion to its population. Many of these were taken from the gaols, though criminals were sometimes known to choose the alternative of the gallows. Thus it came about that revolutionary agitators and other undesirables were drafted into the fleet, where the existence of so many genuine grievances provided a fruitful soil for the spread of their doctrines.

The movement began with a demand for an increase in pay. This petition having been shelved and apparently forgotten at the Admiralty, in April the Spithead fleet refused Lord Bridport's order to sail. A 'General Assembly' was elected, which maintained discipline with great efficiency while formulating its demands. Eventually commissioners arrived from London, and on receiving a promise of free pardon the men returned to duty. But delays in effecting the promised reforms, together with an Admiralty order designed to make such a movement impossible in the future, convinced the men that they had been tricked, and early in May the mutiny broke out again. This time the intervention of 'Black Dick' Howe, now too old and crippled for service

afloat, was necessary before the seamen would return to duty. On the strength of his promise that grievances should be redressed the Spithead mutiny came to an end.

No sooner had matters been settled at Spithead than a mutiny of a much more dangerous kind broke out at the Nore. The three battle-ships stationed there at the time were joined during May by the greater part of Admiral Duncan's fleet from Yarmouth, and the entire force placed itself under the orders of 'Parker the Delegate,' an ex-convict who had joined the Nore flagship under the quota system, in spite of the fact that he had already been dismissed from the service on account of his disgraceful record. Parker terrorized the surrounding countryside and plundered all merchant vessels that had the temerity to use the Thames. But the violence of his own methods soon betrayed him. Shore batteries and armed small craft were prepared, and the mutinous vessels surrounded. Convinced of the Admiralty's intention to blow its own fleet out of the water rather than allow such a state of affairs to continue, one ship after another deserted Parker, until he himself finally surrendered on June 14. He met with the hanging he deserved, together with fourteen other seamen and four marines.

Luckily for Britain news travelled slowly in 1797, and in any case the French invasion plans did not mature. But although the battle of Cape St Vincent had for the time being removed the danger from the Spanish fleet, and Lord St Vincent, by the exercise of his usual stern, and even harsh, discipline, prevented the naval mutiny from spreading to the blockading fleet before Cadiz, France had another ally that still ranked as a naval Power. Hoche had never abandoned the idea of an invasion of the British Isles, and it was mainly due to him that an army was concentrated near the Texel, within which lay the anchorage of the Dutch fleet. To guard against this danger the fleet at Yarmouth under Admiral Duncan was ordered to sea, at the very moment when ship after ship mutinied and sailed away to join Parker at the Nore. Only the flagship *Venerable* and one other ship, the *Adamant*, in both of which incipient mutinies had been quelled by the Admiral himself, remained loyal. With these two Duncan courageously left for the Texel and anchored right in the channel on the southern shore of the island, prepared to blockade the sixteen sail of the line, twenty frigates, and fifty transports that lay within. There he was joined by the *Circe*, a frigate whose allegiance was so doubtful that her captain and first lieutenant issued their orders sitting back to back on the quarterdeck, with loaded carbines across their knees.

Duncan's ruse was entirely successful. The Dutch deemed it certain that he must be supported by the Channel fleet, just out of sight, a delusion that Duncan fostered by sending the *Circe* to the horizon to relay false signals in the international code. Gradually the

Admiralty was able to reinforce him, as one ship after another was purged of her undesirable elements and sent back to sea. In September Hoche died, and the invasion scheme was abandoned. In October the Dutch fleet came out, and on the 11th of that month Duncan caught it, close in with the shore off the village of Camperdown.

The battle that followed was one of the most fiercely contested in naval history. The opposing fleets were evenly matched: each numbered sixteen sail, and in de Winter the Dutch possessed an admiral no less courageous than Duncan. No elaborate tactics were observed by either side. Duncan's sole idea was to get between the Dutch and the shore in order to prevent their shallower-draught vessels from escaping him, and with this end in view he approached his enemy in two columns. The battle began at about one o'clock, and lasted until half-past three. The result of it was that Duncan captured nine ships of the line, two frigates, and Admiral de Winter himself. The fury of the battle can be gauged from the fact that when taken the Dutch prizes were found practically smashed to pieces, while a number of the English ships, though still flying their own flag, were in little better case. Duncan received a tremendous ovation when he returned home, for Camperdown was indeed an encouraging climax to a remarkable year.

During the dark days of 1797 the Bank of England suspended cash payments. With the First Coalition at an end naval successes could do no more than render England secure from invasion; all hope of defeating France had vanished, at any rate for the time being. Pitt accordingly opened peace negotiations, but disagreement over the return of the British colonial conquests, especially the Cape of Good Hope, brought them to an abrupt conclusion. In September the wily Talleyrand became French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on the 5th of that month (Fructidor 18) the Directory, led by Barras, overthrew an attempt to modify the Constitution. Opposition members of the Council of Five Hundred, greatly increased in number by the recent elections, combined with Orleanist monarchists and others to attack the Directors' policy, demanding reforms and religious liberty. Barras appealed to Bonaparte, who was still in Italy, and the latter, unwilling to commit himself personally, sent the swaggering Jacobin General Augereau. With his help the Council was surrounded, and a series of arrests began. Carnot, who was implicated in the plot, escaped by flight; General Pichegru, now an avowed royalist, and many other prominent men were sent to the penal settlement at Cayenne. The election of the disaffected deputies was annulled, and the Council sank into a position of insignificance, while the reorganized Directory took on a new lease of power. But once again it had been shown that its authority depended on the Army.

At the end of the year Bonaparte returned to Paris, where he was careful for the time being to behave with a studied discretion. The Directory appointed him to command the Army of England, but a review of the naval situation soon showed him that for the present no scheme of invasion stood a chance of success. "We shall not for many years acquire the control of the seas," he wrote to the Directory, and returned instead to an idea that had long been revolving in his mind—the conquest of Egypt, and its retention as a base from which to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean and to drive the British from their lately won possessions in India. A desire to keep Bonaparte actively employed, and an exaggerated idea of the importance of the British Indian trade, led the Directory to agree to the scheme, and preparations began at Toulon and other ports in Southern France and North Italy for the embarkation of an army of 35,000 men, together with a well-equipped expedition of scientists and antiquaries.

Meanwhile the Directory was extending its influence in Europe. In February 1798 trouble at Rome led to a French occupation, the removal of the Pope, and the proclamation of a Roman Republic. In April a rebellion in the Swiss Cantons received French help, and resulted in the establishment of the Helvetic Republic. In peace or war France seemed capable of extending her influence and her system of government. With the Roman Republic on his frontier, Ferdinand IV of Naples negotiated in May a defensive treaty with Austria, by which in case of attack he was to receive the aid of 40,000 troops. To Pitt, who since the failure of his peace negotiations had become anxious to build another coalition, Austria intimated that the presence of a British fleet in the Mediterranean was an essential preliminary. So during 1798 the Mediterranean became once more the main theatre of operations, and incidentally the scene of Nelson's first great victory.

Horatio Nelson was the son of the vicar of Burnham Thorpe, in Norfolk, where he was born on September 29, 1758. In 1770, at the age of twelve, in spite of a weak constitution and poor physique, he went to sea with his uncle, Captain Suckling of H.M.S. *Raisonné*. A voyage in a merchantman, an expedition to the Arctic, and a cruise on the Indian station, where the climate caused a breakdown in health, followed in quick succession. Having passed his lieutenant's examination before his twentieth birthday, Nelson was sent to the West Indies shortly after the outbreak of the American War of Independence. Before he was twenty-one he was post captain commanding the 24-gun frigate *Hinchinbrook*. But his health was injured by an expedition to the Mosquito Coast against the Spaniards, in which the seamen from the *Hinchinbrook* played a conspicuous part. He was invalided home, and many months elapsed before he was fit once more to take command of another frigate. After the war was over he held for a time

an appointment on the Leeward station, and then for five years he lived quietly ashore at Burnham Thorpe.

The beginning of the French Revolutionary War found Nelson urgently requesting the Admiralty for a ship. He was given command of his first battleship, the 64-gun *Agamemnon*, and in her he sailed to the Mediterranean in 1793. Soon after his arrival there he made the acquaintance of the Court of Naples, for Hood gave him the task of transporting the Neapolitan troops to Toulon. When Corsica was taken from the French it was Nelson who successfully stormed the fortresses of Bastia and Calvi. During the siege of the latter some flying splinters of stone cost him the sight of one eye. When Hotham fought his action against the Toulon fleet Nelson distinguished himself by tackling three vessels, all larger than his own, without support. Jervis invariably selected him whenever the question of an independent command arose, and made him a commodore. As we have already seen, it was Nelson's unauthorized action at St Vincent that enabled Jervis's tactics to succeed. For his part in the battle he was made a Knight of the Bath, and his promotion to Rear-Admiral soon followed.

While the blockade of Cadiz was in progress Nelson was sent with three sail of the line and five smaller vessels to attack the island of Teneriffe. Unfortunately his night assault on the fortress of Santa Cruz failed; his right elbow was shattered, and the arm had to be amputated. It was a very miserable and disheartened Nelson who lay on a bed of sickness in London in the autumn of 1797, listening to the crowds cheering Duncan's victory at Camperdown. But he recovered, and early in April 1798 left England in the 74-gun *Vanguard* to rejoin St Vincent off Cadiz. With two other seventy-fours and three frigates he was at once sent into the Mediterranean to watch the preparations known to be in progress at Toulon.

On May 21 bad weather drove Nelson off his station, and did such damage to the *Vanguard* that some time had to be spent refitting on the Sardinian coast. On the last day of the month Nelson sighted Toulon again, only to find that the harbour was empty. Bonaparte, with his army and equipment in a fleet of several hundred transports, convoyed by sixteen sail of the line, fourteen frigates, and numerous small craft, under the command of Admiral Brueys, had put to sea. As he had sailed on a north-westerly wind Nelson thought South Italy the probable objective, and determined to make for Naples. On the way he was joined by reinforcements from St Vincent, consisting of ten seventy-fours and a fifty. But the storm had caused him to lose touch with his frigates, which made it extremely difficult to gather news.

There were no French at Naples, but the British Ambassador, Sir William Hamilton, suggested that they might be at Malta. There, as it happened, on June 9, Bonaparte had concentrated his force.

Within a few days he was in possession of the island, and, leaving a garrison of 4000 men, he sailed for Egypt. Apprised of the fate of Malta, Nelson guessed correctly the ultimate objective of the expedition, outsailed the French without seeing them, and reached Alexandria on June 28, only to find his hopes disappointed. He left again immediately, thus missing the French by one day.


Nelson now made for the coast of Syria, cruised among the islands, and returned to Sicily. At Syracuse he performed the miracle of watering and revictualling his fleet in five days, a feat which he always said was only made possible through Lady Hamilton's influence with the Queen. Once more he sailed eastward, and on the morning of August 1 he discovered the French battle-fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay, between Alexandria and the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. Since his last visit the French had captured Alexandria, won the battle of the Pyramids, and occupied Cairo.

The shoal-water along the coast and the dangerous reefs that extend from Aboukir Point placed Admiral Brueys in what he considered an advantageous position. His thirteen warships were anchored in a bent line, the flanks protected by the great 120-gun flagship *Orient*. Between the warships and the land lay four frigates. Assuming that no ship would run the risk of penetrating between their fleet and the shore, the French neither manned nor cleared for action the guns on the landward side.

They little knew the daring of their enemy. In spite of the fact that twilight was approaching, and that the only chart he possessed was a small sketch of the bay, Nelson sailed direct to the attack. In electing to fight at anchor Brueys had made the fatal mistake of sacrificing his power of mobility. Nelson was thus able to concentrate his fleet on what portion of the enemy he chose, while the remainder of their ships looked helplessly on and, in fact, were practically ignorant, when darkness fell, of what was really happening. With four horizontal lamps at their mizzenmasts as a signal to distinguish friend from foe, the British fleet crowded upon the northern arm of the French line. Five of them passed between their enemies and the shore; the rest, with the exception of Captain Troubridge's *Culloden*, which had gone aground in rounding the point, engaged on the seaward side. Ship after ship, the French fleet found its enemies coming upon it in the darkness, until the *Orient* and even the vessels beyond her were engaged. Nelson himself was cut across the forehead and had to be carried below, convinced by the pain and flow of blood that his end was near. Meanwhile the mighty *Orient* had disabled the *Bellerophon*, only to be attacked on both sides by the *Swiftsure* and *Alexander*. Brueys was wounded, and bled to death on his quarterdeck. Eventually the *Orient* caught fire, and about ten o'clock, when the flames reached

the magazine, she blew up. The silver and statuary that Bonaparte had looted at Malta went with her. After a lull the battle was resumed, and it did not end till about 3 A.M. Only three of the French warships were then intact. Two got away, but the third went aground. Even the two that escaped were captured during the subsequent operations against Malta.

The battle of the Nile, by the completeness of its victory, was



THE BATTLE OF THE NILE
(AUGUST 1, 1798)

productive of far-reaching results. The famous Bonaparte was isolated in Egypt with a large army; the British were in undisputed command of the Mediterranean, and thus conditions were once more ripe for the formation of another coalition against France. No better illustration could be found of the value of naval supremacy in time of war. Bonaparte, who was just on the point of attacking Syria, found the Egyptians rising against him. On September 11 the Turkish Empire, of which Egypt formed a part, declared war on France. Meanwhile, before news of the victory had reached England, progress was being made towards a Second Coalition. Austria was alarmed at the French intrigues in Switzerland and Italy; Russia at French

interference with Baltic shipping. The Tsar Paul was personally annoyed at the conquest of Malta, for he had long been interested in its rulers, the Knights of St John, of which order he was shortly afterwards elected Grand Master. On August 10 preliminaries were signed between Austria and Russia; Prussia, kept quiet by Sieyès, whom Talleyrand had sent to Berlin, refused to join. The question of subsidies from Britain was still under discussion when the unfortunate action of Naples, largely the fault of encouragement from Nelson, threatened to wreck the new accord. In spite of a warning to keep friendly with

France until all was ready, she tried to drive the French from Italy in November, and was instantly defeated and converted into the Parthenopeian Republic. Only the island of Sicily remained inviolate, and thither the Neapolitan royal family was conveyed by Nelson. The British Government was accused by Austria of trying, by means of the Austro-Neapolitan agreement, to drag her into the war too soon. The matter, however, was eventually patched up. A provisional treaty between Britain and Russia for the subsidizing of an army of 45,000 men was signed in December 1798. Conventions with Turkey, Portugal, and the King of Naples made the Coalition complete. Meanwhile a Russo-Turkish fleet had captured the Ionian Isles (which France had occupied as a naval base under the Treaty of Campo Formio), the British had taken Minorca, and the French garrison at Malta had been placed under close blockade. The prospects of putting a check on the aggressive French Republic had never looked so rosy, due principally to the successes gained by the British fleet.

Bonaparte and the Second Coalition (1799-1801). With his customary sangfroid Bonaparte had not allowed himself to be perturbed by the snapping of his only link with France. He set about planning a new administration for Egypt, and preparing for an invasion of Syria, as a means towards bringing the Sultan to terms. In February 1799 he crossed the Isthmus of Suez with 13,000 troops, captured the fortress of El Arish, and occupied the town of Gaza. Advancing northward up the coast, he took Jaffa and laid siege to Acre. But in the roadstead near that city lay two British men-of-war, the *Tigre* and the *Theseus*. Their commander, Sir Sidney Smith, the man who made Napoleon "miss his destiny," had been sent to co-operate with the Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean. With him at Acre was a French royalist named Phélippeaux, an accomplished engineer who had done much to improve the defences of the port. On March 18 Bonaparte's siege-train, which had come by sea from the Nile, arrived off Acre. Sidney Smith captured it and used the cannon to strengthen the defence works still further.

It was not until May that the French assault on the breaches at Acre was delivered. Turkish troops had just arrived by sea to reinforce the garrison, but they were so slow in getting ashore that Sidney Smith was obliged to land his own seamen to prevent the town from falling. In this way Acre was successfully defended, and Bonaparte, whose troops were suffering severely from disease, raised the siege and retired to Egypt.

In July a Turkish army landed at Aboukir Bay. Bonaparte promptly concentrated his forces and drove it into the sea. Negotiations with Sir Sidney Smith followed, during the course of which the latter sent on shore some newspapers containing accounts of the initial

successes gained by the Second Coalition. Instantly the affairs of Egypt faded into insignificance. Content to await his time on the previous occasion, Bonaparte now saw that the moment to overthrow the Directory had come. As soon as the British warships left the coast he embarked in a small vessel with a few selected officers, men whose names were within a few years to become famous throughout Europe. On October 9, 1799, he landed at Fréjus, in the south of France, good fortune having enabled him to slip unobserved through the British cordon near Malta.

From his own point of view Bonaparte's arrival was timely. The material fruits of the Revolution—civil equality, unencumbered land, and the new Rhine frontier—had all been endangered by the Directory, and France was ready to welcome anyone who could ensure their safety. A wholesale conscription law, passed in September 1798, had raised troops to fight the Second Coalition, but the possible theatres of war were now extended far beyond the boundaries of France. Pitt and Dundas, hoping for an Orangist rising in Holland, had decided to risk a land-operation once again. An expedition of 30,000 British and 17,000 Russians sailed for the Helder, where it secured the surrender of what remained of the Dutch fleet. But the expected rising did not materialize; marsh fever began its deadly work among the troops, and when the Tsar Paul showed signs of leaving the Coalition the Convention of Alkmaar, signed in October 1799, made arrangements for the withdrawal of the expedition. Elsewhere initial successes had been scored by the Allies. In Switzerland the Austrians defeated Jourdan near Stockach. Soon afterwards, reinforced by a Russian army under Korsakoff, they proceeded to occupy the country as a base from which to invade Franche-Comté. Meanwhile Suvaroff, with a Russian army numbering about 60,000 men, was co-operating with the Austrians under Melas in North Italy. The armies of Moreau and of Macdonald were defeated during the spring and summer of 1799 and driven back until they were confined to the Riviera coast.

At this point the goodwill between Austria and Russia, on which everything depended, came to a sudden end. Now that Sardinia had been recovered, Russia wanted to restore it to its former ruler, but Austria, partly from motives of greed, and partly because she thought the Sardinians unable to defend the Alpine passes, wished to occupy it herself. The quarrel was brought to a head by the failure of the Austro-Russian armies to co-operate harmoniously. In September Suvaroff struggled across the St Gotthard Pass to carry out his part of a plan for concentration in Switzerland, only to find that the Archduke Charles had withdrawn the Austrian army, leaving Korsakoff to be routed at Zurich by Masséna. Suvaroff escaped with difficulty to the Rhine valley, bitterly accusing the Austrians of treachery.

When he heard the news the Tsar Paul gave orders for his troops to withdraw, declaring that he would never co-operate with Austria again.

Apart from the success at Zurich, however, the situation of France was serious enough in the autumn of 1799, especially as regards Italy, where the new republics had all collapsed and Nelson was busy re-establishing the Bourbon monarchy at Naples. At home the corrupt administration of the Directory was manifest in the poor condition of public undertakings, the riots, strikes, and general distress. In spite of Governmental control over elections, the deputies in the legislature were mostly in active opposition. Sieyès, now the most important of the Directors, wished to put an end to this situation and place the executive beyond the reach of its critics at a time so full of danger to the State. The arrival of Bonaparte, the nation's hero, provided the very man he needed to carry out the necessary *coup d'état*. The two met; matters were discussed; Lucien Bonaparte, who was a member of the Council of Five Hundred, and several others were included in the scheme. On November 9 those members of the Directory who were not implicated were arrested, and the two houses of the legislature, warned that a 'plot' had been unearthed, were persuaded to resume their sittings at Saint-Cloud, eight miles from Paris. There on the following day (19 Brumaire) the deputies began to suspect what was afoot. Sieyès' heart failed him; Bonaparte met with no encouragement when he tried his oratory on the Ancients, and the Five Hundred actually greeted his explanations with angry shouts. He cut such a sorry, irresolute figure that he had to be hurried out, and it was left to Lucien to save the day. As President of the Council he called on the guard to clear the Chamber of the members, who by now were beyond his control.

Once again force prevailed, and the news of what had occurred induced the Ancients to vote a provisional Government, with Sieyès, Bonaparte, and Ducos as Consuls. It was now that Bonaparte, who, whatever his private schemes may have been, had hitherto followed the directions of his confederates, made himself supreme in spite of the plans Sieyès had prepared. By his desire the government of France was vested in three Consuls, of which he was the first. The other two, Cambacérès and Lebrun, soon faded into insignificance. There were also a Council of State (a body of permanent officials chosen by the consuls) and a legislature of two houses that exercised no real authority whatever. Thus did Bonaparte become the actual, though not as yet the titular, ruler of France. By an overwhelming vote at the plebiscite then taken the change to autocracy was approved.

Bonaparte had promised his supporters "peace after victory," and he had not much time in which to establish his administration before the campaigning season opened. After restoring Carnot to the War

Ministry and Talleyrand to the Foreign Office, he drew up a plan for driving the Austrians from their positions in Switzerland and Italy. Russia had already withdrawn from the Coalition.

Early in the spring of 1800 the Austrian army in Italy isolated Masséna in Genoa, where with 18,000 troops he was besieged by an army of 25,000. The rest of the Austrian forces were watching the Southern Alpine passes. Trusting that Masséna would be able to hold out for some time, Bonaparte planned a daring march designed to place himself right across the Austrian communications, by doing which, as he well knew, he would run the risk of completely losing his own. An army under Moreau was assembled in Alsace, to make a feint attack across the Rhine. Meanwhile a second army, commanded by the First Consul himself, advanced into Switzerland, descended the Great St Bernard Pass into Italy, and on June 2 occupied Milan. Another corps arrived by way of the St Gotthard, bringing the French total to 50,000 men. On June 6 Masséna surrendered, but his protracted defence had kept the Austrians occupied for long enough. General Melas, finding Bonaparte in his rear, had now to collect his forces and fight a battle to regain his communications with the Brenner Pass. By the 12th his army had assembled round Alessandria; on the 14th the battle of Marengo was fought. On the previous day Bonaparte had detached a division under Desaix to gather intelligence in the direction of Rivalta. Thus weakened, his army was driven back upon Southern Giuliano. He was perilously close to defeat, but as luck would have it Desaix heard the sound of the guns, arrived suddenly upon the Austrian flank, and enabled him to check and then to rout his enemy. An armistice followed, under the terms of which Melas abandoned the Milanese, but he was allowed to march his army to safety, for Bonaparte realized that his own position was none too secure.

Restoration of the French authority in Italy followed rapidly, even Naples agreeing to admit French soldiers to her territory and to exclude British ships from her ports. Meanwhile Moreau's campaign, begun as a feint to cover Bonaparte's movements, developed into a successful offensive. It culminated on December 3 with a victory over the Austrians at Hohenlinden. Vienna was threatened, and the Emperor consented to make peace. By the Treaty of Lunéville, signed on February 9, 1801, the Second Coalition accordingly came to an end. Bonaparte was sufficiently anxious for peace to forgo any fresh demands, merely stipulating that France should retain Belgium and the Rhine frontier, and that the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics should be formally recognized. In the following month he entered into a secret agreement with Spain for the cession of Louisiana to France.

The Armed Neutrality and the Treaty of Amiens (1800-2). On September 4, 1800, by which time Nelson had gone home on leave, the French at Malta surrendered to General Pigot. Pitt had not at first intended to retain the island, but it was decided to do so for the time being, as Bonaparte, when he realized that its surrender was inevitable, had presented it to the Tsar, whose attitude on withdrawing from the Second Coalition was so threatening that Pitt was afraid he might see Malta converted into a hostile naval base. The surrender of the French army in Egypt followed a year later. In March 1801 Keith and Sir Ralph Abercromby made a landing in Aboukir Bay. The latter died of wounds in the same month, but his successor, General Hutchinson, took Cairo and Alexandria, and by September he had effected the French evacuation.

In April 1800 Lord St Vincent succeeded Bridport in command of the Channel fleet. His first action was to tighten the Brest blockade. Between twenty and thirty ships of the line were now kept constantly at sea off the port, the Admiral's guiding principle being "well in with Ushant in an easterly wind"—the wind which would enable the French to come out. Torbay and Plymouth became the anchorages for refitting, instead of Spithead, and no officer was ever allowed to sleep ashore. At this time there were nearly fifty French and Spanish warships in Brest harbour. In February 1801 St Vincent, whose health no longer permitted him to go to sea, was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, and the task of carrying out his blockade system at sea was left to Admiral Cornwallis.¹

Bonaparte's energies were now free to deal once more with the question of defeating Britain. He became intensely interested in maritime affairs, and particularly in the idea of reviving the Armed Neutrality of 1780. To this end he began making friendly overtures towards the Baltic Powers. Danish ships and Russian prisoners were released; Malta was dangled as a bait before the Tsar. At the same time Britain was offending the Danes by forcibly searching their convoys, and the Tsar by making it obvious that she intended to keep Malta. Matters came to a head on December 16, 1800, when a Convention of Armed Neutrality was signed by Russia and Sweden, to which Denmark and Prussia agreed. It was laid down that belligerent goods, except contraband of war, were free on neutral ships, and that the word of the naval officer escorting a convoy should guarantee it against search. This hostile attitude was a distinct threat to British naval supremacy, for the Baltic supplied the heavier type of naval stores, such as timber, hemp, and cordage. Grenville therefore refused to agree to the terms of the Armed Neutrality, and in January 1801 laid an embargo on Russian, Danish, and Swedish vessels. An envoy

¹ Sir William Cornwallis (1744-1819).

was sent to Copenhagen to persuade the Danes to withdraw, supported by a fleet under Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson as second-in-command.

The attitude of Denmark remained adamant. She was in a strong position, her fleet and fortresses dominating the principal passage from the Baltic to the North Sea. Parker wished to take up his station in the Cattegat and to maintain a blockade. Nothing, however, would suit Nelson but an attack on Copenhagen itself, as a preliminary to an advance against Russia, the mainstay of the Neutrality. After a series of futile negotiations with the Danes he was allowed to have his way, and on May 30 the British fleet approached the city.


Near the entrance to Copenhagen Harbour stood the great batteries of the Trekroner, mounting about seventy guns. Several ships had been placed to block the channel itself, and outside in the roadstead, anchored right along the edge of the shoal water to make them assailable on one side only, was the Danish fleet, eighteen ships all told. Although not large, they were all well armed with guns, manned by military as well as naval gunners.

Nelson was anxious to attack. Parker gave him ten ships of the line, two fifties, and all the smaller craft. With these, having surveyed the channel under cover of darkness, Nelson set out to surprise his enemy by approaching the farthestmost, or southern, flank of the line, away from the Trekroner and the harbour entrance. On April 2 the attack was delivered. Three of the British battleships ran on to the shoals, but all the rest came safely into action. For three hours the fight continued, the Danes replacing their casualties by boat-loads of men from the shore. Parker, thinking that Nelson had failed, hoisted the signal to break off the action. The frigates obeyed, but Nelson, flapping the stump of his arm in his agitation as he paced the deck, refused to see the signal. After another hour he sent a note ashore under a flag of truce, threatening to use fireships if the Danes did not surrender. Eventually the armistice was accepted; Nelson collected his prizes, and found that he had captured all the enemy's ships but three.

Negotiations followed, during which the Danish Government heard that the Tsar Paul had been murdered on March 24. Influenced by this news, Denmark agreed to abandon the Armed Neutrality for fourteen weeks. The British fleet entered the Baltic, and after the recall of Parker proceeded under Nelson to Reval. But the twelve Russian warships he expected to find there had already left for Kronstadt, and in any case it soon became evident that the new Tsar Alexander I had no intention of continuing his father's anti-British policy. Further naval operations therefore became unnecessary. Prussia once more opened the northern ports, which she had closed to British commerce. Britain and Russia signed an agreement in June, to which first Sweden

and then Denmark adhered. Thus Bonaparte's effort to foster an anti-British coalition ended in failure, and stalemate between France and Britain ensued once again.

The long-threatened Irish rebellion blazed forth in 1798, and convinced Pitt that the union of the Dublin and Westminster Parlia-



THE BATTLE OF THE BALTIC (APRIL 2, 1801)

ments, as a preliminary to the granting of Catholic Emancipation, was the only solution to the trouble. The necessary Act of Union was passed in 1800, but George III refused to consider the question of Catholic Emancipation. Pitt felt his honour at stake and resigned. It therefore fell to the lot of his successor, Addington, to make peace with France. In March 1801 discussions began, and ended with the Preliminaries of London, signed on October 1. By that time Bonaparte

was hurrying matters on, as he wished to reach agreement before news of the inevitable French capitulation in Egypt could arrive. The definitive Treaty of Amiens was signed on March 25, 1802. Britain retained only the Spanish island of Trinidad and the Dutch island of Ceylon, restoring the Cape of Good Hope, Elba, Minorca, and the French West Indian islands. In return Bonaparte agreed to evacuate Naples and Rome. His position in North Italy remained secure, for he had just accepted office as President of the Cisalpine (now renamed the Italian) Republic. But the most thorny question of all was the future of Malta. Neither France nor Britain could bear to see an island of such strategic value in the other's hands, or in those of any other Great Power. Eventually it was agreed that Britain should restore it to the Knights of St John, that the Grand Master should be proclaimed neutral and receive the protection of 2000 Neapolitan troops, and that Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia should guarantee its independence. It was because the last-named stipulation remained unfulfilled that the British did not give the island up.

The Treaty of Amiens proved a welcome respite, both for Britain and for France. But by leaving the latter victorious on the Continent and in possession of the Rhine frontier and the former Austrian Netherlands, and by abandoning the cause of the houses of Orange and Savoy, it did not achieve the objects for which Britain originally went to war. It was therefore unsatisfactory, and could only be regarded as a truce, a fact that Pitt's supporters pointed out to the Addington Ministry in no uncertain terms.

Napoleon as an Administrator. The very favourable terms obtained by France at the Treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, the prompt reorganization of home affairs, and the discovery and suppression of several plots against Bonaparte's life raised his popularity to such a pitch that he was requested, as the result of a plebiscite held in May 1802 to assume office as First Consul for life. The Constitution of the Year X followed, still further reducing the power of the legislative assemblies, and placing the making of treaties and alliances in the hands of the First Consul and the Council of State. Napoleon, now virtually an autocrat, ruled by decrees, his authority subject to no real constitutional limit. The use of his Christian name dates from this period.

Already the task of reorganizing France had begun. In this connexion by far the most important official was Fouché,¹ Minister of the Interior. From now on France was governed by a corps of Civil Servants of excellent type, especially during the earlier period of Napoleon's *régime*. Later, when so much extra territory had to be administered, and France had ceased to be so wholeheartedly behind her new ruler, the standard declined. The old centralization appeared once more,

¹ Joseph Fouché, Duke of Otranto (1763-1820).

all appointments in administration and justice being made by the executive at Paris, which controlled affairs in every department through its agents, the prefect and the sub-prefects. By means of this system, backed by Fouché's secret police, the Press was censored, political debate forbidden, and order and internal peace were quickly restored, though at the cost of that spontaneous individuality without which no state can for long maintain its free development and growth.

Taxation was now taken from the local authorities and placed in the hands of officials at Paris. Broadly speaking, Napoleon's system was to draw as little as possible from the land in time of peace, so that he might conserve its resources for time of war. Consequently he preferred indirect to direct taxation. His most lasting achievement in financial affairs was the foundation of the Bank of France in May 1800 in the form of a limited liability company in which he and many of his Ministers held shares. The Governor and Vice-Governor were appointed by the State.

Napoleon saw only too plainly that the greatest failure among the late revolutionary experiments had been the attitude of the Government towards religion. He knew the extent to which his own position depended on the country people, and the degree to which his popularity would be enhanced if he restored Catholicism to its old place as the religion of the State. Furthermore, he was determined to have the priests on his side, and to use them in support of his authority. It would not be possible, however, to restore the lands and other wealth that the Church had formerly owned. Prolonged negotiations were carried out with the Papal representative, Cardinal Consalvi, resulting finally in the Concordat signed in July 1801. In matters of doctrine Papal authority was recognized as supreme, but Napoleon kept in his own hands the nomination of bishops, and even the right of approving parish priests. Church lands were not returned, but the clergy received a revenue from the State. On Easter Day, 1802, Napoleon officially attended Mass at Notre-Dame. Thus by beginning his reign as the champion of religion he gained the support of many devout Catholics, whose consciences had passed through a period of great uneasiness during the previous five years. He sacrificed that support, however, by his subsequent treatment of the Pope.

Napoleon was very anxious that Frenchmen should grow naturally to accept the new *régime*, and especially that the next generation should be free from the political restlessness which had produced so many changes. For this reason it was necessary that schoolmasters as well as priests should have the approval of the Paris executive, and that the principles they instilled should be subject to official control. Local authorities were instructed to attend to elementary education, but it was in schools of a more advanced type, known as *lycées*, that the most

important work was done. A large number of scholarships was established for State pupils. In 1808, after rejecting many previous schemes, Napoleon finally approved of the constitution for a new University of France, with its headquarters at Paris and sixteen affiliated colleges in the provinces. No one was allowed to open a school without being a member of this university and a graduate of one of its faculties.

But the greatest and most lasting benefit that Napoleon bestowed upon France was the codification of the laws. A commission on the Civil Code, afterwards known as the Code Napoléon, completed its work in March 1804. Napoleon, though he knew nothing about law, often presided over the debates. His saying, "You act as lawyers, not as statesmen," reveals the direction in which his influence was applied. In general the Code was a return towards the old type of family life, with children subject to their fathers and wives to their husbands, and private property guaranteed to its owners. Napoleon said at St Helena that this Code was his principal achievement. Other commissions were appointed to draw up criminal, penal, and commercial codes, the whole being complete by the year 1810. Equality before the law and the right of public trial were guaranteed. With the extension of French rule this legal system was applied in Italy, Holland, Switzerland, and parts of Germany, where it was welcomed as a notable advance in the cause of liberty. In these parts of Europe its influence has prevailed to the present day.

For many years public works had been neglected, so it was not long before Napoleon embarked on expensive schemes in this connexion. Throughout his reign improvements to roads, canals, bridges, and harbours were continuously in progress, carried out largely by the labour of Spanish prisoners of war.

Little could be added to Napoleon's power as First Consul, but he aimed at a more distinguished title. Considering the history of France over the past fifteen years, the matter was one of some delicacy, but a year after the resumption of the war against England a plot against his life produced the necessary wave of popularity. A royalist scheme was hatched in London for the murder of Napoleon and the overthrow of his system of government. Georges Cadoudal, the leader of the revolt in La Vendée, and General Pichegru (who had escaped from Cayenne) were to carry it out. So many conspirators were involved that the scheme was soon discovered. Napoleon arrested the leaders, but as the plot was evidently royalist in intention that step appeared to him insufficient. Living in Baden, a few miles beyond the Rhine frontier, was the Duke of Enghien, a member of the royal family. A military raid easily effected his capture. He was brought to the fortress of Vincennes, near Paris, tried, shot, and buried in a grave that had already been prepared. Napoleon was well aware of his innocence,

but the propaganda that followed the affair did its work, and France rejoiced at the lucky escape of its adored ruler. The royalists must be shown that the nation had no intention of allowing a Bourbon to resume the throne. On May 18, 1804, the Senate decreed that "Napoleon Bonaparte, now First Consul of the Republic, is Emperor of the French." By an overwhelming majority the people accepted the decree, and the necessary adjustments were embodied in the Constitution of the Year XII. On December 2 the Coronation ceremony took place at Notre-Dame, Napoleon placing the crown upon his own head, while the Pope, who had been summoned for the occasion, gave the blessing of the Church. Thus a new royal family was given to France; a new nobility sprang up, to hedge the Emperor round with the trappings of Court life, and in spite of his ability and experience to divorce him more and more thoroughly from the reality of public opinion. From that moment onward his popularity began slowly to decline.

Causes of the Napoleonic War. When making the Treaty of Amiens the Addington Ministry had not only abandoned the cause of the houses of Orange and Savoy, but had also omitted to exact any guarantee for the independence of the new Batavian and Cisalpine Republics, considering the matter sufficiently secured by the Treaty of Lunéville. Such, however, was by no means the case. Before the actual signature of the Treaty Napoleon had become President of the Cisalpine Republic. In the autumn of 1802 he virtually annexed Piedmont, Parma, and Elba. The French troops in the Batavian Republic were not withdrawn, and before long news came that they were being increased. Protests from Addington merely met with the reply that as Britain had not been a signatory to the Treaty of Lunéville it was none of her business.

Normal relations between Britain and France were not resumed with the coming of peace. In June 1802 Napoleon made commercial overtures, but Addington in effect refused them, and in consequence British trade with France was not resumed. As time went on freedom of speech and freedom of the Press, two expensive democratic luxuries that do much to make the diplomatic path a thorny one, embittered the relations between the two countries. Napoleon complained of these attacks, but was himself responsible for replies of a similar type, published in the official *Moniteur*.

During the autumn of 1802 Napoleon seized the opportunity of civil dissension in the Helvetic Republic to extend his influence in that country also, dispatching thither an army of 30,000 men and forcing the Swiss to accept his interference in the role of 'mediator.' Addington protested strongly, and also at the continued occupation of Holland, saying that the British promise to evacuate the Cape of Good Hope was made only on the understanding that the Dutch Republic was to

be entirely independent. It was the old, old question of a hostile Power dominating the Netherlands cropping up again with renewed vigour. In both countries the Press campaign hardened. The danger appeared so acute that Addington was closely questioned in the House as to Britain's preparedness for war. While admitting considerable reductions in the Army, Addington replied that he considered Britain safe, since she could muster 196 sail of the line, against a total of 131 by the French, Spanish, and Dutch together.

In January 1803 there appeared in the *Moniteur* a report written by Colonel Sebastiani, an envoy sent by Napoleon on a supposed commercial mission to Egypt. But the real purpose of the mission was revealed by the statement that 6000 troops would be sufficient to reconquer the country. The fact was that Napoleon had chosen to make his policy colonial and expansive, as witnessed also by expeditions to investigate possibilities at the Cape of Good Hope and Pondicherry and on the Australian coast. Nothing could have been better calculated to alarm the British, already highly suspicious of Napoleon's intentions.

But by far the most important cause of the resumption of the war was the question of Malta. With France obviously harbouring designs on Egypt, Sicily, Corfu, the Morea, and the Eastern Mediterranean generally, to hand over this island to the feeble rule of the Knights of St John appeared little better than inviting a renewal of the French occupation. Addington therefore refused to discuss evacuation, on the grounds that the situation had radically altered since the signing of the Treaty of Amiens. His technical excuse was that the article guaranteeing the neutrality of Malta had not been ratified by Russia or Prussia. While this dispute was in progress news came that French troops were massing along the Channel coast and in Holland, and that unusual activity was evident in the ports and shipyards of both countries, especially at Antwerp. It seemed undeniable that Napoleon was bent on war. At the moment he had only about forty sail of the line in commission ; was it wise to allow him full time to complete his preparations ? Determined to bring matters to a head, Addington in April 1803 demanded the immediate evacuation of Holland and Switzerland, an indemnity for the King of Sardinia, and the right to hold Malta for ten years. As no satisfactory answer was forthcoming the British ambassador left Paris on May 12, and as further negotiations seemed solely designed by Napoleon for the purpose of gaining time war was declared on France on May 18. Holland, as the ally of France, was also involved.

The Threat of Invasion and the Campaign of Trafalgar. Before declaring war the British Government had already mobilized the Navy. The press-gang resumed its work, and the naval dockyards,

lately the object of an economy and efficiency campaign by Lord St Vincent, once more became busy. No sooner had the war begun than Cornwallis was at his old station off Brest.

In fighting Britain Napoleon knew that his best hope of success lay in converting the maritime struggle into a military one. The declaration of war had caught him unawares. His naval preparations were not complete, and he was in no position to support his commitments overseas. He sold Louisiana to the United States for 80 million francs, and, forgetting his tentative plans for a colonial empire, began to develop his scheme for an invasion of Britain, fully aware that by forestalling his bid for naval and maritime power the British Government had already struck a serious blow at the commercial and financial stability of France.

French troops now took possession of Naples and the southern tip of Italy. This possible threat to Malta, Egypt, and the Near East had to be met with a fleet, and accordingly Nelson was sent to reoccupy the Mediterranean. In his flagship, the 104-gun *Victory*, he resumed the blockade of Toulon. The only other effective movement that Napoleon could make on land was to occupy George III's electorate of Hanover, where control of the rivers Elbe and Weser enabled France to strangle British trade with Germany. But the chief purpose of the 'Grand Army' was the invasion of Britain. The coasts of France were everywhere armed with artillery, but particularly between the Somme and the Scheldt, where several thousand shallow-draught vessels, built in different seaports and along the banks of many rivers, were collected for the transport of the invading force. Gradually over 150,000 troops, destined to become welded into the finest army the world has ever seen, created by the finest soldier, assembled along the Channel coast, especially round Boulogne. At that port a special harbour was dug, and there most of the transports were concentrated, the British doing their best to destroy them as they crept along the coast, though without much success on account of Napoleon's coastal defences.

When news of the extent of the French preparations reached England apprehension in the southern counties became intense. The Trinity House Volunteer Artillery was born, a short-lived body that armed some old frigates and moored them across the Thames to prevent an attack on London. The Sea Fencibles were re-established, a body of watermen who could be called upon for defence in time of necessity. Martello towers were built on the south coast, and beacons prepared. But in the opinion of the Admiralty there was no need for alarm. "I do not say the French cannot come; I only say they cannot come by sea," St Vincent told the House of Lords. He knew that flat-bottomed boats, crowded with men, even though armed with guns, stood no chance against any kind of warship, and that for Napoleon

to gain *complete* control of the Channel for sufficient time to allow him to embark, reach England, disembark, and supply the necessary equipment and weapons for a preliminary fighting force of over 60,000 men and 6000 horses was quite impossible. Over a hundred British frigates and small craft constantly patrolled the Channel; in addition to Cornwallis and Nelson with their fleets off Brest and Toulon, smaller squadrons were watching the Texel, Rochefort, and Ferrol. While this system of blockade was maintained England was safe. But it was a weary business for the Navy, with the ships constantly at sea in all weathers, and the men hardly ever able to set foot on shore. In the Mediterranean Nelson struggled perpetually against bad weather and ill-found ships, for St Vincent's dockyard reforms were proving a sad handicap. He was frequently forced to lose touch with Toulon altogether, and to retire to the Maddalena Isles, north of Sardinia, to refit.

Napoleon had hoped to put his plan into operation during the summer of 1804, but various political and practical considerations forced him to postpone it. In May of that year, the same month in which Napoleon became Emperor of the French, Pitt with general acclamation replaced the incompetent Addington (a change that led to the retirement of St Vincent from the Admiralty), and at once set about the task of improving relations with Russia and Austria, as a prelude to another coalition. At the same time relations with Spain grew steadily worse. By the original treaty of 1796 Spain had agreed to supply naval assistance to France when called upon. In the present instance Napoleon insisted on a money subsidy instead. The Spanish Government was warned that Britain might at any time consider this a cause of war. When, in addition to this, Spain permitted, and, in fact, assisted, the commissioning of French warships lying in Ferrol and Cadiz Pitt planned reprisals. In October four British frigates, on the look-out for the treasure fleet, took an equal number of Spanish ships. On December 12 Spain declared war.

The possibility of using the Spanish Navy, and the death of the admiral who was to have commanded the Toulon fleet, caused a modification of Napoleon's plans. He decided that instead of sending an expedition to the West Indies merely to create a diversion and scatter the English squadrons, as had at first been intended, he would order the naval concentration itself to be carried out there. The Toulon and Rochefort fleets, accompanied by the Spanish, were to sail for Martinique, lead Nelson and the smaller squadrons far afield, and then await the coming of Admiral Ganteaume and the Brest fleet. The idea was well conceived, but in any case it could not have succeeded, for in the event of losing touch with the enemy all British fleets outside the Channel had been instructed to fall back upon Cornwallis off Brest.

In January 1805 the first move was made, when the French squadron at Rochefort evaded the blockading ships and set out for Martinique. In the same month Admiral Villeneuve,¹ commander of the Toulon fleet, put to sea for the same destination, intending to collect the Spanish squadrons on the way. Nelson, who was refitting on the Sardinian coast, looked for him round Naples, Sicily, and Egypt. Meanwhile, however, bad weather had wrought such havoc in Villeneuve's fleet that he had returned to Toulon. On March 30 he got to sea again, eluded Nelson's watching frigates, picked up a Spanish squadron at Cadiz, and on May 14 reached Martinique with a fleet of twelve French and six Spanish ships. But by that time the Rochefort squadron was already on its way back to Europe, while calm weather and Cornwallis's fleet were keeping Ganteaume immobile at Brest. Napoleon was therefore again forced to modify his plans, sending instructions to Villeneuve that if the Brest fleet did not join him within a specified time he was to return to Ferrol and, in conjunction with a squadron he would find there, attack Cornwallis whenever conditions should allow Ganteaume to co-operate.

Meanwhile Nelson, sick with fatigue and worry, was anxiously trying to decide where the Toulon fleet had gone. The disposition of his frigates showed him that no attempt had been made to reach the Eastern Mediterranean. He made for Gibraltar, and discovered that Villeneuve had passed the Straits a month before. No news had come of his reaching the Channel; nor was he to be found in any of the Spanish ports. From information received while cruising off Cape St Vincent Nelson decided to risk a voyage to the West Indies, and set his course for Barbados, which he reached on June 4. The officer in command at St Lucia said that the French had gone south to Trinidad. Nelson reached that island in three days, only to be disappointed. An inspection of the British islands in the Lesser Antilles produced no further news, for Villeneuve had heard of Nelson's arrival and had set sail for Europe. Nelson realized the fact, and determined to follow at once, sending the brig *Curieux* in advance with an account of what had occurred. Within a few days this fast little ship had sighted the enemy, and was thus able to supplement Nelson's dispatches with details of the numbers, position, and course of Villeneuve's fleet. On July 8 the news was in London, and on the following day orders were sent to Sir Robert Calder, commanding the squadron blockading Ferrol, to join the squadron off Rochefort and await Villeneuve to the west of Cape Finisterre.

On July 22 Villeneuve, with his fleet now raised to twenty sail of the line, found himself in the presence of Calder, with fifteen. Partly

¹ Pierre-Charles-Jean-Baptiste-Silvestre Villeneuve (1763-1806) commanded one of the two ships that escaped from the battle of the Nile.

owing to fog, but mainly on account of the undue caution exercised by the British commander, the action that followed did little to hinder Villeneuve's progress, though two of the Spanish ships were taken. Some months later Calder was court-martialled and severely reprimanded. His lack of enterprise might have had serious consequences, for Villeneuve eventually reached the harbour of Corunna, which stands on the same arm of the sea as Ferrol, thus effecting a concentration in the two ports of twenty-nine allied warships. Calder now joined Cornwallis, and Nelson returned to England, where he enjoyed his first leave for nearly two years.


Napoleon was soon forced to realize that the opportunity of invading England was slipping away. In August Pitt completed his Third Coalition, and it became evident that the presence of the Grand Army would soon be needed to check an Austrian advance towards the Rhine. Unless Villeneuve could join Ganteaume at once it would be too late. But when the Corunna-Ferrol fleet did get to sea its commander finally ruined the invasion scheme by joining the squadron at Cadiz instead, where he was promptly blockaded by Collingwood. Unable to delay any longer, Napoleon marched away to the valley of the Danube, while the flat-bottomed boats rotted at their cables and the specially constructed embarkation harbours silted up with sand.

On September 28 Nelson arrived from England to take over from Collingwood the command of the blockading fleet off Cadiz. Villeneuve had already received orders to enter the Mediterranean and assist in the operations against Naples, and was only awaiting a favourable opportunity to get to sea. On October 18 the news that Napoleon was sending another admiral to supersede him made Villeneuve determine to sail at once. Two days later he was at sea with thirty-three sail of the line and several smaller vessels. At daybreak on the 21st Nelson sighted him about ten miles off Cape Trafalgar. The British battle-fleet numbered twenty-seven.

The wind was light, and the two fleets took some time to approach each other. Villeneuve had twenty-one ships in his main body, with twelve as a detached squadron. He bore up for the north, collecting his fleet into an irregular curve, with the hollow side towards Nelson. The latter had already devised his plan of attack. A column of fifteen ships, led by Collingwood in the *Royal Sovereign*, was to attack the twelve ships in the enemy's rearward squadron, while another column led by himself, comprised of the remaining twelve ships, was to attack the allied centre and prevent Villeneuve from discovering what was happening elsewhere. Thus, as always, Nelson planned to effect an overwhelming concentration against a portion of the enemy's fleet.

About noon Collingwood, far in advance of the rest of his column, came into action against the *Santa Anna*, flagship of the Spanish Admiral

Alava. For some time he fought alone against several of the enemy, and then the rest of his ships arrived, to engage successively the enemy vessels to leeward. At one o'clock Nelson's column also reached the enemy's line, he himself in the *Victory* engaging the *Bucentaure*, Villeneuve's flagship. But as he passed astern of her he fouled the *Redoutable*, and so had to engage both ships at once. It was from one of the marksmen stationed in the tops of the latter that within half an hour of beginning the action he received a fatal wound, the bullet passing through his left shoulder, cutting an artery in the lung, and breaking the backbone in two places. Before the battle ended the great Admiral died of internal hæmorrhage. His famous signal,



THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR: THE ATTACK (OCTOBER 21, 1805)

"England expects that every man will do his duty," had been answered by one from the gallant Villeneuve, no less fine in sentiment: "Any captain who is not under fire is out of his station."

By 3 P.M. the centre of the allied fleet had been severely handled, and the rear practically destroyed. The ten ships in the van, as yet untouched, now went about as though to enter the battle. Five of them did so, approaching the *Victory* herself, but after a sharp engagement they were beaten off, four of them leaving the scene of action, only to fall a prey later on to the blockading squadron off Rochefort. Most of the rest joined the Spanish Admiral Gravina, who, with a total of eleven ships, drew off to Cadiz. Thus the battle of Trafalgar came to an end, just before 5 P.M., with a loss to the allies of eighteen ships of the line. No British ship was lost, but that night a storm blew

up that lasted for several days, causing Collingwood to destroy or abandon his prizes. A few of them were found by the enemy and taken into Cadiz.

The battle of Trafalgar did not indeed save England from invasion: the system of blockade and the successful diplomacy of Pitt had already done that. But it rendered England safe from any such threat in the future, for Napoleon never again attempted to obtain control of the sea. Thus the successful British intervention in the Peninsula was made possible; British sea-borne trade, in spite of the Continental System, could not be destroyed, and the ultimate failure of Napoleon's plans for the domination of Europe became certain.

The Third Coalition. When Britain declared war on France in 1803 it appeared unlikely that she would have the help of Continental allies. Austria was too wary to risk another conflict until she was assured of adequate support; Prussia, constantly flattered and bribed by Napoleon, was toying with the idea of a French alliance; Russia was once more resentful of our treatment of neutral shipping, and actively suspicious of our designs in retaining Malta. Yet it was round a British agreement with Russia that the Third Coalition eventually grew. Shortly after Pitt's return to office Napoleon's obvious designs on the Ottoman Empire so far alarmed the Tsar that a *rapprochement* with Britain became possible. In the autumn of 1804 the Russian envoy Novossilzoff arrived with general proposals for restricting France within her own boundaries and establishing the complete independence of the barrier republics. Future peace was to be guaranteed by a league of Great Powers, acting in accordance with an agreed code of international law. These proposals formed the basis of a preliminary convention between Britain and Russia, signed on April 11, 1805. At that time Russia still hoped that Britain would evacuate Malta.

In May 1805 Napoleon had himself crowned King of Italy at Milan, and a month later he annexed the Ligurian (formerly the Genoese) Republic. It was no longer possible to doubt the aggressive character of his intentions, and the Third Coalition came into being almost immediately. In July the Anglo-Russian Treaty was ratified, the Tsar abandoning his demands with regard to Malta. A few weeks later Austria acceded to the terms of the treaty. Britain promised to subsidize her allies at the rate of £1,250,000 per 100,000 troops. An agreement was also made for the help of Sweden. Despite all efforts, however, Prussia elected to remain neutral, hoping to receive Hanover at the hands of the French; Bavaria, the situation of which was strategically important, made an alliance with France.

Things went badly for the Third Coalition from the start. Early in August General Mack, with an Austrian army of 80,000 men,

invaded Bavaria, hoping to overrun the country before French help could arrive. It was his presence on the Upper Danube that led Napoleon finally to abandon his plan for the invasion of England, though, as we have seen, that could not in any case have succeeded. Realizing that Mack's advanced position was quite unsupported by the main Austrian army, Napoleon drew in his outlying troops from Hanover, making so rapid a concentration that Mack was completely deceived, and arrived—as at Marengo—across the Austrian communications before anyone realized that danger was threatening. On October 20, the day before Nelson's victory at Trafalgar, Mack surrendered at Ulm.

Throughout a cold, tempestuous autumn of unusual severity the Grand Army continued its movement down the Danube valley towards the main Austro-Russian army. Vienna was occupied without opposition, and Napoleon was forced to spread his forces in a huge fan to maintain touch with his enemy, now retreating towards Moravia and Hungary. By pretending that an armistice had already been signed the French were able to cross the Danube by the bridge at Spitz without losing a single man. However, Napoleon's situation might have been extremely dangerous had Prussia consented to enter the Third Coalition and attack his communications while the Austrians and Russians were concentrating. Negotiations were set on foot, but achieved no result on account of Prussia's demand for Hanover as the price of her help. Pitt was thoroughly shocked at this barefaced greed, and refused to suggest any such sacrifice to George III, who was already trembling on the verge of insanity. Accordingly the Prussian army did not move, and Napoleon was left alone to deal the Coalition a decisive blow.

On December 2, 1805, without waiting to complete the full concentration of their forces, the Emperors of Russia and Austria delivered an attack on Napoleon's communications near Austerlitz. The French army occupied a strong defensive position, and the attack to which it was subjected was precisely what Napoleon had hoped to bring about. Withdrawing his right wing until the advance of the Russian left had placed it between his centre and a frozen lake, he sent Soult to deliver a counterstroke that drove thousands of Russians with their artillery and baggage into the lake, and cost the Allied army over 30,000 men in casualties and prisoners. The Tsar Alexander merely signed a truce, but the Emperor Francis was forced to make peace, the terms of which were embodied in the Treaty of Pressburg, signed on December 26. Venetia was ceded to the new Kingdom of Italy, and certain Austrian provinces in the west went to Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, all of which were under French influence. Frederick William III of Prussia, heartily glad that he had not yet committed himself to an

act of war, now agreed to a treaty with Napoleon by which he was to receive Hanover, in spite of a further appeal from the Tsar for solidarity in the face of Europe's common enemy.

The news of these disasters hastened Pitt's death, which occurred in January 1806. Especially grievous was the news of the defection of Prussia. But that nation, caught between the shifting sands of her own uncertain policy, was about to reap the humiliation she had for years past so richly deserved. Gradually her people came to see that the 'new Charlemagne,' as Napoleon styled himself, had no intention of confining his activities to France. The Bourbons were driven from Naples, because they had admitted Russian and English troops, and Napoleon's brother Joseph became King there instead. French troops entered the Papal States, in spite of the opposition of the Pope. In June 1806 Holland became a kingdom, for the benefit of Napoleon's brother Louis; in July sixteen of the German states near the western frontier were made into a Confederation of the Rhine, subservient in military matters and foreign affairs to Napoleon. The 'Holy Roman Empire' accordingly came to an end, and the Emperor Francis assumed the style of Emperor of Austria, in place of the older title.

These events, as revealing the personal domination to which Napoleon had committed himself, were disturbing enough to Prussia, but there were other matters that affected her more closely still. Frederick William was forced to close his ports to English commerce and to cede part of his dominions to Napoleon's brother-in-law, Murat, now Grand Duke of Berg. Worst of all, Napoleon's negotiators were actually offering to return Hanover to George III. The anger of the Prussian Army leaders could no longer be held in check, and as the Tsar now refused to ratify a peace treaty with France the Third Coalition took on a new lease of life.

But the result was merely another disaster. Without waiting for Russian co-operation, the Prussian Army decided to strike forthwith at the French communications, under cover of the Thuringian forest. Instead it was Napoleon, with an army numbering nearly 200,000 men, who appeared so suddenly on the Prussian communications that a hasty retreat was followed by two decisive actions at Jena and Auerstadt on October 14. The armies of Hohenlohe and Brunswick were overwhelmed and driven in scattered bodies across Prussia, to seek refuge in the great fortified towns as best they might. Napoleon followed, taking the Prussian fortresses as he came, and within a few weeks he had occupied Berlin. While there he formulated the great scheme by which he hoped to bring Britain to her knees.

The Continental System. The part played by commerce-destroying as a weapon with which to strike at English trade and hence at English subsidies, since it does not partake of the spectacular character of

military and naval operations, is rarely given the attention it deserves. During the twenty-one years of warfare, in spite of constant patrolling by frigates and sloops, and the passing of a special Convoy Act in 1798 compelling shipowners to pay for the advantage of naval protection, over 10,000 British vessels were taken by the enemy, representing rather more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total commerce of the Empire. A modification of the Navigation Acts was accordingly imperative from the start, and the proportion of British goods carried in neutral ships rose sharply as the war progressed.

The idea of excluding British shipping and manufactures from French-controlled ports was inherited by Napoleon from the days of the Republic. In 1793 the Convention had prohibited the admission of English manufactured goods, an order re-enacted by the Directory in 1796. In that year neutrals were warned that if they allowed Britain to confiscate or search their ships France would at once claim a similar right. That these laws were frequently evaded is shown by the fact that in 1798 they were enacted again, this time with the proviso that the neutrality of a vessel was to be determined not by its flag, but by its cargo, the whole to be confiscated if any British goods were found. The result of this system was that English trade with the North German coast (at that time the nearest seaboard outside French control), and especially with Hamburg, multiplied enormously, English goods percolating thence into Central Europe, and even into France itself. Meanwhile, owing to the naval operations in the West Indies, the trade in tropical produce fell almost entirely into British hands.

No sooner had the war been resumed in 1803 than Napoleon issued a decree confiscating all British and colonial produce in his dominions, and requiring neutral vessels to present a certificate to the effect that they carried no goods of British origin. This rule applied to Holland as well as France. It was not until 1806 that Britain adopted a retaliatory measure. By an Order in Council dated May 16 of that year she declared that the entire coast from Brest to the Elbe, all of which by that time was in French hands, was in a state of blockade, and that neutral vessels would be excluded entirely from some of the ports that lay upon it, and only be admitted to the rest if they were bound to or from a port outside Napoleon's jurisdiction. This high-handed action was productive of much future trouble between Britain and the neutral maritime Powers. It also led Napoleon to consolidate and extend the previous regulations against British trade into one comprehensive 'Continental System' that, as the name implies, was to embrace the whole of Europe. It was a desperate throw, for, as he knew full well, the hardship that it would impose and the consequent difficulty of maintaining it would, as time went on, make his rule increasingly unpopular. But he calculated on making it so speedily effective that

the ruin of British commerce would be achieved within a comparatively short period.

On November 21, 1806, the System was formulated in the Berlin Decrees. The British Isles were declared to be in a state of blockade. All commerce and all communication with them was forbidden, and any vessels coming from British ports were to be refused admittance to the ports of France or her allies. British subjects were to be made prisoners of war; British goods were to be confiscated, and even neutral property was to be seized if it was of British origin. "The present decree," Napoleon declared, "shall be considered as a fundamental principle of the Empire." With the exception of Portugal, the coasts of Europe from the Elbe to Italy were therefore theoretically closed to British goods.

At first British merchants continued to ship their wares in neutral ships much as before, for Napoleon had his hands full with other affairs. Such a system as the one he had evolved must be made complete to be really effective, and it was for this reason that he lost no time in defeating Russia and bringing her to terms, in the manner shortly to be described. Meanwhile it will be convenient to detail here the measures by which Britain strove to combat this new menace to her stability, and the additional decree by which Napoleon amplified the first.

On January 7, 1807, Britain issued an Order in Council warning neutral vessels that they would be prevented from trading between any two ports from which the British flag was excluded. This was followed on November 11 and 25 by six other orders, declaring a blockade of all ports where the Continental System was in force, refusing to recognize the sale of enemy vessels to neutral countries, forbidding neutrals to trade in enemy colonial produce, and declaring their vessels good prize in certain circumstances, though they were to be allowed into blockaded ports provided they had touched at a British one first, and paid there a tax on their cargo. The aim was to force neutrals into British ports, if they wished to trade at all. The position of such countries was rapidly growing intolerable, and constant friction ensued, especially with the United States. Napoleon's answer to these measures made the lot of the neutral more unhappy still. By the Milan Decree of December 17, 1807, he enacted that any vessel bound to or from a British port, or submitting to search by a British cruiser, was good prize for the French, whatever the flag under which it sailed.

The Continental System had now assumed its final form. As we shall see, it led Napoleon to invade Portugal, to annex Holland, to assume the administrative control of Germany, and to invade Russia. Thus it proved ultimately to be one of the principal causes of his downfall. In the meantime it failed in its real object, because although

seriously, and (by 1811) even desperately, reduced, British trade with the Continent was never entirely destroyed. By means of double licences issued by the British, one of them genuine, for the British blockading ships, and the other forged, for use in some Continental port, neutral ships carrying British goods were allowed through the blockade and into the ports of Napoleon's allies, where the authorities were only too ready to connive at the evasion. During the years 1807-10, while Napoleon was busy with military campaigns, thousands of such licences were issued. Heligoland became a magazine of English goods, ready at any time to supply the coastal smugglers. Holland continued to admit neutral ships, though Napoleon twice closed his frontier against her in consequence. In the Mediterranean Malta fulfilled a function similar to that of Heligoland. And all the time the internal trade of the French Empire continued to stagnate, while misery and privation grew. Such was the System, the political results of which were to produce such serious consequences for its author.

The Treaty of Tilsit. The winter of 1806-7 found Napoleon's task of smashing the Third Coalition still unaccomplished. The Russian army was now joined by the remnant of the Prussian, for Frederick William still hoped to save some of his territory. On February 8, 1807, the opposing armies met at Eylau, where a desperate battle resulted in little advantage to either side, though Napoleon, whose situation was too uncertain to allow rumours of a reverse to spread unchecked, announced a victory. The Third Coalition now for the third time took on a new lease of life, when Prussia and Russia agreed to renew their common resistance by the Treaty of Bartenstein. To this treaty Sweden adhered, and the usual British promise of subsidies, naval assistance, and even a military expedition to Stralsund soon followed.

But once again resistance to Napoleon had only flickered up in order to be the more completely extinguished. On June 14 the Russian army under General Bennigsen was decisively beaten at Friedland, suffering 25,000 casualties and losing eighty guns. The only assistance from Britain that had so far materialized was of so feeble a nature that Napoleon's suggestions for peace found a ready acceptance with the Tsar Alexander, a peculiar person who had never quite forgotten his suspicions of Britain, and now fell completely under the spell of the French Emperor. For the sake of privacy the two Emperors met on a raft moored in the river Niemen at Tilsit, and there discussed a rearrangement of the European states system, incidentally settling the fate of Prussia at the same time. Under the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit, signed between France and Russia on July 7, 1807, Prussia was to be stripped of all her territory west of the Elbe, most of which went to form part of a new kingdom of Westphalia under Jerome Bonaparte. Her Polish provinces in the east became the Grand Duchy

of Warsaw, a buffer state between the two empires, but placed under Napoleon's faithful ally the King of Saxony, and really under the control of a French marshal. French troops occupied Hanover and, by the terms of a later agreement with Prussia, were to remain in the latter's territory until the war indemnity was paid. Napoleon, as was his custom, assured Alexander that the two of them together could do as they liked on the continent of Europe. The latter hoped, therefore, for Constantinople. He was at the time engaged in a war with Turkey, undertaken by the Turks in the first instance at the promptings of Napoleon himself. It was now agreed that this conflict must end, and that if Turkey refused the terms she was offered most of her European dominions should be taken from her. Constantinople, however, Napoleon did not intend to see in Russian hands. Meanwhile the Tsar was to suggest peace terms to Britain, requiring the restoration of all her overseas conquests since the beginning of the war. Russia was to join the Continental System, and if Britain did not agree to the proposed terms before a certain date Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal were all to be forced into the System as well. This part of the treaty was kept secret, but rumours of its import soon arrived in London, where they produced momentous consequences.

The news of the defection of Russia and the final collapse of Prussia left no doubt in the mind of Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, that the Third Coalition was at an end, and that consequences even worse might follow. In August the Swedes lost Stralsund to a French army. In these circumstances Canning, fearing that France might treat Denmark and her fleet as she had treated the Dutch, decided that the only hope of securing the Baltic trade was to arrive at Copenhagen first. He proposed to Denmark a treaty of alliance, and the handing over to Britain of the Danish fleet, either for co-operation with the British or at least for internment to save it from the French. These terms were refused, and the result was another battle at Copenhagen. A fleet of twenty-five sail of the line under Admiral Gambier was sent to co-operate with a land force that had originally been intended to help the Swedes. On September 7, after Copenhagen had been subjected to several days' bombardment, the Danes surrendered. Their fleet, consisting of fifteen sail of the line, as many frigates, and a number of smaller craft, was brought back to England. The Danish island of Heligoland was also captured, and became, as we have seen, an excellent base for smuggling English goods into the Continent.

It is, of course, arguable that intimate knowledge of Napoleon's methods justified Canning's policy towards Denmark, but it is doubtful whether much advantage was derived therefrom. Bitter Danish hostility was ensured for the remainder of the war, and an excellent excuse was furnished to Russia for her change of attitude. In October

she closed her ports to the British and broke off relations, in accordance with the Tilsit agreement. The Baltic coasts were incorporated in the Continental System, to which even Sweden, now at the mercy of Russia, was forced to agree during the course of the following year. But to be really effective the Continental System must be absolutely complete, and the necessity of making it so led Napoleon to decide on a policy he had for some time kept in mind—namely, the assumption of direct control over Portugal and Spain.

The Peninsular War. Charles IV of Spain had for long been an unwilling ally of Napoleon. The destruction of his fleet at Trafalgar and the expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples had caused him great uneasiness. To his selfish and crafty Minister Godoy the declaration of war by Prussia, so unexpected and so awkward a circumstance for Napoleon, had seemed the right moment to change sides. In October 1806 the Spaniards had therefore been called to arms, though no enemy had actually been named. The news of Jena brought from the Spanish Government an explanation that the mobilization was intended for the benefit of France. Napoleon was not deceived, and decided then that sooner or later the Bourbon Government must be overthrown.


In the summer of 1807, in accordance with the Treaty of Tilsit, Portugal was required to close her ports to British shipping and to confiscate British goods. The reply was a virtual refusal. Napoleon's answer to this was the Treaty of Fontainebleau with Spain, by which the latter agreed to give passage to French troops on their way to the conquest of Portugal. An army was collected at Bayonne under the command of the rapacious General Junot. In the month of November this force advanced across Northern Spain, crossed the mountains into Portugal, and, through bad weather and over wretched roads, raced south in an endeavour to enter Lisbon before the city could be evacuated. On November 30 Junot arrived with the vanguard—less than 2000—of his troops, and the disorganized, terror-stricken inhabitants allowed him to enter the city. They had just been deserted by the royal family, which had departed for Brazil, escorted by ships of the British Navy. Junot then proceeded to consolidate his position, and by a systematic campaign of pillage he soon brought the populace to the brink of rebellion.

Meanwhile French troops were pouring into Spain, ostensibly on their way to reinforce Junot. But few of them appeared in any hurry to cross the Portuguese frontier. Instead they began to occupy important fortresses like Pamplona, in the foothills of the Pyrenees, and even towns on the east coast, such as Barcelona. By the beginning of 1808 French troops were virtually in control of Northern Spain. Napoleon was therefore in a position to take immediate advantage of the situation that arose in March, when a riot in the capital brought

about the abdication of Charles IV and placed Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, on the throne in his stead. French troops occupied Madrid, and French advisers were sent to persuade the young king that the solution to his family troubles could best be found by a consultation with the Emperor himself. With some misgivings Ferdinand set out, expecting to meet Napoleon at Burgos. But the Emperor intended the meeting to take place on French territory ; Ferdinand was practically forced across the frontier to Bayonne, and orders were sent to Spain that Charles IV, his Queen, and other members of the royal family were also to attend. A fever of anger and suspicion spread across Spain at the news, but the warning was lost upon Napoleon. Pretending that he alone could save Spain from falling into anarchy, he forced Ferdinand to restore the crown to Charles, and Charles to cede it to him. It was in vain for the Spaniards to argue that such a surrender would never be deemed valid in Spain. Napoleon was satisfied that he could check any Spanish insurrection without much difficulty, and he named his brother Joseph as the new king.

Insurrections broke out at once. The main line of communication for the French was the road Bayonne—Vittoria—Burgos—Salamanca—Madrid, and its safety was soon apparently assured by a French victory over a Spanish army in the north. Elsewhere, at Saragossa, Gerona, and Valencia, the French showed themselves unable to deal with the local risings. But the chief disaster was suffered at Baylen, south of Madrid, where on July 19 a French division of poor quality, caught between two fires, and short of food and ammunition, was surrendered by General Dupont to a ragged Spanish army under General Castaños. The effect was out of all proportion to its practical importance. French troops had actually surrendered to Spaniards, the most despised soldiery in Europe ! The news spread all over Spain, to give a wonderful impetus to the growing insurrection. It reached Madrid, where Joseph had been upon his new throne for less than a fortnight. He at once evacuated the capital and fell back behind the line of the river Ebro, there to wait until Napoleon could support him with reinforcements.

It was at this juncture that the British Cabinet decided once more to undertake a major expedition to the Continent. The mountainous nature of the Spanish peninsula separates the country into provinces so distinct in character and so effectively isolated from one another that a success gained in one district makes little difference to the conduct of the war elsewhere. In such a country, peopled by a race grown so fiercely vindictive towards the French, and from its earliest history so well adapted to the practice of guerrilla warfare, it seemed that a national resistance might at last arise that would be a match even for the soldiers of France. At Gibraltar Sir Hew Dalrymple was already



THE PENINSULA

aiding Castaños with supplies. The province of Asturias was soliciting a similar assistance, and it was realized that the position of Junot at Lisbon had become extremely precarious. A force of 5000 British soldiers was cruising off the south of Spain; 12,000 men, originally intended to help the Swedes, were on their way back from the Baltic under the command of Sir John Moore; 10,000 more were already assembled at Cork. It was decided to dispatch the last-named troops first, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Arthur Wellesley was born at Dublin on May 1, 1769, four months before the birth of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was a member of an aristocratic English family that for many years had been settled upon its Irish estates. As a boy he had shown so little evidence of ability or ambition that an Army commission, obtained through influence in the customary manner, seemed the best that could be planned for him in the way of a career. Influence and purchase succeeded in making him a colonel soon after Britain entered the Revolutionary War in 1793, and as such he commanded the rearguard during Cumberland's disastrous retreat through Holland into Hanover. A few years later he was sent with his regiment to India, where he played an important part in the Mysore War, and in the campaigns against the Mahrattas, during which he won the decisive victory of Assaye, defeating a native army of 50,000 men with a force less than 8000 strong. Just before the triumphant conclusion of Nelson's Trafalgar campaign he returned to England a major-general and a Knight of the Bath.

In 1808 many people doubted whether Wellesley's success against native armies could be repeated against the trained levies of France. In any case he was a very junior general, and it was not intended that he should remain in command of the main expedition to the Peninsula, but only of the advance-guard from Cork. None the less he met with two important successes before he was superseded. The place of disembarkation had been left to his own discretion. Finding the authorities at Corunna unwilling or unable to guarantee supplies and transport for his troops, and the Bishop of Oporto (whence the French had been expelled by a successful insurrection) ready to promise what he was obviously unable to perform, Wellesley decided to land much farther down the coast, in order to threaten Lisbon before a concentration could be effected for its defence. On August 1 the disembarkation began at the mouth of the Mondego river. The English troops were very deficient in cavalry, artillery, and transport. Their communications depended upon the fleet, which followed when the march south began. Meanwhile Junot was hastily concentrating his scattered forces, recalling a division under Loison from the Spanish frontier, and sending another under Laborde to delay the English advance for as long as possible. At Roliça, on August 17, Wellesley drove Laborde from a

strong defensive position, and then retired to the coast to cover the landing of some newly arrived reinforcements. With his army raised to 18,000 men, he was about to attempt an outflanking movement against Junot's main army when the latter attacked him at Vimeiro, delivering a spirited assault on the English centre and left. By an able reinforcement of his left, and by holding fast with his centre, where the troops were well posted on high ground, Wellesley was able to beat off the attack, and the French eventually retired, though unmolested and in good order.

By this time Wellesley had been superseded by an officer senior to himself, Sir Harry Burrard. Wellesley's original intention of placing his army between Junot and Lisbon was promptly vetoed by his more cautious superior, who was then almost immediately superseded himself, by the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple. At this juncture Junot proposed a conference, the outcome of which was the settlement known as the Convention of Cintra. By the terms of this agreement Junot was to evacuate not only Lisbon, but all the outlying fortresses in Portugal garrisoned by his troops, on which condition the British were to transport his army back to France. Dalrymple, Burrard, and Wellesley all thought the arrangement an equitable one; they wanted to occupy Lisbon, rather than to storm it after a bombardment, and it was essential to obtain command of the secure waters of the Tagus before the autumnal storms made the unsheltered coast impracticable for the supporting fleet. But as the politicians at home thought the Convention a poor outcome of the victory at Vimeiro all three generals were ordered home to attend an official inquiry.

The British force in Portugal was now placed under the command of Sir John Moore.¹ Though an able and courageous officer, Moore's relations with the Cabinet were unfortunately not good, a fact that led him to fear an unsympathetic verdict on his operations in the event of a reverse. His orders were to co-operate with the Spaniards, who by now had collected three armies to face the French on the Ebro. So far the disorganization of the Spaniards and their lack of commissariat, transport, and equipment had not become fully apparent, and Moore had therefore no particular reason to suppose them incapable of holding the French, or of covering his advance as he moved up in support. To the north and west the frontier of Portugal is bounded by mountain-ranges of barren and difficult character, at that time intersected by few roads suitable for the passage of wheeled traffic, especially during the winter season. To the north the principal pass was guarded on the Portuguese side by the fortress of Almeida, and on the Spanish side by that of Ciudad Rodrigo; the southern pass was similarly guarded by Elvas and Badajoz. Almeida and Elvas had been surrendered by

¹ Sir John Moore (1761-1809).

Junot under the terms of the Convention of Cintra, so that both these routes were available to Moore for his entry into Spain. The northern one was by far the more difficult ; Moore had no time to survey it properly for himself, and all accounts agreed that the passage of artillery and baggage was impracticable by such a route in the late autumn.

On taking up his command early in October Moore found about 20,000 English troops at Lisbon. Between 10,000 and 14,000 more were on their way to join him, under the command of Sir David Baird. These troops were to land on the north-west coast, as Moore intended to effect his concentration round Salamanca. Most of the artillery and baggage, with one infantry brigade, was sent under Sir John Hope by the easier southern roads into Spain ; the rest of the army proceeded by way of Almeida. Such a dispersal of forces has been severely criticized, though it appears to have been justified, owing to the practical difficulties. On November 23 Moore with the centre column was at Salamanca, having arrived before either Baird or Hope. But by that time the situation had undergone a sudden change, as startling as it was unexpected. Napoleon, with the long-awaited reinforcements, in a series of sharp engagements had scattered the bewildered Spanish armies from his path. Without, apparently, realizing the proximity of the English, he then marched straight for Madrid, driving the Spanish artillery from the strong position it had taken up on the Somosierra Pass. On December 4 he entered the capital.

Meanwhile Moore, who by this time had been joined by the column under Hope, was making his plans for a retreat into Portugal by the way he had come. Urgent requests from Mr Frere, however, the British representative at Madrid, persuaded him to make a movement against Soult,¹ who was guarding the vital French communications. Such a threat on the part of the daring little English force might at least save Southern Spain for the time being, and give the Spanish commanders a chance to reorganize. On December 20 Moore joined forces with Baird, and on the following day he was in touch with the French cavalry near Sahagun. The regular attack was planned for Christmas Eve, but hearing that Napoleon had got wind of his presence and was hastening back from Madrid to cut off his retreat, Moore cancelled his orders and fell back across the river Esla, just in time to destroy the bridges before Napoleon's advance-guard arrived. Withdrawal was now possible only in the direction of Vigo or Corunna.

During the disastrous retreat that followed discipline was at times completely lost. The weather was terrible ; supply magazines were inadequate ; certain routes and towns were already choked with the remnants of the Spanish armies. Above all, Moore made the mistake

¹ Nicolas-Jean de Dieu Soult, Duke of Dalmatia (1769-1851), son of a notary.

of hurrying his troops too fast, without taking advantage of the mountainous nature of the country to raise their morale by fighting rearguard actions. Actually the five picked regiments that formed his rearguard lost fewer men than the regiments that were not in touch with the enemy at all. At Astorga Napoleon decided to return to Paris, either on account of serious news from Austria or because he had no wish to be associated personally with a pursuit unlikely to meet with success. At Lugo on January 5, 1809, Moore halted and offered battle. Soult, now in command of the French, made a reconnaissance and refused action. The retreat was then resumed, even more hurriedly than before, with fresh scenes of indiscipline and disorder.

On arrival at Corunna Moore found that the transports had not arrived, and an action thus became necessary to cover his embarkation. On January 16 the battle was fought, centring chiefly round the village of Elvina. Both in troops and in artillery Soult was greatly superior, but his attack met with a sharp repulse, which might have resulted in a decisive defeat, but for the fact that both Moore and Baird received their death-wounds at the critical moment, and Hope, since darkness was approaching and enough had already been done to cover the embarkation, decided to break off the action.

The successful withdrawal of the English army is a classic example of the flexibility conferred by command of the sea. But the original intention of transferring the troops to Lisbon had to be abandoned. Their demoralization was such that Hope decided to make for England, where the publicity occasioned by their arrival in such a condition led to a renewed outcry against the Government's intervention in the Peninsula. But actually Moore's campaign had accomplished work of considerable importance. The French army in Central Spain had been so weakened to provide troops for the pursuit that many months elapsed before it was possible for the occupation of Andalusia and Portugal to proceed. Consequently Lisbon and the Tagus remained in British hands. After the battle of Corunna Soult turned south, entered Portugal, and captured Oporto. Such was the situation when General Beresford began the task of reorganizing and training the Portuguese army and militia, and when Wellesley arrived once more to take up the supreme command.

With Wellesley's return to the Peninsula in April 1809, the Peninsular War, as conceived in his imagination and carried into effect by his untiring energy and patient determination, began in earnest. He knew that a single serious reverse might lead the Cabinet to abandon the whole enterprise, and that none but scanty forces would be forthcoming until he could show some evidence of success. But the situation was not entirely without advantages. The Frenchmen were in a hostile country, unsafe for any but comparatively large bodies of men. Savage

bands of guerrillas interfered seriously with communications and supply. On the other hand, the Portuguese, though often difficult to deal with, and even actively unfriendly, were soon organized by Beresford into useful auxiliaries. Secondly, the French armies were under a geographical disadvantage, their line of communication with France alternately crossing mountain-ranges and rivers, which run east and west, while Wellesley, securely entrenched on the French flank, could operate up the valleys. Finally, the English line of communication, being by sea, provided not only a secure means of retreat, but also an easy means of supply, since goods in bulk could in those days be conveyed more cheaply and easily by water than in any other manner. Wellesley therefore expressed the cautious belief that, small as his force was in number, he would at any rate be able to maintain himself in Portugal.

In addition to the menace of Soult's presence in Oporto, a French army in the east under Victor was threatening Lisbon. Wellesley decided to attack Soult first, leaving a covering force to watch the Tagus in case Victor essayed to cross. Marching north with about 16,000 English and 10,000 Portuguese, Wellesley with extreme daring gained enough boats to cross the Douro before Soult was aware of his approach, and drove the French back across the mountains with the loss of their guns, baggage, and sick. The British loss was trifling.

Soult's defeat and the guerrilla campaign in Galicia led the French to evacuate North-western Spain, and Wellesley was able to turn his attention to Victor. Marching up the valley of the Tagus, he effected a junction with a Spanish army under the difficult and obstinate Cuesta, and together the two withstood Victor's assault at Talavera on July 29. The brunt of the battle was borne by the British, who suffered some 6000 casualties, but Victor was beaten off and forced to retire with even heavier losses. It was not possible, however, to maintain so advanced a position for long. The armies of Soult and Ney¹ were threatening to cut communications with Portugal; hardly any of the supplies and transport so glibly promised by the Spaniards were forthcoming, so Wellesley, thoroughly disgusted with his treatment at the hands of his allies and determined in future to act alone, was forced to retire to Lisbon by way of Badajoz. For the next twelve months he was engaged chiefly in organizing an efficient commissariat and in securing his base in Portugal, in preparation for the attack that he knew must inevitably come. In recognition of his success at Talavera he was raised to the peerage as Viscount Wellington.

Meanwhile the French, having inflicted a crushing defeat on the Spaniards at Ocaña in November, proceeded to occupy Andalusia.

¹ Michel Ney, Duke of Elchingen (1769-1815), son of a cooper.

To claim that practically the whole of Spain was in French hands and to be able to draw upon the supplies of the sunnier and more fertile southern province were no doubt great advantages, but the occupation meant a further dispersal of force, exceedingly dangerous when it is remembered that Joseph's authority over the French marshals was merely nominal, and therefore unable to overcome the mutual jealousies that always interfered with the effective co-operation of the scattered French armies. Had Napoleon himself been present in Spain during the years that followed Wellington would have had to face a much more formidable task.

At the beginning of 1810, the greater part of Spain being now nominally in French hands and peace having been restored elsewhere in Europe, Napoleon sent large reinforcements to the Peninsula and ordered a fresh invasion of Portugal. The task was entrusted to Masséna,¹ a general who had made his reputation during the Swiss and Italian campaigns of the Second Coalition, but who was now past his best and somewhat unpopular with the other French commanders. Since entry into Portugal by the southern route would involve crossing the Tagus it was resolved to make the attack *via* the northern pass, after capturing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which were still garrisoned by the Spaniards and Portuguese respectively.



THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS

For such a move Wellington was thoroughly prepared. After a careful examination of the situation he had come to the conclusion that he could defend himself successfully, provided the attacking force did not exceed 100,000 men. Across the peninsula formed by the Tagus and the sea he had constructed the famous Lines of Torres Vedras, a series of defensive positions of extraordinary strength, formed by the scarping of hillsides, the damming of rivers,

¹ André Masséna, Duke of Rivoli, Prince of Essling (1756–1817), son of a wine merchant. He began life as a cabin-boy.

and the skilful mounting of gun emplacements. The whole was defended by units of artillerymen, marines, and Portuguese militia, thus leaving the field army free. Near the mouth of the Tagus lay the lines of embarkation, where a final stand was to be made if the worst came to the worst. North of the Lines the coastal plain was denuded of its inhabitants, cattle, fodder, and food, in order to force the French to draw supplies only by means of their own transport across the difficult mountain roads.

Towards the end of April Masséna began to concentrate an army of 60,000 men against Ciudad Rodrigo. A division under General Hill was watching the southern pass, but Wellington, with the rest of the army, numbering about 27,000 British and as many Portuguese, lay behind Almeida, with the Light Division under Craufurd spread out in front of him. It was important that Ciudad Rodrigo should hold out as long as possible, for it was the essence of Wellington's scheme that Masséna should find himself trapped in Portugal during the winter season. The Spaniards defended the fortress with notable courage, despite the fact that Wellington, who had no intention of risking a battle against his powerful adversary on the open plain, refused direct assistance. On July 19 it fell; Craufurd's Division, after narrowly escaping disaster, retired on to the main body, and the French began the siege of Almeida. That fortress succeeded in protracting its defence until the end of August, when a chance shell blew up the powder magazine and destroyed part of the defensive works. But by that time Wellington's purpose had been accomplished, for it was the middle of September before Masséna was ready to begin his advance into Portugal.

To satisfy the Portuguese Government, to try out his native auxiliaries, and generally to improve the morale of his army Wellington did not retire behind his prepared position without first offering battle. Before crossing the Mondego he drew up his force along the steep crest of the ridge of Busaco, where Masséna attacked him on September 27. The tactics which Wellington used so often and so successfully against the French armies were put into effect with splendid results. The English troops were in line, hidden behind the crest, but ready with musketry and gunfire to shatter the heads of the French columns as they came toiling into view, and then to drive them down the slope with a series of bayonet charges. Masséna lost nearly 5000 men, inflicting on Wellington casualties numbering less than 1300, and finally gave up the attack. He did not renew it on the following day, having found an undefended road round the British left that enabled him to occupy the coastal plain. Wellington was accordingly forced to resume his retreat, greatly hampered by crowds of Portuguese refugees, for his orders to depopulate the countryside had not been properly carried

out. In October his troops entered the Lines of Torres Vedras, and Masséna, completely taken by surprise, came to an abrupt halt.

Lack of supplies, the insubordination of his corps commanders, and above all the impregnable character of the fortified Lines, which Wellington was strengthening daily, prevented Masséna from attempting an attack, and he fell back to Santarem. There Wellington found him so securely posted that he also decided against risking a major operation, and stalemate ensued. Throughout the winter Masséna's position grew steadily worse, his men suffering every kind of privation, want, and disease, while Wellington was amply supplied from the sea. At last Masséna dispatched a special mission to Napoleon, to inform him of the state of affairs. The Emperor replied with instructions to continue the campaign, and sent discretionary orders to Soult in Andalusia to co-operate by attacking Wellington's position from the south. But Soult's response was half-hearted, though he dispatched some of his forces to the Portuguese frontier, and began the siege of Badajoz. This hardly improved Masséna's position, however, and on March 5, 1811, unable to hold out any longer, he began his retreat. The wonder was that he had ever been able to remain in Portugal so long. A few days later Badajoz, which on account of its tremendous strength was not in any real danger, was surrendered by its commander, whom Soult had managed to bribe.

Wellington received reinforcements from home just as Masséna began his retreat. But even so he was not able greatly to harass the retiring French army. The fall of Badajoz necessitated the detachment of a large force to the southern side of the Tagus; the Portuguese commissariat was still inefficient and obliged to rely on the British for supplies, and, greatest factor of all, Masséna's rearguard was brilliantly commanded by Ney, who took full advantage of the rugged nature of the country to delay the British advance. Eventually Masséna, reluctant to leave Portugal with nothing accomplished, came to a halt behind the river Coa. On April 3 Wellington fought an action at Sabugal in which he succeeded in worsting Reynier's Division; Masséna himself was lucky to escape a decisive defeat. The French then retired to Salamanca, the whole campaign having cost them about 30,000 men. Although Masséna was past his prime and unable to win the respect and loyalty of his subordinate commanders, the failure can hardly be laid to his account. Napoleon did not appreciate the fact that his principle of making war support war could not be applied to a barren country like the Peninsula, or that Soult was so comfortably situated in Andalusia that he would not leave it without direct orders. Strategically, though not tactically, Wellington with his limited resources had secured a great victory, and it has been truly said that the French

check before the Lines of Torres Vedras was the turning-point of Napoleon's struggle against Europe.

Wellington now determined to take the offensive. In order to surprise the enemy as to the route by which he would advance it was necessary to recover the fortresses controlling both passes—Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz. Almeida was promptly invested. Masséna advanced to its relief with an army of about 48,000 men, outnumbering the force that Wellington was able to draw up for the defence of his siege lines. The British right rested upon the village of Fuentes de Onoro, where Masséna delivered his assault on May 3 and 5. The flank in question was so drawn out and so inadequately protected that it was forced to give way and retreat to a stronger position. There the French advance was checked and the village saved. Masséna did not renew the attack, as he was then superseded in his command by Marmont.¹ Wellington was thus able to claim a victory, and the French garrison in Almeida, seeing that there was no hope of relief, blew up the magazine and evacuated the fortress.

In the south a Spanish army under La Peña, assisted by a British force under Graham, had attempted to raise the siege of Cadiz by fighting an action at Barossa. The news of this caused Soult to withdraw to Seville, but Beresford, who was in command of a mixed force of 10,000 British and as many Portuguese, did not at once begin the siege of Badajoz. Towards the end of April, though still severely handicapped by lack of engineers, he began the investment, only to be obliged to raise it in order to meet Soult, who had concentrated against him an army of 25,000 men. As Beresford had the assistance of about 15,000 Spaniards under Blake his army was superior in number, though not in quality. On May 16 the battle took place at Albuera. Soult secured the woods in front of the village, and made a demonstration on the British left, while massing his real attack on the other flank, where the Spaniards were posted. On that side the allied army was soon thrown into such confusion that Beresford thought the battle was lost. Prompt action by the Second and Fourth Divisions succeeded in saving the day, at the cost of about 4200 British casualties. Soult lost over 8000, and accordingly did not renew his attack. By comparison Beresford's loss was the more serious. "Such another battle would ruin us," wrote Wellington, who arrived shortly afterwards to direct in person the renewed operations against Badajoz.

Soult's army was now joined by that of Marmont. The latter was a skilful and daring strategist, and an excellent administrator who had already worked wonders with the demoralized army of Portugal. The French concentration numbered over 60,000 troops, and Wellington

¹ Auguste-Frédéric-Louis-Viesse de Marmont, Duke of Ragusa (1774–1852), son of an Army officer.

was obliged to retire from Badajoz and take post behind the Guadiana. Badajoz was at once revictualled and reinforced, but Wellington's prestige was such that Soult and Marmont hesitated to attack him in a position of his own choosing, and since for reasons of supply it was impossible for the French to keep a large army concentrated for any length of time Marmont soon retired northward, while Soult went back to Andalusia. Leaving some troops behind him to watch the Estremadura frontier, Wellington returned to the river Coa. On the whole the campaign of 1811 had been disappointing, Almeida being the only concrete gain. But there could be no doubt that the initiative had passed to the British, particularly as Napoleon, now in the midst of his plans for a gigantic invasion of Russia, was about to withdraw troops from Spain.

While Wellington was slowly developing his campaign in Portugal subsidiary operations were constantly in progress in Eastern Spain, where the native levies were aided and supplied by a British squadron off the coast. The warlike Catalans were especially active, constituting a problem that the French were never able to solve. By far the most successful French general in that theatre of war was Suchet,¹ who had succeeded in capturing the strongholds of Tortosa and Tarragona. During the winter of 1811-12 some of Marmont's troops were detached to assist in the eastern campaign. The rest were widely scattered behind Ciudad Rodrigo, on account of the difficulties of supply. For Marmont to make a concentration in force would therefore take an appreciable time. Wellington, whose commissariat was now efficient and whose troops lay in the villages behind Almeida, determined to take advantage of this fact. During the first week of January 1812 he moved up to the assault on Ciudad Rodrigo. In bitter weather the siege-lines were prepared and breaches made in the walls. Marmont, completely taken by surprise, had concentrated little more than half his available army when he heard that the fortress had fallen, on January 19. The British losses were small, as the defending garrison was not strong, but General Craufurd, commander of the Light Division, was mortally wounded. Inside the fortress the English found Marmont's battering-train. After the defences had been repaired Ciudad Rodrigo was handed over to a Spanish garrison and Wellington hurried south to resume the attack on Badajoz.

The problem that now confronted him was one of infinitely greater difficulty. Badajoz was protected on one side by the river Guadiana. Phillipon, its defender, had done much to put the castle and the town itself into a strong state of defence. At any moment Marmont might follow the English army south and combine again with Soult. The latter could not alone mass a very formidable army, but he collected

¹ Louis-Gabriel Suchet, Duke of Albufera (1770-1826), son of a silk manufacturer.


about 24,000 men and began to press upon Wellington's covering force. It was vitally necessary, therefore, to hurry on the siege operations as quickly as possible. By April 5 two breaches had been made, just as the news came that Soult was approaching. On the 6th, a further breach having been effected, Wellington delivered his assault under cover of darkness. The breaches were attacked by the Light and Fourth Divisions. As the leading files swarmed upon the glacis they were destroyed by the explosion of a mine, and when their comrades advanced over a pile of dead bodies they were brought to a standstill by a *chevaux de frise* of swords, secured immovably in the breaches. Subjected to a hail of missiles of all kinds, 4000 soldiers fell in that sector of the assault alone.

Meanwhile the Third Division, under Picton, equipped with twenty-foot scaling ladders, was delivering a feint attack against the castle. Contrary to expectation, this proved a success, and as the Fifth Division also captured the bastion of San Vicente at the other side of the town the defenders of the breaches were taken in the rear. Thus, at the cost of 5000 casualties, Badajoz fell to the British. For three days the soldiery ran riot in an orgy of bloodshed, licence, and incendiarism which even Wellington was unable to check.

With the gateways of Spain in his hands, Wellington could now plan a definite offensive. After the fall of Badajoz Soult withdrew his army into Andalusia. He did so unmolested, because Marmont, acting under orders from Napoleon, was making a tentative movement towards Portugal. In any case to attack the French by the southern route would merely force them back upon their lines of communication. On the other hand, an invasion of Spain *via* Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo would threaten the French communications, and perhaps even Madrid itself. It was this plan that Wellington intended to put into effect, but his possession of both routes left the French completely in the dark as to his plans. In order to confuse them still further various diversions were prepared. A squadron in the Bay of Biscay kept the Army of the North constantly on the watch; a British force from Sicily was to land on the east coast to occupy the attention of Suchet; Hill was sent to Almaraz to capture the forts guarding a pontoon bridge over the Tagus, which formed the most direct communication between Marmont and Soult. Although forced to cut his scaling-ladders in half to get them down the narrow mountain-paths, Hill succeeded in carrying out this important task, after which Marmont and Soult had to use the bridge at Toledo, a hundred miles farther up the river. The operation had the added advantage of giving no indication of which of the two commanders Wellington meant to attack.

On June 12 the Anglo-Portuguese army, numbering over 50,000 men, began its march through the northern pass in the direction of

Salamanca. Marmont withdrew from the city northward. Wellington entered it and crossed the river Tormes, while the Sixth Division began the task of reducing the forts recently constructed by the French. Marmont's plan was to outmanœuvre Wellington and cut off his retreat into Portugal. Joseph at Madrid was planning to send assistance from the Army of the Centre, and it might be possible to catch Wellington between two fires. He approached Salamanca, however, with a view to relieving the forts if possible, but on June 27 they fell, whereupon he withdrew behind the river Douro.



THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN

Wellington was in no position to force his way across the river, for the bridge at Tordesillas, the only one that had not been broken down, was in Marmont's hands. He accordingly took up his position across the Trabancos, and waited. On July 8, 6000 more troops joined Marmont's army, and the latter thereupon threatened to cross the Douro at Toro, ostensibly to outflank Wellington's left and cut him off from Salamanca. Wellington began to concentrate on his left, leaving his right wing to watch Tordesillas. But Marmont had completely deceived him; the movement at Toro was merely a feint, and the French army, taking advantage of the bend in the river, had

doubled back and was crossing at Tordesillas. Wellington's isolated right wing had to be withdrawn in extreme haste ; protected by the cavalry, it crossed the Guarena and rejoined the main body, with Marmont pressing hard upon it. Then began a race southward, both armies moving down the Guarena in sight of each other. The French marched the faster, and on July 21 they crossed the Tormes at Alba, which Wellington had supposed occupied by his Spanish allies. The English army was now in an awkward position, threatened with the alternative of losing either Salamanca or its own communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. But, able as Marmont had proved himself as a strategist, he now made a tactical mistake that cost him all the advantage previously gained.

On July 22 the long-awaited battle of Salamanca was fought. The British army was concealed behind one of the two hills known as Los Arapiles. After a morning of complicated manœuvring Marmont, who appeared to think that the British were escaping him along the Ciudad Rodrigo road, made a hasty movement to his left, completely detaching that wing of his army from the main body. The opportunity of defeating his enemy in detail was instantly seized by Wellington. As the hot afternoon drew to a close the Third Division and the Cavalry attacked the French left before it could be supported and drove it upon the main body in terrible confusion. Marmont and his second-in-command, Bonnet, were badly wounded, but Clausel made a gallant effort to restore the battle by a spirited attack with his right. This was eventually beaten off by the Sixth Division, which advanced to restore the shattered British line, and Clausel withdrew the defeated army by way of the bridge at Alba. He went unmolested, for by that time darkness had fallen, and Wellington still believed Alba to be in the hands of the Spaniards. By the following night the French army, which had suffered over 15,000 casualties, three times as many as the British, was forty miles away, retreating to the north-east.

Wellington followed, and, finding the so-called Army of Portugal had retired through Valladolid toward Burgos, decided that the time had come to attack Joseph at Madrid. At his approach the latter evacuated the city and retired, once more sending orders to the disobedient Soult to join him. On August 13 Wellington entered the capital, where he was received by the populace with extravagant joy. The French munitions and military stores at the Retiro Palace were captured. But the co-operation that Wellington had expected from other sources proved disappointing. The Spanish irregulars in Galicia and Andalusia failed to contain Clausel and Soult. The English landing on the east coast, which took place at Alicante at the beginning of August, was too feeble an affair to be effective. Joseph, Soult, and Suchet were able after all to concentrate an overwhelming force, and

Wellington decided to go north and deal with Clausel at Burgos, before these combined armies of the south and east were ready to move upon Madrid.

On September 1 he set out, with 20,000 men, leaving about 16,000 to garrison Madrid. Clausel fell back as he approached, abandoning the town of Burgos, but leaving about 2000 soldiers to defend the castle. It was at the hands of this insignificant force that Wellington received the worst check of his career. With a mere handful of guns, no transport animals to bring up a proper siege-train, hardly any engineer officers, and a continual shortage of powder, he tried by gunfire and by mining to make a practicable breach. But neither the English nor the Portuguese troops showed up to advantage in the face of such difficulties, while the defenders revealed notable activity and courage. Five assaults were delivered and repulsed.

News soon came from Madrid that a great concentration was preparing to retake the city. Dry weather had made the Tagus easily fordable, and it was evident that the capital could not be held for much longer. In the north the Army of Portugal, now under the command of Souham, began to press upon Wellington, outnumbering his mixed army of English, Portuguese, and Spaniards by nearly 10,000 men. To avoid being caught between two fires Wellington raised the siege and retreated south, destroying the bridges behind him. Hill, commanding the 40,000 allied troops left in the Tagus valley, decided to evacuate Madrid, greatly to the despair of the inhabitants. On October 30 his intention was carried into effect, and after a difficult retreat he joined Wellington near Salamanca. Wellington's total force then numbered nearly 70,000 men, but with Drouet (who had replaced Souham), Joseph, and Soult against him he was in danger of having to fight a general engagement against superior forces. The influence of Soult, however, was against risking a general attack, so that Wellington was able to continue his retreat upon Ciudad Rodrigo and the Portuguese frontier without being unduly harassed. Rain and floods hampered his progress; the commissariat broke down, and discipline vanished as the hungry troops roamed the woods in search of acorns and wild swine. The repulse at Burgos and the subsequent retreat had seriously damaged the army's morale, though the regimental officers hardly deserved the harsh order in which Wellington blamed them for the collapse of discipline. But in spite of the gloom in which the campaigning season of 1812 came to an end, there was much cause for congratulation. Some 20,000 prisoners and 3000 guns had been taken; Salamanca had been a tremendous victory; all Spain south of the Tagus had been cleared of the French. Moreover, the Spaniards now appointed Wellington commander-in-chief of all their armies.

When the spring of 1813 arrived the position of the French in Spain was already serious, even before Wellington renewed his attack. The armies of Portugal, the Centre, and the South, numbering in all about 90,000 men, were situated along the Tagus valley and the Portuguese frontier. Little co-operation could be expected from Suchet in the east, for that general was fully occupied with the small English army (now under the command of General Murray) that had been harassing him since its landing in the previous year. King Joseph, anxious as ever to win the support of his troublesome subjects, saw the prospects of success rapidly fading. In April, acting on orders from Napoleon, he evacuated the capital, and with long trains of wagons loaded with plunder moved north to establish his headquarters at Valladolid, hoping at least to render his communications with France secure.

In May Wellington began his advance into Spain on a wide front. With the centre he himself reached Salamanca, where he was joined by Hill with the right, who up to the last minute had been endeavouring to persuade the French that the attack was really to be made in the valley of the Tagus. Meanwhile the left, under Graham, was crossing the Traz os Montes, the mountain barrier of Northern Portugal, in a great flanking movement intended to cross the rivers well to the west of the French armies. This force included more than half Wellington's total army of 70,000 men. The difficulties attending Graham's march over mountain roads and across unfordable rivers were tremendous, but the plan proved so successful that the French armies, taken completely by surprise, found their new defensive positions turned in rapid succession. From Valladolid to Burgos, from Burgos to Pancorbo, from Pancorbo to Vittoria, Joseph, at last aware of his danger, was forced to retire, striving to call in his outlying divisions as the retreat continued. At the last-named town his artillery park and his baggage trains had been concentrated. Here was the junction of the principal roads running to the French right, left, and rear, and here, if only to allow of the evacuation of the wounded and the stores, a battle must be fought.

Vittoria is surrounded by hills, the town standing in a great natural basin approachable from the south by a narrow defile. Since the French had once again been forced partially to form front to their western flank, owing to the usual enveloping movement by Graham, it fell to Hill, in command of the right wing, to force the pass. Meanwhile Wellington was attacking across the river Zadorra, which forms here a loop round the west and south of the town. The action began on the morning of June 21. Constant retreat had so upset the morale of the French troops that their fighting qualities were seriously impaired. To the north Graham, held in check by Reille, was threaten-

ing the main line of retreat to Bayonne, so that Joseph, when he found his left and centre falling back in extreme confusion, had no option but to order a general retreat over the swampy track to Pamplona in the west. Some 8000 French casualties were suffered in the battle, and the number would have been far greater but for the difficulties of pursuit over such a roadway, and the hampering presence of the baggage, wounded, camp followers, and women left behind by the retreating French. Of their 153 pieces of artillery only one was saved. Joseph also lost his military chest, amounting, it is said, to a million pounds, most of which fell into the hands of the English and Spanish soldiery and the camp followers.

After such a disaster no course was open to Joseph but to withdraw his shattered army into France. Meanwhile Reille's division, which had covered the retreat, fell back behind the Bidassoa, where it was joined by Foy, whose rapid retreat Graham had been just too late to prevent. Clausel, on the French left, was hastening to assist Joseph when he heard the news of Vittoria. He at once retired down the Ebro, at first with the intention of joining Suchet in Eastern Spain, but, finding himself severely hampered by the Spaniards, crossed the Pyrenees by the Jaca Pass, leaving behind him great quantities of baggage.

Wellington did not immediately invade France. "I shall wait to see what turn affairs take in Germany," he wrote, knowing that if Napoleon's desperate attempts to turn the scales proved successful in Central Europe a British army in the south of France could be subjected to so overwhelming a concentration that only a hasty and ignominious retreat would save it. Other more immediate considerations had also to be faced. Suchet still had a considerable army in the east, though he was soon confined to Catalonia; a new base for the English army must be established in Northern Spain, to replace that at Lisbon, and the fortresses of San Sebastian and Pamplona, still garrisoned by the French, must be taken by storm, since they threatened the lines of communication.

Owing to lack of naval co-operation, San Sebastian had been succoured by sea. It was defended by about 4000 men, and its position at the end of a spit of sand made it peculiarly difficult of assault. An English division under Graham, assisted by a force of Spaniards, began the siege and made several breaches in the walls, but the attack delivered on July 25 was beaten off. Wellington was about to take command of the operations when he was suddenly called upon to repel a new invasion of Spain. Joseph had been relieved of his position, and the command of his defeated armies had been given to Soult. Within a surprisingly short time the energy of the new commander had worked wonders, and a thoroughly reorganized, re-equipped army was ready

to undertake the relief of Pamplona, which Wellington had left for the time being to a Spanish blockade.

With his dispositions well screened from the observation of Wellington by covering troops and mountain-ranges, Soult massed his army for an invasion by way of St Jean and Roncesvalles. A show of activity on the lower reaches of the Bidassoa led Wellington to suppose that an attempt was to be made to raise the siege of San Sebastian, while all the time the main French army was concentrating on the opposite flank. On July 24 Soult began his advance through the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya. The divisions of Byng, Cole, and Hill, situated on the British right, were thrust steadily back upon Pamplona, until on July 28 a stand was made on the line of hills at Sorauren. By that time Wellington had arrived post-haste to take command. So close were the two armies that it was possible for Wellington to recognize Soult on the opposite ridge as he directed the battle. On that day the French attack was repelled with considerable loss. The attempt to relieve Pamplona having failed, Soult now decided to move to his right and drive the besiegers away from San Sebastian. But the execution of such a flank march in the face of a determined enemy was a matter of no small difficulty. Wellington had divined his enemy's intentions, and by a series of determined attacks he soon placed Soult in such a position that his retreat was all but cut off, only a strong element of good fortune allowing him to make good his escape into France at all. The whole confused series of engagements, usually known as the battle of the Pyrenees, had cost the French 15,000 men.

The siege of San Sebastian was now resumed in earnest. On August 31 an attempt at its relief by Soult was defeated at San Marcial, mainly by the Spaniards. On the same day the town of San Sebastian was taken by storm, the citadel surrendering a few days later. Pamplona fell on October 31, by which time Wellington and his army had entered France.

The course of events in Central Europe, where the nations were at last rallying to the overthrow of the French Empire, led Wellington to yield to pressure from home and undertake an immediate invasion. Soult's army was drawn up in a prepared position of great strength behind the Bidassoa, the weakest part of which lay near the coast, where the river spreads across a sandy estuary to the sea. Wellington had discovered that at low tide the river was fordable. On the morning of October 7, 1813, his troops waded across, took the enemy by surprise, and consolidated their new position in the French defensive works. Simultaneously an attack by way of the Vera Pass proved equally successful.

A pause followed, for both armies were short of transport, supplies, and money. Then, with Pamplona in his hands and the approach of

wintry weather making it imperative to get his army off the Pyrenean heights, Wellington attacked the centre of the second position, on the Nivelle. With unexpected ease the dispirited French troops were driven back with the loss of fifty guns, and the passage of the river was accomplished. Soult now fell back to cover the approaches to Bayonne, before which a large entrenched camp had been constructed.

Several sanguinary engagements followed on the Nive early in December, when Wellington crossed the river and was immediately subjected to a series of counter-attacks that were with difficulty repelled. Thereupon the operations for the year 1813 came to an end, for difficulties of supply were still serious, the more so as Wellington was determined that he would not arouse against himself in France a guerrilla warfare of the type that had so severely hampered the French troops in Spain. An outbreak of excesses by the English soldiers had been severely checked, and a similar tendency on the part of the Spaniards led to the dispatch of most of them back into Spain. This prompt action, coupled with the fact that the inhabitants of Southern France had long since grown weary of the perpetual warfare of Napoleon's *régime*, freed Wellington from much of the anxiety usually attendant on a commander who operates on enemy soil.

By February 1814 Wellington was ready to resume the offensive. He was now in a much stronger position, his army outnumbering that of Soult, some of whose troops had been withdrawn for Napoleon's operations on the Rhine. Feeling his position insecure, Soult withdrew the bulk of his army upstream to Orthez, leaving a garrison in Bayonne. Wellington left Hope to invest it, and followed Soult with the main army. On February 28 the French, drawn up on the steep spurs facing the river, stood at bay to dispute the passage of the Gave de Pau. After a sharp engagement, during which it appeared at one time that Wellington's efforts to cross the swollen river and the marshy valley through which it flowed must end in failure, they were dislodged with heavy loss. Soult resumed his retreat in the direction of Toulouse and the valley of the Garonne, hoping, perhaps, for support from Suchet, who was on the point of evacuating Catalonia. Meanwhile Bordeaux declared itself royalist, and was occupied by Beresford with two divisions.

Toulouse, the great arsenal of Southern France, was well defended. Not only were its military works provided with the heaviest of artillery, but the town itself was surrounded on three sides by the waters of the Garonne and the Languedoc Canal, and on the other by marshy ground across which ran roads impracticable for military purposes. Wellington succeeded in throwing troops across the Garonne below the town, and with a divided army he began his assault on April 10. The action was risky, and his losses proved considerable, but eventually Soult withdrew his defensive outposts into the city, which he evacuated after the fall

of darkness. Wellington marched in, and almost immediately afterwards he received news that Napoleon had abdicated. On April 19, having heard that Suchet had already decided to recognize the new order in France, Soult unwillingly consented to do the same, and the Peninsular War came to an end.

By restoring the tarnished prestige of British arms Wellington had done far more than merely contain in the Peninsula enemy forces superior to his own. The victorious course of events in Spain and Southern France was of considerable importance in the building of the final coalition that brought about the overthrow of Napoleon. It was in Spain that the British first found, and fostered, a national, as apart from a purely military, resistance to French aggression; once that feeling could be induced in Central Europe as well, nothing could save the mushroom Empire, in spite of the fact that Napoleon's reference to the Spanish war as a "running sore" would seem to indicate that he regarded it only as a minor, though constant, irritation. In great measure the loss of the campaign was due to him personally, partly owing to his failure to provide a unified command on the spot, over generals whose mutual jealousies must have been known to him (a curious error for one who uttered the maxim "Unity of command is the first necessity of war"), and partly because of his insistence on his own principle of making war support war. At one time as many as 300,000 French troops were in the Peninsula, but, quite apart from the activities of the guerrillas, the necessity of obtaining food for men and horses kept them widely scattered. In spite of his inferior numbers, Wellington knew that as a rule not more than 80,000 troops could be concentrated against him, and then only after laborious preparation and for no more than the space of a few weeks. It was for this reason that he took such infinite pains to organize an efficient commissariat for himself. His army was then generally more mobile and better supplied than the French, while his main line of communication by sea was both safer and easier than the great roads running from Spain into France. Although as a general Wellington undoubtedly had his limitations, no commander could have been found to exercise more effectively the patience and attention to detail needed for a series of defensive campaigns. Tactically, his employment of the line, with its superiority in fire-power, as against the column, with its reliance on shock, could in no country be better demonstrated than among the rocky hills and ravines of Spain and Portugal.

The Collapse of the Tilsit Agreement. To be properly understood a military campaign must be studied in its entirety, for which reason the Peninsular War has been followed to its close without interruption. At the time of its origin Napoleon was apparently at the height of his power, elevated by the Treaty of Tilsit to a position from which he could

dominate the policy of practically every state in Europe. But from that moment a growing resentment to his authority began to make itself felt, while almost immediately the first cracks appeared in the new relationship between France and Russia, to widen, in spite of Napoleon's efforts, until they involved him in a war which all his genius was unable to win.

Spain was the first country to break out in popular resistance to the domination of France, but after 1807 a similar spirit was stirring in Germany as well. In October of that year Frederick William III of Prussia made Baron von Stein¹ his principal Minister, and a series of sweeping reforms began, destined to place the people at one with their ruler in the patriotic cause of national freedom. Feudalism disappeared; the serfs were freed, the nobles' right to certain lands and specially reserved appointments was abolished, and the big cities were relieved from the restrictions hitherto imposed by the central Government, which was itself carefully reorganized to form a more efficient and cohesive body. Stein was in office for only fifteen months, after which the suspicions of Napoleon procured his dismissal, but the work was continued by his successor, Hardenberg. No less important were the reforms of the military system carried out by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. In spite of the limitation of numbers imposed by Napoleon's orders, they succeeded in creating a militia capable of supplying a large force of trained reserves in the event of war.

Napoleon was under no illusion about the feelings aroused by his actions in Central Europe. Austria had refused to recognize Joseph as King of Spain. The prompt rebellion in the Peninsula and its initial success at Baylen might therefore encourage trouble for France elsewhere, and even give rise to doubts in the mind of the Tsar Alexander, who had already realized that Napoleon had no intention of furthering the Russian designs on the Turkish Empire. In order to consolidate the alliance afresh before matters could go any farther Napoleon accordingly arranged a meeting with Alexander at Erfurt in September 1808. The brilliant scenes of Tilsit were repeated, and among them Napoleon and Talleyrand formulated the French demands. Alexander was not wholly complaisant. He flatly refused to assist in persuading Austria to disarm, though he promised help if she attacked France. With regard to Turkey, he had to be content with Napoleon's promise that he would raise no objection if Russia acquired the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. It was agreed that Napoleon's plans for the future government of Spain should proceed. On a matter of much greater delicacy Talleyrand's diplomatic skill did not meet with success. Josephine had borne Napoleon no heir, and he was anxious to divorce her and contract a marriage alliance with one of the ruling houses of

¹ Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Baron von Stein (1757-1831).


Europe. A relative of the Tsar seemed the obvious choice, but a suggestion that his elder sister should be the fortunate lady was not well received, and before very long was indirectly rejected by her engagement to the Duke of Oldenburg.

In January 1809 the news that Austria was about to take the lead in what might have proved a general German rising against the French recalled Napoleon from his pursuit of Moore across the mountains of Northern Spain. The humiliations endured so repeatedly by the proud house of Habsburg had become intolerable, and the Spanish war seemed to offer a suitable opportunity for revenge. Austria had been forced to cede the Tyrol to Bavaria. It was known that the province was unhappy under its new masters and ripe for revolt. When Austrian troops arrived in April the Tyrolese rose under their leader, Andreas Hofer, whereupon the Bavarians and their French allies were immediately put to rout. But before the month was out Napoleon had arrived to take command, and in a series of sharp engagements he was driving the Austrian army down the valley of the Danube. On May 10 the French occupied Vienna; shortly afterwards they met the Austrians at Aspern-Essling, and suffered what was to all intents a reverse. Several weeks had to be spent in collecting reinforcements before Napoleon once more fell upon the Austrian army and defeated it at Wagram on July 6. The victory proved costly, and the French were by no means in a strong position, but Austria sought peace in view of the fact that no general support from the rest of Germany was forthcoming. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn, signed on October 14, she surrendered Croatia, Carniola, Trieste, and the Adriatic coast to France. Napoleon added them to his Empire as the Province of Illyria. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw received some of the Austrian share of the Polish partitions, and even Russia, whose promised 'assistance' to France had cost her a casualty list of seven men, gained a small slice of Austrian territory. Austria had learned her lesson so effectively that Napoleon's fate had to be beyond all doubt before the astute Prince Metternich,¹ the Austrian Foreign Minister, would allow his master to be drawn into hostilities again.

Other German outbreaks of less importance, including that in the Tyrol, were now stamped out with great severity. A British attempt to create a diversion on behalf of the Austrians, though well conceived strategically, failed in execution through inferior leadership and organization. The intention was to capture Antwerp, for which purpose an army of 40,000 men was landed on the Dutch coast in the summer of 1809. After attacking Flushing it was forced to withdraw to the island of Walcheren, where it was so weakened by disease that the remnant had to be re-embarked before the close of the year.

¹ Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince Metternich-Winneburg (1773-1859).

Hitherto Napoleon had been content to control his subordinate states indirectly, while allowing them nominally to retain their identity as separate nations. He now began a series of 'fatal annexations' that revealed his system as admittedly based on the rule of force, and that probably did more than anything else to unite all Europe against him. The agreement with the Pope had proved short-lived. Part of the Papal dominion had been annexed in 1808, and in the following



EUROPE IN 1810

year the Pope's denunciations of Napoleon led to the annexation of Rome itself, followed by the imprisonment of the Pope at Savona. More serious than this, however, were the annexations in Northern Europe, Napoleon's last desperate attempt to make the Continental System effective. Louis Bonaparte, the King of Holland, had begun to think more of the wellbeing of his subjects than of furthering his brother's plans, and his administration of the Continental System had grown lax in consequence. Forced to cede to France all his territory west of the Rhine, and to admit a French army to watch his coasts,

he felt his position so keenly that on July 1, 1810, he signed his abdication. On July 9 Holland was declared to be a part of the French Empire.

During this year the struggle to exclude British goods from the Continent, and the counter-struggle to get them in, reached its peak. Over 18,000 licences, forged or otherwise, were issued by the British; but so strenuous had Napoleon's efforts become that in many cases it was discovered that they were no longer a safeguard. Throughout Germany English goods were seized and burnt wherever they were found, and prohibitive tariffs were imposed on all colonial produce, since it was reasonably certain that such goods must have passed through British hands. In August the whole of the North German coast, from Holland to Lübeck, on the Baltic, was subjected to a military occupation. On December 10 this region also was annexed to the Empire, including the Duchy of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns of Lübeck, Hamburg, and Bremen. Such arbitrary actions, necessary for the support of a principle productive of untold hardship and poverty, effectively swept away the remembrance of the benefits gained by Germany from the imposition of the French legal and administrative system. At the same time France herself was groaning under the constant strain of perpetual war.

Meanwhile Napoleon's succession plans were proceeding. Josephine was divorced in December 1809, and another attempt was made to secure a marriage alliance with the Tsar, this time with his younger sister. Once again the proposal was not received with enthusiasm, but negotiations were still proceeding when a suggestion came from Metternich, who was determined that Austria must now play for safety and "increase her strength for better days," that an Austrian bride would serve Napoleon's purpose just as well. Without waiting for a definite answer from Russia, Napoleon dispatched a formal proposal to Austria. In the spring of 1810 he married the Habsburg Princess Marie Louise. A year later she bore him a son. But the likelihood of the long-sought heir ever succeeding to the vast French Empire, now territorially at its greatest extent, was already rapidly diminishing. One of the most ominous signs of what was to come was the fact that Talleyrand, the cleverest and most astute Minister in France, seeing that the Napoleonic *régime* could not last much longer, was already planning to safeguard his own future.

The alliance with France had never been popular with the Russians. The Tsar himself, even before the meeting at Erfurt, had begun to doubt its value. While the Continental System continued to press more and more hardly upon his subjects his own relations with Napoleon, both personal and diplomatic, grew increasingly estranged. The manner in which the Habsburg betrothal had been brought about

was little short of an insult ; the dispossession of the Tsar's relative, the Duke of Oldenberg, was no better, and for long Alexander refused to admit that any form of indemnity could be considered as compensation. Then the question of Poland had all along been a thorny one. Alexander had always intended to keep his share of the Polish territory gained by the infamous partitions, and he knew that the Poles in the newly created Grand Duchy of Warsaw looked upon Napoleon with gratitude as the restorer of their liberty, still hoping that one day he might secure for them the unredeemed portions of their former kingdom. But the real question at issue between Napoleon and the Tsar was the Continental System. Secretly Alexander had long connived at its evasion, and when in 1810 Napoleon began his efforts to make it more effective by the issue of fresh regulations he refused to agree. In October of that year Napoleon demanded that all ships in Russian ports carrying colonial produce should be arrested, whatever their nationality, on the grounds that such goods must have passed through British hands, and were therefore liable to confiscation. But not only did the Tsar refuse to go beyond his original promise of excluding British ships only ; in December he issued a commercial ukase, or Order in Council, that deliberately permitted and encouraged the entry of such goods, while at the same time imposing tariffs that could not fail to be harmful to the trade of France.

If the Continental System were thus to be set aside by his ally Napoleon knew that his plans for compelling Britain to make peace would fail, that Germany would follow the example of Spain and rise in a national revolt, and that the whole structure he had built up in Europe would fall to the ground. French finances were already tottering, conscripts were being called up in advance of their time, and, in fact, only a successful war, with its attendant profits of plunder and indemnities, could restore his prestige and position both at home and abroad. For these reasons he decided that the alliance of Tilsit was virtually at an end, and began to make preparations for the most gigantic campaign of his career.

The Invasion of Russia. After so many years of unremitting warfare Napoleon had perforce to rely very largely on the assistance of foreign troops. Moreover, it was essential before invading Russia to discover who were his potential enemies, and to make arrangements securing his flanks and his communications with France. Austria unwillingly agreed to protect his right with an army of 30,000. Turkey refused overtures for a similar arrangement ; instead she made peace with the Tsar and ceded to him the district of Bessarabia. By a treaty signed in February 1812 Prussia agreed to lend a corps of 20,000 troops to operate on Napoleon's left, and to allow him free passage through her country. At the same time she secretly advised the Tsar that this

arrangement had only been imposed upon her by force. Sweden, where Napoleon's ex-Marshal Bernadotte was now heir to the throne, not only refused assistance, but actually signed a treaty with Russia. Such was the situation when Napoleon, directing operations from his headquarters at Dresden, began assembling his army in Poland and East Prussia. About a quarter of a million were French, the Rhine Confederation contributed 150,000, Poland 60,000, and Italians, Dutchmen, and Swiss brought the total to approximately 600,000 men. The Tsar could not muster nearly so large an army, and Napoleon hoped that "one good battle" would be sufficient to bring him to terms.

On a hot, dusty day in June Napoleon's army began crossing the river Niemen. He did not intend to penetrate too fast or too far into the interior of Russia, and, in fact, he was very soon in difficulties over the provision of supplies for so vast a body of troops, operating in a country so poor and so sparsely inhabited. The Russian army had intended to make a stand, but was soon forced to withdraw to Vitepsk, and then to evacuate that town as well. Here Napoleon halted, intending at first to remain there for the time being and to consolidate his position. But the news that the Russians were concentrating at Smolensk led him to resume the advance, in the hope of forcing a decisive engagement. On August 17 and 18 a partial action took place, under cover of which the main Russian army once again withdrew. Napoleon organized a rapid pursuit, the success of which convinced him that the Russians were still within reach, and led him to make the fatal decision of attempting the capture of Moscow before winter set in. It seemed extremely unlikely that Alexander would abandon so important a city without risking a general engagement in its defence. At Borodino, on September 7, Napoleon found the Russian army drawn up under General Kutusoff. By this time the vast invading army had become so strung out along its line of communication that Napoleon was able to place only about 130,000 men in the firing-line, a force approximately equal to that of the Russians. In consequence he displayed unwonted caution, and although the Russians were dislodged, no pursuit could be organized capable of turning their retreat into a rout. However, the advance was resumed, and on September 14 Napoleon's army reached Moscow. The city had been abandoned, most of the civil population had fled, and there were hardly any stores or supplies to be had. To make matters worse, fires broke out as soon as the invaders arrived, and large areas of the town were gutted before they could be extinguished.

For a month Napoleon remained at Moscow, endeavouring by a series of tempting offers to bring the Tsar to terms. None were of the slightest avail. The Russian army had withdrawn to the south, and

was not far away. Disquieting news kept arriving of Wellington's successes in Spain, news that might have serious repercussions in Europe if the Emperor remained in Moscow. Moreover, practical considerations of supply made it impossible to stay there any longer. In the middle of October he gave the order for retreat, intending to take a route to the southward, where there was some hope of obtaining food for horses and men on the course of the march. But once more his intentions were foiled, for the Russian army blocked his path, and as his depleted forces were too weak to dislodge it he was obliged after all to return by the way he had come.

Until November 6 the weather continued fine, but on that day the Russian winter set in with a vengeance. Already Napoleon's effective troops had been reduced to about 50,000 men, and the blizzards of snow, accompanied by intense cold and icy winds, now took daily toll even of these. The army became a rabble, subject to continual attacks by hordes of Cossack cavalry, to which little effective resistance could be made. Only the rearguard under Ney maintained any semblance of discipline as the army struggled onward, dispersed in scattered bands that fought among themselves for what little food and shelter there was to be had. At Smolensk the stores were pillaged by the first arrivals, so the advance had perforce to be continued.

Still further disasters were to come. A large body of Russian troops succeeded in outflanking the retreat, seizing the only available bridge over the Beresina. By making a feint downstream Napoleon drew the enemy away while bridges were constructed by his engineers. Returning, a large part of his army crossed in safety, but thousands of the rearguard and stragglers were drowned by the breaking of one of the bridges and the treacherous nature of the ice, over which the soldiers attempted to rush. Many more stragglers arrived too late to cross at all, and so were left to the mercies of the Russians or to die of exposure. On December 5 Napoleon left his troops and hastened back to Paris, realizing that his presence in the capital was essential before news of the disaster could spread. Meanwhile the remnant of the Grand Army was driven out of Vilna and back across the Niemen. By that time its numbers had been reduced to 20,000.

The War of Liberation. With Napoleon's army so ignominiously expelled from Russian territory, it might be thought that the Tsar had every reason to suppose the danger past. Such was far from the case. Napoleon obviously could not afford to make peace under the shadow of disaster, and it was known that he was actively engaged in organizing a fresh army. The question at issue was whether or not affairs were ripe for the creation of another Coalition, based this time on a national rising of the German states, similar in character to that in Spain. Nominally these states were still allied to France, so the

situation required delicate handling. It was the influence of certain German patriots, coupled with his own strange conviction that he had been appointed by God to overthrow the tyrant, that led Alexander to take the momentous step of crossing the Niemen, with the avowed intention of putting an end to Napoleon's control over Central Europe.

General Yorck, who commanded the Prussian troops on the left flank of Napoleon's advance, had already signed an armistice with the Russians, without waiting to ascertain the wishes of his own Government. Early in 1813 the Tsar's army occupied East Prussia, convinced by Stein, Scharnhorst, and other German leaders (who had deserted to him rather than remain unwilling co-operators with France) that Frederick William was only awaiting his opportunity to change sides. Before long the two rulers met at Breslau, and in February the Treaty of Kalisch was signed, an agreement destined to become the basis of the Fourth Coalition. Alexander agreed that Prussia should recover the territory taken from her after the defeat of 1806, and Frederick William promised to forgo his claim to Hanover, the great stumbling-block to improved relations with England. Thus, owing to Scharnhorst's army reforms, Napoleon's enemies were at once increased by the addition of nearly 200,000 trained Prussian soldiers.

It must not be supposed, however, that all the German states were willing at once to enrol themselves under Prussia. Large numbers of volunteers soon arrived, and the Hanseatic towns revolted in the north, but most of the Confederation of the Rhine still remained within the Napoleonic orbit. Napoleon was therefore able to muster a considerable army in a comparatively short time, supplementing his foreign troops by recalling a number of regiments from Spain and by anticipating the conscripts for the following year. Meanwhile his diplomacy was directed towards ensuring that Austria should remain faithful. In this he was helped by the fact that Metternich viewed Alexander and his policy with considerable suspicion, and was himself by no means convinced that Napoleon's hour had yet come. The obvious policy for Austria, therefore, was to await the course of events, and Metternich accordingly announced his intention of maintaining complete neutrality, in spite of Napoleon's offer to restore Illyria if Austria would continue the war against Russia.

Late in April Napoleon was ready to renew the campaign, with an army numbering about 350,000 men. A large proportion of these were inexperienced troops, not equal in quality to the garrisons still scattered throughout the German fortresses. Napoleon's successes proved barren in consequence. On May 2 he repelled an allied attack near Lützen, in Saxony, and on May 20 he again defeated his enemies at Bautzen. Neither of these victories was very convincing, however, though as a result of the first the King of Saxony decided to remain

true to the French cause. At the beginning of June both sides agreed to an armistice, the Allies hoping to consolidate their unfavourable military position, and Napoleon expecting to procure fresh reinforcements.

Now was the time for Metternich to put forward his proposals. He demanded that Napoleon should be content with the Rhine frontier, that Austria should recover Illyria, that Poland should be partitioned as before, and that the Confederation of the Rhine should cease to exist. Slowly resistance to Napoleon was growing and hardening. England, following a treaty with Sweden signed early in March, made on June 15 an alliance at Reichenbach with Russia and Prussia, promising liberal subsidies. At the end of the month Napoleon interviewed Metternich at Dresden. By that time Austria had already promised to support the Fourth Coalition if her terms were refused. "So you too want war: well, you shall have it," said Napoleon, knowing that he dared not make peace under the conditions suggested. The news of Wellington's victory at Vittoria and the flight of Joseph from Spain still further strengthened the Allied position. The armistice was extended to August 10, upon which date, since Napoleon had not modified his attitude, Austria declared war upon France.

The Allies therefore resumed the war in a much stronger position, in spite of the fact that Murat had been summoned from his Kingdom of Naples and Denmark had agreed to support France, aware that Norway was to be the reward of Bernadotte for bringing Sweden into the war. Nearly half a million men were now available to fight the French, the main armies being a Prussian one under Blücher¹ and an Austrian one under Schwarzenberg. Within a week after Austria's entry into the war the latter began moving upon Dresden. But once again Napoleon showed a flash of the old quality. On August 27 he defeated Schwarzenberg in a brilliant action near the Saxon capital that might have had very serious results for the Allies if it had not been for Napoleon's fatal lack of cavalry. During the next few weeks the situation grew steadily worse for the French, their outlying forces suffering a series of defeats that left thousands of prisoners and hundreds of guns in the hands of their enemies. It was evident that there had at last arisen in Europe a coalition so strong in numbers and morale that only the outstanding genius and personal prestige of Napoleon himself could make any stand against it. And then at length the Emperor met with the second great disaster of his military career.

Wellington was already on French soil when the Prussians and Austrians fought the prolonged engagement at Leipzig that became known as the Battle of the Nations. For days the two armies and their auxiliaries had been closing upon Napoleon, threatening to

¹ Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, Prince of Wahlstadt (1742-1819), 'Old Forward' to his soldiers. He had been in the Army since the age of thirteen.

combine and to cut off his retreat to France. On October 16 the general action began, Napoleon hoping to protect Leipzig itself from capture. On October 18 the battle ended, with the French army driven in confusion through the city streets, and even into the river Elster, from lack of sufficient bridges to cross. Saxony was lost; Bavaria had already deserted to the Allies, and it was no longer possible for Napoleon to maintain himself in Central Europe. With about 40,000 men and two hundred cannon, all that remained of the new army raised after the Russian disaster, he retreated across the Rhine into France. Nearly 200,000 men were left behind on garrison duty in the fortresses of Germany, all before long to fall to the Allied forces. Austria recovered Illyria; the Confederation of the Rhine collapsed, and before many months had passed the French were out of Northern Italy, though Murat, who had returned to Naples, still hoped to obtain recognition of his title from the Allies.

On November 9 the Allies sent to Napoleon from Frankfort a definite proposal for peace, on the basis of the 'natural frontiers' of the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrenees for France. Germany, Italy, Spain, and Holland were to become independent once more, and the exact details were to form the subject of a conference. In reply Napoleon did not refuse to negotiate, but he refused to accept these basic conditions in advance, and the war accordingly continued. Already the Allied demands had grown as Napoleon's difficulties increased, and the news that Wellington was now actually on French soil and that Holland had revolted led to the determination that France must be confined within the old boundaries of 1792—*i.e.*, those of the period before the wars started.

In February 1814 Napoleon was apprised of the new demands, when negotiations were reopened at Chatillon. By that time three separate armies, under Schwarzenberg, Blücher, and Bernadotte, had crossed the Rhine. Hopelessly outnumbered, Napoleon rushed his troops from place to place, fighting a series of engagements in which he was frequently successful. His hand had been strengthened also by the changed political situation, for the Allies were now demanding back the conquests of the Revolution itself. The peasants in particular, fearing for their newly acquired agrarian freedom, were disposed to rally themselves behind Napoleon on the grounds that his cause was once more the cause of France. He was therefore both unwilling as well as unable to agree to the fresh demands of the Allies, and the military operations continued. On their part the Allies now signed at Chaumont a Quadruple Alliance for twenty years, agreeing on the number of troops to be maintained by each Power and the amount of the subsidies to be provided by Britain.

For Napoleon the end was not long delayed. No steps that he could

take with such means as were at his disposal could prevent the Allied armies from steadily converging upon Paris. On March 30 they were at the outskirts. After heavy fighting Joseph, who commanded in the absence of his brother with the field army, gave his generals permission to withdraw. On March 31 the Allied army entered Paris. With the arrival of Alexander and Frederick William upon the scene, Talleyrand decided that the moment had come to change sides. A provisional Government, appointed under his influence, declared on April 2 that Napoleon was deposed. But even this news did not convince the latter that all was lost. He tried to abdicate in favour of his son, and when this arrangement was rejected made one final despairing effort to persuade his generals to march upon Paris. It was too late: he had refused all the Allies' peace proposals, in the belief that war offered better prospects of success, and now the Army itself had turned against him. No course remained open but unconditional surrender. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau he abdicated all claims to the sovereignty of France and Italy, receiving that of the small island of Elba in exchange, with the promise of a pension of £80,000. Thereupon the Allies settled down to discuss the future of Europe.

The Peace Settlement. Two problems were at issue: the conditions to be imposed upon France and the realignment of European frontiers. The first was settled by the Treaty of Paris, ratified on May 30, 1814. Talleyrand and the French royalists having decided that the Bourbon monarchy must be restored, the brother of the murdered king assumed office as Louis XVIII. Britain agreed to return all the captured French colonies with the exception of Tobago, St Lucia, Mauritius, and the Seychelles. The proud Empire of Napoleon was reduced to a monarchy, though this time with the boundaries of 1792. Thus Landau, Philippeville, Saarbrücken, Annecy, and other districts peopled by nearly half a million souls remained a part of France. No indemnity was imposed, because it was hoped by a continuance of the policy of alliances and by a rearrangement of the countries bordering France to render Europe secure from a revival of French aggression.


The second problem was settled by a Congress at Vienna that began its deliberations in November. A conflict of interests among the Allies was instantly revealed. It had already been agreed that Holland, deprived by Britain of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, and Essequibo, should be strengthened by the addition of the former Austrian Netherlands; that the Kingdom of Sardinia should be restored and granted in addition the old Republic of Genoa, to form a more effective barrier between France and the plains of Northern Italy; and that Denmark should be forced to cede Norway to Sweden, and to agree to the retention of Heligoland by Britain. The boundaries of Central Europe, however, were not so easily settled. Russia, owing to her

acquisition of Finland, Bessarabia, and smaller districts, had already emerged from the war stronger than she had entered it, and Castlereagh, who went to Vienna with the firm intention of taking a full hand in the settlement, was anxious to build up in Prussia and Austria two strong Central European Powers as a barrier against Russian expansion westward. The Tsar, however, was determined to have Poland. Prussia, mindful of her share in that country after the infamous partitions, was unwilling to relinquish her claims unless she received Saxony in return. A deadlock ensued, in consequence of which the astute Talleyrand, quick to take advantage of the situation, regained for France a position of considerable importance by supporting Britain and Austria in their resistance to the demands of the other two Powers. Matters became so serious that at one time war itself appeared probable, but eventually it was decided that the Tsar must have his way, and the greater part of the duchy of Warsaw became Russian territory, with a promise of national institutions for the Poles.

Prussia also virtually got her way as regards Saxony, receiving about half the territory and nearly a million of the inhabitants of that kingdom. Of her former share in Poland she got back Danzig, Thorn, and the province of Posen. In the Rhine valley her previous possessions were enlarged to form the new provinces of Westphalia and the Rhine. The full implications of this great increase of territory will be fully discussed in a later chapter. The German states as a whole, after certain minor territorial changes, were banded together in a confederation of thirty-nine states under the presidency of Austria. As compensation for her share in defeating France, the last-named Power received in North Italy the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia.

On December 31 peace was signed at Ghent between Britain and the United States. In June 1812 the Americans, exasperated by the arbitrary searching of their merchant vessels for contraband of war and the impressment of sailors from under their flag on the grounds that American ships were harbouring British deserters, had issued a declaration of war. At sea, a number of isolated frigate actions had gone generally in favour of the more heavily armed Americans; on land Canada had successfully repelled an invasion; British troops had captured Washington, but had been repulsed in an attack on New Orleans. The original cause of the conflict having by force of circumstances been removed, the peace treaty dealt merely with the question of the Canadian frontier and the neutralization of the Great Lakes.

The Hundred Days. The differences of opinion between the Allies at Vienna had not been lost upon Napoleon, who kept as closely in touch with European affairs as his situation would allow. At first he




apparently harboured no intention of returning to France, but as the months went by circumstances convinced him that the country as a whole would welcome his restoration. It was true that Louis XVIII had granted a written constitution, guaranteeing equal opportunities for all and the sacred revolutionary principle of equality before the law, but at best there was an uneasy feeling among Frenchmen that he had been imposed upon them by the Allies. The peasantry and the many thousands of discharged soldiers were openly dissatisfied with the new *régime*, which was made all the more irksome by the arrogant and uncompromising attitude adopted by many of the returned royalist *émigrés*. Finally, the suspicion that somebody else might take advantage of the situation to overthrow the Bourbons on his own account led Napoleon to make his great decision. On March 1, 1815, having eluded the watching British warships, he landed in France with 1200 men. The troops sent to capture him fell easily to the magnetism of his personality and joined his banner. The nearer he got to Paris the more widespread was the support he received. Louis XVIII and his Court fled across the frontier, and late on the night of March 20 Napoleon was once again installed at the Tuileries. Carnot, Fouché, Soult, and Ney all joined him, though most of the other influential leaders made excuses to hold aloof.

Remembering the events of the previous year, Napoleon realized that a fresh invasion of France must at all costs be prevented. To consolidate his position at home he issued an amended constitution guaranteeing Parliamentary government. In an effort to obtain recognition from the Allies he promised to respect the new frontiers and professed peaceful intentions for the future. It was all in vain. On March 25 the Allies concluded between themselves and with the Government of Louis XVIII a new military treaty, designed exclusively for the overthrow of the tyrant. While Russia and Austria were preparing their forces 120,000 Prussians, under Blücher, and about 90,000 Dutch, Belgians, and British, under Wellington, began concentrating in Belgium. Napoleon had available nearly 200,000 men, and from these Carnot rapidly equipped a striking-force of 125,000 seasoned troops, including 20,000 excellent cavalry. With this army Napoleon prepared to carry the war into enemy territory.

Wellington's headquarters were at Brussels, and his army was based upon Ostend and Antwerp. Blücher's headquarters were at Namur, his line of communication running through Liège to his base at Cologne. Since Napoleon personally, and not France, was held to be the enemy, the Allied troops had not crossed the Sambre, but were dispersed in cantonments behind it, the banks of the river being patrolled by a Dutch-Belgian division and a Prussian corps under General Zieten. The two armies were operating from divergent bases,

inter-communication between them depending upon the lateral roads running across or behind their combined fronts. In view of this fact Napoleon determined to repeat the strategy of his first campaign against the Sardinians and Austrians in Italy—*i.e.*, to strike at the junction of the two armies, and by driving them apart to deal with each one separately before it could be succoured by the other. Well-



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO

ington expected an attack on his communications with Ostend, and accordingly kept a strong force posted on his right wing, which never saw battle at all. In this he was completely deceived as to Napoleon's intentions, which necessitated the advance of the main French army up the Charleroi—Brussels road. By adopting that route Napoleon gained the added advantage of having no strong fortresses to overcome before making contact with his enemy. Once the Allied troops opposed to him could be driven off the lateral Nivelles—Namur road, they would be forced to retire for some distance before regaining touch, owing

to a tract of marshy land that would make inter-communication particularly difficult.

Before daybreak on June 15 the French army began crossing the Sambre round Charleroi in three columns, on a front six miles wide. Collecting his corps, Zieten fell back along the road to Ligny. Napoleon followed with the greater part of the French army, intending to strike the Prussians first and drive them back upon Namur. Meanwhile Ney with the remainder of the French troops pressed forward upon the road to Brussels. Luckily for Wellington, the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who commanded a division of Dutch and Belgians, took upon himself to occupy the vital road junction at Quatre Bras, instead of concentrating his troops upon Nivelles, as he had been ordered. About 11 o'clock on the following morning Wellington himself arrived at Quatre Bras, and, finding that the French before him were not present in strength, rode off to meet Blücher at a windmill not far from Ligny. There he received news that the main French army lay before the Prussians, whereupon he returned to Quatre Bras in order to stage a diversion.

Already Napoleon had made his first mistake, by allowing his army to bivouac on the previous night in column of route instead of in order of battle. Consequently it was nearly 2 P.M. before enough troops had arrived to enable him to make an original deployment of 60,000, which he deemed sufficient for his purpose. He was completely unaware that owing to Zieten's delaying actions Blücher had had time to concentrate 80,000 men on the hillside at Ligny. Shortly after the attack began, finding himself faced with a much stiffer opposition than expected, Napoleon sent instructions to Ney at Quatre Bras to send D'Erlon's corps to his aid. No sooner had this corps arrived than it was urgently recalled by Ney, who had begun his action with 17,000 men and was himself vitally in need of reinforcements, as Wellington's army at Quatre Bras grew during the course of the afternoon to a total of 26,000. The result was that D'Erlon spent the greater part of the afternoon marching between the two engagements, without playing much part in either.

About 7 P.M. the battle of Ligny ended with the defeat of the Prussians, who suffered some 15,000 casualties. But Napoleon was unable to turn the defeat into a rout, and the Prussian army retired in good order. Nightfall put an end also to the engagement at Quatre Bras, where Wellington had successfully held his own, though his losses were greater than those of the French.

On June 17 Napoleon made his second, and greatest, mistake. Instead of joining Ney with the utmost dispatch and overwhelming Wellington in his isolated position at Quatre Bras, and instead of taking immediate steps to recover touch with the Prussians and ascertain the

exact direction of their retreat, he delayed for the entire morning before issuing definite orders. It was not until 2 p.m. that Grouchy with 33,000 men set out for Gembloux, where the Prussians were believed to be, with instructions to follow them towards Namur and Liège, and to discover whether or not they intended to make any movement in the direction of Brussels. Grouchy reached Gembloux long after the Prussians had left, and then found that a part, at any rate, of Blücher's army had retired on Wavre. Contrary to the French expectation, the Prussian general had boldly taken the risk of severing his communications with Namur in order to keep in touch with his ally. But Grouchy had no idea that Wellington intended to stand and fight at Waterloo; the Prussian movement appeared to him merely a retirement in the direction of Brussels, and he accordingly decided to attack Blücher directly at Wavre, instead of manœuvring round his flank to cut him off from the road between Quatre Bras and Brussels.

Meanwhile Napoleon's army was rejoining that of Ney. It arrived just in time to see Wellington completing his withdrawal. The latter had already been in touch with Blücher, and was aware of the direction of the Prussian retreat. He accordingly agreed to withstand the French attack at a position he had already reconnoitred in front of the village of Waterloo, provided that Blücher would assist him with at least one corps. During the night an assurance to this effect was received.

On the morning of June 18 Wellington's troops were in position along the ridge of Mont Saint-Jean, sheltered, as was his custom, by the crest of the slope and by a sunken road that ran behind it. Altogether his army numbered only 67,000 men, for the right wing, detached to guard communications with Ostend, was still at Hal, thirteen miles distant. About 24,000 of his troops were British. Across the valley, on the ridge of La Belle Alliance, Napoleon had drawn up his army of 72,000 Frenchmen. His numerical advantage was enhanced by the facts that his troops were on the whole far more experienced and of better quality, and that both in cavalry and artillery he was greatly superior. On Wellington's part, therefore, the action was bound to be purely defensive, a type of operation peculiarly suited to his genius.

The *château* of Hougoumont lay before Wellington's right, and the farm of La Haye Sainte before his centre. The former was held by the Guards, and the latter by the German Legion. Just before noon, having waited for the rain-sodden ground to dry so that he could use his cavalry with full effect, Napoleon delivered his preliminary attack against these two outposts. Within an hour of beginning the action news came that Prussian troops—von Bülow's corps—were approaching the French right. A force of cavalry was sent to contain them, and a

dispatch to Grouchy instructed him to join Napoleon without delay. Meanwhile a massed attack in column, followed by a cavalry charge, was launched against Wellington's centre. Both these attacks were successfully repelled. As the afternoon wore on they were followed by a series of cavalry charges, after due artillery preparation, against Wellington's right and centre. The British general met these onslaughts in characteristic fashion. Forming his English and German troops into squares, he sheltered them from the artillery fire behind the crest of the ridge, and then used them to break up the successive waves of gallant horsemen who came thundering into sight over the top of the rise. It was touch and go, as Wellington himself admitted afterwards, but for hour after hour the squares held firm as the horsemen surged round them.

By 5 P.M. Bülow's advanced troops were attacking the French right at Planchenoit, while Grouchy was still engaged with Thielemann's corps at Wavre. Napoleon was now obliged to detach a considerable body of troops to hold Bülow in check. It was obvious that the expected assistance from Grouchy would not materialize, and that a supreme effort must be made to carry Wellington's position before successive Prussian corps could arrive to reinforce Bülow. A determined attack on La Haye Sainte at last drove out the survivors of the German Legion. Then, about seven o'clock, Napoleon staked his final throw—an attack by the six battalions of the Imperial Guard. Twice their columns, led by Ney, the hero of the Moscow retreat, swept up the slope towards the British line. Twice they were driven back in confusion, and on the second occasion Wellington, realizing that the Prussians were now present in strength to support him, ordered his cavalry to charge. Simultaneously the Prussians renewed the attack on Napoleon's right. The French army was driven off the field, and scattered in headlong flight along the Charleroi road. Thus the fact that the Allies had begun the campaign from widely divergent bases, instead of proving the cause of their downfall, enabled them to turn Napoleon's defeat into a rout by threatening the flank and rear of his communications. To Wellington belongs the credit of withstanding the attack of a superior army, led by the greatest master of the art of war; to Blücher the credit of accepting, after defeat, a serious risk in order to rejoin his ally.

Once again Napoleon arrived at Paris, having left a defeated army in his rear. Once again he refused at first to be convinced that all was lost, and talked of assuming dictatorial powers and raising a fresh army of 300,000 men. But the illusion had vanished, and France could no longer be persuaded to rally to his support. Lafayette brought forward a motion to the effect that the Legislature was the real Government of France. On June 22 Napoleon signed his abdication, and after

an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the new French Government to employ him as a general he departed to Rochefort, originally with the intention of escaping to America. Instead he surrendered to the captain of H.M.S. *Bellerophon* on July 9, and eventually was exiled to the lonely island of St Helena, far removed from the possibility of another escape to France.

In July Louis XVIII re-entered Paris in the wake of the Allies. Only a restoration of his rule would satisfy Europe that French aggression was finally at an end. Even so France had to submit to harsher terms than those imposed in 1814. An Allied army of 150,000 men was to occupy her frontier fortresses for a period not exceeding five years. Her boundaries were reduced to those of 1790. An indemnity of £28,000,000 was demanded, and also the restoration of the many art treasures seized during the long years of warfare. If Prussia had had her way the terms would have been even harder, but both Britain and Russia were determined that France should remain a first-class Power, and learn to live at peace with her German neighbours, rather than harbour a desire for revenge. Fortunately for the peace of Europe these wiser counsels prevailed.

The work of the Congress of Vienna, already virtually completed before the episode of the Hundred Days, was now rounded off without further difficulty. As the question of Italy will be dealt with in the next chapter it is sufficient to note here the ultimate fate of Murat, King of Naples. In the spring of 1815, still doubtful whether or not the Allies would recognize his position, he followed Napoleon to France. The latter, however, refused to employ him. In October he returned to Italy in the hope of retrieving his fortunes, but he was promptly arrested and shot.

At first it appeared that Britain's territorial gains were poor compensation for the vast sums of money she had disbursed in financing four great coalitions and in meeting the expenses entailed by her direct participation in the war. Two of her gains, however, soon proved to be of real importance: the naval station at Malta and the colony at the Cape of Good Hope, destined to grow during the course of the next hundred years into a self-governing dominion.

In 1821, after six unhappy years spent partly in writing memoirs that are a peculiar mixture of shrewd thinking and wilful perversion of fact, Napoleon died of cancer at the age of fifty-one. Thereafter a 'Napoleonic legend' grew round his name that with the lapse of time eventually brought even the British public to recognize the measure of his genius. One of his maxims, which reads curiously like the previously quoted saying of Frederick the Great, sums up for us the insatiable energy that was undoubtedly his chief characteristic: "Work is my element. . . . I am born and built for work."

SUMMARY

- (1) *Causes of the Revolution*
 - (a) Nobles had lost importance, but retained privileges.
 - (b) Administrative system centralized and cumbrous.
 - (c) Writings of Montesquieu, Diderot, Voltaire, and Rousseau.
 - (d) Oppressive taxation, leading to national bankruptcy.
- (2) *The First Stages of the Revolution (May–October 1789)*
 - (a) States-General became National Assembly.
 - (b) Oath in the tennis-court.
 - (c) Capture of the Bastille.
 - (d) Abolition of privilege.
 - (e) King and Assembly transferred to Paris.
- (3) *The Constituent Assembly (October 1789–September 1791)*
 - (a) Rise of the Jacobin Clubs.
 - (b) Influence of Mirabeau and La Fayette.
 - (c) *Assignats* and Civil Constitution of the Clergy.
 - (d) The flight to Varennes.
 - (e) The Constitution : an orgy of election.
- (4) *The Fall of the Monarchy (October 1791–January 1793)*
 - (a) Declaration of Pillnitz ; war with Austria and Prussia.
 - (b) Attack on the Tuileries ; King suspended and imprisoned.
 - (c) The National Convention ; Gironde and Mountain ; France a republic.
 - (d) Capture of the Austrian Netherlands.
 - (e) Death of the King.
- (5) *The Formation of the First Coalition*
 - (a) Attitude of Pitt, Fox, and Burke ; opening of the Scheldt ; Decree of Fraternity.
 - (b) February 1793. War declared on England and Holland.
 - (c) First Coalition : England, Austria, Prussia, Holland, Spain, Sardinia, Portugal.
 - (d) French driven from Netherlands ; rebellion in La Vendée.
 - (e) Fall of the Gironde ; power assumed by the Committee of Public Safety.
- (6) *The Terror, the Thermidorians, and the Directory (July 1793–October 1795)*
 - (a) The Terror ; maximum laws, representatives on mission ; work of Carnot, Bon Saint-André, Collot d'Herbois, and Robespierre.
 - (b) Death of Danton and the opposers of the Terror.
 - (c) Culmination of the Terror under Robespierre.
 - (d) New Constitution published by the Thermidorians ; last attempt at mob violence ; new government of five Directors.
- (7) *The Collapse of the First Coalition (1793–97)*
 - (a) 1793. Dunkirk ; Wattignies ; Hood at Toulon.
 - (b) 1794. Turcoing ; Fleurus ; Holland overrun ; the First of June.
 - (c) 1795. Holland, Prussia, and Spain made peace.
 - (d) 1796. Bonaparte's Italian campaign.
 - (e) 1797. Treaty of Campo Formio.

- (8) *The Navy in Victory and Rebellion (1796-98)*
 - (a) 1796. French expedition to Bantry Bay.
 - (b) 1797. Mediterranean evacuated ; St Vincent ; mutinies at Spit-head and the Nore ; Camperdown.
 - (c) 1798. The Nile ; formation of the Second Coalition.
- (9) *Bonaparte and the Second Coalition (1799-1801)*
 - (a) 1799. Sidney Smith at Acre ; Napoleon First Consul.
 - (b) 1800. Marengo ; Hohenlinden.
 - (c) 1801. Treaty of Lunéville.
- (10) *The Armed Neutrality and the Treaty of Amiens (1800-2)*
 - (a) 1800. Capture of Malta ; Armed Neutrality of the Baltic Powers.
 - (b) 1801. First battle of Copenhagen.
 - (c) 1802. Treaty of Amiens.
- (11) *Napoleon as an Administrator*
 - (a) Centralization.
 - (b) Bank of France.
 - (c) Concordat with the Pope.
 - (d) University of France.
 - (e) The Codes.
 - (f) May 1804. Napoleon proclaimed Emperor.
- (12) *Causes of the Napoleonic War*
 - (a) French interference in Holland, Italy, and Switzerland.
 - (b) Sebastiani's report on Egypt.
 - (c) Malta.
 - (d) Rebuilding of the French fleet.
 - (e) May 1803. War declared.
- (13) *The Threat of Invasion and the Campaign of Trafalgar*
 - (a) Resumption of naval blockade ; Grand Army at Boulogne.
 - (b) March 1805. Villeneuve left Toulon for West Indies.
 - (c) July 1805. Villeneuve intercepted by Calder.
 - (d) October 1805. Trafalgar.
- (14) *The Third Coalition*
 - (a) England, Austria, Russia, Sweden.
 - (b) 1805. Ulm ; Austerlitz ; Treaty of Pressburg.
 - (c) 1806. Prussia defeated at Jena.
- (15) *The Continental System*
 - (a) May 1806. English Order in Council declared blockade of coast from Brest to Elbe.
 - (b) November 1806. Berlin Decrees declared British Isles blockaded.
 - (c) January and November 1807. Orders in Council affecting neutrals.
 - (d) December 1807. Milan Decree affecting neutrals.
- (16) *The Treaty of Tilsit (1807)*
 - (a) Eylau ; Friedland.
 - (b) Treaty of Tilsit between Napoleon and the Tsar.
 - (c) Danish fleet taken by Britain.

(17) *The Peninsular War*

- (a) 1807. Junot occupied Lisbon.
- (b) 1808. Joseph declared King of Spain ; Baylen ; Vimeiro ; Convention of Cintra ; Napoleon at Madrid.
- (c) 1809. Corunna ; Oporto ; Talavera.
- (d) 1810. Invasion of Portugal ; Busaco ; Lines of Torres Vedras.
- (e) 1811. Fuentes de Onoro ; Almeida recaptured ; Albuera.
- (f) 1812. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz recaptured ; Salamanca ; Madrid occupied ; Wellington checked at Burgos.
- (g) 1813. Vittoria ; Sorauren ; invasion of France.
- (h) 1814. Orthez ; Toulouse.

(18) *The Collapse of the Tilsit Agreement*

- (a) Rise of nationalism in Prussia.
- (b) 1808. Meeting at Erfurt.
- (c) 1809. Austria defeated at Wagram ; Treaty of Schönbrunn ; Walcheren expedition.
- (d) 1810. Annexation of Holland and the North German coast ; the Tsar's ukase.

(19) *The Invasion of Russia (1812)*

- (a) Alliance between Russia and Sweden ; Austria and Prussia to protect Napoleon's flanks.
- (b) Borodino ; occupation of Moscow ; the retreat ; army reduced from 600,000 to 20,000 men.

(20) *The War of Liberation (1813-14)*

- (a) Treaty of Kalisch between Russia and Prussia.
- (b) Napoleon raised fresh army ; Lützen ; Bautzen.
- (c) Treaty of Reichenbach between Britain, Russia, and Prussia ; Austria joined later.
- (d) Leipzig ; the Frankfort proposals.
- (e) Invasion of France ; abdication of Napoleon.

(21) *The Peace Settlement*

- (a) France : Louis XVIII restored ; boundaries of 1792.
- (b) Belgium to Holland ; Genoa to Sardinia ; Norway to Sweden.
- (c) Russia gained most of Poland.
- (d) Prussia gained parts of Poland, half Saxony, Rhine provinces.
- (e) Austria gained Lombardy and Venetia.
- (f) Britain gained Tobago, St Lucia, Mauritius, Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, Malta, Heligoland ; made Treaty of Ghent with United States.

(22) *The Hundred Days (1815)*

- (a) March 20. Napoleon reached Paris.
- (b) March 25. Military treaty of the Allies.
- (c) June 16. Ligny and Quatre Bras.
- (d) June 18. Waterloo.
- (e) Abdication of Napoleon ; army of occupation ; boundaries of 1790 ; indemnity of £28,000,000 imposed on France.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The causes of the Revolution.
- (2) The reasons why Britain entered (a) the Revolutionary War, (b) the Napoleonic War.
- (3) The reasons for the collapse of the First Coalition.
- (4) The influence of sea-power on the conduct of the wars.
- (5) The work of Napoleon as an administrator.
- (6) The effects of the Continental System on Britain and on the Continent.
- (7) The reasons for the British success in the Peninsula.
- (8) The causes of Napoleon's downfall.

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CHAPTER VI

THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY

THE French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars woke Italy from the drowsy political medievalism that had for so long enwrapped the collection of little states of which she was composed. For nearly twenty years the peninsula went through stirring times of change and feverish activity, not wholly without their effect in awakening some sense of national feeling and fostering some political ability. It is true that Napoleon plundered the Italians, that he had scant regard for their interests when they conflicted with his own, and that many thousands of Italian soldiers died at his bidding in what was to them an alien cause. But in the process of inflicting his will upon Italy Napoleon bestowed benefits which it was beyond the power of Italians to forget when his system collapsed in 1815.

The original French invasion of 1796 resulted in North Italian republics on the French model, with popular assemblies and equality of citizens before the law; two years later Rome itself became a republic, and a year after that most of Naples followed suit. Although these republics were of short duration, both then and in the years that followed, when a large part of the peninsula had been annexed to France and the remainder was divided between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Naples, the Italians enjoyed many advantages previously unknown. Roads, canals, bridges, the general improvement in economic conditions that necessarily follows the fusion of several small state-systems into larger units, improved education, a uniform system of law, the abolition of irksome feudal rights—all these resulted from the French dominion in Italy. But it is with political thought and experience that we shall be chiefly concerned in tracing the steps by which Italian unity was achieved. Here, again, the Italian *Risorgimento* can date its origin from Napoleonic times. Able Italians were encouraged to enter the Civil Service, and received there excellent training in administrative work; the representative institutions, short-lived though some of them were, at least awoke a vision of progress and reform, and taught Italy that whatever efforts might be made to put the clock back once more, things could never, after so great a social upheaval, really be the same again. Napoleon, while at Elba, was invited to become the head of a united Italy, and though no doubt the

scheme was premature, and Napoleon not the man to bring it to fruition, the idea of unity had already been born, albeit only in the minds of a few.



ITALY AFTER 1815

The Settlement of 1815. The settlement of Italy as drawn up at Vienna in 1815 bears witness to the desire of European statesmen to restore as nearly as possible the state of affairs before the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. Except for the disappearance of the republics

of Genoa and Venice, the new map of Italy differed in few respects from the old. The country was divided into eight states, four large and four small. The richest of these, the great plain to the north of the river Po, now to be called the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, were annexed to the Austrian Empire. Placed thus once more under a foreign domination, with all political and administrative advancement cut off by the highly centralized Austrian system that governed direct from Vienna, subject to an alien penal code, their men forced to serve abroad as soldiers, and with taxation so heavy that a quarter of the Imperial Austrian revenue was derived from the Italian provinces, Lombardy and Venetia seethed with discontent, notwithstanding the efficiency and order that allowed full play to their growing material prosperity.

Of the minor states Tuscany was the most important. Under the mild rule of its restored Habsburg Grand Duke it was for the time moderately content, though there was little chance of progress or reform, and the Austrian influence was supreme at Court. The Duchy of Modena was also ruled by a relative of the Habsburgs, the able though reactionary Francis IV; Parma and Piacenza were given for life to the Habsburg Marie-Louise, ex-Empress of France, and the tiny state of Lucca to a Bourbon princess of the same name.

In Southern Italy, Naples, or the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, was restored to the corrupt, reactionary, priest-ridden rule of the Bourbons in the person of Ferdinand IV.¹ Brigandage, it has been said, was the natural industry of this kingdom, the rulers of which were notorious for the corruption and peculation of their system of government. Possessed of a more fruitful soil than that of the mountainous districts of Central Italy, the easy-going peasantry of this kingdom might have appeared to the casual observer to be by no means discontented with their lot. Nevertheless revolution had a peculiar knack of taking sudden hold on Naples, and the Government was faced with a permanent problem in Sicily, where the people were anxious for self-government. Once again Habsburg influence was strong, for by a secret treaty Ferdinand had promised that no reforms should be introduced of a type not approved by Austria for the rule of her own dominions.

Across the centre of the peninsula stretched the broad band of territory directly under the rule of the Pope. This consisted of the Romagna, the Marches, Umbria, and the Patrimony of St Peter. Nowhere in Italy were the forces of reaction so powerful. Clericalism reigned supreme; no laymen were allowed to participate in the Holy Office, which believed unashamedly in the value of popular ignorance as a means of securing docile obedience in the governed. In the Romagna certain towns were garrisoned by Austrian troops.

¹ Ferdinand IV (1751-1825).

There remains only the Kingdom of Sardinia, a state greatly increased in size and consisting of the island of that name, Piedmont, the Duchy of Savoy, and the former Republic of Genoa. Its ruler, Victor Emmanuel I, was quite as reactionary a prince as any in Italy, dominated to such an extent by the clerical party that church-breaking and blasphemy were punished by the death penalty. He destroyed utterly the whole legislative and administrative system that the French had built up. In the Papal States street-lighting had been abolished, in the effort to destroy everything that savoured of the French occupation; with the same end in view Victor Emmanuel dug up the carefully laid Botanical Gardens and forbade the word 'constitution' to appear in print. But in one vital respect Sardinia differed from every other state in Italy: she possessed a native Italian king. Elsewhere, by means of direct rule, family relationship, or treaty, the Habsburg influence might be supreme, but with the house of Savoy this was far from being the case, in spite of the fact that Metternich's system of government, or something closely approximating to it, was made the rule in Sardinia, and that the Queen herself was an Austrian.

As early as 1815, then, the future problems of Italy were clearly foreshadowed: to rid herself of the Austrians, to give rein to the suppressed and as yet inarticulate forces of constitutionalism, and thus to clear the way for the rising tide of national feeling that must sooner or later demand the fusion of the Italian-speaking peoples in a single state.

The Revolutions of 1820 21. It is not surprising that Italy after 1815 was honeycombed with secret societies, most of which were much more productive of talk than of action. The largest and most important of these was the Carbonari, or Society of the Charcoal-burners, which had its headquarters at Naples and was said to number some 300,000 adherents in Southern Italy alone. This society, which probably dates back to the Middle Ages and appears to have had some connexion with Freemasonry, aimed rather vaguely at securing constitutional liberties and reforming society in general. The dissatisfaction that was rampant in the Neapolitan army, coupled with the political ambitions of its generals, provided a fruitful field for the seeds of Carbonari agitators, so that all was ready for revolution when a successful movement in Madrid, which succeeded in wresting from the Spanish Government the old constitution of 1812, made the Carbonari think that the moment was ripe for a similar movement in Naples.

On July 2, 1820, some Neapolitan troops revolted and marched on the capital. Ferdinand might have stood firm, but the rebellion gained immediate prestige from the fact that a distinguished soldier, General Pepe,¹ gave it his support and carried with him most of the remainder

¹ Guglielmo Pepe (1783-1855).

of the Army. Ferdinand deemed it wisest to give way, and on July 13 he promised to grant a constitution similar to the Spanish. When the news of this spread throughout Europe Metternich took instant alarm and arranged for the meeting of a European Congress at Troppau in October. Here he enunciated a 'general principle' that all revolutionary movements that had their origin in the masses were dangerous to the cause of good government in Europe as a whole. He carried Prussia and Russia with him, though Britain and France refused to agree. Ferdinand was invited to attend a further conference at Laibach, and after protesting that his attendance was necessary to prevent the European Powers from interfering in Naples with armed force, and swearing once more his solemn fealty to the constitution he had set up, persuaded his unwilling subjects to let him go. He immediately repudiated all he had done, and consented to admit an Austrian army, charged to see that the former state of affairs was restored in Naples. Early in 1821 the Austrian troops crossed the Po on their journey south; in March they met and defeated Pepe's army at Rieti, and the revolution in Naples was at an end.

No sooner had the movement collapsed in the south than it broke out in the north. There the Carbonari derived their chief support from the nobility, the Army, and the literary classes. On March 10, 1821, a mutiny broke out in the garrison at Alessandria, followed by a similar movement at Turin, Genoa, and elsewhere. As in Naples, the aim of the rebels was a constitution, but since hatred of the Austrians was an especial characteristic of the Carbonari in North Italy it was hoped to foster a similar rebellion across the frontier in Lombardy. This was the object of Santa Rosa,¹ leader of the Liberal section of Piedmontese opinion, who was in touch with some of the principal Lombard patriots. But the movement in that province did not materialize, though in Piedmont events continued to move rapidly. Faced with a rebellion that he was half unable, half unwilling to suppress, Victor Emmanuel abdicated. His brother and heir, Charles Felix, Duke of Genoa, was away, so for the time being the next heir to the throne, Charles Albert, a member of a younger branch of the house of Savoy, was appointed Regent. This young prince was himself a sympathizer and supporter of the Liberal cause, but, being also a loyal member of his house, tended to waver from one extreme to the other in a manner that throughout his whole career cost him the support of many adherents on either side. However, he granted the desired constitution, subject, of course, to the approval of the real ruler, Charles Felix. This concession the latter flatly refused to ratify, declaring that while he was king the royal privileges should remain intact. Charles Albert was sent out of the way, and the hated Austrian

¹ Annibale Santorre di Rossi de Pomarolo, Count of Santa Rosa (1783-1825).

soldiers were allowed to enter Piedmont, where they scattered the rebels at Novara and occupied Alessandria. Thus the second attempt at a rebellion in Italy was effectively crushed.

In spite of the comparative ease with which they were suppressed, the revolutions of 1820-21 affected the political situation in Italy profoundly. The Austrian grip tightened; secret police, spies, and counter-spies flourished in the doubtful undercurrents that ran beneath the seemingly placid atmosphere of Lombard life. Pepe and Santa Rosa had not been the men to head a general Italian rising; their movements had not been co-ordinated, and to a great extent they had even differed in aim. Failure inevitably meant a worse state of affairs than before. Austria set out on a deliberate policy of Germanizing her Italian provinces, and embarked on a series of political trials that were to result eventually in alienating the goodwill of European opinion. Already the Austrian police had grown suspicious of the Milanese dramatist Silvio Pellico,¹ who became a Carbonaro and was arrested and sentenced in 1821 to a long term of imprisonment. After the suppression of the rising in Piedmont a determined effort was made to secure the leaders of the Liberal element in Lombardy. The chief of these, Count Confalonieri,² and nearly fifty others were at first condemned to death, and afterwards reprieved, but awarded long terms of imprisonment. Most of them were eventually taken to the great fortress of the Spielberg, in Moravia. The hardships and sufferings they endured for no greater crime than their ardent sense of patriotism were movingly described by Pellico in his book *My Prisons*, published after his release. No better medium could have been devised for inflaming the feelings of Italians all over the peninsula against the Austrian rule, for the book became widely known and exercised an influence the extent of which it is hardly possible to gauge.

The Revolutions of 1831-32. It was now the turn of Central Italy to become infected with the revolutionary fever. There also a strong current of unrest ran below the surface. The Paris revolution of July 1830 was largely instrumental in bringing it to light, for the liberal-minded Louis-Philippe, who was now placed upon the throne of France, would, it was hoped, view similar events elsewhere with a benevolent eye, especially if they were directed against the European settlement made in 1815. The death of Pope Pius VIII and the initiation of his successor, Gregory XVI, in February 1831, therefore led to open rebellion in Umbria, the Romagna, and the Marches, where the temporal power of the Pope was declared to be at an end and provisional Governments were set up. At the same time a similar movement appeared in Modena. Francis IV himself seems to have

¹ Silvio Pellico (1788-1854).

² Count Federico Confalonieri (1785-1846).

been implicated in a wild plot to raise the standard of revolt against Austria and to carve out for himself a new kingdom in Northern Italy. Convinced at the last moment that help from France would not materialize, he tried to stop the movement by arresting its leaders, but, finding himself too late, fled to the Austrians for help. Parma also was affected, and Marie-Louise departed in haste until Habsburg assistance should arrive. The rulers of both these little duchies could be reasonably sure that Metternich would not refuse to take action on their behalf, and when Gregory XVI also issued an appeal to Austria the collapse of the three unco-ordinated movements was certain.

By the end of March the Austrian troops had restored order in Modena, and Francis IV returned. Louis-Philippe, answering an inquiry from Metternich, had intimated that he had no objection to this. In the Papal States, however, the situation was complicated by Franco-Austrian jealousy, since the French clerical element was not prepared to see Austria acting alone as the Papal champion. Louis-Philippe therefore stipulated that Austria should evacuate the Papal States as soon as possible. This was done in July, but the new Pope's repressive measures and the actions of his *sanfedisti*, or mercenary troops, caused the rebellion to break out again. In January 1832 the Austrian forces reappeared; this second intervention was too much for Louis-Philippe, and in February French troops occupied Ancona. It was not until 1838 that both nations withdrew their forces, after six years of mutual suspicion.

The revolutions of 1831-32, therefore, accomplished very little beyond rendering inevitable a fresh period of reaction and revealing the fact that Austria was not the only nation concerned with the future of Italy. In view of what was to come it was significant that among those who fought for the Italian rebels was Louis-Napoleon, nephew and stepson of the former conqueror of Italy. This youthful Liberal, who since 1815 had lived in exile in Switzerland and at Augsburg, joined the Carbonari and took part in the assault on Civit  Castellana. Forced to fly before the advancing Austrian troops, he escaped at last disguised as a footman on the box of his mother's carriage, after she had nursed him through an attack of measles at Ancona.

Mazzini and the Society of Young Italy. The prompt suppression of this second series of rebellions was a severe indictment of the methods of the Carbonari and similar societies. The futility of such sporadic risings against the might and determination of Metternich, who was always ready, and apparently was always to be permitted, to take action anywhere in Italy, could bring nothing but discredit upon the men who sought to provoke them. The years immediately following

1831 were indeed a dark period for Italian patriots, and might have proved one of utter despair, if belief in the cause had not been kept alight, and in many hearts actually kindled, by the ardent labours of Giuseppe Mazzini.

Mazzini was born in 1805, at the time when Napoleon's army was about to embark on its task of crushing Pitt's Third Coalition. His father was a doctor and professor of anatomy at the University of Genoa. As a boy of fifteen Mazzini's pity and interest were aroused by the sight of a band of refugees from the 1821 rebellion, and he determined to devote his life to the cause for which they had fought so vainly. As he grew to manhood his convictions strengthened. He had been trained for the legal profession, but his tastes were literary, and he soon began to contribute to various journals as a free-lance writer. Some of the papers for which he wrote were eventually suppressed on account of their liberal tendencies. Mazzini was at this time a great reader of forbidden books, which he smuggled into Genoa from abroad. He soon found himself attracted to the Society of the Carbonari, to which he sought, and obtained, admission. The experience, however, was a great disappointment. So far as he was permitted to gain insight into its organization, the Carbonari appeared to him to be directed by a group of men drawn mainly from the middle class, lacking in vitality, inspiration, and understanding. The great mass of the Italian people remained untouched by their doctrine, for a general vagueness and inertia took the place of a constructive programme of concerted action. It seemed to Mazzini that the Carbonari needed, above all things, the enthusiasm of youth.

None the less the revolutionary movement of 1831 found Mazzini busily enrolling members on behalf of the Society. The result was his arrest by the Sardinian police, who already suspected him. He was imprisoned in the fortress of Savona, sent to Turin for trial, and after emphatically denying everything was acquitted for lack of evidence and exiled. He went first to Switzerland, and then almost immediately to Marseilles, where, with a few youthful companions, he launched the Society of Young Italy. For two years he laboured to pour into Italy a flood of articles, letters, and political pamphlets that grew in volume until secret presses had to be set up in Italy to cope with the demand. Lodges of the society appeared first at Genoa, then at Leghorn, then all over North and Central Italy. Disappointed members of the Carbonari flocked to join. No one over forty years of age was accepted, for the basic purpose of Mazzini's idea was to instil a new political creed into Italian youth, and to fit it for the performance of a task from which the natural caution of advancing years might shrink, or at least prove inadequate in leadership. This was the lesson he had drawn from his association with the Carbonari.

In the same year that the Society of Young Italy was founded Charles Albert succeeded Charles Felix on the throne of Sardinia. Mindful, perhaps, of the Liberal tendencies professed by this monarch in the past, Mazzini addressed to him an open letter, calling upon him to lead the Italian people in their quest for political and national freedom. "All Italy waits for one word to make herself yours. . . . Place yourself at the head of the nation and write on your banner: 'Union, Liberty, Independence.' . . . On this condition we bind ourselves round you, we proffer you our lives, we will lead to your banner the little states of Italy." Whether or not he ever saw this letter, Charles Albert made no response. Mazzini himself said later that he never expected any, but merely intended to disillusion the Piedmontese with regard to the character of their king. At all events, he ceased to look for leadership in high quarters, and republicanism became a cardinal point in his creed.

There was nothing vague about the political ideals that Mazzini taught his followers. "Young Italy," he wrote in the articles of the society, "is a brotherhood of Italians who believe in a law of progress and duty, and are convinced that Italy is destined to become one nation." The object in view could only be accomplished by building on secure foundations, so the first task was to organize and educate the *whole* people—not merely a class—in the belief of the progress of society and the mission of Italy as a great European nation. The ideal was to be a religion in itself. People must be taught that if they wished to become citizens of a self-governing state they must first fit themselves to rule. This could not be accomplished without sacrifice; the citizen must learn to think first of his duties, rather than his rights. Upon this basis Mazzini proposed to move forward to the attainment of his objects. The first of these was the expulsion of the Austrians. The people must be taught to look upon revolt as a duty; insurrection must continue until it succeeded, and succeeded without the aid of foreign Powers, for in the long run nothing could withstand a people rightly struggling to be free. The second object was to unite Italy in a single state, an object that now, for the first time, under the spell of Mazzini's eloquence, became the guiding star of many thousands of Italian patriots. Lastly, the newly won liberties were to be safeguarded by the establishment of a republic, for Mazzini was literally unable to conceive that his aims could be accomplished under any other form of government. Monarchy as he knew it simply spelt reaction, clericalism, and stagnation, if nothing worse. Government must be by the people as well as for them: only thus could they learn to rule, and only thus could the future of social progress be safeguarded.

The importance of Mazzini's work lies in his preparation of the ground for what was to follow, even though events were to turn out far other-

wise than he had anticipated and desired. He made the great mistake of thinking that Italy, and, indeed, all Europe, was ripe immediately for the realization of his schemes. In 1833 he organized an Army revolt in Piedmont, the premature discovery of which resulted in twelve executions and a number of imprisonments. Forced to escape the attentions of the French police, Mazzini made his way to Genoa, and later in the same year he began to collect a band of several hundred exiles for an invasion of Piedmont. The force was to be commanded by a professional soldier named Ramorino, but this officer seems to have had the cause little at heart, and eventually the action of the Swiss Government broke up the movement. For the next three years Mazzini remained in hiding in Switzerland, until early in 1837, when he moved to London. Bitterly grieved and driven almost insane by his failure, he ceased for the time to be a driving force in Italian affairs, and the movement of Young Italy practically collapsed. For Mazzini was no statesman; the inflexibility of his ideas made it difficult for him to realize that anything could be done on lines other than his own. It was not until 1839 that he took heart once more and determined to resume his political activities.

The Rise of the Moderates. Not all Italian patriots were attracted by the impetuous zeal of Mazzini. There had always been a number who sought for a practicable, carefully reasoned solution of Italy's problems, and to them Mazzini savoured rather of the agitator than the prophet. His return to politics rather strengthened than modified this view, for during the next six or seven years Mazzini was implicated in more than one abortive rising. These centred largely in the Papal Dominions, which of all the states in Italy were the most corruptly and inefficiently governed, and simmered perpetually on the verge of open revolt. In the Romagna especially murder and counter-murder were almost continuous, and it was there that Papal repression was seen at its worst. It was a common saying among the inhabitants that they would rather be ruled by the Turks; to the Christian of the mid-nineteenth century it was not possible to think of a more damning indictment. Even the wearing of a beard rendered one unsafe, for that was supposed to be the mark of a Liberal. One notable attempt at a rising, sponsored by Mazzini, took place in Calabria, whither two young naval officers named Bandiera went to lead the movement. The Government of Naples had been forewarned, and the rising was nipped in the bud. Mazzini's implication in the affair was revealed by the British Government, which had for some time previously been tampering with his correspondence, an action which resulted in some violent denunciations in the House of Commons, and earned some sympathy in England for the Italian cause. But these futile little risings, resulting in nothing more than the useless shedding of blood, helped to convince the more

thoughtful sections of Italian opinion that in practice the methods of Young Italy were no better than those of the Carbonari. Consequently the idea of federation gained many adherents during the eighteenth forties.

One of the chief exponents of federalism was a Sardinian priest named Vincenzo Gioberti.¹ Suspected of complicity in the Piedmontese rising of 1833, he had been exiled from Italy. Now, ten years later, he published at Brussels his *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians*. Gioberti's message, in so far as it was concerned with the mission of Italy as one of the great nations, was similar to that of Mazzini, but his idea of the means by which national unity must be effected was widely different. Instead of a revolutionary movement originating with the people, he looked to the Italian rulers to achieve unity from above. The only possible head for such a federation of Italian states seemed to Gioberti to be the Pope, and accordingly those who were influenced by his views—and they were many—came to be known as the Neo-Guelphs.

About the same time that Gioberti's book appeared a volume was published in Paris called *The Hopes of Italy*. Its author, Count Césaire Balbo,² was also a subject of the King of Sardinia. Perhaps the most significant part of this work was its insistence on the Austrians being driven out of Italy at all costs, to seek, if they chose, compensation in the Balkans at the expense of Turkey. Mazzini's idea of a united Italian Republic was attacked, and the alternative of a confederation upheld, with Lombardy and Venetia included. Balbo did not make clear whom he advocated as the president of his confederation, but it seems probable that his thoughts were centred on the King of Sardinia. In fact, it is notable that in both these books the Sardinian Army forms a very considerable factor.

An influential writer whose hopes were centred frankly on Sardinia was Massimo d'Azeglio,³ whose political pamphlet *Recent Events in the Romagna* gave an account of the suppression of a revolt there in 1845. In implication it was a terrible indictment of the clerical rule in the Papal States, so it is hardly surprising to find that d'Azeglio had no belief in the Pope as leader of a reformed Italy. His treatise, however, together with the two books before mentioned, did much to wean thoughtful Italians from the revolutionary and republican ideas sponsored by Mazzini, and to concentrate attention on the possibility of action by Italian rulers themselves.

It was at this moment that the unexpected came to pass. All Italy was surprised and delighted by the advent of a reforming Pope, in the person of Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, who in June 1846 succeeded

¹ Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–52).

² Count Césaire Balbo (1789–1853).

³ Massimo Taparelli, Marquis d'Azeglio (1798–1866).


to the Papal Chair as Pius IX. Almost immediately events began to move in the Papal States; one reform succeeded another during the first eighteen months of the new rule. Political prisoners were pardoned, the Press censorship was lifted, a 'Consulta' composed largely of laymen was called into being, a Civic Guard was enrolled, Rome was made a municipality, and plans were put on foot for a customs union with other Italian states. Before this programme of reform had proceeded very far Metternich became seriously alarmed, for it was known that the new Pope was no friend to Austria. In 1847 Metternich sent additional troops to occupy Ferrara, and issued general warnings to the effect that such Liberal measures were merely the first steps upon the slippery and dangerous path of revolution. Meanwhile in England Palmerston was watching the course of events with grave concern. "Italy is the weak part of Europe, and the next war that breaks out in Europe will probably arise out of Italian affairs," he wrote to Russell in July 1846. To Palmerston it had for some time appeared probable that such a war might arise in Italy between France as the champion of Liberalism and Austria as the representative of despotism. His remonstrances against Austrian misrule, however, merely evoked Metternich's famous reply that Italy was nothing but a geographical expression. For the moment, therefore, Palmerston's only concern was to prevent trouble by persuading the Italian rulers to grant constitutional reforms, and in 1847 he dispatched the Earl of Minto to Italy with that end in view.

In Piedmont Charles Albert, the 'wobbling king,' now at last appeared to be wavering in the right direction. The unifying result of the new Italian railways, and the Scientific and Agricultural Congresses, which soon developed into political gatherings, were beginning to have their effect in lowering the barriers between the different states of Italy, when attention was focused more strongly than ever upon Piedmont by the granting of certain Liberal reforms of a moderate character, such as a limited freedom of the Press. Charles Albert came forth openly as the supporter of Pius IX, and intimated that if war with Austria were inevitable he was ready to play his part. In Lombardy tension grew between the Italians and their foreign masters, and all Italy was seething with excitement as the year 1847 drew to a close.

The Revolutions of 1848-49. The storm that broke over Italy, and, indeed, all over Europe, in the year 1848 found the Austrian troops in Lombardy under the command of a capable, iron-willed soldier of the old school, Marshal Radetsky.¹ This veteran warrior, who had been Austrian Chief-of-Staff at the battle of Leipzig, was now over eighty years of age, but his touch was as firm and sure as ever. His men trusted

¹ Josef Radetsky, Count of Radetz (1766-1858).

him, and their confidence was well placed, for it was to his courage and optimism more than to any other factor that the continuance of the Austrian rule in Italy was due. Communication between Vienna and her Italian provinces lay across the Brenner Pass, the mouth of which on the Italian side was protected by the famous Quadrilateral, consisting of the formidable fortified towns of Peschiera, Mantua, Verona, and Legnago. Within this Quadrilateral and astride the head of the vital line of communication to Vienna, an Austrian army could count itself secure from complete disaster at any rate, and



THE QUADRILATERAL

possessed of an excellent base from which to dominate the plains of the Po.

January 1848 provided a foretaste of what was in store. Numbers of Milanese refused to smoke, because smoking provided duty for the Austrian revenue. 'Tobacco riots' ensued between these patriots and those who were seen smoking in the streets. Radetsky took firm measures; the riots were quickly suppressed, but the number of troops in Milan was increased as a precautionary measure.

During the next two months the movement began in earnest. A rising in Sicily spread rapidly to the mainland, and once more King

Ferdinand deemed it wise to grant a constitution. On March 4 Charles Albert promulgated a constitution for Sardinia. The Grand Duke of Tuscany followed suit, and it was now that Pius IX performed a similar service for Rome, as previously mentioned. But the key to the whole situation lay in Lombardy and Venetia: something more was needed here to induce a rising against the efficient policing of Radetsky's well-trained troops. On March 17 it came: the news that Metternich, the pillar of European autocracy, had fallen from power before the revolutionaries of Vienna. Next morning special concessions from the Emperor were published, but it was already too late for conciliatory measures. The city of Venice had risen *en masse*: without attempting the hopeless task of regaining control, the Austrians retired and left the Venetians, under their leader, Daniele Manin,¹ to proclaim the Republic of St Mark. In Milan, where Radetsky was at the head of some 20,000 troops, matters were not so easy. For five desperate days the Italians, ill-armed and without adequate leadership, fought the renowned Austrian soldiers from house to house, until on March 23 Radetsky wisely withdrew from the city and began an ordered retreat in the direction of the Quadrilateral, knowing that if he were to maintain himself in Italy at all he must seek security until the situation in Austria permitted the dispatch of reinforcements.

For the second time in his life Charles Albert was put to the necessity of making up his vacillating mind in a grave national crisis. Intensely distrustful of the republican element among the Italian nationalists, he yet felt that if ever he were to take the lead in securing Italian independence he must act at once. His hatred of the Austrians prevailed, and he declared war on the day that Radetsky evacuated Milan. The step was taken without any foreign support, even from the new French Republic; Russia and Prussia went so far as to recall their ambassadors from Turin. The Sardinian Army at its maximum never exceeded 40,000 regular troops, poorly equipped and lacking in scientific training. In addition there were the volunteers, who came flocking northward to the number of about 90,000, and also regular troops from Naples, Tuscany, and the Papal States, which set out against the wishes of their rulers, the majority of them afterwards being recalled.

From the first Charles Albert's procrastination as a military leader played into Radetsky's hands. The Austrians were allowed to make good their retreat to the Quadrilateral, though they were defeated at Goïto in April and again in May, and soon afterwards lost the fortress of Peschiera. Meanwhile diverse aims were causing increased confusion and delay on the Italian side. On April 29 Pius IX issued an Allocution to his cardinals in which he declared that war was "wholly abhorrent" to him, and that the Papal forces were to be used for defensive

¹ Daniele Manin (1804-57), a Venetian lawyer of Jewish extraction.

purposes only. It was evident that the course of events had put a decided check on his reforming activities, and that the advocates of confederation could expect nothing further from him. The republicans under Mazzini, who had reached Milan on April 7, were highly suspicious of the aims of Charles Albert, who had a considerable following all over North Italy. During the summer months, in an endeavour to settle the political question once and for all, plebiscites were held. Milan, Parma, Piacenza, Modena, and even the new Republic of St Mark decided for incorporation with Sardinia.

For the moment, therefore, with some semblance of unity agreed upon, all seemed to be proceeding well for the Italians. The Austrian Government, with its hands full in Hungary and Bohemia, was more than half convinced that the Italian provinces could never be recovered, and was already suggesting that Palmerston should mediate. With revolution, counter-revolution, and general uncertainty stalking abroad, Palmerston was in his element. His comments and his advice flew in all directions across the troubled face of Europe ; during the course of this year alone 28,000 dispatches passed through the Foreign Office. Palmerston also thought that Austria would have to evacuate Italy. In June he wrote to the King of the Belgians : " I cannot regret the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy. The Alps are her natural barrier and her best defence. I should wish to see the whole of Northern Italy united into one kingdom. Such an arrangement . . . would be most conducive to the peace of Europe, by interposing between France and Austria a neutral state strong enough to make itself respected."

Radetsky, however, did not despair. Within the Quadrilateral he collected reinforcements until he had 60,000 men under his command. With these he assumed the offensive in July, and on the 25th of that month he inflicted a decisive defeat on Charles Albert at Custozza. The Sardinian army retreated to Milan, closely pursued by the Austrians. Charles Albert decided that he could not hold the city. His decision to evacuate it nearly cost him his life, so furious were the inhabitants at their desertion by the Sardinians. Numbers of them streamed out of the city with the retreating troops and across the frontier into Piedmont. Radetsky resumed control, and signed an armistice with Charles Albert that was eventually prolonged until March of the following year.

From the first, however, it was obvious that Charles Albert would have to fight again. His personal credit and that of his house demanded it ; with his army and his kingdom intact he could not leave matters where they were, though the Sardinian Parliament was divided as to whether the war should be resumed at once or continued later. By this time the Austrian Government was in a stronger position at home, and after Custozza there was no more talk of foreign mediation. On

March 12, 1849, the war was renewed. The Sardinian troops, now under the command of a Polish officer named Chrzanowsky, assumed the initiative and began an advance upon Milan. The Austrians, however, placing themselves cleverly to the south of Chrzanowsky's march, forced him to form front to a flank and drove him off his line of communication at Novara on March 23. Realizing that all was over, Charles Albert abdicated in favour of his son, who assumed the Crown as Victor Emmanuel II. The new King arranged terms of peace with Radetsky. He paid an indemnity, but refused to give up his Parliamentary constitution. "My house knows the road of exile," he said, "but not of dishonour."

The news of Sardinia's failure at Novara had decisive results elsewhere in Italy. Such further risings as the Lombards attempted were promptly and savagely suppressed. In Tuscany the movement petered out, and the Grand Duke returned. Ferdinand of Naples, who had already recovered much of his former power, now dissolved the Constitution, crushed the Sicilians, and imprisoned his political opponents wholesale. It was only in Venice and at Rome that the movement continued.

The Roman Republic. The armistice after Custozza had appeared to be good news for the republicans. "The war of the princes is over," said Mazzini; "now we will fight a people's war." Before many months had passed he was actually to find himself head of a republic, with its seat of government at Rome. First, however, it is necessary to introduce another great Italian patriot, the volunteer commander Garibaldi.

Giuseppe Garibaldi was born at Nice on July 4, 1807. His father was a merchant sailor, the owner of a small coasting-vessel. Giuseppe's education was scanty; in 1822 he went to sea, and was captain of his ship by the time he was twenty-five. It was the exiled Italians he met abroad who first taught him something of his country's cause. Thus it came about that in 1833 he joined the Society of Young Italy, just before the ill-fated raid from the Swiss border. Garibaldi's part was to foment a simultaneous rising in the Piedmontese Navy. He was suspected, and forced to fly with a price on his head.

In 1836 Garibaldi arrived in South America, a political exile. Here he took service under the infant Republic of Rio Grande do Sul, which was fighting to gain independence from the Brazilian Government. For the next six years Garibaldi led the life of a guerrilla chieftain, sometimes at sea and sometimes ashore in command of a band often several thousands strong. During this period he married, and it was in consequence of this that in 1842 he decided to lead a more settled life at Monte Video.

Before long Garibaldi was fighting again, this time in the war

between Uruguay and the Argentine. From among the numbers of his exiled countrymen he raised an Italian Legion that proved the chief factor in saving Monte Video from disaster. The members of this Legion, the fame of which soon spread even to Europe, were clothed in red shirts, a stock of which had apparently been acquired at a cheap rate by the Uruguayan Government. In this way there arose the distinguishing mark of Garibaldi's followers, and, incidentally, the 'coloured-shirt' movement that is so conspicuous a feature of Continental politics to-day.

News of the stirring events of 1847 found Garibaldi ready to return. Sending his family on ahead, he collected nearly a hundred exiled Italians and set out for Italy in April 1848. By the beginning of July he was offering his sword to Charles Albert. It was politely rejected, so Garibaldi took a commission under the Provisional Government of Milan. On the evacuation of that city by the Sardinians Garibaldi and his volunteers continued the campaign in the foothills of the Alps. Mazzini went with them, but before long the little force was driven across the frontier into Switzerland.

Meanwhile at Rome Pius IX continued rapidly to lose the support of the democratic and Liberal element among his people. In September 1848, some few weeks after the armistice between Charles Albert and Radetsky, he placed in power a new Minister named Pellegrino Rossi,¹ a confident and efficient administrator who had been trained in the French school, and who now set about placing the Papal Government on a sound and well-ordered footing. Rossi's measures, however, alienated most sections of popular opinion. The situation in the Romagna was particularly difficult, for Garibaldi had now arrived there with the nucleus of his Legion, and was rallying the democratic element to his side. On November 15 Rossi was stabbed to death as he entered the Palazzo della Cancelleria to attend a meeting of the Council. The people of Rome rejoiced so openly at the murder that on November 24 the Pope fled in disguise to Gaeta, in the Kingdom of Naples, where he was joined by the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

The republicans were not slow to grasp their opportunity. Mazzini urged the Romans to abolish the temporal power of the Pope and to proclaim a republic which, he hoped, would eventually embrace all Italy. On February 9, 1849, this was done, and Mazzini arrived at Rome to accept office as one of the three dictators. Under the title of *Triumvirs* these men wielded absolute power in Rome after the news of Novara had shown the republicans that they would soon be fighting desperately to maintain their new constitution. While Mazzini wrestled with the difficult task of co-ordinating the rival policies of his new colleagues Garibaldi and his Legion were endeavouring to

¹ Pellegrino Luigi Edoardo, Count Rossi (1787-1848).

frustrate the efforts of Ferdinand of Naples to restore the Pope by force. The latter had now given up all pretensions to Liberalism, and fulminated against the new Government at Rome, describing the city as "a forest of roaring beasts . . . leaders of Communism and Socialism." But it was not the Neapolitans who were to effect his restoration. Louis Napoleon, now President of the Second French Republic, in order to win the support of the Catholic interest in France and to forestall the intervention of Austria in the Papal States, sent a force of 8000 men under General Oudinot to Civit  Vecchia. His orders were to restore the Pope on condition that the latter would give guarantees for constitutional government. But the presence of Garibaldi at Rome frustrated Oudinot's attempt to take the city by surprise on April 30, and he was forced to send a request for further troops.

Throughout the month of May there was a pause in the French military operations. Garibaldi returned to the southern frontier, where he twice defeated the Neapolitan army. Meanwhile the elections in France had resulted in a triumph for the Catholic and reactionary party. Accordingly Louis Napoleon determined at all costs to bring about the restoration of the Pope's temporal power. Negotiations between Mazzini and the French envoy, de Lesseps, never genuine in character so far as the French President was concerned, soon came to an end, and on June 3 the attack on Rome was renewed. Garibaldi, now virtually the commander of the 8000 mixed troops available for the defence, organized a magnificent resistance which, in spite of some mistakes, gained for him a great personal reputation and invested Rome with something of its ancient glory in the eyes of all Italy. But the odds were too great; on June 29 and 30, with little more than half his original force, Garibaldi was driven from nearly every position, and it was evident that Rome must fall. The Roman Assembly decided to make terms, so, refusing to be a party to the surrender, Mazzini resigned. Garibaldi made up his mind to escape from Rome in order to continue the struggle elsewhere. With him went 4000 of his men, and it was to them, lined up on the Piazza of St Peter's to make their farewells, that he uttered the exhortation that has since become famous: "I offer neither pay, nor quarters, nor provisions; I offer hunger, thirst, forced marches, battles, and death. Let him who loves his country in his heart, and not with his lips only, follow me." The little army made good its escape; Mazzini, after wandering about the streets practically daring the French to arrest him, fled after a few days and eventually returned to London. The Pope was restored, and with him the old priest-ridden system of corruption and repression that he himself had formerly done so much to lighten. Bad as the French interference was for the citizens of the Papal States, it

was to prove in the future still more unfortunate for the Government of Louis Napoleon.

Garibaldi and his men now set out towards the north, where the Venetian Republic was still maintaining a stout resistance to the Austrian troops. In spite of the plebiscite for fusion with Piedmont, the Venetians had after the armistice resumed control of their own affairs. In the spring of 1849 Manin was made President, and throughout the summer of that year his shrewdness and daring were the inspiration of the resistance to the Austrian attack. But he failed to create an adequate military force, and at the end of August Venice capitulated. Manin went into exile in Paris, where during the succeeding years he did much to keep French sympathy alive. Gradually he came to see that the best chance of effecting Italian unity lay in supporting Victor Emmanuel, and he tried to convert Mazzini to the same point of view, but without success. Garibaldi, whose forces never succeeded in crossing the Po, made his escape by sea, and reached the United States.

The year 1849 therefore closed with the situation in Italy apparently much as it had been before. Actually, however, the revolution had cleared away many false hopes and awakened many sentiments that were never again to die. It was true that the mistakes of Charles Albert had been largely responsible for the collapse, and that his policy of concentrating upon a North Italian kingdom, instead of assuming leadership of the revolutionary movement as a whole, had intensified the unfortunate divisions among Italian patriots and allowed the Austrians a comparatively easy task. But none the less the house of Savoy did now become the rallying-point for Italian nationalism, more especially since it was evident that the aspirations of the Neo-Guelphs were but a dream incapable of fulfilment.

Except in Piedmont, despotism settled once more upon the peninsula. In Naples the royal reconquest was so horrible that Palmerston actually allowed munitions to reach the insurgents from Woolwich Arsenal, an act for which he was forced to apologize. Thousands of political prisoners were condemned, and it was to the condition of these men that Gladstone was referring in 1851, when he wrote a letter to Lord Aberdeen, quoting a description of the Neapolitan *régime* as "the negation of God erected into a system of government."

Cavour and Napoleon III. During the ten years that followed the collapse of Mazzini's Government at Rome the republican ideal practically died out of Italy. Mazzini himself had now performed his great work for the Italian cause, and it would have been better for his reputation if he had ceased to take any further part in politics. It was said of him that "his watch had stopped at 1848," and, in fact, he could never bring himself to realize that, comparatively few as his

followers now were, his hostility towards and suspicion of the house of Savoy were merely hindering progress along the only path that promised a reasonable chance of success.

Garibaldi, though still a republican at heart, also became a supporter of Victor Emmanuel during the ten years' peace. After an interval of seafaring, farming, and candle-making in the United States he returned to Nice in the spring of 1854. Two years later he purchased the northern half of the island of Caprera, whither he retired to occupy his time in farming and the rearing of sheep and goats.

It was not only the Republican party that found its influence on the wane. The events of the years 1848-49 had destroyed also the hopes of the Neo-Guelphs. Gioberti himself recognized as much, and published a work in which he agreed that the best hopes for Italian independence lay in the extension of the powers of Italy's sole remaining constitutional Government at Turin. There Victor Emmanuel, with the help of his Prime Minister, Massimo d'Azeglio, continued the work of reform by abolishing many of the powers and privileges of the Church, in spite of the strenuous opposition of the Pope. But the task of preparing Piedmont, and, indeed, all Italy, for a renewal of the struggle against Austria, was primarily the work of the third great Italian patriot, Count Cavour.

Camillo Benso di Cavour was a Piedmontese noble who had been born at Turin in 1810. He was educated at the Military Academy, and appointed one of the royal pages, but his hatred of the life led to his dismissal, and he entered the Army. In 1831 he renounced a military career and devoted himself to the administration of one of his father's country estates. Agriculture and commerce he found absorbing occupations, and he was not slow in introducing innovations of all kinds, such as the cultivation of sugar-beet. When Charles Albert granted Piedmont a constitution in 1847 Cavour became a politician, and despite his aristocratic prejudices a politician imbued with very Liberal ideas. Before long he was returned to the Assembly as Member for Turin, and in 1850 was appointed Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, to which soon afterwards were added the departments of the Navy and of Finance. In spite of the fact that his sarcastic, contemptuous, and somewhat crafty nature did not endear him to his colleagues, and that personally the King never really liked him, Cavour's ability won for him the position of Prime Minister in the autumn of 1852.

"Piedmont must begin," said Cavour, "by re-establishing in Europe, as well as in Italy, a position and a credit equal to her ambition." To do this he set about a programme of internal reform of his own devising. Trade treaties with other states brought about a mutual reduction of duties, for Cavour was a disciple of Adam Smith; railways, shipping,

banks, and a system of agrarian credit were all developed ; strenuous efforts were made to place Piedmontese finance on a sound and extended footing. But it was in foreign policy that he sought to find the key to the solution of the Austrian difficulty, and it is in this field that his statesmanship made its chief contribution to the Italian cause.

The war of 1848-49 had taught Cavour that Italy stood a poor chance of freeing herself by her own exertions. At the same time events in the Papal States showed him not only that France was the natural rival of the Austrians in Italy—that had been clear for long enough—but that France was willing to forestall, and perhaps even to oppose, the influence of Austria by force of arms. Upon these convictions was based Cavour's decision to join in the Crimean War on the side of the Liberal Powers, England and France. To most of his compatriots this step appeared in the light of a mad wastage of Italian resources in an alien cause. None the less Cavour had his way, and in 1855 General La Marmora left for the seat of war with 15,000 men, a force that afterwards was substantially increased. "I am persuaded that the laurels which our soldiers will gather in the plains of the east will do more for the future of Italy than all that has been done by those who have thought by declamation and writing to effect her regeneration," said Cavour in defending his action, and the results justified his policy. Despite the enormous expense undertaken to ensure what appeared at the time to be distant and nebulous advantages, the Sardinian army, which performed excellent work at the battle of the Tchernaya, gained much in experience and fighting quality. The prestige of newly acquired military glory was no small consideration if Sardinia were ever again to lead Italy against the Austrians, after the disasters of Custozza and Novara. Moreover, Sardinia now assumed some importance in Europe, as the accepted ally of two Great Powers.

But perhaps the most far-reaching result of the war came from Cavour's attendance at the peace conference at Paris in 1856. The Austrian delegate tried in vain to prevent his admission on an equal footing with the representatives of the other Powers, but Cavour found that he had a friend in Lord Clarendon, who towards the end of the conference surprised the meeting by denouncing the state of affairs in Naples and the Papal States. Cavour contributed a very moderate speech on the condition of Italy ; the Austrian delegate protested, and no resolution was taken. Nevertheless, as Cavour himself said on his return to Turin, the Italian question had for the future become a European one. Although inquiries proved that England would contribute nothing but moral support, Cavour now definitely made up his mind that the assistance of France could, and must, be obtained.

Warned by the opinion of the Congress, Austria began, through the medium of the Archduke Maximilian, to institute a series of Liberal

reforms in Lombardy. At the same time military preparations proceeded in Piedmont, where a National Society appeared in 1857, pledged to secure "the Union of Italy, one and indivisible, under Victor Emmanuel as King." But the task of showing Napoleon III wherein lay the answer to the question he had propounded in 1855, "What can be done for Italy?" received a check. On the night of January 14, 1858, Napoleon and the Empress were approaching the Paris Opera House on their way to attend a State performance when three bombs were thrown at their carriage. The resulting concussion blew out all the gas-lamps and plunged the street into darkness. The crowd was thrown into confusion, 156 people being wounded by the flying splinters, eight of whom died later. Napoleon himself struggled from the wreckage of his coach with no worse damage than a scratch on the nose. The author of the plot, who was arrested with his confederates, proved to be an Italian named Felice Orsini. Napoleon's anger found vent in a strongly worded protest to England, where the plot had been hatched, and a demand that strong measures should be taken against the democratic element in Sardinia. But Victor Emmanuel refused to be bullied. "Our house," he wrote, "has carried its head high for 850 years, and no one will make me bow it." Napoleon was impressed by this attitude, and Cavour was able to continue his plans unchecked.

Napoleon's desire to do something for Italy was genuine. His character was not without a streak of idealism, and he could never forget his participation in the rebellions of 1831. In addition he was anxious to overthrow the settlement of 1815, to acquire for France in Europe something of the predominance so long enjoyed by Austria, to gain the friendship of the Italian state on his borders, and if possible to win military glory and the 'natural frontier' of the Alps. Consequently it was by his wish that a secret meeting took place between himself and Cavour at Plombières in July 1858. The result was a verbal agreement by which Napoleon undertook, in the event of a war occurring between Austria and Sardinia within the next twelve months, and in which Austria was the aggressor, to render military assistance until Italy was "freed to the Adriatic." France was to contribute 200,000 troops, and Sardinia 100,000; a North Italian kingdom, including Lombardy, Venetia, and the northern part of the Papal States, was to be secured for the house of Savoy. For this France was to receive Savoy on the French side of the Alps, and, in the event of Parma and Modena also being included in the Italian kingdom, Nice as well. Plans were made for the formation of a central state of which Tuscany was to form the nucleus. The whole was to become a loose confederacy under the Pope; actually it would have been under the protection of France. This agreement was to be secured by a dynastic marriage between the Sardinian Princess Clothilde and Napoleon's cousin,

Prince Jerome. It now only remained for Cavour to provoke Austria to a declaration of war.

The War of Liberation in the North (1859-60). The treaty between France and Sardinia, embodying the terms agreed upon at Plombières, was signed on January 18, 1859. Already the shadow of events to come had fallen across Europe. On New Year's Day Napoleon had expressed his regret to the Austrian Ambassador that relations between France and Austria were not so good as formerly, and a few days later Victor Emmanuel, in opening his Parliament at Turin, stated that his Government "was not insensible to the cry of anguish that came from many parts of Italy." These unmistakable hints plunged Italy into enthusiasm and Europe into alarm. Both Queen Victoria and Lord Derby made it clear that England would oppose any forcible alteration in the treaties of 1815. There was no telling what the attitude of the German Diet might be. So great was the apprehension aroused in Europe generally that by March Napoleon had begun to waver. On the 18th of that month he suggested, at the instigation of Russia, that a European Congress should examine the Italian question. Much against his will Cavour agreed, and the proposal was also accepted by Prussia and Britain, though Lord Malmesbury, the British Foreign Secretary, grumbled that Britain could not "go on running from one to the other like an old aunt trying to make up family squabbles." Austria, however, refused to attend the Congress unless Sardinia first disarmed. Ever since the beginning of the year it was realized that volunteers, many of them from Lombardy and Venetia, were pouring into Piedmont. At the end of February Garibaldi had been summoned from Caprera to organize these men into a guerrilla force, a policy that was not without its effect in helping to make war inevitable.

Cavour now insisted on the right of Sardinia to be admitted to the proposed Congress without previously submitting to any conditions not accepted by Austria. Had all the Powers been unanimous in compelling his agreement to preliminary terms he would have been forced to concur, but fortunately for him Austria put herself in the wrong by delivering on April 23 an ultimatum demanding the immediate disarmament of Sardinia. This was at once refused; Austrian troops invaded Piedmont, and the necessary conditions for compelling Napoleon's adherence to the treaty were thus fulfilled. England warned Austria that she had forfeited all claim to support. The replacement of Derby's Government by that of Lord Palmerston a few weeks later was to prove a further accession of moral support for the Italian cause. Meanwhile Victor Emmanuel had made his position clear. "I fight for the right of the whole nation," he proclaimed. "I have no other ambition than to be the first soldier of Italian independence."

On April 29 Napoleon declared war upon Austria; his armies

poured into Piedmont, and early in May he himself arrived to take command. For Austria the military situation was not promising. The railway system was incomplete, the heavy guns for the Quadrilateral had not yet arrived, and the number of troops within reach of the Ticino was insufficient. Added to this, the procrastination of Marshal Giulai, who omitted to attack the Sardinians in force before their allies could concentrate, deprived Austria of her best chance of success.

Before the end of May several minor successes had fallen to the Allies. On June 4 they won a pitched battle at Magenta, the result of which was the occupation of Milan four days later. Lombardy was declared to be a part of Victor Emmanuel's kingdom, and revolution raised its head throughout the Central Duchies and the Papal States. The Emperor Francis Joseph now arrived to assume command of the Austrian army. He proved to be no more successful than Giulai, for on June 24 the Austrians were defeated at the great battle of Solferino. Meanwhile Garibaldi, in command of the volunteer *Cacciatori delle Alpi* ('Alpine Chasseurs'), had been conducting an independent campaign in the foothills of the Alps, in the course of which he had got the better of three Austrian brigades. The Austrian army was now, therefore, confined to Venetia and the Quadrilateral. At this juncture the progress of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour suffered an unexpected check.

For some time Napoleon had been growing uneasy about his participation in the war. Undertaken in the first instance with the idea that the expulsion of the Austrians would be followed by a federation more or less under French control, the war had now become a movement for unity and independence. It was obvious that the Italians, having got rid of one foreign domination, were not likely to tolerate another. It seemed also that the Pope would lose such temporal power as still remained to him. This last consideration was of great importance, for the clerical influence in France, headed by the Empress herself, was becoming increasingly opposed to the war. Added to all this, two military considerations had arisen: the Austrians were now securely posted in the Quadrilateral, from which it was doubtful whether they could ever be dislodged, and Prussia was mobilizing troops as a preliminary to suggesting mediation. With the bulk of the French army and military resources already in Italy, the situation of Paris, comparatively close to the Rhine frontier, might be precarious. In view of all this Napoleon decided to make peace. On July 9 he met Francis Joseph at Villafranca, and an armistice was signed. It was agreed that Venetia and the Quadrilateral should remain in Austrian hands, that Lombardy, with the river Mincio as its frontier, was to be given up to Napoleon for transference to Piedmont, and that the Duchy of Parma was also to be surrendered to Victor Emmanuel. Tuscany, Modena, and the Romagna were to be restored to their former rulers. As regards the

future of Italy, it was agreed to sponsor the original scheme for a federation under the Pope.

There can be little doubt that Napoleon had ample excuse for his withdrawal from the war, but his method of doing so, behind the back of his ally, naturally provoked bitter resentment in Italy. Victor Emmanuel was forced to agree, but Cavour was so furious at what he believed to be the utter ruin of his hopes that after an angry scene he tendered his resignation. "I am left alone to face the music," said the King bitterly as he accepted it. In England the news augmented the growing sympathy with the Italians, and Palmerston made it clear that he regarded Villafranca in the light of a betrayal.

But there were soon intimations that matters could not be settled so easily as the two Emperors supposed. The people of Tuscany, Modena, and the Romagna were in no mood to accept the old order again. The centre of interest was thus transferred to these states. During the course of the war their rulers had fled, and they were now under provisional Governments directed by Piedmontese commissioners. The outlying provinces of the Papal States had also risen in revolt, but with the exception of the Romagna had been reconquered by the Papal forces. After Villafranca the Piedmontese commissioners were recalled, though hints were conveyed that this order need not be obeyed. In Tuscany affairs could safely be left in the hands of the patriot Ricasoli,¹ but in the Romagna the commissioner remained at his post. Before long that province was united with Modena and Parma, as a new state with the name of Emilia. It was governed by Farini,² the former Piedmontese commissioner of Modena, and its military forces soon entered into a league with those of Tuscany. Garibaldi was second-in-command of this league, and set about making plans for an attack on the Papal States. This project he abandoned at the desire of Victor Emmanuel and his new Prime Minister, Rattazzi; so, leaving Central Italy, Garibaldi retired for the time being to Genoa, convinced that a wrong policy was being pursued and that golden opportunities were being lost.

In November the treaty of peace between France and Austria was signed at Zürich. It was now quite obvious that the Central States would be satisfied with nothing less than annexation by Piedmont, for Napoleon would not allow Austria to restore the old rulers, and the Pope had already refused his consent to the scheme for a federation. Napoleon toyed with the idea of a European Congress, but the publication of a pamphlet called *The Pope and the Congress*, probably written by Napoleon himself, wrecked the scheme because it suggested that the Pope should lose all his dominions except the Patrimony of St Peter.

¹ Bettino, Baron Ricasoli (1809–80).

² Luigi Carlo Farini (1812–66).

In January 1860 Cavour returned to office. Without hesitation he immediately set about the task of bringing Central Italy under the rule of Victor Emmanuel. Napoleon agreed that in the event of a plebiscite declaring in favour of such a course he would raise no objection, provided Savoy and Nice were ceded to France as originally promised. In March the plebiscites were held with the result anticipated, and Tuscany and Emilia became a part of the Italian kingdom. Shortly afterwards plebiscites in Savoy and Nice produced, under pressure from the Government, a vote in favour of annexation by France, and the transfer was carried out. One can argue that geographically speaking Savoy is a part of France, and that Napoleon was entitled to some compensation for the rise of a powerful new state on his borders, already numbering over 10,000,000 people. But his action provoked grave disquietude in England and a strongly worded protest from Palmerston's Government. Garibaldi, and many another Italian patriot with him, bitterly deplored Cavour's action in striking such a bargain, though in view of all the circumstances it is difficult to see how he could have made a better one.

The War of Liberation in the South (1860-61). The changes that had taken place in North Italy affected profoundly the situation in the south. Ferdinand II of Naples (King 'Bomba') had died in May 1859, to be succeeded by his irresolute son, Francis II. The latter's new Minister, General Falingieri, made an attempt to introduce Liberal reforms into the constitution, but was soon forced to retire from public life. Theoretically Francis II's position should not have been easy to assail; he had a well-equipped regular army of nearly 100,000 men, capable, if properly led, of controlling any movement that might arise among the degraded Neapolitan peasantry. The army, however, as in the days of 1820, was far from trustworthy. "Dress them how you like, they will run away all the same," a former Neapolitan ruler had said of his troops. The officers were disaffected and sometimes illiterate, and in the year that Francis came to the throne the military situation was still further weakened by the disbanding of the Swiss regiments in Neapolitan pay.

The Sardinian Government proposed to Naples an alliance against Austria. It is doubtful whether the offer could have been seriously meant, but in any case the news soon arrived that Naples was planning instead an alliance with Austria and the Pope. Such an arrangement might prove a very definite threat to the existence of the new kingdom in North Italy. But it was difficult for Cavour to take direct action without finding himself confronted by France, and possibly by Austria as well. In these circumstances Garibaldi was allowed to play the part on which his fame principally rests. Even Mazzini once more gained a little momentary influence.

Mazzini had done little to further the cause during the War of Liberation in the north. In 1859 he was in Tuscany, but since he could not bring himself wholeheartedly to support the house of Savoy, and was bitterly opposed to the alliance with Napoleon, he could do no good and returned to England. Sicily, as ever the most restless part of the Neapolitan dominions, now offered the best field for his activities. There his agents endeavoured throughout the year 1859 to fan the embers of revolt. It was hoped to obtain the services of Garibaldi as leader. The latter answered the invitation from Sicily with the words, "Unite yourselves to our programme—Italy and Victor Emmanuel!" and insisted that if ever he were to be tempted south the Sicilians must first rise and show the strength and quality of their rebellion.

On April 4, 1860, a desperate little rising broke out at Palermo. There were 20,000 Neapolitan troops quartered in or near the town, so the movement was easily suppressed. But under the leadership of two of Mazzini's agents, Francesco Crispi and Rosalino Pilo, the insurrection was kept alive elsewhere in the island. Garibaldi's aid had once more been invoked, and by this time he was already making his preparations near Genoa. Ostensibly Victor Emmanuel and Cavour refused their assistance, and the former forbade any of his soldiers to join the expedition. Actually several of his officers did so, and Cavour, seeing that the only hope for a united Italy lay in the success of this rebellion, gave all the secret encouragement in his power. On May 5 Garibaldi and his 'Thousand,'¹ having seized two merchant vessels, the *Piemonte* and the *Lombardo*, started on their hazardous adventure. During the campaign in the Alps the red shirts had not been seen, for fear of wounding French susceptibilities. Now Garibaldi appeared once more in the old fashion, with red shirt and grey cloak, and fifty similar shirts were distributed among his followers.

On May 11 Garibaldi landed at Marsala. Within a few weeks he had defeated the Neapolitan 'regulars' at Calatafimi, captured Palermo, and overrun almost the entire island. Thousands of the enemy's troops surrendered on condition that they were allowed to leave for the mainland, and many more remained 'neutral' in their fortresses. Garibaldi was made Dictator of the island, a position that he wisely decided to retain for the time being, in spite of Cavour's proposal that Sicily should be handed over to Victor Emmanuel forthwith. A most difficult situation faced Cavour in consequence. All depended on the attitude of the rest of Europe, especially the Mediterranean naval Powers, Britain and France, for it was evident that matters could not be left as they were, and that an attack on Naples itself must follow. Napoleon was not inclined to allow any such thing, for he had no wish to see the rise

¹ 1089 actually landed with Garibaldi in Sicily.

of a united Italy, and as Russell and Palmerston cared much more for liberty than any other principle they also were disposed towards an Italy consisting of two states rather than one. Napoleon now proposed joint naval action to prevent Garibaldi from crossing to the mainland, but the English Government, unwilling to encourage any further intervention by France in Italian affairs, refused. The ultimate success of the whole scheme was thus assured. When, soon afterwards, the Sardinians made their attack on the Papal States the English Ministers went still further. The open displeasure of the European Powers, which might so easily have taken concrete form and compelled Sardinia to desist, was held in check by Russell's grandiloquent approval of "the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties and consolidating the work of their independence." It was England, therefore, rather than France that won from the Italians a gratitude destined to be held in remembrance for many years, though in doing so she convinced the rest of Europe that her foreign policy was guided by self-interest alone.

In August Garibaldi and his forces crossed to the mainland. His march northward resembled a triumphal progress, and on September 7 he entered the city of Naples, whence Francis II had already fled. Here also Garibaldi proclaimed himself Dictator, and the situation became one of extreme difficulty for Cavour. He had indirectly assisted Garibaldi and braved the displeasure of Austria by refusing aid to Francis II in his hour of need, though, on the other hand, Garibaldi showed signs of breaking completely away from any control exercised by the Sardinian Government. Mazzini had re-entered the field, and was once more vigorously advocating republicanism. In view of Garibaldi's noted antipathy to Cavour, this constituted a very definite danger, especially when, refusing as yet to hand over his conquests to Victor Emmanuel on the ground that they were incomplete, Garibaldi announced his intention of attacking Rome as soon as he had dealt with Francis II and the Neapolitan army. Such a course would certainly mean the intervention of Napoleon III, whose troops were still garrisoning Rome and the Patrimony of St Peter.

Cavour decided on a bold course. In the Papal States, in addition to a number of ex-Austrian troops in Umbria and the Marches, a new force of Catholics, drawn from Ireland, Belgium, and elsewhere in Europe, and pledged to defend the dominions of the Pope, had now reached the formidable number of 15,000. This force was commanded by a retired French Army officer, General Lamoricière, well known as an opponent of the Third Empire. It was obvious that sooner or later an attempt would be made to recover the Romagna from Victor Emmanuel. With this as an excuse Cavour sent an ultimatum to the Pope, demanding that these forces should be disbanded. Four days

later, in default of a favourable reply, Sardinian troops invaded Umbria and the Marches. Napoleon had agreed that their appearance in Naples, *via* the Papal States, was the only way to keep Garibaldi's ambition within bounds, and had promised to take no action provided the province controlled by his own troops remained untouched. For the sake of appearances, however, he broke off relations with Turin.

On September 18 the Papal army was defeated at Castelfidardo, and shortly afterwards Ancona was occupied by the Sardinians. Meanwhile Garibaldi was striving to drive the Neapolitan army from the banks of the Volturno. He was eventually successful, but his failure to reduce Capua and Gaeta before Umbria and the Marches had been entirely overrun by the Sardinian army resulted in the complete success of Cavour's policy. In October Victor Emmanuel entered Neapolitan territory at the head of his army, authorized by the Turin Parliament to annex Southern Italy if the results of a plebiscite were favourable. Garibaldi and his shabby 'staff' waited by the roadside as the glittering Sardinian troops filed past. When the King approached he rode forward to meet him, removed his hat, and cried, "*Saluto il primo Re d'Italia!*" With these words the cause of Italian unity triumphed, for in uttering them Garibaldi proclaimed his fealty to Victor Emmanuel, about which so many fears had been current.

On October 21 plebiscites were held in Naples and Sicily. Out of a population of one and three-quarter million less than eleven thousand voted against annexation by Victor Emmanuel. In Umbria and the Marches, where a plebiscite was held a few days later, the result was even more striking, only some fifteen hundred people expressing a wish to remain under the rule of the Pope.

Garibaldi's task was now complete, and the jealousy of the regular Army officers soon made it clear that he and his men were needed no longer. Gradually the Sardinian army overcame the resistance of the remaining Neapolitan strongholds, and Francis II fled to Rome. On November 7 Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi, sitting side by side in the royal carriage, made a triumphal entry into Naples. Then the man whose idealism and inspired leadership had made this possible stole quietly away to Caprera, with no other reward than a little borrowed money and a bag of seed-corn for his farm.

In February 1861 the new Italian Parliament met at Turin. Only Venetia and the Patrimony of St Peter remained outside its jurisdiction. Cavour, whose masterly statesmanship had woven victory out of a situation that seemed to promise sure defeat, was not destined to see the final consummation of Italian unity. On June 6, 1861, his end hastened by the responsibilities and anxieties of office, he died, as much a martyr to his country's cause as any patriot who fell before an Austrian bullet.

The Conquest of Venetia and Rome. Although 1861 witnessed the practical completion of Italian unity, it was obvious that nationalist aspirations would not be satisfied while Austria remained in possession of Venice, and Rome was denied to the Italians as their 'natural capital.' Negotiations were already on foot with Napoleon for the withdrawal of the French troops, when in July 1862 Garibaldi decided to take the law into his own hands and carry the city by storm. With a guerrilla army numbering about 4000, mostly recruited in Sicily, he marched northward towards Rome. Once again Victor Emmanuel's Government was put to the necessity of stopping him at all costs, and a skirmish took place at Aspromonte. Garibaldi was wounded and taken prisoner, and the episode came to an inglorious close.

In 1865 the Italian capital was transferred from Turin to Florence. This was in consequence of an agreement with Napoleon, under the terms of which all French troops were eventually to be withdrawn from Italy. In the same year Victor Emmanuel offered to purchase Venetia, and to assist Austria in the event of a conflict with Prussia. The offer was refused, and in consequence Austria found in Italy an enemy instead of a friend when she came face to face with Prussia in the following year.

On April 8, 1866, Italy and Prussia signed a treaty, the former agreeing to attack Austria in the event of Prussia going to war within three months. When Bismarck delivered his attack on Austria the terms of the treaty were carried out. Italy declared war on June 20; four days later her army, under General La Marmora, was soundly defeated by the Austrians at Custozza. The campaign continued, however, for the Austrians were crippled by the defeat of Sadowa, and were forced to withdraw troops from Italy. Garibaldi once more conducted a campaign with his volunteers in the Alps. But the war as a whole was an inglorious episode in Italian history. At sea matters fared no better, for the Austrian fleet had little difficulty in defeating the Italians near the island of Lissa. It was due solely to Bismarck that Italy received Venetia as a result of this campaign. The Austrians handed the province over to Napoleon for transference to Victor Emmanuel. Garibaldi was intensely chagrined that Italy should have won it in such a way. As it was, Italy was forced to leave the valley of the Trentino, which she had claimed, in Austrian hands.

By 1867 the French army, in accordance with the previous agreement, had officially been withdrawn from Rome. Once again Garibaldi, to whom the capture of Rome had become a crowning ambition, decided to make an attack. Slipping away from Caprera, where the Italian Government sought to detain him, he landed on the mainland and defeated the Papal army at Monte Rotondo, only to see his volunteer

force destroyed at Mentana by the French, who had hastily returned. The clerical party in France had forced Napoleon to resume his protection of the Papacy. Again the French troops remained on Italian soil.

But the end of the Pope's temporal power was already in sight. In the summer of 1870, with defeat at the hands of Prussia confronting him, and the ruin of his tottering Empire imminent at last, Napoleon withdrew his forces from Italy. Victor Emmanuel, after an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Pope to assent to a peaceful occupation of the Holy City, ordered his troops to attack, and on September 20 Rome was occupied. A plebiscite showed an overwhelming majority in favour of annexation, and Rome became the capital of Italy. Garibaldi was kept carefully out of the way until the deed was accomplished.

While the steadfastness and courage of Victor Emmanuel and the genuine desire of Napoleon III to 'do something for Italy' played a considerable part, the credit of bringing the Italian nation into being belongs primarily to the three men whose careers we have briefly traced. Cavour, the statesman, was dead before the final scenes were enacted; Mazzini, the prophet, and Garibaldi, the soldier, both lived to see the first Parliament at Rome. During the War of Liberation Mazzini's influence had been slight, but both then and afterwards he never ceased to continue his agitations on behalf of republicanism. The capture of Rome by the house of Savoy was the death-knell of his hopes. To the end he refused to accept an amnesty at the hands of Victor Emmanuel, though he was often in Italy under an assumed name. He died peacefully at Pisa on March 10, 1872. Ten years later, on June 2, 1882, Garibaldi died at Caprera, his last years, like those of Mazzini, clouded by disillusion and defeat. None the less of all the Italian patriots his memory remains with his countrymen the most beloved and honoured.

SUMMARY

(1) *The Settlement of 1815*

- (a) Lombardy and Venetia given to Austria.
- (b) Three large states (Sardinia, Papal States, Naples), four small states (Tuscany, Parma, Modena, Lucca).
- (c) Habsburg influence strong everywhere; only Sardinia had a native Italian king.

(2) *The Revolutions of 1820-21*

- (a) Rebellion in Naples; defeated by Austrian troops at Rieti.
- (b) Rebellion in Piedmont; Charles Albert's constitution set aside by Charles Felix.
- (c) Silvio Pellico's book *My Prisons*.

- (3) *The Revolutions of 1831-32*
 - (a) Rebellions in Papal States, Modena, and Parma ; all suppressed by Austrian troops.
 - (b) Jealousy of Austria led France to occupy Ancona till 1838.
- (4) *Mazzini and the Society of Young Italy*
 - (a) 1831. Society of Young Italy founded at Marseilles, to 'organize and educate' Italians under forty for rebellion.
 - (b) Mazzini's aims : (i) Expel Austrians ; (ii) unite Italy ; (iii) establish a republic.
 - (c) 1833. Failure of attempted rebellions ; Mazzini exiled in Switzerland and England.
- (5) *The Rise of the Moderates (1843-47)*
 - (a) Gioberti's *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians*.
 - (b) Balbo's *Hopes of Italy*.
 - (c) Liberal reforms initiated by Pius IX and by Charles Albert.
- (6) *The Revolutions of 1848-49*
 - (a) March 1848. Constitutions granted in Naples, Piedmont, and Rome ; rebellions in Venetia and Lombardy.
 - (b) Charles Albert declared war on Austria.
 - (c) July. Sardinian defeat at Custoza ; armistice signed.
 - (d) March 1849. War renewed ; Sardinian defeat at Novara ; abdication of Charles Albert.
- (7) *The Roman Republic*
 - (a) November 1848. Murder of Rossi ; flight of the Pope.
 - (b) February 1849. Proclamation of Roman Republic ; Mazzini one of the Triumvirs.
 - (c) July 1849. General Oudinot entered Rome to restore the Pope, after defence by Garibaldi.
- (8) *Cavour and Napoleon III*
 - (a) Italian hopes now centred on Victor Emmanuel I ; Cavour became his Prime Minister in 1852.
 - (b) Sardinia allied with Britain and France in Crimean War ; Cavour at peace conference.
 - (c) 1858. Meeting at Plombières between Cavour and Napoleon.
- (9) *The War of Liberation in the North (1859-60)*
 - (a) April 1859. Sardinia and France began war against Austria ; battles of Magenta and Solferino.
 - (b) Peace of Villafranca (July) ; France withdrew ; Cavour resigned.
 - (c) January 1860. Cavour returned to office ; Central Duchies and Romagna added to Sardinia ; Savoy and Nice ceded to France.
- (10) *The War of Liberation in the South (1860-61)*
 - (a) Revolt in Sicily ; Garibaldi and the 'Thousand' landed and captured the island.
 - (b) Garibaldi crossed to Naples ; Victor Emmanuel invaded the Papal States.
 - (c) Naples, Umbria, and the Marches added to the Italian state.
- (11) *The Conquest of Venetia and Rome*
 - (a) 1866. Venetia ceded to Italy after the Seven Weeks War.
 - (b) 1870. Rome captured during the Franco-Prussian War.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The part played in securing Italian unity by Mazzini, Cavour, and Garibaldi.
- (2) The extent to which foreign influence assisted the Italian cause.

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CHAPTER VII


BISMARCK AND THE UNION OF GERMANY

HISTORICAL generalizations are easy, and therefore dangerous, since they inevitably contain half-truths. The statecraft and militarism of the Hohenzollerns, so successful in raising Prussia to the status of a first-class Power, only to be followed after so brief an interval by her complete humiliation at the hands of Napoleon, might seem but the prelude to a renewed demonstration of Prussian might, once Europe had removed the Gallic menace from the political scene. It is in this light that many have reviewed the career of Bismarck and his success in uniting Germany under Prussian leadership. Many years, however, elapsed after 1815 before that great statesman assumed the chief control in Prussian affairs, and during that period the national consciousness of the German race, which had awakened and developed under the French yoke, grew steadily in strength and flourished all the more since it was nursed in adversity and seemed fated to find its expression only in sentimental dreams and the cherishing of thwarted ambitions. When Bismarck started to build he used once more the old materials, and used them in much the same manner. Like Frederick the Great, he found the foundations already prepared. But they were foundations of a very different character, and it is here that the comparison between Germany in the eighteenth and Germany in the nineteenth century breaks down.

The Confederation of Germany (1815-48). German participation in the final stages of the struggle against Napoleon had been largely a national movement, organized in consequence of the spontaneous reaction against the economic hardships imposed by the French control of Central Europe, though the Governments of a few of the German states had remained faithful to France until the last moment. The remaking of a map, the boundaries of which had shown constant fluctuation for the past twenty years, was no easy matter. Peace congresses work at the end of wars, when every one is exhausted and the natural temptation is to effect the speediest solution possible. It is therefore not surprising that the solution reached at Vienna was a combination of the state of affairs before the French Revolution and the alterations imposed by Napoleonic rule.

By the Act of Confederation, which formed a part of the Treaty of Vienna, Germany became a Confederation of thirty-nine states, the sole political link between them being a Federal Diet in which it was intended that matters affecting the German states as a whole should be settled. All states were represented in the Diet, though its assemblies were arranged in such a manner that for all ordinary purposes the larger states had more power than the smaller. Austria, the ruler of which had for long held the premier position among the German princes, received the presidency of this Diet. The only other state at all comparable to her in size and influence was Prussia, her territory now greatly increased by the addition of Swedish Pomerania in the north, the province of Posen and the fortress of Thorn on her eastern border, about half Saxony and Thuringia in the south, the Altmark to the west of the Elbe, and with her former Rhine territories expanded into the provinces of Westphalia and Rhenish Prussia. Of the other larger states Hanover, now restored to the British Crown, became a kingdom, as were Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony, an honour granted them by Napoleon which they were allowed to retain.

There were several reasons why the peace settlement as regards Germany was weak and incomplete, and also several notable defects that make it easy to see now that the germs of future discord were already present. In the first place, the Diet was not a purely German body, concerned with German affairs alone. Hanover belonged to the King of England, Holstein to the King of Denmark, Luxemburg to the King of the Netherlands, yet all these states were included in the Germanic Confederation. Conversely, the two most important states in the Confederation, Prussia and Austria, owned territories that lay outside it—for example, in Poland and Hungary. In the case of Austria this factor was to have a very important influence on the course of events. Thirdly, the striking increase in the power of Prussia altered the political balance of Central Europe and presaged further change. The *Fürstenbund* of Frederick the Great and the policy it embodied had by no means been forgotten; Austria must hold closely to her premier position in Germany or see the leadership pass to her great Protestant rival in the north. Moreover, the new distribution of Prussian territory had tended to shift her political balance. The gains of Frederick the Great had been made along his eastern frontier; the principal increases of 1815, however, were along the course of the Rhine. The German delegates to the peace conference had tried to recover Alsace and a part of Lorraine from France, holding them to be the illegal acquisitions of Louis XIV and his successor, but their claims had not been admitted. As it was, however, the new Rhenish provinces did much to keep alive that antagonism between the Gallic and Germanic races which has become such an unfortunate feature of modern



PRUSSIA IN 1815

history. The economic and industrial importance of these provinces, which tended still further to throw the balance of Prussian interests towards the Rhine, increased steadily as the century advanced, and ended by practically converting Prussia into a western Power.

Another source of future upheaval lay in the constitution of the Confederation itself and the attitude of its own members. The Federal Diet had no executive and no federal army as such. Its decrees had to be carried out by the individual Governments—or not, as those Governments chose. It had been intended that constitutions should be set up in the German states, but Metternich,¹ the Austrian Chancellor, who was by far the most important statesman in Europe at this time, was vitally interested in maintaining things as they were, both territorially and politically. “My realm is like a worm-eaten house,” said the Austrian Emperor Francis I; “if one part is removed one cannot tell how much may fall.” Metternich’s influence, therefore, was directed towards maintaining the *status quo*, and since the question of German unity was closely bound up with the movement for political freedom, he strove to keep the Diet weak and the bonds of the Confederation loose. In this matter the mutual jealousies of the German princes played into his hands. The Austrian delegates in the Diet therefore tended to obstruct effective action, and the Confederation remained a mere league of rulers. All other nations in Europe had their national flag, their army, their common solidarity in the face of foreign Powers. Germany alone had none of these things.

The rivalry of Austria and Prussia in the Germanic Confederation became apparent the very first time that the Diet met in 1816, and the struggle that was so soon to come for the mastery of Central Europe was immediately foreshadowed. It seemed to the Prussians that any policy on which both they and the Austrians were agreed could easily be imposed on the rest of the Diet, but when Metternich received a hint to this effect he promptly turned the suggestion to his own advantage by informing the lesser German states that Prussia was trying to subvert the constitution of the Diet at their expense. Distrust and fear of Prussia therefore spread among the smaller members; while Metternich’s influence was enhanced. The first round of the contest, slight and obscure as it was, thus went in favour of Austria. It became easy for her to obstruct action in the Federal Diet to such an extent that any hopes of German unity that had centred round it were soon buried and forgotten, more especially since the Diet agreed that the framing of constitutional Governments for the German peoples was not its concern, but must be left to the rulers of the individual states themselves.

In this matter the states of Southern Germany led the way. Nassau

¹ Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince Metternich-Winneburg (1773–1859).

had already proclaimed a constitution : within a few years the Grand Duke of Weimar followed suit, then Württemberg, Bavaria, and Baden, though the Württemberg constitution was soon revoked. But the most important question was whether King Frederick William III would carry out his promise and grant a constitution for Prussia. There were many difficulties in the way. Prussia was now a heterogeneous collection of provinces, differing in outlook, religion, and even race, hardly conscious as yet of a common bond, and strangely enough without much real enthusiasm for a share in the central Government. None the less Frederick William might have made the experiment if it had not been for an extraordinary incident that took place in 1817, and the capital Metternich made of it. There had grown up throughout Germany societies of students known as *Bürschenschaften*, bands of patriotic young Liberals whose noisiness was out of all proportion to their importance. In Weimar these Liberals were particularly active, and at a festival held at the Wartburg (the Grand Duke's castle), to celebrate the battle of Leipzig, they went so far as to make a bonfire of unpopular literature, including the Prussian 'Code of Police Law.' When it became known that the flames had also been fed with those symbols of military autocracy, a Uhlan's stays and a corporal's cane, practically every Government in Germany was convinced that a dangerous revolutionary movement had been brought to light. The poor Grand Duke of Weimar was bombarded with reproaches for permitting and encouraging such things, and the dangers of experimenting with constitutional forms of government were magnified on all sides. In view of this when the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle met in the following year Metternich found it quite ready to listen with respect to his reactionary point of view.

Even now Prussia might in time have got her central Parliament, for the old Minister Hardenberg was devoted to the scheme. But once more the German democrats played into Metternich's hands. In March 1819 a student named Karl Sand murdered the journalist Kotzebue, who had shown himself an ardent admirer of Russian despotism. Sand's action evoked a good deal of approval, especially on the part of his fellow-students, and once more fear of revolutionary agitations became widespread among the rulers of Germany. In Prussia the police were armed with special powers, and the King invited Metternich to confer with him at Teplitz. The agreement concluded there between Austria and Prussia was promulgated by the Carlsbad Decrees, drawn up later in the year at a conference to which the other principal German states were invited. For the next thirty years these decrees stifled the rising spirit of German Liberal hopes, for they were reactionary in the extreme. A special commission was set up at Mainz to investigate the extent of the democratic movement ; the Press was subjected to

censorship, and the *Bürschenschaften* and similar gymnastic unions were disbanded.

Austrian influence, as embodied in the policy of Metternich, was now supreme. Frederick William of Prussia had been over-persuaded, and determined to content himself with local diets for his separate provinces. All chance of uniting Germany into a strong federal state appeared to be past; Austria had shown that she would never allow it, since it would limit her power, Prussia had fallen into line with Austrian policy, and no other state was strong enough to take the lead. Germany, said Prince Hohenlohe of Bavaria, slumbered for thirty years, and the bed in which she slept was the so-called Federal Diet at Frankfort. None the less the slumber was disturbed by uneasy dreams. Throughout Germany the universities kept alive the idea of an intellectual and cultural solidarity, while the conviction grew apace that the leadership of Austria, with her outworn institutions and reactionary principles, could point the way to no future of development for the Germanic race. But meanwhile there was growing in the north of Germany an economic movement that we must examine before turning to the outbreak of Liberalism that spread before the middle of the century from end to end of the whole European continent.

The Zollverein. After 1815 Prussia dominated the north of Germany. She controlled either the mouths or some part of the course of most of the great rivers that offered the natural trade outlets to the sea, and was in a position to charge heavy transit duties on goods crossing her territories. Her soil was poor, and therefore as population increased she was forced to turn to the development of industry for its support. At first the situation was not encouraging; Britain had obtained a commanding position in foreign trade, denied so far to nations constantly under the threat or the actuality of war for the past twenty years, though the operation of the Continental System had in some cases proved beneficial to German industries. High tariff barriers and Navigation Laws protected the markets of Britain, France, and other European countries from foreign competition, and Prussia was therefore obliged to look principally to the German states round her. But the rulers of these states relied largely for their revenues on tariffs equally high. Moreover, the German map, even in its new simplified state, was such a *kaleidoscope* that the distribution of commodities from one part of Germany to another was an awkward and expensive business. The Prussian dominions themselves were not all in one piece, and there were several 'enclaves' reaching into the heart of the various provinces. All these considerations made some sort of customs union, or *Zollverein*, a necessity for Prussia.

The first step in this direction came between 1818 and 1820, when

Prussia abolished internal tariffs in her own provinces and made agreements by which the rulers of the several enclaves in her territory did the same, in return for fixed sums drawn upon the Prussian customs. In 1828 Hesse-Darmstadt joined, for by that time the advantages of the system had become evident, and it began to evoke considerable interest. The British Government viewed the new movement with dislike and strove to oppose it, for Britain had a valuable market in North-western Germany, where she was especially interested in the Hanse towns (which kept their customs duties very low), in the great fairs held at Frankfort and at Leipzig, and in the agricultural districts of Hanover and Mecklenburg. For some years, therefore, these states remained outside the Zollverein, though Prussia soon made progress elsewhere. Similar leagues had been formed in Central and South Germany, but they were short-lived. In 1831 Prussia broke up the former by detaching Hesse-Cassel and Saxony; between 1833 and 1836 Bavaria, Württemberg, Thuringia, Baden, and finally Frankfort joined the Prussian Zollverein. British influence had been strenuously exerted to keep the last-named out of the system, but we had in this country to realize at last that such opposition was fruitless.

The later history of the Zollverein completes the tale of Prussian success. Austria, strongly protectionist, while the Zollverein was moving in the direction of free trade, worked hard for its dissolution between 1849 and 1854, and succeeded in detaching some of the southern states, though these soon returned to their original alliance. During this period Hanover and Oldenburg also joined. The political importance of this union of German interests must not be exaggerated, but it was, nevertheless, considerable, especially when Prussia, on behalf of the union, began to make commercial treaties with foreign countries. Between 1844 and 1867 such treaties were signed with Belgium, France, Britain, and Italy, and for a time one was also in operation with Austria. In 1867 a *Zollparlament* (tariff Parliament) was set up to control customs revenue for the whole of Germany. But all this came at a later period: for the moment it is sufficient to remember that before the middle of the century there was one department of German affairs in which Prussia had, in spite of the jealousy of the smaller states, been able, by virtue of her controlling position, to take and maintain the lead.

The Revolutions of 1848-49. In 1840 Frederick William IV succeeded his father as King of Prussia. We have seen how the old king, in spite of his honest intentions to establish some form of constitutional government, had ultimately been won over, reluctantly enough, to the safer reactionary principles of Metternich. The new king was a likable yet rather peculiar character, not much in love with the Prussian system as he found it, anxious to experiment with new ideas and to

test the revivifying influence of the Liberal forces fermenting in his kingdom, yet sufficiently enamoured of the past and all that it stood for to own a mighty respect for the great autocratic house of Habsburg. A ruler such as this, drawn in one direction by his enthusiasms and in another by his loyalties, was hardly likely to act consistently in time of uncertainty, and upon this fact depended in no small degree the issue of the crisis that swept all Germany some eight years after he became a king. X

In 1847, in spite of the protestations of Metternich and the Tsar, Frederick William, announcing that he was about to fulfil the original intentions of his father, summoned a 'United Diet' of the eight Prussian provincial assemblies. The experiment, however, was a complete failure, because the powers of the new Diet were limited in practice to little more than the task of approving financial measures, and when the representatives claimed that Frederick William III's intentions had covered a much wider field, they were promptly dismissed. The net result was therefore merely to raise and then dash the hopes of the Liberal element in Prussia, and to give rise to a general feeling of dangerous tension.

Early in the following year the long-suppressed forces of constitutionalism burst forth and spread with startling rapidity all over Europe. In January a rebellion broke out in Naples and Sicily, resulting before long in a triumphant but short-lived constitution wrested from King Ferdinand. In February Louis-Philippe of France fled from his capital, and the Second Republic was declared. By March the movement had spread to Germany and the dominions of the Habsburgs. The Emperor was speedily overwhelmed by the demands of all nationalities among his subjects. The Magyars of Hungary, the Czechs of Bohemia, even the Viennese themselves, all demanded constitutions. Recognizing the downfall of the reactionary system that he had maintained for so long, Metternich resigned his Chancellorship and left Vienna in secrecy and haste. Successful risings and the granting of constitutions followed rapidly in many of the German states. Their chances of permanence depended very largely on the attitude adopted by Frederick William IV towards the Liberal movement in Prussia.

On March 4 the Prussian King promised to grant a constitution. Popular opinion in Germany, however, went far beyond the attainment of individual constitutions in the separate states, and the Liberal movements had become identified with an overwhelming demand for some scheme of centralized democratic government that should unite Germany as never before. On March 5 a body of reformers met at Heidelberg and after animated and enthusiastic discussion eventually decided on a plan devised by von Gagern, the Prime Minister of Darm-

stadt, for an all-German National Assembly, with an elected Chamber, a Senate to represent the individual states, and a President to be chosen later. It was agreed that the members should meet at Frankfort in May.

Meanwhile affairs were developing in Berlin, where something approaching a regular revolution broke out as soon as news arrived of the flight of Metternich from Vienna. Frederick William, visualizing the possibilities of the future, announced his practical agreement with von Gagern's scheme, and great was the rejoicing of the Prussian reformers. But an unfortunate incident soon gave a new turn to events. On March 18, while endeavouring to control the crowds round the palace, the Prussian soldiery unfortunately used their weapons, and a number of civilians were killed or wounded. This was too much for the amiable Frederick William, who stopped the action of the military, identified himself with the new movement, declared himself a nationalist, and announced that Prussia's interests should now be those of a united Germany. This appeared to be a great triumph for the revolutionaries everywhere, but it provoked profound suspicion from most of the other German rulers, and especially from the house of Habsburg. For the moment, however, the latter had its hands full at home, and all appeared to be progressing favourably when the new National Assembly met at Frankfort on May 18.

Much as the Habsburgs disliked the idea of the Frankfort Parliament, with its avowed intention of making Germany a nation at last, Austrian representatives were present, because it was felt that otherwise Prussia might have matters all her own way. The Austrian Archduke John was elected 'Imperial Vicar,' to hold office while a constitution was being evolved. All the delegates were full of enthusiasm, but, as in the early stages of the French Revolution, this meant that they were all full of ideas, and anxious to be heard. Fundamental principles were discussed at length, and autumn had arrived before the work of constitution-building really began. By that time the situation had become complicated by the progress of events in the Austrian dominions, and by the crystallization of certain conflicting interests that appeared insoluble. These turned chiefly upon the two principal German Powers, Austria and Prussia. Both these great states possessed provinces outside the boundaries of the Germanic Confederation. Frederick William was quite willing to include his Polish subjects, and Ferdinand I of Austria realized that his importance in the new state might suffer if he only represented the actual German population of Austria itself. Moreover, there was a considerable German population in Bohemia, which was determined to be included at all costs, although the Czech majority in that province was aiming at a Slav, rather than a German, state, and had accordingly summoned

✓ a Pan-Slav Congress to meet at Prague. It was this conflict of racial ambitions in Bohemia that gave the Austrian Emperor his chance to suppress the new forces altogether. In the troublous days of the spring he had granted self-governing constitutions in Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, so that he might be free to deal with the rising in North Italy and meet the attack launched upon his territories there by the neighbouring state of Sardinia. But in June, shortly after the Pan-Slav Congress met at Prague, Count Windischgrätz took advantage of the racial divisions there to bombard the city with Austrian artillery and re-establish the old *régime*. In July the advance of the Sardinian army in support of the rebels in North Italy was checked by the Austrian victory at Custozza; in August, finding that the Magyars were faced with a rising of their own particular 'minority,' the Croats, the Emperor Ferdinand seized the opportunity to cancel his concessions in Hungary; and, finally, when it was found that the Slavs and Germans could not agree in the Vienna Parliament, Count Windischgrätz arrived to repeat there his performance at Prague. Thus it came about that by the beginning of November 1848, when the Frankfort Parliament was just starting the serious work of framing an all-German constitution, the tide had already turned against the revolutionaries in the Habsburg dominions, and the Emperor's resistance to constitutional and national aims in the Germanic Confederation was correspondingly strengthened.

Meanwhile the incidence of another problem, that of finding a means of including in the new Germany states such as Holstein, which was under an alien ruler, had revealed the fact that the National Parliament at Frankfort had no means of enforcing its decisions except with the aid of one of the great military states. Since 1460 the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had been under the Crown of Denmark; they were closely connected, and had no wish to be severed one from the other, but Holstein was included in the Germanic Confederation, while Schleswig was not. Recently two parties had grown up within them, the Eider Danes, who wished to make the river Eider the boundary of Denmark and thus to incorporate Schleswig in the Danish kingdom, and the German nationalists, who sought incorporation in a united Germany. ✓ Early in 1848 Frederick VII, who had just ascended the throne of Denmark, proclaimed a constitution that was to hold good for the whole of his dominions. This looked like a substantiation of the aims of the Eider-Danish party, and the Duke of Augustenberg, who owned the reversion to the duchies in the event of the male line of Denmark failing, made himself the spokesman of the German party and sought support at Berlin. The Diet decided to enforce the German viewpoint, and, backed by this authority, a Prussian army invaded Holstein and Schleswig. This provoked an immediate reaction from

the European Powers. Russia and Sweden protested loudly : Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort were pro-German, though Palmerston had no wish to see Denmark weakened or the Zollverein extended, and offered his mediation to both sides. Frederick William would have agreed, but before matters could be decided the National Parliament at Frankfort was in session, and had decided that the Prussian action must be continued in the name of Germany. This was all very well, but it meant that Prussia had to face the rising opposition of several Great Powers, and Frederick William determined to withdraw. The Frankfort Parliament was highly indignant at being let down in such a fashion, but the whole incident revealed in the clearest possible manner that it had no power to enforce its wishes against so powerful a member-state as Prussia. It gave way and agreed to the Prussian withdrawal, though the sudden revelation of its real weakness was a serious blow to the whole cause of German nationalism.

The problem of reconciling the aims while satisfying the demands of its two principal members soon proved beyond the powers of the National Parliament and wrecked the whole scheme which the Liberal reformers had embarked upon with such enthusiasm. What followed can be briefly told. The new Prussian constitution did not work in accordance with Frederick William's ideas ; troops reoccupied Berlin, and by the beginning of December the experiment had been abandoned and the Prussian Government had reverted to the old state of affairs. In the same month a reactionary Government was formed in Austria under Prince Schwarzenberg, who persuaded Ferdinand I to abdicate in favour of his nephew, Francis Joseph. Shortly afterwards a new constitution was declared for the Austrian Empire as a whole, which served as a prelude to a demand by the Austrian representatives that all the Habsburg territories should be included in the new Germany. In view of this the Frankfort Parliament decided to do without Austria altogether, and in March 1849 offered the Imperial crown of a united Germany to Frederick William IV. Three weeks later Frederick William refused it. His reasons were sound. Austria had opposed the motion, and although she now had her hands full with a Hungarian revolt, it seemed obvious that the time had not yet come when the Habsburgs could be openly supplanted in Central Europe against their will. Several of the minor German princes had also refused to concur, or had shown marked reluctance to associate themselves with the offer. Coupled with this, Frederick William's legitimist principles rebelled against accepting a crown that came to him by way of the votes of a democratic assembly, a fact that caused his famous reference to " picking a crown out of the gutter." If Prussia were to assume the leadership of Germany she must have it on her own terms. There can be little doubt but that Frederick William was right, for, to say the least

of it, his position as German Emperor in the circumstances then existing would have been one of extraordinary difficulty. But his refusal caused the collapse of the National Parliament. Its members saw no chance of any other solution, and the delegates were either withdrawn or went home in disgust. In June 1849 the few remaining members were forcibly dissolved.

This, however, did not immediately put an end to all idea of strengthening the bonds between the individual states of Germany. What followed served to throw into still sharper relief the irreconcilable ambitions of Hohenzollern and Habsburg. Prussia planned and went some way towards carrying into effect a 'League of the North,' but the opposition of Austria caused the defection of several of the members, and since Austria had by August 1849 succeeded, with Russian help, in crushing the Hungarian revolt she was now once more a power to be reckoned with in the affairs of Germany. A renewal of the war over the duchies between Prussia and Denmark ended once more with the withdrawal of the former, in view of the attitude of other Powers, and Schwarzenberg determined on nothing short of the restoration of the old Diet of 1815, which had only been suspended and not dissolved. Prussia was isolated and faced with the possibility of war not only with Austria, but with Russia as well. She gave way; the Northern League was finally dissolved at a convention held at Olmütz in November 1850, and in the following year the old Frankfort Diet resumed its interrupted functions. By this time Prussia had once more received a constitution from Frederick William IV. But the King had no intention of really diminishing his powers; it is important to remember that he remained a much more effective force in the direction of policy than the constitutional monarch of Britain, for example. Moreover, the method of choosing the members of the Prussian Parliament was such that power lay chiefly in the hands of the noble and wealthy classes of the community, for the Upper House consisted of nobles nominated by the King, and the Lower of representatives chosen by three 'colleges,' or divisions of electors, grouped according to the amount they paid in taxes. Thus a delegate from the first college, representing only a handful of wealthy men, held equal political power with one from the third college, who might represent many thousands of poor ones, and so the classes most likely to oppose the Government were kept politically weak.

Bismarck and the Army Reforms of William I. The time has now come to introduce the great statesman who dominated European politics in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and to whose diplomatic foresight and ruthless determination Germany owes her existence as a single state. As we have seen, the materials were all ready to his hand; the desire for unity was a widespread force among

the German-speaking peoples, all the stronger for having been aroused in strength and then dashed through the jealousies and discords immediately brought to light. It remained for Bismarck now to point the way by which the task was to be accomplished.

Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck was born at Schoenhausen on April 1, 1815, and his early life was passed on the family estates at Kniephof, in Pomerania. He came of 'Junker' stock, the old, simple, religious, Conservative lesser nobility, to whom Prussian institutions and the Hohenzollern crown meant far more than any new-fangled ideas about Liberalism and German unity. School life in Berlin was followed by the university at Göttingen, and afterwards at Berlin, though it cannot be said that young Otto paid much attention to his studies. However, he eventually passed his examination in law and entered the Civil Service. This career proving distasteful, he soon abandoned it, settled on part of the family estates, and resumed once more the life of the Prussian countryside. At this time he certainly did not show much aptitude for politics, or even for hard work; in fact, his wild, extravagant ways earned for him locally the nickname of the 'mad Junker.'

In 1847, at the age of thirty-two, Bismarck took his seat as a member of Frederick William IV's experimental Prussian Parliament, and his political career began. A tall, imposing figure, with a strong face and a massive frame, he yet possessed, curiously enough, a high, piping voice. But the words that he uttered were usually full of astuteness and sound judgment. His views were naturally those of his class—Conservative to the core, and distrustful of new experiments and ideas. He was deeply grieved when the King, in his somewhat erratic fashion, allied himself with the national rising of 1848. Bismarck helped to organize a kind of Conservative opposition to the jubilant Liberal element. His views were expressed with such force that the King once referred to him as a red reactionary who smelt of blood. But Bismarck was somewhat mollified when Frederick William refused to accept the democratic crown of a united Germany. "The Crown of Frankfort," he said, "may be very bright, but the gold which gives truth to its brilliance has first to be won by melting down the Prussian Crown." His entire attitude towards the question of German unity is admirably epitomized in that sentence; above all, he did not want to see Prussia swallowed up in Germany, and it is worth noting here that what he actually lived to accomplish was rather the converse—*i.e.*, the swallowing up of Germany by Prussia.

After the restoration of the old Diet at Frankfort Bismarck was accredited to it as a member of the Diplomatic Corps. Austria was once more in her old position as President of the Germanic Confederation, and Bismarck was not long in discovering that she intended to oppose

the interests of Prussia in every possible way. "The Austrians are continually intriguing under the mask of a rough geniality," he wrote. He became convinced that the old co-operation between the two chief German Powers was gone for good, and that war between them for the leadership of Germany must eventually ensue. Accordingly his policy from now onward was directed towards the isolation of Austria in Germany and in Europe. In the Diet and in every other way he did his best to assert the equality of Prussia. For example, when the Austrian President of the Diet received him in shirt-sleeves Bismarck promptly commented on the heat and removed his own coat also.

In 1858 the unbalanced mind of Frederick William IV gave way. When it was seen that the malady was likely to prove permanent his brother William was appointed Regent. The new ruler was a man of reactionary opinions, a believer in the old Prussian system, and no lover of democratic experiments. Nevertheless he felt himself bound to honour the constitution, and placed a Liberal Ministry in power. Bismarck was recalled from Frankfort and sent to represent his country at St Petersburg. These new arrangements were hardly complete when the news came that Austria was once more involved in a war with Sardinia. The Italian patriots, assisted now by the armies of Napoleon III, began in 1859 the series of campaigns that were to end in the unification of Italy under the house of Savoy. German opinion rallied to the Austrian cause, and the army of Prussia was mobilized. Its services were not called upon, for the Emperor Francis Joseph had no wish to be beholden to Prussia for assistance, but the mobilization itself had far-reaching effects that ended in placing the destiny of Prussia in Bismarck's hands. Certain defects in the Prussian Army system were immediately laid bare, and the Regent appointed General von Roon¹ as Minister of War in order to put through a scheme of reform which he had, as a soldier himself, desired for many years. Under the old system every Prussian was supposed to serve for three years with the colours, followed by two in the reserve and fourteen in the Landwehr. But the population had increased to such an extent that there was no longer a sufficient number of regiments to absorb all the recruits of military age, and a considerable number escaped service every year. The Regent therefore decided to raise thirty-nine new infantry and ten new cavalry regiments, and to lengthen the period of service with the reserve. The fighting strength of the Prussian Army would thus be raised from 215,000 to 400,000 men.

Large armies are expensive luxuries, and it was necessary to convince the Prussian Parliament that the reform was needed, since the money must be raised by extra taxation. The Parliament was by no means persuaded, and although some money was granted provisionally,

¹ Albrecht Theodor Emil, Count von Roon (1803-79).

objection was made to the longer term of service, for the Liberals feared the increasing professionalism of the Army under a new class of officer. William I, however (who at sixty-three had become King on the death of his brother in January 1861), went ahead with the scheme in its entirety, raising new regiments and training 2000 extra officers. Von Roon, who was a friend of Bismarck, wanted the co-operation of the latter in the Ministry, but the King was unwilling to grant him the post of Foreign Minister, which was what Bismarck especially desired. However, he was recalled from St Petersburg and, after some hesitation, sent to Paris, where he was given reason to believe that he would not remain for long.

In 1862 a new Parliament met, which proved to be even more opposed to the Army reform than its predecessor. The Chamber refused to pass the budget if the new Army estimates were included. In view of this attitude the Ministry felt that it could not continue to support the King's policy against the wishes of the people's representatives. Thus a constitutional deadlock arose, and William I was faced with the prospect of cancelling his schemes and disbanding his new forces. Rather than do this he determined to abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince, and the deed was already prepared when as a last resort he took von Roon's advice and summoned Bismarck. Together the two agreed that the Army reforms must go on, in spite of the Chamber; the deed of abdication was destroyed, and Bismarck became President of the Ministry and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Prussian Parliament remained in existence, but from now onward its powers, never very great, were theoretical rather than real. "These chatterers cannot really rule Prussia," Bismarck wrote to a friend. He knew that he owed his position to the King; he was a diplomat, not a member of the Prussian Landtag, a body which he heartily despised and in which he was intensely unpopular. If he were to remain at the head of affairs matters must be conducted in accordance with his wishes; provided the King agreed to his policy, or could be persuaded, no other authority in Prussia was competent to question his actions. With these views Bismarck accepted office, and began, in accordance with his own methods, the long task of fashioning Germany into a nation. "The question now at issue," he said, "is not between Conservative and Liberal, but whether the *régime* in Prussia shall be monarchical or Parliamentary. If needs must Parliamentarianism should be withstood by a period of dictatorship."

The Polish Insurrection (1863). To Bismarck's way of thinking a Minister could best serve his country by knowing exactly, in the first instance, what he meant to achieve; by planning carefully the steps by which he intended to accomplish his purpose; by recognizing correctly the moment when the opportunity was favourable for putting

each step into effect ; and finally by a thoroughgoing determination to support each move, once it had been embarked upon, by the utmost power at his command. It will be seen at once that such *Realpolitik* must not at any stage be allowed to run the risk of failure ; military preparedness forms an essential part of the whole. Hence the vital importance to Bismarck and his sovereign of the military reforms, and the former's well-known assertion, when discussing the budget, that great questions are not decided by speeches and votes, but by " blood and iron." It was a phrase that gained great publicity, and Bismarck was sorry afterwards that he had not chosen his words more carefully.

Long before the Prussian Parliament had abandoned its attempt to frustrate the new policy of military aggrandizement Bismarck had found occasion to give Europe a foretaste of the methods by which he intended to direct his foreign affairs. In January 1863 the Russian Poles, who had been in a state of extreme unrest ever since the abrogation of their constitution some years previously, rose in revolt against a new conscription order promulgated by the Tsar Alexander II, from whom they had hoped for some alleviation of their condition. The prompt suppression of this revolt was a matter of vital interest not only to the Tsar, but to Prussia as well, for the Polish nationalists considered not only Posen and the districts added to Prussia's eastern boundaries in 1815 as lawful Polish territory, but also West Prussia, which had been lost to Poland by the First Partition in the time of Frederick the Great, yet without which Poland could have no access to the sea. Bismarck was, of course, fully aware of these aims, and of the danger of a sympathetic rising in Prussian territory, and accordingly determined to support Russia to the full. General von Alvensleben was sent to the Tsar with a proposal for common action. On February 8 he drew up a Convention, by the terms of which several Prussian army corps were massed along the eastern frontier, and both Powers agreed to allow their troops to operate indiscriminately in each other's territory if the task of suppressing the rising made this advisable.

In taking this action Bismarck, though hardly as yet seated securely in office, ranged all the Great Powers but Russia against him, and actually received a 'sentence of death' from the exasperated Polish nationalists themselves. In June Britain, France, and Austria sent separate notes of protest to the Tsar, for public opinion, when not itself directly concerned, is easily enlisted on behalf of a suppressed minority, and there was a vague idea abroad in Europe that Russia had not carried out her intentions for the future government of Poland, as expressed at the Congress of Vienna. The Alvensleben Convention, however, had placed the Tsar in a strong position. Secure in the knowledge that he was now certain of suppressing the revolt, he flatly

refused either to negotiate or to admit that any other nation had the right to interfere. Napoleon III was quite willing to send a military expedition to the Baltic, but Prussia threatened war if such a scheme were carried out, and Palmerston and Russell, perhaps mindful of the Crimean affair and suspicious of the lengths to which wholehearted co-operation with France might carry them, refused to associate themselves any further with the policy of France. By the spring of the following year the Tsar was therefore able to crush the last manifestations of rebellion in Poland, after a campaign of desperate ferocity on both sides.

To Bismarck the affair proved a definite accession of strength and a forward step in his policy of isolating Austria. For the first time the bold and over-confident Palmerston had been successfully rebuffed; all chances of a close friendship between France and Russia had been destroyed, since Napoleon III had taken upon himself to champion the cause of his fellow-Catholics, the Poles; and, most important of all, there was no longer any prospect that Austria would receive Russian help, or even sympathy, in the event of a war against Prussia. Bismarck's first essay in foreign politics had been in the nature of casting bread upon the waters, and he had cast it to some effect. But his action had still further increased his unpopularity with the Prussian Liberals, and he was content to wait his time, without taking advantage of the offer of a Russian alliance against Austria, as tentatively suggested by the Tsar.

The Schleswig-Holstein Question. Long before the Polish insurrection was finally settled the thorny question of the Danish duchies had cropped up again with renewed intensity. The fresh crisis was none of Bismarck's seeking—his hands were more than full already—but he was not slow to take advantage of the situation that it produced, for under his guidance the inevitable outcome was an accession of power for Prussia.

The previous crisis had been settled by a Protocol signed in London in March 1852. It was agreed then that Holstein and the little Duchy of Lauenburg were to remain members of the Germanic Confederation, and that Prince Christian of Glücksburg, who was heir to the throne of Denmark, was also to be recognized as heir to the duchies. The Duke of Augustenburg was induced to sign a document promising not to enforce his claims, and received in return a payment of money, which was, however, partly in respect of the estates of which the Danish Government had already deprived him. Since the signing of this agreement the Eider-Danes had been giving ample proof that they intended to proceed with their scheme, at least to the extent of separating Schleswig from Holstein by incorporating it more closely in Denmark. Local traditions in the duchies received scant consideration

from the Danes, and efforts were made to suppress the German language. That the Schleswig-Holstein question had not been settled by the London Protocol was abundantly evident from the report of Mr John Ward, who was sent in 1857 by the British Foreign Office to investigate the state of affairs in the duchies. Meanwhile, as sympathy with the duchies grew in Germany, the Danish viewpoint hardened, and a club was actually founded at Copenhagen to resist foreign interference.

Matters came to a head in 1863, when the King of Denmark finally repudiated the London Protocol and published a new constitution, the general effect of which was to sever Holstein from Schleswig and virtually to incorporate the latter in Denmark. In November he died, and was succeeded by Prince Christian, who promptly endorsed his predecessor's policy by signing the new constitution. This was too much for Frederick, the new Duke of Augustenburg, who now announced that he was not in any way bound by his father's renunciation, assumed the title of Frederick VIII of Holstein, and placed himself at the disposal of the German element not only in Holstein, but in Schleswig as well. Naturally he was keenly supported in the German Diet, which sent troops from Hanover and Saxony to his assistance, and the whole affair created a political intrigue of the first water. It was exactly the type of situation in which Bismarck delighted to try his skill. Although it seems probable that he did not at first see what use could be made of it, he wrote afterwards in his memoirs that he "kept annexation steadily before his eyes from the beginning."

Strangely enough, the first effect of the crisis was to bring Prussia and Austria together with a common policy. Neither really wanted to support Augustenburg; both pretended that their aim was to enforce the terms of the London Protocol, which, they alleged, had been broken by the Danes, and when the German Confederation refused to associate itself as a body with any policy that would leave Denmark with certain rights in the duchies Prussia and Austria announced that they would go their own way, signed an agreement for concerted action, and forced war upon Denmark early in February 1864. This was exactly what Bismarck had hoped to bring about. He was delighted at his success in thus tying Austria to the tail of his own scheme, especially since Austria and the other ruling houses of Germany had just been forced to abandon a plan for improving the Confederation, entirely because Bismarck had not allowed his royal master to co-operate. "This summer," he wrote to his subordinate in Paris, "we have achieved that which we have been vainly striving to do for twelve years. Austria has adopted our programme; . . . she accepts assistance from us; . . . never before has Viennese policy been thus directed from Berlin, both wholesale and retail." In adopting an independent policy Bismarck also struck a blow at the prestige of England. In spite of

the pro-German leanings of Queen Victoria, who had on the previous occasion been well instructed in the German viewpoint by the Prince Consort, now recently deceased, Palmerston was inclined to take the opposite view, and had said in the House of Commons during the summer of 1863 that if anyone interfered with the independence of Denmark, "those who made the attempt would find in the result that it was not Denmark alone with which they would have to contend." Bismarck assiduously encouraged the idea that England would support the Danes in a war, because he wanted the latter to fight. A successful conflict would give him the chance of imposing his own terms at the peace; otherwise the matter would be settled by another conference, when anything might happen.

Prussia and Austria had ostensibly begun the war to enforce the conditions of the Protocol of London, but it was not long before this intention was openly abandoned. The Danes were expelled from the duchies in very short time, for the reorganized Prussian army at once proved its efficiency. Denmark itself was then invaded, though the Austrians were rather doubtful about the wisdom of this step, and after a siege the strong fortress of Düppel was captured in April. A European conference, brought about principally through the agency of Russell and Palmerston, now met at London to consider the matter. But England, strongly pro-Danish, did not get the expected support of France, whom she had not supported as strongly as she might have done over the Polish question, and Napoleon even went so far as to suggest the incorporation of the duchies in Prussia. This was awkward for Austria, and when the Duke of Augustenburg refused to surrender the military control of Holstein to Prussia as the price of Bismarck's support the conference came to an end. Austria and Prussia resumed the war, the issue of which could not remain long in doubt. By the Treaty of Vienna, signed on October 30, Denmark agreed to her opponents' terms, her King abandoning all his claims, in favour of the rulers of Austria and Prussia. The German Diet was to be debarred from any participation in the settlement now to be decided upon. Once again Bismarck's policy had met with success. Russell and Palmerston had considered war, but refrained owing to lack of support from British public opinion. Their peace policy was endorsed by a vote of the House of Commons, and the British Government was forced to content itself with a formal protest against the Austro-Prussian action, which meant the incorporation of about a quarter of a million Danes in Germany.

The Saxon and Hanoverian troops were now withdrawn from Holstein, so that Austria and Prussia were in full possession of both duchies. But their co-operation was rapidly cooling; seeing at last something of the extent of Bismarck's aims, the Austrian Government

began once more to espouse the cause of Augustenburg. In this Austria was supported, as ever, by the smaller German states, which all feared the threat of Prussian aggrandizement. But Austria was unable to oppose Prussia too openly, as the situation in her Italian provinces was precarious, and she was in no condition to support a strong policy by a threat of war. Bismarck was not ready for a war with Austria either, with the result that for the time being he "papered over the cracks" between the two countries by the Convention of Gastein, signed in August 1865. By this agreement the rights of the Duke of Augustenburg were finally repudiated; Austria agreed to administer Holstein, while Prussia administered Schleswig and received as her own the Duchy of Lauenburg, paying in compensation to Austria the sum of two and a half million Danish talers. In return for his services to the State William I created Bismarck a count, but in spite of the success of the latter's policy his relations with the Prussian Chamber did not improve, for his action had by no means endeared him to the Liberal section of German public opinion.

The Austro-Prussian War (1866). "Neither Prussia nor Germany can remain what they have been; and, in order to become what they must, they will have to travel along this road. No other course is possible." These words were uttered by Bismarck in the early summer of 1866, with reference to the impending hostilities between his own country and Austria. By the time that they were spoken the course of events after the Convention of Gastein had both convinced him of the immediate necessity for contesting the leadership of Germany, and provided him with the necessary excuse for settling the matter at once.

Before trying conclusions with Austria Bismarck had to make certain that there was no probability of interference from elsewhere. A few weeks after the signing of the agreement at Gastein he met Napoleon III at Biarritz, and although no one knows exactly what took place, it appears that the Emperor expressed himself agreeable to the duchies becoming a part of Prussia, and that he received some hint from Bismarck that there might be territorial compensation for France along her eastern frontier, in the event of Prussia gaining substantial increases of territory as the result of a war with Austria. The neutrality of France was accordingly secured, at any rate so far as the initial stages of the conflict were concerned, for Napoleon quite expected both combatants to be so exhausted by the struggle that France would find herself in a stronger position than before, even in relation to the victor. This theory of the neutral nation proving the strongest in the long run might be thought perfectly sound, but in practice it has often failed, as many other rulers besides Napoleon III have found to their cost.

Bismarck also thought it advisable to win the co-operation of Italy, the new addition to the list of European Great Powers. The Italian

Government was anxious to secure Venetia, which had remained in Austrian hands after the War of Liberation, and in spite of a certain distrust of Prussian loyalty (not wholly unjustified in view of the Prussian attitude during the previous Italian war) consented in April 1866 to draw up a treaty with Prussia by the terms of which Italy agreed to attack Venetia if Prussia went to war with Austria within the next three months.

By the spring of 1866 affairs in the duchies had presented Bismarck with his *casus belli*. The unpopular, autocratic rule of Manteuffel, the Prussian Governor of Schleswig, was in marked contrast to the freedom enjoyed by the Holsteiners under the Austrian Gablenz. The Augustenburg party was by no means dead, and in spite of the Gastein agreement Gablenz did nothing to suppress its adherents, thus giving rise to the belief that Austria did not consider the present arrangement permanent. Bismarck professed to regard this as a deliberate encouragement of revolutionary principles, but his protests were met by the flat assertion that Austria would govern Holstein as she pleased. Bismarck, convinced that it would be dangerous to the Prussian cause to accept another rebuff from Austria, decided that the moment had come to fight. With some difficulty old King William was persuaded that the quarrel was a just one; "I want peace, but am resolved to make war if needs must," he told his Privy Council, and Bismarck was able to proceed with his plans.


At the beginning of June 1866 Austria declared her intention of summoning the Estates in Holstein, and of referring the whole question to the German Diet. On the grounds that this was a breach of the Convention of Gastein Prussian troops from Schleswig marched into Holstein. At the same time Prussia proposed a complete reform of the Germanic Confederation, with Austria excluded from it altogether. Austria retaliated by declaring the Prussian action in Holstein illegal, and asking the Diet for 'federal execution' against Prussia. The Diet agreed with Austria; Prussia withdrew from the Germanic Confederation, and thus found herself involved in a war not only with Austria, but with nearly all the other states of Germany.

Both Austria and Prussia had mobilized some time previously, a fact indicating unmistakably that war was inevitable in any case. The efficiency of the Prussian war machine was now evidenced in striking fashion. Long before the smaller German states had time to join the Austrian troops or even to evolve a common plan of action their forces were scattered in a lightning campaign that ended in the occupation of Saxony, Hesse, and Hanover. The Austrian army, which had made tentative movements in the direction of Saxony and Silesia, was thrust back upon Sadowa and Königgrätz, where, under General Benedek, it was defeated in a hotly contested battle on July 3.

In numbers the two armies were evenly matched, but the Prussians under von Moltke¹ had the advantage of better generalship and better equipment. William I and Bismarck were present at the battle. As the result of some rapid manœuvring afterwards the Prussian forces were successfully thrust between the defeated Austrians and Vienna. Bismarck now had to reverse his policy of constantly inciting the King against Austria, for he was convinced that matters had gone far enough and that a speedy peace was necessary before the political situation changed. Interference was unlikely from Britain, where the replacement of Russell's Ministry by that of Derby had produced no change of policy, though it was known that Queen Victoria favoured armed support on behalf of Austria. The situation in North Italy, however, gave Napoleon a chance to interfere. Less than a fortnight before the battle of Sadowa the Italians had been defeated at Custozza, and the Austrian Government now endeavoured to forestall a renewed Italian offensive by offering to hand Venetia over to France. With this disputed territory in his possession, to give added weight to his diplomatic representations, it was hoped in Vienna that Napoleon would be able to persuade the Italians to make peace. Napoleon accepted, and offered his mediation to all three of the principal combatants. Bismarck considered this a breach of the promise of non-intervention given at Biarritz, and it was this action on the part of Napoleon, coupled with the fact that he desired the friendship rather than the enmity of Austria (once he had excluded her from the affairs of Germany) that led him to curb the warlike ambitions of William and his military officers and decide on an immediate peace, without humiliating Austria any further.

On August 23, 1866, the Peace of Prague was signed. Bismarck had so arranged his terms that Napoleon was led to believe Germany would remain disunited, and thus to withdraw his demand for territorial compensation along the Rhine. Thus although Prussia now annexed Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and the city of Frankfort, increasing her population by some four million inhabitants, and bound the other German states north of the river Main (of which Saxony, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg were the chief) closely to her by forming a North German Confederation, Bavaria and the other German states south of the Main were left to form an independent confederation of their own. On the face of it this forcible division of Germany into two parts hardly appeared to be a step in the progress of German unity, but the apparent division of Germany into two separate leagues kept Napoleon quiet by allaying his suspicions while Bismarck was making his settlement with Austria, and enabled

¹ Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Count von Moltke (1800-91), Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army and the greatest strategist of his time.



THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION (1866)

him to achieve his immediate purpose—the final dissolution of the Germanic Confederation of 1815 and the exclusion of Austria from German affairs. Bismarck had long intended to make Austria a foreign country, and had at last succeeded.

Shortly after the Treaty of Prague peace was concluded between Austria and Italy, the latter receiving Venetia, but giving up a claim she had preferred to part of the Tyrol.

It had been expressly stipulated that the four German states south of the Main should be allowed to enter into what relations they chose with the North German Confederation, free from any pressure on the part of their former ally, Austria. They soon discovered that they could not afford to remain on bad terms with their conquerors. A threat from Bavaria that South Germany might turn to France for protection led Bismarck to disclose Napoleon's demand for German territory on the upper waters of the Rhine. The result was a series of military alliances between Prussia and the southern states, known as the August Convention, by which the latter agreed to place their armies under Prussian command in the event of war, and received in return a guarantee of the integrity of their own territory. The setting up of the Zollparlement for the whole of Germany, which occurred soon afterwards, placed the commercial as well as the military control of the weak southern confederation in Prussian hands. Thus another important step was taken in the progress of German unity, and the nature of the final episode was clearly foreshadowed. It was not until March 1867, however, that Napoleon learned of the military agreement; only Thiers foresaw enough of the future to remark gloomily in the French Chamber, "It is France that has been defeated at Sadowa."

As for Bismarck, he at last found himself winning the support of the people's representatives. An act of indemnity absolved him from the unconstitutional nature of his actions; he was created a general, and received a large sum of money. But the strain of the past months had been so great that his health gave way, and he was forced for a time to leave Berlin.

The Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). When, many years afterwards, Bismarck was explaining in his memoirs the reasons why he refrained from inflicting too mortifying a defeat upon Austria he asserted that he knew at the time that another war was inevitable within a few years. "It was already quite clear to me," he wrote, "that we should have to defend the conquests of the campaign in further wars. . . . That a war with France would succeed that with Austria lay in the logic of history." So much was obvious even to the statesmen of neutral countries: Lord Clarendon, who was at the British Foreign Office from 1868 till his death in the summer of 1870,

made fruitless efforts to bring about general disarmament, and was inclined to blame Bismarck for their failure. Meanwhile the latter's position was strengthened at home, since he now became Chancellor of the North German Confederation as well as Minister-President of Prussia.

From the beginning of 1867 relations between France and Prussia were in a state of dangerous and growing tension. After years of repression at home Napoleon III had now admitted the people to a voice in affairs, endeavouring thereby to revive his waning popularity, but in point of fact rather weakening the hands of his Ministry by making that body susceptible to the whims of an unstable and often ill-advised public opinion. For a Bonaparte prestige was a vital necessity, and of late things had been going badly for Napoleon. The glories of the Crimean War were long since past. Italy, for which he had done so much, was now estranged; from Mexico, where he had made the Archduke Maximilian of Austria a puppet emperor, he had been forced to withdraw in face of a threat from the United States, leaving the unhappy Maximilian to face a firing-squad of his rebellious subjects. Now, with growing apprehension, France was forced to witness the birth of a mighty German state beyond her frontier, fashioned stage by stage with sure precision by the inexorable Bismarck. Some compensation, some diplomatic success, must be obtained, and with both Napoleon and his people in this frame of mind matters were bound sooner or later to play into Bismarck's hands.

Friction first occurred over the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. Disappointed in his attempt to gain compensation elsewhere, Napoleon proposed in 1867 to annex this duchy, and discovered that the King of Holland was willing to dispose of his rights as Grand Duke. But the matter was complicated by the fact that Luxemburg had been a part of the former Germanic Confederation, and that the fortress itself was garrisoned by Prussian troops. Great indignation was therefore expressed in Germany, where Luxemburg was declared to be a land 'essentially German.' Bismarck did not really care what happened to Luxemburg, which was not a member of the North German Confederation, and since he was not ready for war with France agreed at a European congress, convened to discuss the matter, to withdraw the Prussian garrison. But Napoleon was not allowed to have his way either, and Luxemburg became a neutral state on much the same terms as Belgium. For the moment the danger of war was averted, but it was France rather than Prussia who lost by this new settlement. The matter gave colour to the contention that Napoleon was unscrupulous and grasping, and intensified his isolation in Europe. An attempt to strike up an alliance with Austria came to nothing, and relations between France and Italy steadily deteriorated. Then, odd as it may

sound when speaking of events still within the memory of living man, the long-expected conflict arose over that hoary old occasion of European wars—a vacant Spanish throne.

In 1868 Queen Isabella of Spain deserted her country and fled to France in face of a national rebellion led by Marshal Prim.¹ In the following year, the representatives of the Spanish people having decided that monarchy was to remain their form of government, the throne was offered to Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. It did not appear that this choice would lead to complications with France, because although Leopold was a member of the ruling house of Prussia, he was also a relative of Napoleon III. At first the offer was refused, but the Spaniards continued to press the matter, and Bismarck, though the affair was officially no concern of his, did everything he could in secret to bring about an acceptance. Obviously no harm could accrue to Prussia from a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne, especially one whose family had already shown extraordinary signs of affection and loyalty towards William I, while definite commercial or other advantages might easily follow. Bismarck was probably sincere in his statement that no 'encirclement' of France was intended, though he was certainly not slow to take advantage of the French attitude when once it was clearly defined. At last the reluctant assent of William I, as head of the house of Hohenzollern, was obtained, and in June 1870 Leopold accepted the Spanish offer.

The repercussion in France was immediate. Shortly before the Duc de Gramont,² a statesman violently opposed to Bismarck, had been made Foreign Minister, and he now declared in the Chamber that he looked upon the whole affair as a deliberate attempt to disarrange the European balance of power. If the matter were persisted in Gramont asserted that the French Government would know how to do its duty "without hesitation and without weakness."

The adoption of this attitude gave Bismarck the very opportunity he needed for accepting a conflict with France in which the latter would appear the aggressor, while Prussian policy could assume a correct and even injured tone. "It was hard to find in the law of nations a pretext for France to interfere with the freedom of Spain to choose a King," he wrote in his memoirs, and went on to adopt the view that she deliberately chose to make a Prussian affair out of a matter that really concerned no country but Spain, an attitude which, he says, "was internationally unjustifiable and exasperating, and proved to me that the moment had arrived when France sought a quarrel against us and was ready to seize any pretext that seemed available." As yet, however, the matter was a personal affair, concerning William I as head of

¹ Juan Prim, Marquis de los Castillejos (1814-70).

² Antoine-Agénor-Alfred, Duc de Gramont (1819-80).

his house alone; the Prussian Ministry disclaimed all knowledge of it, and Bismarck kept out of the way on his private estate at Varzin.

It was not long before the French Government formulated its demands. The ambassador Count Benedetti¹ received instructions to seek an audience with William I, who was taking the waters at Ems, and to demand that as head of the family he should order Prince Leopold to withdraw his candidature. Leopold might have been approached direct, but Gramont was particularly anxious that the withdrawal should come at the instigation of the Prussian King, thus making it appear that Prussia, rather than Leopold, had given way to the demands of France. William's answer to Benedetti was conciliatory enough; he replied that Leopold was free to do as he chose, and that he would exert no pressure to influence his decision in either direction. In view of the threatening situation that had arisen Leopold, never very enamoured of the proposed kingship, decided to withdraw. Paris hailed this as a diplomatic victory over Prussia, which it certainly was not, and Bismarck, hovering in the background, but well informed of what was happening, was plunged in despair, afraid that in spite of all his efforts the matter would end there, with Prussia to all appearances humiliated by France.

Far otherwise. Even the 'Iron Chancellor' himself could not have engineered more skilfully the way in which the French Cabinet now played straight into his hands. To place beyond all doubt the diplomatic success that he claimed to have scored over Prussia, Gramont decided to follow the matter up, and to demand from William a guarantee that the Prussian candidature to the throne of Spain should never again be renewed. Benedetti, in accordance with fresh instructions from Paris, took advantage of a chance meeting with the King to prefer these new demands, but when he pressed them met with an emphatic though courteous refusal. William broke off the conversation, sent a message to the effect that the matter was closed, and refused Benedetti's request for a further audience.

Meanwhile Bismarck had returned to Berlin, determined, in view of Prussia's humiliation, to resign. On July 13 he was dining with Roon and Moltke when he received a telegram describing what had just occurred at Ems. The King had been so disturbed by these renewed menaces from France that he had decided to return to the capital, where he was in a position to consult his Ministers, and the telegram concluded by authorizing Bismarck to communicate Benedetti's demands to the Press if he saw fit. It was just the opportunity that Bismarck required to place France in the wrong and to rouse the indignation of every state in Germany. Receiving from Moltke

¹ Vincent, Count Benedetti (1817-1900).

an assurance that the Army was prepared for an immediate war, he forthwith transcribed for the Press an edition of the telegram that, by the omission of certain parts, made William's reply to Benedetti appear like a decisive severing of relations as the result of an insult, though the King had really only intended to close the matter until it could be taken up officially in Berlin. Thus the impression arose throughout Germany that the inoffensive old Prussian King had been deliberately accosted and insulted at Ems by the French Ambassador, and that it was in answer to this crowning affront on the part of France that his Ministry had at last reluctantly taken up the challenge.

Popular indignation in Germany was at once manifested in the Press. Now it was the turn of France to feel that humiliation awaited her if she withdrew from the position she had taken up. Unless war were declared Napoleon feared for the safety of his tottering throne, and his Ministry was certain of its own overthrow. On July 15, 1870, the declaration was signed; on the 19th it reached Bismarck. By that time he had already persuaded the King to order general mobilization. Most of the European nations now published declarations of neutrality. Britain contented herself with obtaining from either combatant a guarantee for the neutrality of Belgium. France and Prussia were thus left to decide between them which was to be the strongest nation in Europe. Both hoped for a speedy victory: Napoleon to restore his tarnished military reputation, Bismarck in order to lessen the chances of outside interference.

At the beginning of August the two armies came into contact. Napoleon had intended to invade South Germany, to detach if possible the southern states from what was believed to be their unwilling alliance with Prussia. The efficiency of his military preparations, however, soon proved a myth, and instead he fell a victim to the three German armies massed along the Middle Rhine. During the first week of August the French troops were defeated at Wissemburg, Spicheren, and Wörth, and were forced to retreat. It was now vitally necessary to concentrate all the French forces to stem the threatened invasion, but this was prevented by two more Prussian victories. Marshal Bazaine was defeated at Gravelotte, following which he was forced to shut himself up in Metz with 170,000 men, and Marshal Macmahon was defeated at Sedan on September 1, as he sought to force his way to the relief of Metz. At the latter battle the entire French Army surrendered, and Napoleon with it. Feeble and worn from anxiety and illness, the Emperor sought King William to plead for better terms. He found Bismarck instead, and the Prussian demands went unmodified.

Sedan did not end the war, but it overthrew the Second Empire.

In Paris Jules Favre¹ and Léon Gambetta² proclaimed a republic, and the former, who had condemned the war in the first place, visited Bismarck to seek an armistice. "You represent nothing more than an insignificant minority," Bismarck told him, and went on to demand the cession of Alsace, part of Lorraine, and the town of Metz. "We will fight to the end. We will not yield an inch of French soil, nor a stone of French fortresses," was the reply, and the war continued.

Before the end of September the German army had reached the environs of Paris, and the siege began. Gambetta escaped from the beleaguered city in a balloon, and with fierce energy he began to organize the raising of armies all over France. But citizen armies take weeks to train and equip; France's enemies were no longer those of 1792, when unbounded enthusiasm and weight of numbers could make up for lack of discipline and military skill. The one hope lay in Bazaine, and he had already committed the prime strategical error of allowing the only regular army that France now possessed to be closely invested in a fortified town. To this mistake he now added the treachery of direct negotiations with Bismarck, who easily held him in play until the position was hopeless, whereupon he was forced to surrender, on October 27. The German troops thus liberated then turned their attention to the overthrow of Gambetta's new armies.

During November several attempts were made to relieve Paris, but all ended in defeat. In January 1871 an attack on South Germany was driven back, and on the 28th of that month, after another meeting between Favre and Bismarck, Paris capitulated and an armistice was signed. The horrors of the siege had done much to awaken sympathy for the French cause, and Bismarck was intensely relieved when Paris fell while he was still in a position to dictate the terms of peace, without being forced to submit the matter to a European congress.

Before the war came to an end, however, and, in fact, before the fall of Paris, there was a momentous interpolation—no less than the completion of Bismarck's work in consolidating all the German states in one empire. During the winter of 1870-71 he had remained at Versailles, busy in completing the details of the union of the North German Confederation with the states of the south. As he had always desired should be the case, they joined of their own free will. Baden had long wished to do so; Württemberg and Bavaria agreed to terms. The latter, as third biggest of the German-speaking nations, received special concessions in civil, police, military, and legal affairs, since Bismarck desired above all that Bavaria should be contented and loyal. He had to contend also with difficulties from William I, who

¹ Jules-Claude-Gabriel Favre (1809-80), a republican advocate.

² Léon Gambetta (1838-82), also a lawyer, and an opponent of the Second Empire.

expressed grave doubts at relinquishing his forefathers' title in favour of the Imperial one. Bismarck used all his arts of persuasion, and actually drafted the letter requesting William to assume the title of German Emperor, which was then copied and forwarded in his own name by the King of Bavaria, on behalf of all the German ruling princes. Only when the request came from such a source would William consent. He was not the only Prussian who felt misgiving at this merging of Prussia with the rest of Germany. Even Roon referred to the affair rather contemptuously as "the hatching of the Kaiser egg." However, on January 18, 1871, Bismarck's task was fulfilled with the proclamation of William I as German Emperor, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The Bund became the Reich, and it was with this new, triumphant state that France had to negotiate the terms of peace.

The task was carried out by Thiers, who had replaced Gambetta after the capitulation of Paris. In return for surrendering Belfort, captured during the war, the Germans insisted on occupying Paris with troops. It was there that Thiers, from the French seat of Government at Bordeaux, had to negotiate terms. By the beginning of March these had been settled, and the full treaty was signed at Frankfurt on May 10, 1871. France agreed to pay an indemnity of five milliards of francs, and to allow German troops to occupy French territory until the sum was paid. Alsace and the eastern part of Lorraine, which Prussia had been demanding as the price of peace ever since the victory of Sedan, became 'Reichsland' as a part of the German Empire. The reasons for this were mainly strategic, for the districts in question included the great fortified towns of Strasburg and Metz, which guard the crossing of the Rhine and block the principal gap leading from France into Central Europe. Bismarck refused to countenance the suggestion that Alsace should become neutral, in the same way as Belgium and Luxemburg. He feared that in such a case the strong French feeling that must necessarily exist there would inevitably attach the tiny new state to France in the event of another war. "There was nothing else for us to do," he told the Reichstag, "than to take these areas of land, with their fortresses, wholly into German power, so as to defend them as a strong glacis of Germany against France, and in order to remove the starting-point of a prospective French onslaught several days' marches farther away." Bismarck hoped also that the possession of this territory would act as a bond between North and South Germany. Valid as his reasons for the annexation were from the immediate viewpoint of practical politics, statesmen were not wanting in Europe who foresaw danger as soon as French fortunes began to mend. Gladstone, though his Ministry refused Thiers's request for British mediation on behalf of France, was seriously troubled, and told Lord Granville that he feared "this

violent laceration and transfer is to lead us from bad to worse, and to be the beginning of a new series of European complications."

For the moment, however, Bismarck was supreme, and stood forth as the most powerful statesman in Europe. In nine years he had brought about that which the centuries had failed to achieve, the union of the German states in a single nation. Unscrupulous as his methods often were, one cannot but admire the clarity with which he grasped the details of his plans and the skill with which he turned each fresh situation to account, from the time when he laid the foundations of his policy by securing the invaluable friendship of Russia. Self-confidence was his most important characteristic, enabling him to overcome the vacillating policies of more hesitant statesmen and insecure Cabinets. It was only in later life that he grew alarmed at the thought of how easily he might have lost everything. "My whole life was a bold gamble with other people's money," he is reported to have said after his retirement. "I could never tell beforehand whether my plans would succeed. Even now I am often kept awake at night by thinking how everything might have turned out differently."

SUMMARY

- (1) *The Confederation of Germany (1815-48)*
 - (a) Thirty-nine states, under presidency of Austria, with Federal Diet at Frankfort.
 - (b) Great increase in Prussian territory.
 - (c) Metternich successful in suppressing Liberalism and nationalism (Carlsbad Decrees).
- (2) *The Zollverein*
 - (a) Prussia in a commanding position economically.
 - (b) 1818-36. Most German states joined the Zollverein.
 - (c) 1844-67. Trade treaties with foreign countries.
- (3) *The Revolutions of 1848-49*
 - (a) 1847. Frederick William IV's 'United Diet.'
 - (b) 1848. Widespread revolutions; fall of Metternich; National Assembly at Frankfort; Frederick William refused the Imperial crown.
- (4) *Bismarck and the Army Reforms of William I*
 - (a) Prussian delegate to the revived Diet; ambassador at St Petersburg and Paris.
 - (b) William I Regent (1858) and King (1861).
 - (c) 1862. Deadlock over Army reforms: Bismarck became Minister-President.
- (5) *The Polish Insurrection (1863)*
 - (a) Treaty of General Alvensleben with the Tsar.
 - (b) Russia now friendly and estranged from Austria and France.

(6) *The Schleswig-Holstein Question*

- (a) Attempt by Eider-Danes to incorporate Schleswig in Denmark ; Augustenburg declared himself ' Frederick VIII ' of Holstein.
- (b) 1864. Joint war on Denmark by Prussia and Austria.
- (c) Treaty of Vienna ; King of Denmark made his claims over to Prussia and Austria.
- (d) 1865. Convention of Gastein ; Austria to administer Holstein, and Prussia Schleswig.

(7) *The Austro-Prussian War (1866)*

- (a) Treaty with Italy, to secure attack on Venetia.
- (b) Prussian troops occupied Holstein ; Diet condemned Prussia at instigation of Austria.
- (c) Austria defeated at Sadowa ; Treaty of Prague signed in August.
- (d) Prussia annexed the duchies, Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Frankfurt, and formed the North German Confederation.
- (e) The states of South Germany made military alliances with Prussia.

(8) *The Franco-Prussian War (1870-71)*

- (a) 1867. France attempted to annex Luxemburg.
- (b) 1870. Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen accepted Spanish throne ; protests from France ; Ems telegram.
- (c) German victories at Gravelotte and Sedan ; capture of Metz and Paris.
- (d) January 1871. William I proclaimed Emperor of Germany.
- (e) May 1871. Treaty of Frankfort ; France lost Alsace and Eastern Lorraine.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The rise and defeat of German Liberalism.
- (2) The difficulties confronting Bismarck, and the methods by which he overcame them.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE ACTION OF RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST, MIDDLE EAST, AND FAR EAST

RUSSIA has never been a colonizing Power. Beginning as a small state in the heart of a great continent, far removed from the ocean highways of commerce, she has aimed at territorial aggrandizement by steadily expanding her own frontiers, reaching the sea eventually at four places, and seeking persistently for ports ice-free all the year round. The importance of this movement belongs properly to the nineteenth century, when it brought Russian interests into direct conflict with those of Britain and other Great Powers.

The Russians are the most populous of the Slav races, a tribe originating in all probability among the forests and lakes of Northern Europe. Legend says that a group of Northmen settled at Novgorod in the year 862, and formed there the nucleus of a loose state scattered over the surrounding district. Later on the rulers of this state transferred their capital to Kiev, far to the south on the river Dnieper, and in 988 they embraced Christianity. Novgorod, however, still remained as an important trading centre, and became one of the Hanse towns.


In the thirteenth century the Russians were overwhelmed by the Tartar invasions from Mongolia, and were forced for many years to pay tribute to the Great Khan. It was during this period that Moscow, another of the Russian principalities, superseded Novgorod and Kiev. Its ruler Ivan III captured Novgorod in 1478, acquired other territory as well, and even became strong enough to refuse payment of the Tartar tribute. He married a princess of the house of the old Byzantine Emperors of Constantinople, and adopted their sign of the double eagle. Russia (or Muscovy, as it was known in Europe at that time) had at last become a real state, and assumed relations with foreign Powers.

Ivan IV (1533-84), who is better known to history as Ivan the Terrible, was the first Russian prince to be crowned with the title 'Tsar,' the Slav form of 'Cæsar.' His territory reached the sea at the point where Archangel now stands, and during his reign the Russians began to penetrate Siberia. Exploring far to the north, to avoid the more populous plains of Central Asia, they reached the valley of the

river Amur and the Sea of Okhotsk during the course of the following century. During the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725) they began the conquest of Kamchatka, and even took to the sea in search of America. Peter's wars against the Ottoman Empire and against Sweden brought his boundaries to the sea at two other points, of much greater importance. In 1696 he captured Azov, on the Black Sea, though fifteen years later, after suffering defeat at Turkish hands, he was forced to restore it. In 1721, by the Treaty of Nystadt with Sweden, he received Esthonia, Livonia, Carelia, and part of Finland, thus gaining a considerable coast-line on the Baltic.

The extension of Russian territory was actively continued by Catherine the Great, who ascended the throne in 1762. The great Russian rivers flowing into the Black Sea were of little use for foreign trade so long as that sea remained a Turkish lake, and Catherine was determined that Russia should expand southward. From the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea, across Mesopotamia, Arabia, Asia Minor, Egypt, and the entire Balkan peninsula, the Ottoman Empire held sway, and in Catherine's scheme we see the beginnings of the series of struggles between Russia and Turkey that were destined to last for more than a hundred years. In 1770 she sent a fleet all the way from the Baltic to foster a Greek rising against the Turks, but the movement failed and the Greeks were left to their fate. Four years later, by the Treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardji, Russia gained Azov once more and the district around it, Kinburn and the mouth of the river Dnieper, and some territory on the eastern shores of the Black Sea. A permanent Russian embassy was established at Constantinople, and the Tsar was granted rather vague rights of protection and representation with regard to the Greek Church that became of great importance later on.

In 1783 Catherine annexed the Crimea. She built an arsenal at Sebastopol, and launched battleships upon the Black Sea. Five years later the Russians, still encroaching to the west, attacked and captured the fortress of Oczakov. It was at this time that the interest of the British Government was first aroused in Russian ambitions in the Near East, the purport of which had become evident to the Younger Pitt. He demanded the restoration of Oczakov to Turkey, and wanted to dispatch a fleet to the Black Sea to add weight to the representations of diplomacy. But Parliament did not feel that British interests were bound up in the incipient 'Eastern Question,' and Pitt failed to get his way. In 1792 the Treaty of Jassy was signed between Russia and Turkey, ceding to Russia Oczakov and the coast westward to the river Dniester. When Catherine died in 1796 the entire northern shore of the Black Sea was therefore in Russian hands, while in the north the three partitions of Poland had brought the Russian frontier to the river Niemen.



Such, territorially, was the situation when the nineteenth century opened. The expansion of Russia had now passed the stage when the steps of its accomplishment could be considered a matter of local significance. In the possession of Riga the Russians already had a port that was practically ice-free all the year round, but this was of little use so far as South Russia was concerned, and the question of egress from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean called insistently for a satisfactory settlement.

The Napoleonic Period. Russia was not the only European nation strongly interested in the future of the Turkish Empire. Ever since the first half of the sixteenth century France had enjoyed in Turkey a number of exclusive privileges that were extended from time to time by a series of 'capitulations.' These embodied special terms for French trade, rights of immunity for French nationals, and, eventually, special privileges for Latin monks in the Holy Land. In Egypt particularly, where these rights had originally been conceded, the position of France was strong. It was evident, therefore, that Russian encroachments and Russian ambitions, once their purport had become clear, would lead to a conflict of interests between Russia and France. Some indication of this might have occurred after the fall of Oczakov, but for the outbreak of the French Revolution immediately afterwards. As it was, Catherine II was able to consolidate her gains on the Black Sea unopposed.

The new century began with a dictatorship in France, and fresh realization of the importance of the Near East in French policy. Napoleon saw in Egypt and the Levant the key to conquest and dominion in India and the East, and the opportunity to strike a crushing blow at English prestige overseas. It was true that the first expedition to Egypt had failed, but Napoleon was only awaiting a favourable opportunity to renew the attempt. Russia also had a new dictator, for in 1801 Alexander I had assumed the throne of his murdered father. In the same year the eastern shores of the Black Sea passed into Russian hands, when Georgia was finally incorporated as a part of the Empire. Alexander's motives were those of Catherine; he was convinced that the Turkish power in Europe was doomed, and determined that Russia should in some way gain a controlling interest over the Balkans and a secure outlet to the Mediterranean. A glance at the map will show at once the importance of Constantinople in such a scheme. It stands on the narrow passage known as the Bosphorus, which, together with the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, separates Europe from Asia Minor. For convenience the whole passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean is referred to as 'the Straits.'

Alexander continued the anti-French policy of his predecessors by joining the Third Coalition. He made an alliance with Turkey,

was allowed access to the Mediterranean, and established a naval base in the Ionian Islands. This did not suit Napoleon at all, and it became the object of his policy to win Turkey to the side of France, and thus confine Russia once more to the Black Sea. In this he was successful; Turkey declared war on Russia in 1806, and in April of the following year Napoleon also enlisted Persia on his side, by promising to help her in recovering Georgia from Russia. By this time, however, Napoleon wanted his hands free to enforce the Continental System against England, and Russian co-operation was more valuable by far than Turkish. When discussing the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit with Alexander he knew well the type of ground-bait necessary to whet his prospective ally's appetite. By vaguely promising Alexander the 'Empire of the East' he implied that Russia should gain from Turkey the two Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Tsar hinted in no uncertain terms that he was after Constantinople, and negotiations for splitting up the Turkish Empire as a prelude to an attack on Persia and India continued long after the treaty was signed. For the time being it was necessary for Napoleon to keep his ally faithful, but it is quite evident that he never intended that Russia should gain control of the Straits. "Constantinople! Never! That would mean the empire of the world," he is reported to have said.

To promise Russia possession of somebody else's principalities was easy, but Napoleon left Alexander to get them for himself. The result was a renewal of the war between Russia and Turkey in 1809, a desultory conflict that lasted until 1812, when Napoleon's invasion made peace with the old enemy a vital necessity for Russia. By the Treaty of Bucharest Russia did not gain the principalities, but her frontier was advanced from the Dniester to the Pruth, to include the district known as Bessarabia.

Historical periods are not demarcated by the opening and closing of centuries. The Napoleonic turmoil was the logical outcome of something that had its origin many years before, and nineteenth-century foreign politics began properly after 1815, since they arose in the main from the settlement made in that year at Vienna. By that time certain broad trends of policy were discernible in the attitude of the Great Powers towards the Near East. France never forgot the grandiose schemes of her late Emperor; she clung jealously to her commercial privileges in Egypt, and cultivated close and friendly relations with the virtually independent ruler of that province. Austria, now in possession of an extensive seaboard on the Mediterranean, was looking for further acquisition of territory in the western Balkans whenever the time should prove convenient. In the Turkish Empire the new ruler, Mahmoud II, was a man of energy and ability, though

Russia still clung to the belief that the fall of the Ottoman dominion in Europe was only a matter of time. The principle of nationality was of small importance in Eastern Europe after 1815; some one, doubtless, would have to replace the Turks in the Balkans, and by this time it was no secret that Russia meant to have control of the Straits as soon as opportunity offered. This might be accomplished in either of two ways: by supporting the Sultan in the hour of need, and gaining special concessions as the price of assistance; or by supporting his enemies and exacting concessions or territory by a peace forcibly imposed. In the events that follow we shall find Russia adopting both these courses, according to the circumstances at the time. Usually, however, she preferred the latter.

The Independence of Greece. Quite early in the century the break-up of the Ottoman power in Europe began. In 1804 the Serbians rose in revolt and, led by Black George¹ the pig-dealer, virtually won their independence. Alexander I attempted to interfere on their behalf when negotiating the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, but as soon as his hands were free of the Russian war Mahmoud II succeeded in crushing the Serbs. But the revolt broke out once more under a new leader, Obrenović, and in 1817 Turkey agreed to allow the Serbs to govern themselves under his guidance as hereditary prince. With this little step the process of disintegration began.

In European eyes the most interesting of the Balkan peoples were the Greeks. Their past history made it extremely easy to arouse resentment against the Turkish dominion over this particular race. One rising, as we have seen, had already been suppressed in the Morea, but the subsequent success of the Serbs had not been without its effect, for there was among the Greeks, who were by no means confined to the islands and southern part of the Balkans peninsula, a very definite degree of national feeling. A number of them were wealthy merchants or administrators, whose homes lay in a special quarter of Constantinople, from the name of which they were known as 'Phanariote Greeks.' In this quarter lived the Patriarch, or head of the Greek Church, a body which exercised considerable influence in fostering the national sentiment.

The Greek Revolt began in March 1821 in circumstances of peculiar interest to Russia. Prince Alexander Hypsilanti,² a Phanariote Greek who was a general in the Russian army and at the same time President of a Greek secret society that aimed at the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire, invaded Moldavia from Russia with a few companions and

¹ Karageorge (1766-1817), so called from his swarthy complexion. In 1817 he was murdered in his sleep, and his head sent to Constantinople.

² Prince Alexander Hypsilanti (1792-1828), commissioned in the Russian Imperial Guard in 1809, died at Vienna.

raised the Greek standard. There is no doubt that he fully expected the support of the Tsar Alexander, and, indeed, hinted as much in terms impossible to misunderstand. Alexander, however, maintained a correct attitude. While aiming at special Russian influence in the Near East, he was not convinced that this could best be obtained by assisting at the probable collapse of the Ottoman power. Moreover, his absolutist principles made it difficult for him to countenance revolt in any form. He remained, therefore, under the influence of Metternich and the Holy Alliance; Hypsilanti, left to himself, proved an incompetent leader, and in any case the Greek cause was not very popular in the Danubian provinces. Within less than four months the rising was crushed. Hypsilanti escaped into Austria-Hungary, and Metternich put him in gaol.

Meanwhile, however, the revolt had broken out in the Morea and among the Greek islands, where the Turks soon found themselves at a complete disadvantage. There were two main reasons for this. During the early stages most of the Turkish forces were suppressing the troublesome Ali Pasha of Janina, who had made himself practically independent in the mountains of Albania. Secondly, the Greeks were admirable sailors, and held command of the sea round the islands and coasts. They began by massacring every Mussulman on whom they could lay hands in the Morea. The Sultan naturally retaliated by similar outrages on his Christian subjects, whenever opportunity offered. The worst of these reprisals was the murder of the Greek Patriarch, whose body was afterwards found floating in the Bosphorus and taken to Odessa. This lack of distinction between the innocent and the guilty, combined with the attack on the Orthodox Church and Turkish depredations on Russian merchant shipping in the Straits (not surprising, since many Greek ships sailed under the Russian flag), was too much for Alexander I. He presented an ultimatum to Turkey in July 1821, and broke off diplomatic relations.

The Greek Revolt had now, therefore, become a matter of grave international importance. Anxious to prevent war between Russia and Turkey, Metternich and Castlereagh acted together to persuade the Sultan to grant some, at any rate, of the Tsar's demands. For the time danger was averted, but meanwhile the struggle in the peninsula went on with increased ferocity. The Turks landed on the island of Chios and murdered or carried off the whole population. The Greeks replied by practically driving the Turkish fleet off the sea. Since they were therefore masters of the *Ægean*, Canning, who had succeeded Castlereagh at the Foreign Office, decided in March 1823 to recognize the provisional Greek Government.

The next step was a proposal from Russia that the Powers should join in mediation, suggesting as the terms of settlement that Greece

and the islands should be divided into three separate provinces, under the suzerainty of Turkey. But Canning refused to co-operate in this scheme, and eventually Austria also decided that Greece must either remain as before or become wholly independent. As for the Sultan, he indignantly refused any mediation whatever, having discovered a means that bid fair to settle matters entirely to his own satisfaction. In return for the promise of Syria and Crete Mahmoud's powerful vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt, sent his fleet and army under the command of his able son, Ibrahim Pasha. The fleet, unhampered by the Greeks, was allowed to establish a base in Navarino Bay, and in 1825 Ibrahim began systematically to reconquer the Morea. At the close of the year Alexander I died, an event which, coupled with the report that Ibrahim intended to depopulate the Morea and colonize it with some of his father's subjects, brought matters to a head once more.

The new Tsar, Nicholas I, was a very different man from his brother Alexander. Believing firmly in autocracy, Russia, and the policy of Catherine the Great, it was unlikely that he would hesitate to attack Turkey if the Sultan failed much longer to conform to the Russian attitude. Canning, who was anxious to prevent war between the two, with its manifold possibilities for the Russian power, sent the Duke of Wellington to St Petersburg on a special mission. Wellington and Nicholas were similar types, and they made friends; it was agreed that the two countries should co-operate in attempting mediation. By the Protocol of St Petersburg, signed in April 1826, Britain and Russia agreed to suggest that Greece should become practically independent of the Sultan.

This seemed to Canning a much better arrangement than allowing Nicholas to take action on his own. Since, however, the Protocol did not touch on those matters which had caused the severing of relations between Russia and Turkey, Nicholas forced the Sultan to sign the Convention of Akkerman in the following October. This gave Russia special rights of navigation in the Straits, and yielded to her demands on behalf of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had been practically under Turkish military rule ever since Hypsilanti's unfortunate rising.

In July 1827 France agreed to the principle laid down in the Protocol of St Petersburg, and the three countries signed the formal Treaty of London. It was agreed that the Greeks must become a self-governing community under the suzerainty of the Sultan; that an immediate armistice must be suggested to both sides, and, if necessary, imposed by force. How this could be done without actually resorting to acts of war was not quite clear. The question arose almost at once, for when the Turks learned what was afoot they promptly refused to consider the matter of an armistice at all. But since English, French, and



THE BALKANS IN 1833

Russian naval squadrons were already at hand in the Eastern Mediterranean, Canning hoped that by blockading Ibrahim Pasha in the

Morea it would be possible to paralyse the main Turkish operations, and that the mere threat of this would suffice to bring Turkey to reason. Then, at the crucial moment, when he hoped at last to reap the fruits of his diplomacy, Canning died.

Meanwhile the English Admiral Codrington¹ was left in some uncertainty as to how far the Government intended him to go. In September an Egyptian fleet of nearly one hundred vessels had joined the Turks in Navarino Bay, and it was obvious to the watching squadrons that the devastation of the Morea was being prosecuted as savagely as ever. Remonstrances to Ibrahim elicited no satisfactory answer, so on October 20 the Allied fleet sailed right into the bay. Some shots fired by the Turks on a boat from one of the English warships provoked an immediate answer. The result was a general engagement, and in the course of a few hours the Turco-Egyptian fleet was entirely destroyed.

The battle of Navarino, fought so unexpectedly in time of peace, changed the whole situation completely. The feeble Ministry of Lord Goderich, and that of Wellington which followed it, were taken aback and rather dismayed at an occurrence that might so encourage revolt in the Balkans as to break up the Ottoman Empire without further ado. Wellington said he still held to the principles laid down in the Treaty of London, but he refused to take any more active measures against Turkey. As for the Sultan, his rage knew no bounds. Concentrating particularly on his hated enemy Russia, he repudiated all his recent agreements, closed the Dardanelles to Russian trade, and made war between the two countries inevitable. Thus the very thing that Canning had striven so long to avert at last came to pass. In May 1828 the Russian army crossed the Pruth on its advance towards Constantinople, while England and France, forced to admit the provocation under which the Tsar was acting, looked helplessly on.

Almost immediately, however, the excellent fighting qualities of the Turkish troops gave the two Western Powers a chance to intervene once more and prevent matters from being settled entirely according to the wishes of Russia. The Russian army was checked and held up for some months on the northern side of the Balkan Mountains, and meanwhile Mehemet Ali came to an agreement with Admiral Codrington, under which the Egyptian troops were withdrawn from the Morea. France had a share in this arrangement, for the fortresses held by Ibrahim were handed over to a force of 14,000 French troops which remained in the devastated province for the time being.

Throughout the winter of 1828-29 discussions were taking place to decide the future of Greece, and it was agreed provisionally to make her a self-governing state under the Sultan. Soon afterwards the

¹ Sir Edward Codrington (1770-1851) commanded the *Orion* at Trafalgar.

Russian army made a daring move round the Turkish flank, crossed the Balkans, and occupied Adrianople. Faced with this threat to his capital, and menaced by the presence of a Russian fleet, the Sultan agreed to come to terms, and on September 14, 1829, the Treaty of Adrianople was signed. By its terms Moldavia and Wallachia became practically independent; neutral vessels were to enjoy freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, and the Russian treaty rights in the Straits were reaffirmed. Russia and Turkey also agreed to the arrangements previously made respecting Greece. Although the affair in Navarino Bay had really settled the question of Greek independence, it certainly appeared that Russia, by going to war with Turkey, had after all been the chief instrument in bringing it about, and although she gave up all her conquests, there is no doubt that the Russian position in the Near East was strengthened as a result of the war. The affairs of Greece were not settled till 1833, when she became an independent kingdom under the former Prince Otto of Bavaria. Her frontiers were to run from Arta to Volo. The final arrangement was principally the work of Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary in the new and vigorous Whig Government in London.

The Rebellion of Mehemet Ali. The Greek Revolt had revealed very clearly the weakness of the Sultan's power, and to no one was the fact more clearly apparent than to Mehemet Ali.¹ By birth a low-born Albanian, he had, by sheer ruthless ability and clever foresight in adopting Western methods and ideas, carved out for himself a career which by 1805 had made him the master of Egypt. Since then a series of campaigns had extended his territory to Arabia and the Sudan, and made him by far the most powerful of the Sultan's vassals. To the assistance of the French he owed the improvement of his army and navy, together with many advances in agriculture, industry, and administration. His own ability was of a high order, and his ambitions soared higher still.

As a reward for his assistance in the Morea Mehemet Ali received the island of Crete. The Sultan's promise of the Pashaliks of Syria and Damascus had not materialized, since Mahmoud II argued that the Egyptian campaign in the Morea had after all been a failure. Cloaking his real intention under a protestation of loyalty to his master, Mehemet Ali therefore picked a quarrel with the Pasha of Acre, and in 1831 sent an army under the redoubtable Ibrahim to invade Syria. Palestine was occupied; Acre itself, which had successfully withstood the forces of Napoleon, fell after a siege, and then Damascus. By the summer of 1832 practically all Syria was in Ibrahim's hands, and Mahmoud had made up his mind that the advance must be checked at all costs. But neither his troops nor his generals were the equals of

¹ Mehemet Ali (1769-1849) began life as a small trader in tobacco.

Ibrahim and his Egyptians. In July a Turkish army was routed at the Beilan Pass, and six months later a fresh one met with a similar fate at Konia.

Once again the Turkish Empire appeared to be in danger of complete collapse. The Sultan had long since appealed for foreign aid, but Britain was not at the moment prepared to engage in further

commitments in the Near East (odd as that may sound with Palmerston at the Foreign Office!), and France had been too long associated with the reforms of Mehemet Ali in Egypt not to desire his ultimate success. A golden opportunity was therefore presented to Nicholas of Russia. The Sultan was only too glad of his assistance, and early in 1833 a Russian naval squadron was sent to the Bosphorus. This of course provoked a protest from Britain and France, but it was followed none the less by the landing of a force of 15,000 Russian troops. To put an end to a situation that bid fair to place Russia in precisely the command-



SCENE OF THE CONQUESTS OF MEHEMET ALI

ing position on the Straits that she desired Britain and France now bluntly told the Sultan that he must come to terms with his subordinate vassal. The result was the Convention of Kutaya, by which Mehemet Ali received all Syria, with Damascus and Adana.

In July 1833 the Russian forces withdrew from Turkish territory, but not before an agreement had been signed which in theory at any rate made Russia the military dictator of the Straits. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which the Tsar forced upon the Sultan as the price of his assistance, provided for Russian military and naval support should

a similar situation arise in the future. More significant still, the Sultan agreed in a secret article to close the Straits to all except Russian warships if need arose. The purport of this article gradually leaked out, and both England and France protested in no uncertain terms. Thus, valuable as the treaty appeared on paper, Nicholas must have realized that if he ever attempted to put its terms into practice he would run the risk of provoking a war with England, and perhaps with France. Although he had seized the opportunity offered by Mehemet Ali's rebellion to strengthen the Russian hold over Turkey, the actual value of the new treaty remained extremely doubtful.

Within a few years the opportunity to put matters to the test occurred. Mehemet Ali, unsatisfied with his gains under the Convention of Kutaya, was anxious to become completely independent of the Sultan. Mahmoud, regretting that he had ever given way in the first place, and burning with hatred against his troublesome vassal, was determined to regain Syria by force. By 1838 it was obvious that another conflict in the Near East was pending. Early in the following year the Sultan ordered the advance of what he fondly believed to be a vastly improved and stronger army. But disaster, more complete than ever, was in store for Turkey. In June 1839 the Turks were utterly defeated by Ibrahim at Nessib; six days later the old Sultan died, to be succeeded by his sixteen-year-old son, and the Turkish fleet sailed to Alexandria, to be handed over by its treacherous admiral to Mehemet Ali. Once again the collapse of the Turkish Empire seemed imminent, and the Russian diplomatists prepared to take a hand. This time, however, they had to reckon with the vigorous policy of Lord Palmerston.

The Western Powers began by informing the young Sultan that he must take no steps to settle matters on his own initiative. The promptitude with which they acted in the matter was a sufficient hint to Russia that intervention by her under the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi would not be tolerated. The Tsar realized, however, that the aims of England and France were conflicting. The latter thought it best that Mehemet Ali should become independent, but Palmerston, fearful that French influence would in that case extend right along the Mediterranean from west to east, considered this a possible menace to the safety of British communications with India. The only safeguard he had so far obtained was the occupation of Aden, which had been effected a short while previously. To act wholeheartedly with France in opposing Russia in the Near East might therefore prove a very doubtful stroke of policy.

In this predicament Palmerston was both surprised and pleased to receive an intimation from the Tsar that Russia was willing to abandon the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, to agree that the Dardanelles

should remain closed to all but Turkish warships, and to co-operate with England in finding a solution to the present difficulty. It appeared that now all the Powers would be able to act amicably together in effecting a lasting settlement. But popular opinion in France held strongly that Mehemet Ali should not be coerced, and the accession to power of Thiers,¹ who was particularly anxious to make France strong in the Levant, led to an attempt to impose the French viewpoint upon Turkey behind the backs of the other Powers. Accordingly Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed in July 1840 the Convention of London, by which the four Powers undertook to protect the Sultan and to offer Mehemet Ali the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt, together with Syria and Acre, for the term of his life.

When the terms of this Convention were made public the indignation in France was tremendous. Thiers, breathing vengeance for the indignity to which France had been submitted by an agreement deliberately made without her knowledge and against her known wishes, threatened war and began to make the necessary preparations. Palmerston, however, realizing that Louis-Philippe was not the man to risk a general conflict against the rest of Europe, remained firm. His view was justified, and the fiery Thiers fell from power. Meanwhile, since Mehemet Ali had not accepted the proffered terms, an Austro-British fleet captured Beyrout and Acre and defeated Ibrahim's army. Mehemet Ali submitted, gave back the Turkish fleet, and agreed to the loss of Syria, Crete, and Arabia, which he might easily have retained had not the expectation of active assistance from France encouraged him to oppose the policy of the Four Power Convention.

In 1841 France returned to the fold, when the Convention of London was re-enacted to include her in what was now a Five Power Pact. It was agreed then that when Turkey was at peace the Straits should remain closed to all foreign warships.

The close of the Mehemet Ali episode therefore found Britain and Russia acting in agreement over affairs in the Near East. It was due to the genius of Lord Palmerston that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi had thus been so successfully set aside. That statesman had a great belief in the regenerative powers of the Turkish Empire, which he thought would in time become a 'respectable Power,' under no necessity to place itself under the guardianship of anyone. Unfortunately, however, the new accord with Russia was not destined to be of long duration.

The First Afghan War. While the unruly Mehemet Ali was keeping the Near Eastern question in the forefront of European politics Lord Palmerston's attention was drawn to the possibility of an expansion of Russian influence in the Middle East that might, if allowed to

¹ Louis-Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877), Prime Minister for six months during 1840.

proceed unchecked, eventually threaten the British political supremacy in India. On the north-east, where it is defended by the great barrier of the Himalayas and the lofty tableland of Tibet, the Indian peninsula has always been secure from foreign encroachment. In the north-west, however, the British frontier in the eighteen-thirties was much more vulnerable than it is to-day. At that time full control of Sind and the Punjab had not been assumed. Beyond those native states lay Afghanistan, the northern part of which was under the control of Dost Mohammed, whose seat of government lay at Kabul, and the southern under a confederation of princes at Kandahar. As yet the Russian boundary was far removed from that of Afghanistan, for the Russians had not occupied the country east of the Caspian Sea, and their headquarters lay at Orenburg, still far distant from the valley of the river Oxus. West of Afghanistan lay Persia, where of late years there had been a decline in British influence, and a corresponding increase in the influence of Russia. This state of affairs and its probable significance were brought to the notice of Lord Palmerston by Dr McNeill, a British diplomat in Persia. If Russian influence became paramount in Persia it might eventually extend by way of Afghanistan and the two Indian states beyond, until it reached the British boundary on the river Sutlej.

In 1837 an event occurred that led Palmerston and the Government of India to suppose that the process of encroachment was beginning. Despite the protests of British representatives on the spot, the Shah of Persia attacked Afghanistan and laid siege to the fortress of Herat. It seemed clear that this was being done at the instigation or with the encouragement of Russia, and no satisfaction was forthcoming from the Tsar that this was not an attempt to extend his influence over Afghanistan, behind the advance of a Persian army. Dr McNeill, who had now been appointed British Minister at Teheran, with instructions from Palmerston to prevent Russia from establishing a protectorate over Persia, appealed to Lord Auckland,¹ the Governor-General of India, to send a military expedition to Persia to persuade the Shah that he had better leave Herat alone. Accordingly a small force landed on the island of Kharak, near Bushire, and this, coupled with the fact that their repeated assaults on Herat were proving of no avail, induced the Persians to abandon the attempt. Meanwhile, however, although the Russian designs in this direction appeared for the moment to have been successfully thwarted, there were signs that it was about to be directly established in Afghanistan at the Court of Dost Mohammed himself.

There was in British India a former ruler of Afghanistan named

¹ George Eden, Earl of Auckland (1784-1849), Governor-General of India from 1835 to 1842.

Shah Shujah. Forced to fly from his throne as long before as 1809, he had since 1816 been a pensioner of the East India Company. An unsuccessful attempt to regain his throne was made by the Shah in 1833, with the friendly sympathy of the British and their ally Ranjit Singh, of the Punjab, whose forces captured and held the Afghan frontier fortress of Peshawar. This had naturally provoked the intense hostility and alarm of Dost Mohammed, who determined forthwith to seek the support of Russia. In reply to his representations a Russian envoy named Captain Witkiewicz arrived in Kabul in 1837. Lord Auckland, who had been warned by the home Government to keep a careful watch over the situation on the North-west Frontier, had by this time dispatched to Kabul a representative of his own, Captain Burnes. Burnes soon discovered that the only way to regain the friendship and confidence of Dost Mohammed would be to persuade Ranjit Singh to give up Peshawar. Lord Auckland, however, who considered the maintenance of good relations with the Sikhs of the Punjab a vital necessity to the safety of the British North-west Frontier, was unwilling to do this. He sent a categorical refusal to Dost Mohammed, and recalled Burnes. There was nothing now to prevent the Russian envoy from making good his position, and evidently no hope of establishing British influence over Dost Mohammed. Lord Auckland therefore determined to stake everything on a military expedition to depose the ruler of Afghanistan and to restore Shah Shujah in his stead. Only thus did it seem possible to prevent Afghanistan from falling entirely under the influence of Russia. Palmerston was wholeheartedly in agreement. About the same time that this plan of action had been settled the news came that the Persians had abandoned the siege of Herat. None the less Lord Auckland decided that as a safeguard for the future it was necessary to go forward with his scheme.

Shah Shujah, Mr (later Sir) William Macnaghten, who had been nominated British envoy to the Shah's Court, and a British force of over 14,000 men advanced into Afghanistan and entered Kandahar. The reception they received was not enthusiastic, but no serious resistance was encountered until the expedition reached Ghazni, where it was necessary to blow up one of the city gates and take the place by storm, entailing some 200 British casualties. At Urgundeh, Dost Mohammed was found in person with his army, but his men deserted him, and he was forced to fly. In August 1839 Kabul was occupied and Shah Shujah restored to his throne, a weak ruler relying on the power of British bayonets and with Macnaghten as the real director of policy. For the moment, however, it appeared that the British cause had triumphed and that the Russian designs on Afghanistan had been successfully frustrated, though later in the same

year a Russian expedition left Orenburg to attack the Khan of Khiva, an action for which the Russians had a valid excuse. The difficulties, however, were too great, and the expedition was at length abandoned, though not before Palmerston had warned Russia that he did not intend to allow her to occupy the Oxus valley. A year later the British position appeared to be still further strengthened by the surrender of Dost Mohammed, who was sent into exile in India.

But disaster for the British in Afghanistan was pending. The whole episode is one that reflects little credit on the Government of India. Shah Shujah was unpopular with the Afghans; Macnaghten's policy was often vacillating, and he was forced by circumstances to associate himself with extortion and oppression. The expenses of the expedition led to a reduction in the bribes paid to keep the local chiefs quiet, resulting in the growth of a strong movement of rebellion, for which a leader was found in Akbar Khan, son of the exiled Dost Mohammed. In the autumn of 1841 the movement came to a head, and in face of it the British authorities in Kabul, now hampered by a number of women and children, showed extraordinary weakness and indecision. General Elphinstone, the commander of the military force, was sick in body and dispirited in mind, and did not get on well with Macnaghten and his political officers. The British troops were in cantonments outside the native city, defended, it has been said, merely by "a shallow ditch and feeble earthwork over which an active cow could scramble." In this position, cut off from supplies and with no hope of relief in the terrible cold of the Afghan winter, they were forced eventually to bargain with Akbar Khan for a safe conduct out of the country. On December 23 Macnaghten, while parleying with the Afghan chiefs, was seized and put to death. His mutilated body was hung up in the native bazaar, and two officers who had accompanied him were taken prisoner and kept as hostages.

On January 6, 1842, the British left their cantonments to plunge through the snow on their journey to the frontier. The effective troops numbered fewer than 5000 men, of which about 700 were European, and their movements were greatly hampered by the presence of many thousands of non-combatants and camp followers. From the start they were subjected to repeated attacks by the Afghans, which Akbar Khan professed himself unable to prevent. Intense cold, privation, fatigue, and hostile bullets depleted the straggling column, which for the most part lacked the merest semblance of discipline as it struggled forward at the rate of five miles a day. At length, with its meagre artillery long since abandoned or captured, the remnant of Elphinstone's army fought its way on the night of January 11 into the narrow Jagdalak Pass. Here the road had been blocked by piles of brushwood, and, caught in a trap, the soldiers and camp followers sold

their lives as dearly as they could. A handful was taken prisoner; some, who succeeded in breaking out, were killed a few days later. Only Dr Brydon, exhausted and covered with wounds, rode into Jellalabad with news of the disaster.


The British garrisons at Kandahar and Jellalabad held out successfully. The latter fortress was attacked by Akbar himself, but his forces were routed by a British sortie, and soon afterwards General Pollock arrived with a relieving army 8000 strong. Pollock advanced on Kabul, defeated Akbar's army of 15,000 men with a loss of only thirty-two killed, and retook the city. Here he was joined by a force from Kandahar. The native bazaar was burnt, and the prisoners and hostages eventually succoured. But General Elphinstone, who had been among them, had already succumbed to sickness and died.

Shah Shujah, who had elected to take the risk of remaining behind at Kabul after the British left, had been murdered long before Pollock's arrival. After a short interval the British agreed to the return of Dost Mohammed, and evacuated the country. Thus the disastrous Afghan experiment came to an end, with the situation ostensibly as it had been before. It did appear, however, that the Russian menace in the Middle East was over. The agreement between Russia and Britain over the settlement of the Mehemet Ali question had done much to restore confidence, and when the Persians showed signs of renewing their attack on Herat following the news of the British disaster in Afghanistan, both British and Russian agents acted together in persuading the Shah to abandon the project.

The Crimean War. The period of concord over the Near Eastern question that succeeded the Convention of 1841 was not destined to last into the second half of the century. The troublous years 1848-49, marked as they were by Liberal or revolutionary movements in France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and Prussia, indirectly affected the situation in Turkey by destroying the trust on which the Near Eastern settlement had been based. The most important change that resulted from these movements took place in the Government of France, where Louis-Philippe was deposed and the Orleanist monarchy replaced by the Second Republic, under the presidency of Louis Napoleon, nephew of the first Emperor. This was followed in 1852 by the Second Empire, when Louis Napoleon proclaimed himself the Emperor Napoleon III. This *coup d'état* did not improve the relations between France and Russia, for the autocratic Tsar Nicholas could neither welcome so deliberate a denunciation of the Treaty of Vienna, nor bring himself to recognize the new Emperor as a 'brother.' Napoleon did not forget the insult.

Other causes also contributed to make the Tsar's relations with Europe uneasy. He was profoundly disturbed at the presence in

Turkey of the leaders of the Hungarian insurrectionary movement, and still more so at the fact that Palmerston had not hesitated to show his sympathy with these premature Liberal risings, even to the extent



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CRIMEAN WAR

of supporting the Sultan in his refusal to surrender the exiles to the Austrian Government. In 1851 Palmerston had been forced to resign from the Foreign Office, but in a short while he was back in the Cabinet, under the Premiership of Lord Aberdeen; and although no

longer in control of foreign affairs, his anti-Russian influence in Cabinet discussions had a very direct bearing on the course of events that followed.

The part played by France in the Near East had certainly been inglorious under Louis-Philippe. Bested at every turn by the other Powers, she had been forced to submit. The spectacular Napoleon was determined to alter this state of affairs, and since he depended for his position in France largely on the support of the Catholic party, he began by championing the cause of the Latin Christians in the Holy Land. The 'Capitulations' between France and Turkey, which, as we have seen, dated back for very many years, by defining the privileges of the Latin Church in the Holy Land, provided an adequate excuse for his action. Russia, however, had by the Treaty of Kainardji established a rather vague right to keep a benevolent eye on the Greek Orthodox Church. In the existing state of feeling between the French and Russian Courts it therefore only needed a squabble between the Greek and Latin monks to set their respective champions at loggerheads, to the complete destruction of the European concert so carefully contrived in 1841. For England, who had no desire to see either France or Russia paramount in the Near East, the situation was one of extreme delicacy, with which Aberdeen's feeble Cabinet was ill equipped to deal.

The question that so unexpectedly clarified the rival aims of the Russian and French Governments in the Near East was a demand by the Latin monks for keys to the doors of the Church and Sacred Manger at Bethlehem, and for permission to deposit a silver star, bearing the arms of France, in the Sanctuary of the Nativity. The Greek monks, who of late years had become principal guardians of the Holy Places, resisted these claims. Over this trivial matter Napoleon and Nicholas came to grips. Each made representations to the Sultan, who, while endeavouring to satisfy both, made a decision favouring the Latin monks and therefore totally unacceptable to the Tsar.

The underlying principles at stake immediately came to the surface. The Russian envoy, Prince Mentschikoff,¹ arrived at Constantinople early in 1853 to inform the Sultan that in the opinion of his master the dispute was by no means settled, and to claim a Russian protectorate over all the Sultan's Greek Orthodox subjects, who numbered over twelve million souls. This was a serious and somewhat astonishing claim, and it promptly set the English Government on the alert. Nicholas, however, saw no reason why he should not act in concert with England as on the last occasion, provided he behaved with sufficient candour. He had, in fact, already acquainted the British

¹ Prince Alexander Sergeievich Mentschikoff (1787-1869), who had fought throughout the Napoleonic campaign.

Ambassador at St Petersburg with his point of view. Convinced in his own mind that the collapse of the Turkish rule in Europe could not in any case be much longer delayed, he was determined to prevent the Balkans from becoming a series of small independent states called into being by revolutionary action. If England would agree to these new nations being placed under the protection of Russia, and to a temporary occupation of Constantinople, she might extend her own influence in the Near East and safeguard her Mediterranean route to India by the occupation of Egypt, Crete, and Cyprus. Thus, with the funeral arrangements in the hands of two such capable undertakers, the 'sick man' would eventually slip away with a minimum of misunderstanding and confusion.

Needless to say, the British Government refused to desert its old policy of supporting the Sultan, and the Tsar was flatly informed that in the British opinion nothing would be so likely to produce chaos and catastrophe as the scheme he had just outlined. Accordingly Lord Stratford de Redcliffe,¹ the British Ambassador at Constantinople, while persuading the Sultan to grant Mentschikoff the concessions he demanded on behalf of Greek Christians at the Holy Places, used all his influence to secure a rejection of the Russian demand for a treaty between Russia and Turkey embodying the required protectorate over the Greek Orthodox Christians. In this Lord Stratford was supported by the ambassadors of the other Powers; the protectorate was refused, and Russia found herself completely isolated. In May 1853 the Russian Embassy was withdrawn from Constantinople, and it was made clear that Russia would attempt to coerce Turkey by force.

In July a Russian army occupied Moldavia and Wallachia. Rather to the Tsar's surprise, this had the effect of provoking the hostility of Austria and Prussia, the former being particularly anxious about the Danube outlet for her trade. A Four Power Conference was held at Vienna, the outcome of which was a suggested settlement known as the Vienna Note, presented for approval to the Russian and Turkish Governments. In this note the former treaties between Russia and Turkey regarding the Christian religion were reaffirmed, and the Tsar professed himself satisfied. Turkey, however, secure in the belief that France at any rate would support her with armed force, and encouraged by the extreme anti-Russian policy of Lord Stratford, insisted on the insertion of a clause to the effect that the necessary 'protection' of the Christian subjects was to be the responsibility of the Sultan's Government alone. This amendment was at once rejected by the Tsar, and the last-minute effort at a peaceful solution collapsed. Turkey formally demanded the withdrawal of the Russian army from

¹ Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (1786-1880).

the Danubian principalities, and when this was not complied with declared war on October 23. At the same time the British and French fleets, which by the terms of the Convention of the Straits could not enter the Dardanelles while Turkey was at peace, moved up to the Bosphorus.

At the end of November, while negotiations between Russia and the four European Powers were still proceeding, events took a sudden and serious turn. Admiral Nakhimoff destroyed a Turkish light squadron, manned by 4000 men, in the Bay of Sinope, and since in the circumstances this was taken as indisputable proof of the Tsar's intention to crush and dismember Turkey in spite of all efforts on the part of other Powers to bring about a reasonable solution, anti-Russian feeling in France and England mounted rapidly. As a result of this Napoleon's suggestion that the French and British fleets should enter the Black Sea was put into effect at the beginning of January 1854. Provided their intention was merely the preservation of neutrality without showing favour to either side, the Tsar was not disposed to object, but when inquiry showed that their object was to act in concert with the Turkish Government he withdrew his ambassadors from London and Paris, and England and France declared war on Russia on March 27, following her formal refusal to evacuate the principalities.

Meanwhile active hostilities had broken out on the Danube. Russia attacked the fortress of Silistria, which was gallantly defended by the Turks, in support of whom the British and French armies were landed at Varna, on the Black Sea, in May. Shortly afterwards the Russian army was further menaced by the massing on its flank of an Austrian army, followed by a demand from Austria that all Russian troops should be withdrawn from the principalities. To this the Tsar thought it best to agree, and by the beginning of August the Russian army was once more on its native soil, leaving the principalities to be occupied by the Austrian army, acting on behalf of the Turks.

The question now arose as to whether the Allied purpose had already been accomplished, or whether further measures were called for. England and France decided that it was necessary to veto once and for all the Russian claim to a protectorate over the principalities and the Sultan's Christian subjects, to prevent Russia from controlling the mouth of the Danube and so restricting its trade, and generally to free Turkey from all fear of Russian aggression in the future. The last of these 'Four Points' could not be effected without the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet and its base of operations at the great naval arsenal and port of Sebastopol, "the heart of Russian power in the East." The British and French armies were therefore diverted to the Crimea, where they landed at Eupatoria in September 1854.

Supported by the fleet, the Allied army began its march south along the coast towards Sebastopol. At the river Alma they were

opposed by a Russian army 40,000 strong, under the command of Mentschikoff, which kept up a determined resistance for several hours before being forced to withdraw. Mentschikoff made for Sebastopol, but evacuated the town almost immediately and retired to his base at Bakshiserai, in the middle of the Crimea. Lord Raglan,¹ the British commander, therefore very properly suggested an immediate attack on the fortress, but the French Marshal Saint-Arnaud, who was suffering from a mortal disease which shortly afterwards caused his death, thought it expedient to await the arrival of the artillery necessary to undertake a regular siege. Accordingly the Allies took up their position on the south side of Sebastopol, the British establishing their base on the coast at Balaclava. Meanwhile Admiral Korniloff and the famous Russian engineer Todleben² closed the entrance to the harbour by sinking the Russian squadron, and greatly strengthened the forts and defences round Sebastopol. The most important of these forts were the Malakoff and the Redan.

Mentschikoff now re-entered Sebastopol, while another Russian army delivered a furious attack on the base camp at Balaclava. The onslaught was successfully resisted, but outside Sebastopol itself the Allies could make but little headway. Canrobert, the successor of Saint-Arnaud, proved another general of cautious temperament, and although the Allies repelled an attack on their lines at Inkerman, the winter settled in without their purpose being any nearer to fulfilment. Before long the destruction of a quantity of shipping and stores in a storm, coupled with the incompetence and lack of foresight of the Government at home, which appeared to have little idea of the equipment needed to conduct a winter campaign, placed the British army in a terrible plight, with half its total force utterly unfit for service. The result was the fall of the Aberdeen Ministry and the accession to power of the vigorous Palmerston.

Early in the new year Sardinia, anxious to win the approval of Napoleon III and to obtain experience for her army in the struggle for Italian independence that was so soon to begin, joined the side of the Allies and dispatched a small army to the Crimea. In March the Tsar Nicholas died, and was succeeded by Alexander II. Shortly afterwards another conference met at Vienna, to discuss a settlement on the basis of the 'Four Points,' but since the Russians refused to agree to the allied wishes over a new Convention of the Straits, the war continued. A quantity of Russian stores was captured by the Allies at Kertsch, and when Canrobert was succeeded by the energetic

¹ Fitzroy Henry Somerset, Baron Raglan (1788-1855), had served as aide-de-camp to Wellington in the Peninsula, where he had been first to mount the breach at Badajoz.

² Franz Eduard Ivanovich, Count Todleben (1818-84).

General Pélissier, the attack upon the two principal forts was once more renewed, though still without success. In August a Russian attack near the river Tchernaya did not succeed in raising the siege. By this time Lord Raglan had also succumbed to sickness and had been succeeded in the British command by General Simpson. At last, on September 8, 1855, the Malakoff fell into French hands, and the Russians evacuated Sebastopol.

Towards the close of the year the fortress of Kars, which had been gallantly defended by a Turkish army under General Fenwick Williams, surrendered to a Russian army, following which the new Tsar, faced with a threat of war from Austria, consented to discuss terms of peace.

The Treaty of Paris was signed on March 30, 1856. By its terms the Sultan, in recognition of the fact that his Christian subjects could claim no legal protection from any foreign Power, promised internal reforms to ameliorate their lot. In the firm belief that Turkey was at last about to become a 'respectable Power,' the Sultan was admitted on an equal footing to participate in the Concert of Europe. The Convention of the Straits was renewed, on the understanding that those much-discussed waters should remain closed to all foreign warships while Turkey was at peace. To scotch the Russian menace towards Constantinople it was agreed that the Black Sea should be completely neutralized, with no warships on its waters and no arsenals on its shores, though equal rights of navigation were to be accorded to the trade of any flag. Similar terms were to apply to the trade of the river Danube, from the mouths of which Russia withdrew by the cession of Southern Bessarabia to Moldavia. The two Danubian principalities, though remaining under Turkish suzerainty, were freed from the protectorate of Russia.

The Crimean War has often been characterized as a useless waste of men and money. Within a very few years English statesmen were declaring that it should never have been undertaken. England was held to have drifted blindly into a futile conflict, tied securely to the tail of Napoleon in his search for military prestige. On the English arms, at any rate, the campaign did not reflect much glory, and the news of its disasters proved a contributory cause of the Indian Mutiny that followed so soon in its wake. But Lord Stratford was convinced that if the Russian ambitions in the Near East were ever to receive a salutary check it must be administered at once. If one takes into account the character of the Tsar Nicholas he was probably right. There is no doubt that the result of the war, and the enforced agreement to the neutrality of the Black Sea, were a terrible blow to Russian pride. The opportunity to repudiate this clause of the treaty and to refortify Sebastopol came in 1870, when France was fighting desperately against the invading armies of Prussia, and Bismarck was only too

anxious to gain Russian friendship by his support. Faced with this situation, Britain's only choice was to make war against Russia single-handed or to agree. She chose the latter alternative. In 1856, however, Russia had to humble her pride and submit. Foiled in her expansion towards the Near East, she began, as we shall see later, to resume her designs in the Middle East and to encroach once more towards the frontiers of Afghanistan.

The Bulgarian Massacres and the Treaty of Berlin. Not the least of the checks imposed upon Russia by the Treaty of Paris was the clause putting an end to her rights of interference in the Danubian principalities. Her administration there earlier in the century, and the military occupation that always preceded a war with Turkey, had rendered Russia unpopular with the inhabitants, so that from this point of view both Moldavia and Wallachia had reason to be satisfied with the treaty. It was not long, however, before the new arrangement was upset. In both principalities a strong consciousness of common nationality was growing. Napoleon III thought that the union of the two into a single state would offer an effectual check to the spread of Russian influence over the Balkans; even Gladstone agreed that a 'living barrier' between Russia and Turkey would be an asset to the cause of European peace. Eventually the principalities took matters into their own hands, and in 1861 proclaimed their union, to which the Powers agreed, and the new state of Roumania came into being. Its first ruler was Alexander Couza, a Roumanian nobleman who was replaced five years later by the German Prince Carol, a cousin of the King of Prussia.

But in spite of the new 'barrier' the course of events soon gave Russia a further opportunity of interfering in Turkish affairs. In the Treaty of Paris the Sultan had recorded his "generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire," and had followed this up with a decree that placed his Christian subjects on a footing of equality with their Moslem rulers. The theory was good, but in practice little or nothing came of it. However genuine the intentions of the Turkish Government, its hold over local officials was far too weak to ensure that this new and unpopular system was put into effect, especially after the accession of a new Sultan of unusual weakness and extravagance in 1861. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, situated on the remotest confines of the Ottoman Empire, the lot of the Christian peasants was particularly unhappy, since in addition to Turkish misrule they had to submit to the bitter domination of their own local overlords, who had themselves embraced Mohammedanism. The perpetual unrest was further encouraged by the Pan-Slav movement, secretly fostered all over the Balkans by Russian agents.

Matters came to a head in July 1875, when the people of Herzegovina

broke into open revolt and defeated the Turks at Nevesinye. The news of this initial success spread the flames of rebellion far and wide. The leaders of the movement in Bosnia besought the European Powers to do anything rather than leave them to the mercy of the Turks, and when towards the end of the year the Porte issued still further promises of reform, showed their contempt for the suggestion by prosecuting the struggle with renewed vigour. Faced with such a situation, the Powers were unable longer to remain aloof, and in January 1876 the Sultan was presented with the 'Andrassy Note,' drawn up by the Austrian Chancellor of that name,¹ in conjunction with Russia and the new German Empire. This note demanded religious toleration, a new system of tax-collecting, and the establishment of a commission composed of Moslems and Christians to ensure that the reforms were actually carried out. Both the British and French Governments associated themselves with this note.

The Andrassy Note failed to produce any effect whatever. The Turkish Government refused to allow any control over the reforms it proposed to institute, and the insurgents would place no reliance on any more Turkish promises. In May 1876 the revolt spread to Bulgaria, and the French and German consuls at Salonika were murdered. The result was an even stronger note from Austria, Russia, and Germany, known as the Berlin Memorandum. This proposed an armistice of two months, after which, if a satisfactory settlement had not by then been reached, the Powers proposed to take further action. The tone adopted was so menacing that Disraeli, fearing for the safety of the old Conservative policy of supporting Turkish integrity, refused to associate himself with this Memorandum. By this action he greatly weakened the European Concert and encouraged the Turks, who remembered the action taken by Britain in the Crimean War. In August 1876 the Turkish Government was still further strengthened by the accession of the able Sultan Abdul Hamid. By this time, however, Serbia and Montenegro had declared war on Turkey.

A situation of the utmost gravity had now developed. Once more the British Mediterranean fleet took up its position at Besika Bay. Turkish troops poured into Bulgaria to exact reprisals for the murder of Mohammedan officials; and men, women, and children were indiscriminately massacred. The horrors of these 'Bulgarian atrocities' were freely vented in the English Press, and investigations carried out on the spot served to confirm their truth. The news brought Gladstone from his retirement at Hawarden, to arraign Disraeli's Government for its support of such a monstrous *régime* and to preach the new policy of expelling the Turks 'bag and baggage' from the desolated province. Popular opinion in England veered to his side, and Disraeli

¹ Count Julius Andrassy (1823-90).

found himself in a position of considerable difficulty, especially as his own Cabinet was divided. In these circumstances he redoubled his efforts to produce a peaceful settlement, co-operating once more with the other Powers. Nevertheless he could not help feeling disquieted at the presence of many Russians in the Serbian army, and the decisive threat from the Tsar that induced Turkey to grant the Serbians an armistice in October. To do him justice, the Tsar did his best to explain the Russian viewpoint in an endeavour to gain the co-operation of England, and gave a solemn assurance that in any case he would not aim at the occupation of Constantinople.

In November Britain proposed a conference at Constantinople, where the Powers met during the following month. At the same time a Parliamentary constitution was proclaimed in Turkey, intended perhaps to win support from the more Liberal-minded of the Powers, but in spite of this no headway was made with the question at issue. To cut a long story short, the Turkish Government, anxious to lose no further shreds of its sovereignty in the Balkans, and in the face of warnings from Britain as to the inevitable consequences of this attitude, refused to accept in their entirety any of the settlements suggested. On April 24, 1877, her patience exhausted by many months of fruitless diplomacy, Russia declared war on Turkey. The Tsar reiterated his promise not to occupy Constantinople or the Straits, and reassured Disraeli as to the safety of Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone. In this way he hoped to avert the possibility of a breach with England.

The Russo-Turkish conflict pursued a somewhat unexpected course. Profiting by the lessons of the Crimean War, Russia had already safeguarded her flank by an agreement with Austria, and she now made an alliance with Roumania that ensured the transit of her army to the banks of the Danube. A feint towards the Dobrudja secured the passage of the river with trifling loss, and by the middle of July a Russian army under General Gourko was already in the Balkan Mountains, astride the Shipka Pass. At this point, however, the Russian advance received an unexpected check. The left flank was now unprotected, since the army in the Dobrudja had been unable to make further headway, while on the right Osman Pasha had hastily fortified Plevna, which he held with grim determination against all comers. In September the Russo-Roumanian army delivered a furious assault against the little city, but the attack was driven off with great loss. Since it was deemed unsafe for Gourko to continue his advance until Plevna was reduced, a general siege had to be undertaken. The task was entrusted to Todleben, but it was not until the end of the year that Plevna fell, after a gallant defence lasting five months.

With the coming of the new year the Turkish resistance rapidly

collapsed. Serbia had re-entered the war; Russian troops were steadily advancing round the eastern shores of the Black Sea into Asia Minor, and on January 20, 1878, General Gourko entered Adrianople. In England the Bulgarian atrocities and the factious behaviour of the Turkish Government were forgotten in face of the rising tide of apprehension over the possible designs of the victorious Tsar, flushed with the belated success of his armies. Russia was reminded that the consent of the Powers would be necessary if terms were imposed on Turkey that abrogated those of previous treaties; Parliament was asked for a vote of credit, and the British fleet passed through the Dardanelles, technically for the protection of British life and property. The situation looked threatening, but the Russian army, true to the Tsar's promise, did not occupy Constantinople. Instead a treaty was drawn up between Russia and Turkey at the village of San Stefano, on the Sea of Marmora.

When the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano became known in March 1878 both the British and Austrian Governments were seriously alarmed. The treaty proposed that Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should become completely independent of Turkey, the two last named with acquisitions of territory; Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be granted all necessary reforms, as previously suggested, with Russia and Austria in control to see that they were carried out; Russia was to receive the Dobrudja, Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars, on the Black Sea; Bulgaria was to be made a self-governing principality, stretching from the Danube to the Ægean, and from the Black Sea to the mountains of Albania, her ruler advised by a Russian Commissioner, and her safety guaranteed for the time being by a Russian army of occupation. Thus Turkey in Europe would be split into two parts, the limits of Bulgaria would extend far beyond the territory actually occupied by the Bulgarians, and Russia would control a vassal state with direct access to the Mediterranean. In the light of past history, and in view of the whole trend of his policy and convictions, it was not surprising that Disraeli found the Treaty of San Stefano wholly unacceptable to England. The army reserves were embodied; Indian troops were brought to relieve the garrison of Malta, and the British Government demanded that the new treaty should be submitted to a general European Congress. At first Russia would not agree to this unless the proposed discussion were limited beforehand to certain paragraphs of the treaty only, but, finding that Germany was not disposed to support her, she finally gave way, and the Congress met at Berlin in June 1878, under the presidency of 'honest broker' Bismarck.

Britain was represented by Disraeli and Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, who had just succeeded Lord Derby. By a previous treaty with the Porte it had been agreed that in return for British support

The boundaries shown are those settled by the Congress of Berlin

--- Proposed Bulgarian boundary of the Treaty of San Stefano



THE BALKAN STATES (1878)

in guaranteeing Turkey against further Russian encroachments. Cyprus was to be occupied and administered by a British force. Previous agreements had also been reached with Russia, so that the work of the Congress was speedily concluded. By the new Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878, Bulgaria became a self-governing state under a prince elected by the people, but under the suzerainty of Turkey. The boundaries proposed at San Stefano were considerably curtailed, for the new state was to stretch from the Danube to the Balkan Mountains only. A provisional *régime*, to last not longer than nine months, was set up under an Imperial Russian Commissary until the new administration was ready to take over. The old Ottoman fortresses in Bulgaria were to be demolished. South of Bulgaria, between the Balkan and Rhodope Mountains, a new province called Eastern Roumelia was established under a Christian Governor, nominated by the Sultan. In addition to her provisional rights in Bulgaria, Russia received Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, and the portion of Bessarabia that had been granted to Roumania (Moldavia) after the Crimean War. As an offset to the increase of Russian influence, which in spite of the treaty revision was still to be substantial, Austria received the right to 'occupy and administer' the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the additional right of maintaining a garrison in the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar. No time-limit was placed on this occupation, and the Austrians had to overcome a determined rising in Bosnia before they could make it effective. Roumania was compensated with the Dobrudja; Serbia and Montenegro also received increases of territory, and all three became wholly independent of the Sultan.

From several viewpoints the Treaty of Berlin is open to serious criticism. Roumania was ill compensated for her efforts in the war; Bulgaria could not forget the territory which had been snatched from her grasp by the action of the Powers. Within subsequent years the treaty was destined to suffer a series of arbitrary alterations that kept the Balkans in a state of intermittent turmoil right up to the outbreak of war in 1914. At the time, however, it appeared to be a great triumph for Disraeli, and a justification of his claim to have secured 'peace with honour.' So far as his principal object was concerned, he had certainly imposed a salutary check on Russian influence in the Near East. Before long events proved that the English fears of Russian influence over Bulgaria had little foundation. A strong anti-Russian party soon came into power in this ungrateful province, and in 1885, when Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia declared their union, the Powers hardly bothered to protest, since Russian influence appeared to be already at an end. It was not until ten years after this that real friendship between the two countries was restored. To sum up,

therefore, the Russo-Turkish War and Berlin settlement, while they did much towards freeing the Balkan Christians from Turkish rule, revealed clearly the opposing aims of Austria and Russia in that unhappy region, and did very little after all to further Russian influence in the Near East.

The Second Afghan War. As already recorded, the check imposed on Russia by the Crimean War merely served to hasten her expansion in the Middle East. The apprehensions of the Government of British India, aroused for the second time, reached their climax coincidentally with the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, a crisis which they served to enhance, and led to another disastrous conflict in Afghanistan during the years immediately following the Treaty of Berlin.

From 1856 onward the Russians began to encroach on the country lying to the east of the Caspian Sea. From Orenburg their surveying and exploring parties penetrated steadily towards the south-east, a prelude always to political annexation. By military or diplomatic action city after city was incorporated within the bounds of the Russian Empire: Tashkent and Samarkand in 1865, Bokhara three years later; then Khiva in 1873, which offered a convenient base for the exploration and mapping of the Oxus valley. It was evidently only a matter of time before Merv would also fall into Russian hands and the Tsar's dominions reach the vaguely defined northern borders of Afghanistan. The question at issue was whether or not they were likely to halt there.

Since the conclusion of the First Afghan War, Sind and the Punjab had been annexed, thus bringing the frontier of British India up to that of Afghanistan itself. That turbulent state was now under the rule of the Amir Shere Ali, third son of the late Dost Mohammed. The Amir's relations with the Indian Government were cordial, a state of affairs cemented from time to time by British subsidies. When, ostensibly alarmed at the Russian annexations, he sought from the British a guarantee of his independence in 1869, he was disappointed to meet only with a partial agreement to his demands, and the friendship began to cool. However, the matter was taken up with the Russian Government, and the Tsar disclaimed any intention of establishing a sphere of influence over Afghanistan. Britain was not satisfied, for, as already related, the Russian advance continued.

The occupation of Khiva in 1873 provoked further alarm in Britain and Afghanistan, especially since the Tsar had already given an assurance that the Russian advance would not proceed so far. Once more the Amir requested British help in case of an invasion, and once more he was refused a definite promise of assistance, for Gladstone's Liberal Cabinet was in no mood to increase its commitments abroad. But in the following year Disraeli came into power, pledged to the

fulfilment of a vigorous imperial policy, and the official British attitude on affairs in the Middle East underwent a distinct change. It was decided in London that the first step should be the establishment of a British Resident in Afghanistan, for the news that General Kaufmann, the Russian Governor of Turkestan, had opened relations with Kabul was causing Disraeli profound disquiet. But the Indian Government, convinced that trouble in Afghanistan would inevitably follow such a move, was against the proposal. Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy, accordingly resigned, and Disraeli appointed Lord Lytton¹ to succeed him. The new Viceroy reached India in the spring of 1876, and the exponents of the 'forward policy' now had a clear field.

The negotiations which Lytton opened with Shere Ali proved far from cordial. The Amir was thoroughly disgruntled with what appeared to him the evident selfishness of the British in refusing to protect him unless they were certain that their own interests were threatened. The conference opened at Peshawar in 1877 dragged on its unsatisfactory course. Meanwhile matters were not improved by the British military occupation of Baluchistan, and eventually relations with Afghanistan were broken off.

The crisis came in the summer of 1878, when Russia, angered by the British attitude over her war with Turkey and the Treaty of San Stefano, sent General Stoletoff on a mission to Kabul. News of the welcome he had received from Shere Ali determined Lord Lytton that Afghanistan should have a British Mission, whether she would or no. News of its coming was sent in advance; Shere Ali refused to receive it, and Sir Neville Chamberlain, Major Cavagnari, and the other members of the Mission were stopped at the Khyber Pass and forced to return to India. Thus it came about that the action of Russia in the Middle East provoked a second Afghan War, for the British held that their prestige in India was at stake. Afghanistan was invaded simultaneously by three columns, through the Khyber Pass, the Kuram Valley, and from the direction of Quetta. Shere Ali fled, and died shortly afterwards. The Russian Mission likewise departed in haste, and Russia refused to embroil herself with Britain by lending aid to the Afghans.

The relations between Britain and Afghanistan were now put on a new footing by the Treaty of Gandamak, signed in May 1879 with the new Amir Yakub Khan. Cavagnari became British Envoy at Kabul; certain parts of the country were occupied by British troops, and it was agreed that the foreign policy of Afghanistan was in future to be controlled by Britain. In return the country was to be defended against foreign aggression and to receive an annual subsidy of £60,000.

¹ Edward Robert Bulwer-Lytton (1831-91), son of the famous novelist, and himself a poet.

Within a few months the tragedy of the First Afghan War was repeated. Some Afghan regiments, aided by the mutinous city mob, stormed the British Residency at Kabul and murdered Cavagnari, his three British companions, and their tiny escort of seventy-five soldiers of the Guides. General Sir Frederick Roberts fought his way to Kabul; Yakub Khan was deposed and sent to India, and the British army settled down in the Sherpur cantonments outside the city.

The war, however, was by no means over. Apart from a few hangings, no retributive measures were taken, and the whole country seethed with unrest. For the time being General Roberts was in control, though his rule was only effective so far as his troops could make it. As the winter of 1879 approached the Mullah of Ghazni began to preach a holy war against the British, and an Afghan army under the able leader Mohammed Jan approached Kabul. After a sharp engagement that revealed the unexpected strength and determination of the enemy the British force was besieged in its cantonments. News of its plight was sent to India before the telegraph wire could be cut, and General Charles Gough's brigade moved to its relief. By the time of his arrival, however, the final Afghan assault had been successfully repulsed. The immediate danger was past, for the rising in Northern Afghanistan collapsed with great suddenness.

Meanwhile Sir Donald Stewart was in command of the British troops at Kandahar. In the spring of 1880 he was ordered to march to Kabul, and on the way he encountered strenuous resistance from an Afghan force, numbering about 12,000 men, near Ahmed Khel. With a loss of only 21 men killed, this force was put to flight, though Stewart was subjected to repeated opposition until he reached Kabul. After his arrival the strength of the British at Kabul amounted to 18,000 men.

In 1880 Disraeli was succeeded by Gladstone, and the British Cabinet became anxious to put a speedy end to the occupation of Afghanistan. A new Amir was at last found in the person of Abdur Rahman, a nephew of Shere Ali who had been living in Turkestan under Russian protection. Though somewhat distrustful of him on this account, the British came to terms in August and agreed to evacuate the Sherpur cantonments. Meanwhile, however, the small force left behind by Stewart at Kandahar had rashly attacked a large army of Afghans under Ayub Khan, near the village of Maiwand, and had been driven back into Kandahar in disorder, after suffering severe loss. To avenge this defeat General Roberts made his famous march from Kabul with a division some 10,000 strong, covering the distance of over 300 miles in 20 days. In the ensuing battle, fought on September 1, Ayub Khan's army was routed. The province of Kandahar was evacuated by the British, as well as Northern Afghanistan, and the

rule of Abdur Rahman established. Thus the second attempt of the British to impose their rule on the truculent Afghans came to an end, with the Pishin and Sibi valleys remaining in British hands, and Abdur Rahman agreeing to conduct his affairs in accordance with the Treaty of Gandamak. No British Resident, however, remained in Afghan territory.

The Second Afghan War and the consequent tutelage of the new ruler, Abdur Rahman, did not immediately put an end to the Russian encroachments in the Middle East. In 1883 Britain renewed her promise to help the Amir in resisting unprovoked aggression, and in the following year, when Russia occupied Merv and Sarakhs, a note of protest was forwarded to St Petersburg. It was therefore decided to set up an Anglo-Russian boundary commission to settle the question once and for all. In 1885, however, before the commission began its work, the Russian forces on the spot attacked and captured from the Afghans the town of Penjdeh. For some time matters looked distinctly threatening, but eventually a policy of moderation prevailed, and it was agreed that the Russians should keep Penjdeh and the right bank of the Hari Rud, provided that Abdur Rahman retained the Pass of Zulfikar.

As the century drew to a close it became increasingly evident that Russian influence was once more becoming predominant in Persia. The establishment of Russian consuls at Seistan, near the frontier of India, and at various ports on the Persian Gulf, served to keep British apprehensions alive, especially since no reliance was placed on assurances from St Petersburg that the independence of Persia was in no way threatened. A commercial treaty between Russia and Persia in 1902 did still more to enhance suspicion, and a British expedition to Tibet in the following year provoked in its turn the hostility of Russia. A programme of railway construction in Russian Turkestan, which appeared to have a strategic significance directed towards the Indian frontier, completed the uneasy tale of watchful mistrust in the Middle East. But it was in the Far East that the final stage in the ambitious expansion of Tsarist Russia, with its accompanying friction between London and St Petersburg, was about to work itself out.

The Russo-Japanese War. Since the time when the Russians first began the conquest of Siberia in the sixteenth century their traders and explorers had been steadily spreading the influence of the Russian Court throughout the northern fringes of Manchuria and along the north Pacific Coast. But it was not until the nineteenth century that real political control over these far-distant regions was attempted. In 1847 Muraviev, the Governor of Eastern Siberia, initiated a period of great exploratory activity along the river valleys flowing towards the Pacific, and in particular down the river Amur. Within ten years


a number of Russian settlements had sprung up in the valley of this river, and the Chinese Government was induced to regularize the position by the Treaty of Aigun, signed in 1858. By this agreement the whole district surrounding the Amur, together with the Pacific seaboard between the mouth of that river and the Usuri, were ceded to Russia. The result was the foundation of Vladivostok, the 'Lord of the East,' giving Russia a port on the Pacific. In 1891 the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway began. Six years later it had reached Vladivostok, and extensions began southward in the direction of Manchuria. But the possession of Vladivostok alone did not satisfy Russian desires, for they still lacked an ice-free port on the Pacific. Had there been no more formidable opponent than the weak, unwieldy Chinese Empire, Russia would no doubt have had her way, but a newcomer to the list of first-class Powers, as yet hardly recognized as such, had appeared in the Far East.

About the middle of the nineteenth century Japan had abandoned her policy of seclusion and begun trade and diplomatic intercourse with the rest of the world. Her progress was astonishingly rapid, for her intelligent people proved well fitted for the adoption of Western methods and ideas. The chain of islands of which the Japanese Empire consists closely flanks the Asiatic coasts, and it was on the near-by mainland, in China and Manchuria, that Japan sought, as she does to-day, the necessary outlet for her exports and surplus population. In the eighteen-nineties, therefore, she was becoming vitally interested in the very regions towards which the Russian advance was moving, and particularly in the peninsula of Korea.

In 1894 Japanese designs on Korea brought her into conflict with China. In the course of the ensuing war, which lasted into the following year, Japanese troops occupied Korea, Port Arthur, Kiao Chow, Talienwan, and Wei-Hai-Wei. By the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which she then imposed on China, Japan would have received the whole of the Liao Tung Peninsula, Port Arthur, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands. But China found unexpected champions in Russia, Germany, and France, who exerted pressure on Japan and deprived her of what she considered her legitimate gains. She received Formosa, but was denied any footing on the mainland. Resentment accordingly waxed strong in the Japanese Empire.

Before long feeling ran higher still. It appeared that the European nations had frustrated the Japanese from motives purely selfish. In 1897 Germany occupied Kiao Chow, and in the following year Russia forced China, in spite of the fact that the two countries had signed a defensive alliance, to grant her a long lease of Port Arthur, with the right to fortify it as a naval base. In Japan anti-Russian feeling was paramount, since the Tsar had secured the very place the Japanese

most coveted, giving him the power to menace Japanese security by establishing a strong fleet in Pacific waters. Determined not to be



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

left behind, Britain secured the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, and agreed to recognize Manchuria as a Russian sphere of influence, in return for which Russia recognized British influence in the Yangtze valley.

In 1900 the Boxer Rising gave Russia the excuse to overrun Manchuria as far as the Korean Peninsula, and to hasten forward her programme of railway construction. She made no secret of the fact that after the rising was over she intended to retain the newly occupied territory, thus giving Japan further cause to fear that Korea itself would be the next Russian objective. The dispatch of Marquis Ito to St Petersburg in 1901 seems to indicate some desire on the part of Japan to come to terms with Russia, but Baron Hayashi¹ was at the same time negotiating in London for an alliance with Britain, and Ito's mission was cut short. In January 1902, rather to the consternation of Russia, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed. Both signatories agreed to observe neutrality if either went to war, but to give active assistance in the event of another Power beginning hostilities against its ally. This immensely strengthened the Japanese, for it meant that in the event of war with Russia Britain would safeguard Japan against hostile action on the part of Germany or France.

In 1903 matters came to a head. The German Kaiser, anxious to keep Russian thoughts away from the Balkans, professed to feel pained at the Tsar's "flabby way of going on," and never ceased to encourage him to take high-handed action in opposing the "yellow peril" in the Far East. Russia, therefore, instead of withdrawing her troops from the occupied Chinese territory, demanded still further concessions in Manchuria, in spite of the protests of Britain, Japan, and the United States. In Korea Russian firms secured a timber monopoly, and troops were sent to occupy Yongampo. Negotiations were opened between Japan and Russia, but they proved futile, and on February 10, 1904, war was declared.

Russia was now put to the necessity of fighting a defensive war at a great distance from her seat of government. The sole effective means of communication was the Trans-Siberian Railway, not as yet a complete double track, but with sections of single line as long as twenty-five miles at a stretch. To make matters worse, the railway was cut by Lake Baikal, upon which a fleet of steamers was normally in operation. Just before the declaration of war, however, the lake had frozen so hard that the ice-breakers were unable to keep a passage open. The first task, therefore, that confronted the Russian General Staff was that of improving their main artery of communication. In the middle of the lake, which is twenty-five miles across, a wooden town sprang up for the accommodation of troops, which took two days to march across from the western to the eastern sections of the railway. Eventually a line of rails was laid across the ice, along which horses dragged trucks full of stores and equipment, artillery, and

¹ Tadasu Hayashi (1850-1913), one of the first Japanese sent to study in England, was at this time Japanese Ambassador at St James's.

locomotives in parts weighing as much as thirty tons, for it was of vital importance to increase the sadly deficient rolling-stock in Eastern Siberia and Manchuria. Meanwhile strenuous efforts were being made to complete the double-tracking of the main railway, and to construct a continuous line by building round the southern shores of the lake.

At the beginning of the war Russia had about 85,000 troops in the Far East. Since the initiative necessarily lay with Japan, this force could not be concentrated until the Japanese had revealed their point of attack, which might prove to be Port Arthur, Vladivostok, or Korea. The Japanese Government, close to the seat of war, was not slow to realize the fact that the sooner they came to grips with the enemy the better the odds in their favour. Early command of the sea was therefore of vital importance. Most of the ships of the Russian Pacific Squadron were at Port Arthur, but a few were at Vladivostok and other ports. On paper the strength of the Japanese fleet only slightly exceeded that of the Russian, but in training and leadership it was soon to prove greatly superior.

Admiral Togo¹ put to sea before war had actually been declared, and sank or damaged several Russian warships. The rest of the Russian fleet therefore remained in the safety of Port Arthur harbour, and the Japanese were able to embark their army at once, which they did without waiting to complete mobilization. The Japanese First Army, under General Kuroki, landed in Korea and marched north towards Manchuria, fighting its way across the river Yalu in the face of the scattered Russian forces that could be brought up in time to contest the passage. By this time General Kuropatkin had arrived to take command of the Russian army. In May the Japanese Second Army under General Oku landed on the Liao Tung Peninsula, to co-operate in a direct attack on Port Arthur itself, from land and sea. Within a very short time this army had cut the railway that ran from Port Arthur to Harbin, where a junction was effected with the Trans-Siberian Railway. A Russian attempt to relieve Port Arthur was driven off, and a Third Japanese Army was landed to conduct the siege, while the Second Army began to advance up the railway in the direction of Harbin.

In August the Russian fleet put to sea, only to be severely defeated by Admiral Togo. Eight vessels were lost, including one battleship, and the remnant returned to Port Arthur, which, despite severe bombardment by the Japanese, continued to hold out. When winter succeeded autumn Port Arthur still remained in Russian hands, in spite of the fact that it was cut off on all sides.

¹ Heihachiro Togo (1847-1934), who had studied naval science in England. He was made a count for his services in this war.

Meanwhile relations between the British and Russian Governments were in a state of dangerous tension. In view of the continual suspicions of the past century and the newly concluded treaty of alliance, British opinion naturally favoured Japan, while that of Germany and France favoured Russia. It was rumoured that the Japanese had been allowed to use Wei-Hai-Wei as a base, but the British Government promptly denied this. Then the news that four Russian destroyers had slipped out of the Black Sea, in defiance of the Convention of the Straits, called forth a protest from London to St Petersburg. More serious still was the Russian interference with British shipping suspected of carrying contraband of war. Russian auxiliary cruisers, which had passed through the Straits under a commercial flag, detained and searched the P. and O. *Malacca* and other ships; the Vladivostok squadron actually sank the British *Knight Commander* in eastern waters because a prize crew could not be spared to take her into port. Stern representations had to be made to Russia before this menace to British shipping ceased.

The news of the defeat of their Pacific Squadron determined the Russian Government to send a squadron from the Baltic to the Far East. In October it left Libau, under the command of Admiral Roshdestvensky. This new squadron was manned largely by reservists, and was made up partly of vessels already obsolescent, and partly of newly launched warships that had not yet undergone proper trials. So nervous were the crews that even while in the Baltic they mistook some Norwegian ships for Japanese destroyers, and, coming upon the Dogger Bank fishing-fleet during the hours of darkness, were so convinced that they were being subjected to a Japanese torpedo attack that in the blaze of their own searchlights they sank three of the trawlers, killing and wounding several men. Anger in Britain blazed up afresh, and it was only by the exercise of great restraint that a reasonable tone was adopted in the correspondence that ensued. Eventually the matter was settled by an international commission sitting at Paris. Roshdestvensky was tacitly blamed for the incident, and the Russian Government agreed to pay compensation.

In January 1905 Port Arthur surrendered, and the Japanese were able to continue their threefold advance northward against Kuropatkin's main army. In March a great battle was fought near Mukden, along a front nearly eighty miles in extent, after which the Russians once more retired up the railway in the direction of Harbin. The final Russian disaster, however, was destined to take place at sea. On May 27 Roshdestvensky's squadron, now nearing the end of its long voyage to the east, instead of seeking the safety of Vladivostok by a circuitous route, tried to force the Straits of Tsushima, only to be utterly overwhelmed by the superior and better-trained Japanese fleet. Three of

the thirty-eight vessels in the Russian squadron succeeded in reaching Vladivostok ; a few others reached Chinese or Philippine Island ports, where they were interned ; but all the remainder were either sunk or captured by the Japanese.

On land, however, the military situation now favoured Russia. Stupendous efforts had reduced the largest stretch of single line on the Trans-Siberian Railway to seven and a half miles. The Russian army in the Far East had risen to over one and a quarter million men, of which nearly a million were concentrated south of Harbin to oppose the Japanese advance. While the Russian communications had thus improved and shortened, those of the Japanese had grown steadily worse as their advance took them farther away from the sea. Roads were poor or non-existent, and the problem was only solved by the employment of labour corps recruited from all classes in Japan. This fact epitomizes the real reason for the Japanese success. The whole nation had felt its independence at stake, and was waging the war with an unconquerable determination that made light of obstacles. On the other hand, the Russian peoples neither understood nor welcomed the war that was being fought in the distant East. The sacrifices of the army and navy, and in particular the disaster to the fleet at Tsushima, provoked a revolutionary crisis that compelled the Tsar to make peace at the very moment when the dice had become weighted in his favour.

At the instigation of Japan President Roosevelt suggested negotiations. Although Britain refused to influence her ally, both France and Germany advised Russia to accept the invitation. In August 1905 the Treaty of Portsmouth ended the war, leaving Korea and the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin in Japanese hands. In this way the expansion of Russia in the Far East was effectively checked.

The agreement of 1907, which replaced the century-old hostility between Britain and Russia by a somewhat uneasy friendship, will be dealt with in the section on the causes of the war of 1914-18, to which it properly belongs. It will suffice here to note that the long-continued mistrust, mainly the work of Conservative leaders (since Palmerston was Liberal in name rather than in fact) that characterized British policy, appears open to serious criticism. The insistence that Russian control of the Straits must necessarily constitute a 'threat,' the entry with France into the Crimean conflict, the useless Treaty of Paris, the continual support of the weak Ottoman Government, the futile and costly Afghan Wars, the unjustified fear that Bulgaria would prove a Russian protectorate in disguise, all appear at this distance of time to be the outcome of a policy unnecessarily alarmist. In foreign affairs the enemies of one generation may easily prove to be the

friends of the next, and it is hardly logical for a nation that is itself rapidly expanding in all quarters of the globe to deny similar rights to another, which may have similar needs.

SUMMARY

(1) *The Rise of Russia*

- (a) Ivan IV (1533–84) reached Archangel and Siberia.
- (b) Peter the Great (1682–1725) reached the Baltic.
- (c) Catherine the Great (1762–96) reached the Black Sea ; Sebastopol founded.

(2) *The Napoleonic Period*

- (a) Alexander I gained Bessarabia from Turkey, and tried to obtain a naval base in the Mediterranean.
- (b) Napoleon's schemes awakened French interest in the Near East.

(3) *The Independence of Greece*

- (a) 1817. Serbia self-governing.
- (b) 1821. Hypsilanti began the Greek Rebellion.
- (c) 1823. Britain recognized the Greek Government.
- (d) 1827. Treaty of London (Britain, France, and Russia) ; battle of Navarino.
- (e) 1828. Russia made war on Turkey.
- (f) 1829. Treaty of Adrianople ; Greece independent.

(4) *The Rebellion of Mehemet Ali*

- (a) 1831. Egyptian army invaded Syria.
- (b) 1833. Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.
- (c) 1839. Second war between Sultan and Mehemet Ali.
- (d) 1840. Convention of London : the Powers (except France) imposed terms on Mehemet Ali.

(5) *The First Afghan War*

- (a) 1837. Persian attack on Herat ; Russian Envoy at Kabul.
- (b) 1839. Britain replaced Dost Mohammed by Shah Shujah.
- (c) 1842. Afghanistan evacuated and Dost Mohammed restored.

(6) *The Crimean War*

- (a) 1853. Russia and France supported rival claims to the Holy Places ; Turkey refused Russian Protectorate over Greek Christians ; Russia declared war on Turkey.
- (b) 1854. France and Britain declared war on Russia.
- (c) 1856. Treaty of Paris : neutralization of Black Sea.

(7) *The Bulgarian Massacres and the Treaty of Berlin*

- (a) 1875. Rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- (b) 1876. The 'Andrassy Note' and Berlin Memorandum to Turkey ; Bulgarian massacres ; conference at Constantinople.
- (c) 1877. Russia declared war on Turkey ; siege of Plevna.
- (d) 1878. Treaty of San Stefano created a Greater Bulgaria ; Treaty of Berlin modified this.

(8) *The Second Afghan War*

- (a) Russia's advances in Turkestan approached the Afghan frontier.
- (b) 1878. Russian Mission received at Kabul ; British Mission refused ; British troops occupied Afghanistan.
- (c) 1880. Abdur Rahman made Amir and British troops withdraw.
- (d) 1885. Russians captured Penjdeh.

(9) *The Russo-Japanese War*

- (a) 1858. Treaty of Aigun ; Vladivostok founded.
- (b) 1895. Japan baulked of her gains after Sino-Japanese War.
- (c) 1898. Russia obtained lease of Port Arthur.
- (d) 1902. Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
- (e) 1904. War between Russia and Japan.
- (f) 1905. Treaty of Portsmouth.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The interest of France in the Near East during the nineteenth century.
- (2) The causes of mistrust between Britain and Russia.

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CHAPTER IX

THE CAUSES AND RESULTS OF THE WAR OF 1914-18

(A) CAUSES

DURING the years immediately preceding 1914 the Great Powers of Europe were divided into two groups: the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and the Triple Entente (a 'diplomatic group,' as Sir Edward Grey called it) of Great Britain, France, and Russia. The situation that gave rise to this division began to develop shortly after the Franco-Prussian War. After so short a lapse of time there is still room for diversity of views on the fundamental causes of the war of 1914-18, but we can trace the main threads of the complicated politics that led eventually to the production of the two rival camps, account for their mutual hostility, describe the dangerous crises that arose early in the present century, and detail the immediate causes of the conflict that inevitably resulted.

The German Imperial Constitution. In 1871 Bismarck realized that at last the time had come to change the aggressive character of his foreign policy. There was much to do in consolidating the new German Empire, for with such a varied collection of constituent states real unity could not be achieved without a lengthy period of tactful internal reorganization. King William of Prussia, as President of the new union, had somewhat reluctantly assumed the title of 'German Emperor.' As such it was his right to conduct foreign affairs and to conclude alliances. The appointment of the Imperial Chancellor lay in his hands, and to him alone that official was directly responsible. It is most important to recognize the enormous power that was vested in the two men who held these offices; their freedom from restraint forms the clue to much that happened under the Emperor William II. There were, of course, subordinate officials, whose numbers and importance increased as time went on; but they were independent units of the administrative system, and did not form a responsible cabinet.

The German Legislature was divided into two parts. The Imperial Council, or Bundesrath, was composed of delegates from the states that now formed the new Empire. The Emperor could not declare


an offensive war without the consent of this body. But the number of delegates sent by each state varied in accordance with its size and importance. Prussia sent seventeen, and as the state with the next largest number was Bavaria with six, the check thus imposed on the Emperor was not so effective as it might have been, although it was of course possible for a combination of the other states to outvote the Prussian delegates. This Imperial Council was a most important body, and initiated the bulk of the German legislation. The second part of the Legislature was the Reichstag, elected by manhood suffrage. It must not be imagined, however, that the Reichstag in any way corresponded to our House of Commons: its powers soon proved to be more theoretical than real, for it had no effective control over the Government.

The foregoing details of the new Imperial Constitution reveal the vast influence that could be exercised in pre-War Germany by certain individuals. The 'personal factor' was therefore of much greater importance than in countries like Britain and France.

The Aims of Bismarck. To his contemporaries, and still more to those who read of his exploits in after-years, a really great political figure assumes something of the nature of a superman—until he writes his memoirs. Then, since memoirs inevitably adopt the character of a justification or apology, he suddenly becomes human. Bismarck wrote his memoirs after his retirement, and they make interesting reading. He complains repeatedly that he was not in the confidence of the Army leaders; in fact, the General Staff under the great von Moltke was the one body that was capable of opposing him. But elsewhere his power was unassailable so long as the old Emperor was alive.

Bismarck had originally been a Conservative, but that party began to oppose many of his measures after 1871, so that much of his work was accomplished with the aid of the National Liberals. However, his unique position and influence in Germany led him to minimize the extent of this support, and he tried to prove that as Imperial Chancellor he had to be above party considerations. As for the intrigues of his subordinate Ministers, "the main object," he wrote, "was the negative one of getting rid of me." This failed because it was not possible to supplant him in the confidence of the Emperor. On the Emperor he relied for support, and got it, for a threat of resignation always had the desired effect.

Bismarck's immediate task was the reorganization of the internal affairs of Germany on an imperial basis—especially the Army. "My aim," he wrote, "was the strengthening of our national safety; the nation would have time enough for its internal development when once its unity, and with it its outward security, was consolidated."



To do this successfully peace abroad was essential. Germany for the moment was satiated, and in foreign affairs Bismarck was anxious that the *status quo* should not be disturbed. For the moment, then, the German policy was pacific, and even after 1890 Bismarck described his country as "the single Great Power in Europe which is not tempted by any objects which can only be obtained by a successful war."

The one thing particularly to be feared was the revenge of France. That country began to recover from the late war with astonishing rapidity, and soon showed signs of political strength under its new form of government. Now the political instability of France during the nineteenth century had become a byword, and it was in Bismarck's interest to foster the schemes of the various French parties which desired the return of the Bourbon, Orleans, or Napoleonic dynasties, or some alternative form of republicanism. But his principal concern was to keep France isolated in Europe, especially from other Catholic Powers, such as Austria and Italy, which he thought might prove sympathetic. He had a haunting fear that something might provoke a return of the old alliance of the Seven Years War between France, Austria, and Russia. It was not enough, therefore, to keep France isolated; Germany must be safeguarded by alliances of her own, if possible with those very Powers that might otherwise be won over to the side of France.

The Dreikaiserbund. The first step in this direction was the 'Dreikaiserbund,' a mutual agreement between the Emperors of Germany, Russia, and Austria. As early as 1870 Bismarck made a tentative move in this direction. In 1872 the three Emperors met in Berlin. In Bismarck's opinion relations between Germany and Russia were always very much an affair of personalities. The Russian Minister Gortchakoff was no friend to Bismarck; on this occasion he remarked cynically that the best thing about the meeting of the three Emperors was that nothing had been put in writing, for the Dreikaiserbund was not a formal alliance. In September of the following year the King of Italy also visited Berlin, bringing as a present for Bismarck a handsome alabaster vase and a signed portrait of himself.

The Dreikaiserbund was never very successful. The first rift came in 1875, when the rumour spread in Europe that Germany, alarmed at the rapid recovery of France, meant to attack her out of hand before she grew powerful enough to take her revenge. Bismarck blamed his old enemy Gortchakoff for originating the story. The matter was given publicity in the English newspapers; Queen Victoria and the Tsar Alexander II made personal representations to the old Kaiser, intimating that a second attack on France could not be viewed with equanimity. Bismarck was furious; he denied that there was any truth in the rumour, and wrote later in his memoirs that such a war

might have produced an agreement between Russia, Austria, and England, "leading eventually to active proceedings against the new and still unconsolidated empire." He ridiculed the idea that he could have contemplated such a foolish move. Nevertheless the very intensity of his anger gave rise to grave suspicions. France, after all, was not so entirely friendless.

In 1878 the Congress of Berlin provided further cause for friction between Russia and Germany, and the Dreikaiserbund virtually came to an end. The Russian attack on Turkey and the Treaty of San Stefano produced a situation in the Balkans that was no more acceptable to Austria than it was to Britain, and Bismarck realized that to act in complete accord with one emperor was not possible without sacrificing the confidence of the other. According to him an indirect inquiry had already been made about the attitude of Germany if Russia went to war with Austria. As regards the war in Turkey, he had only promised Russia a 'benevolent neutrality,' but the Russians blamed him for lack of support at the Congress. Although a settlement that seemed to satisfy both Russia and Austria was arrived at and incorporated in the treaty, the fact remained that the interests of those two nations were likely in many ways to prove incompatible. The time had come for Germany to make her choice between them, and in this way the first step was taken towards building the two rival European groups.

The Making of the Triple Alliance. In Bismarck's opinion the democratic nature of the English Constitution did not admit of "alliances of assured permanence," and Germany's choice was therefore limited to Austria and Russia. For several reasons he was convinced that Austria would prove the better ally. In the first place there was always a danger that she might attempt to avenge her defeat at Sadowa, perhaps in conjunction with France, and it was much better to make the nation that bordered Germany on the south into an assured friend than to allow her to remain a potential enemy. Then, again, the old traditional link between Germany and the Habsburg monarchy still counted for something. Bismarck hoped that such an alliance would not necessarily alienate Russia, and would receive the support of England. In fact, the arguments in favour of this alliance seemed to him so strong that he says he would have striven to conclude it, even in the face of a hostile public opinion.

The Austrian Emperor's Minister Count Andrassy was sounded, and agreed that such an alliance would have its advantages. Bismarck paid a visit to Austria, where he met with a great reception. In writing to explain matters to the King of Bavaria in 1879 he did not hesitate to represent the condition of affairs in Russia as vaguely menacing, speaking of an increase in the Russian western army of 400,000 men

ready for active service, and quoting the Russian War Minister's words about preparation for war "with Europe." The German Emperor himself experienced misgivings; he did not like the idea of anything that could be construed as a threat towards his nephew, the Tsar. Bismarck had to talk him over.

On October 7, 1879, the Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Austria was signed. There seems no doubt that at this time it was intended only as a defensive arrangement. The text itself begins by stating that "an intimate accord between Germany and Austria-Hungary can menace nobody, but is, on the contrary, qualified to consolidate the peace of Europe," and their Majesties promised "never to give any aggressive tendency in any direction to their purely defensive agreement." Each nation promised the other full military support in the event of an attack by Russia, and if one were attacked by any other Power to observe at least "a benevolent neutral attitude." The signatories expressed the hope that the Russian war preparations were not directed against them, but if such proved to be the case agreed to inform Russia that an attack on one would be regarded as an attack on both. In view of these terms Bismarck pretended that the alliance was much more valuable to Austria than to Germany, since it only provided specifically for common defence against a Russian attack, which Austria had much the greater cause to fear. France was more likely to prove the German enemy, and the maintenance of good relations between Germany and Russia was just as important as ever.

In May 1882 Italy joined the alliance. The two Central Powers hoped that this would prove an accession of strength by transforming the ancient antagonism between Austria and Italy into a new co-operation for the future, and by providing seaports in the Mediterranean in case of war. At any rate, it removed a possible ally from France. So far as Italy was concerned, the alliance seemed an advantageous move for a nation that had so lately acquired the status of a Great Power, and there is little doubt that Bismarck had worked on the Italian fear of French encroachment eastward along the North African coast, especially after the French occupation of Tunis in 1881. Nevertheless the Balkans constituted a likely field for a future clash of interests between Italy and her Austrian partner.

The Triple Alliance thus came into being in circumstances very different from those of 1914, and long before the creation of such a group as the Triple Entente seemed likely or even possible. It formed a compact chain of states with common frontiers, stretching across Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean.

Bismarck did not intend that the Triple Alliance should spoil his relations with Russia, and to his master such an idea was particularly

abhorrent. Within a few years an agreement had been made which Bismarck described as a "Re-insurance Treaty." The Tsar Alexander II had been killed by a bomb in 1881, and the new agreement was made with his successor, Alexander III. It provided for neutrality in case either Germany or Russia was attacked by another Power, thus safeguarding Germany in case of attack by France, and Russia in case of attack by Austria. Such an arrangement behind the back of Germany's chief ally was hardly honest, though it did not directly contravene the terms of the Triple Alliance. It was not the last of a series of attempts to make sure of Russia.

The Triple Alliance was not at first made public, but events soon showed Bismarck that it would be wise to disclose it. The union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia in 1885 once again brought to the fore the conflicting aims of Russia and Austria in the Balkans, and Italy became afraid that the terms of the alliance might involve her in a war with Russia for the benefit of Austria. Britain desired that the Balkan arrangement as laid down in the Treaty of Berlin should not be disturbed, and Bismarck cleverly persuaded Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, to make a 'Mediterranean Agreement' with Austria and Italy to this end. Thus fortified, Italy consented to renew the Triple Alliance, the terms of which were now published. The danger of a break-up of the alliance was past; Bismarck's policy was succeeding admirably, and now, at the height of his power, he was the outstanding figure in Europe. But in Germany an event was imminent which resulted before long in his downfall.

The Accession of William II : His Character. In March 1888 the Emperor William I died at last, at the age of ninety. Bismarck records that on his death-bed his old master wandered for a time, and, mistaking the Chancellor for his grandson, observed, "Thou must always keep touch with the Russian Emperor; there no conflict is necessary." He feared to the last the paths into which the Austrian entanglement might lead his country.

When a reigning sovereign lives to a great age the next reign is often shorter than usual, for the immediate heir to the throne will himself probably be past middle age. The Emperor Frederick, who now assumed the Imperial title, had for many months been suffering from cancer of the throat, and it was well known that his days were numbered. In just over three months he too was dead, and at the age of twenty-eight his eldest son succeeded to the throne as William II.

It was a position of tremendous power that now fell to the lot of so young and inexperienced a ruler. Vested by the constitution with an authority that was practically autocratic in the important field of foreign politics, sovereign of an empire that was expanding year by year in population, wealth, and a sense of its own imperial destiny,

he had need before all else of wisdom, patience, and insight. But truth to tell, the new Emperor possessed few of such vital qualities. Three days after his birth it was discovered that his left arm had nearly been pulled from its socket, round which the muscles had been badly torn. Since the German doctors had not been able to remedy this injury, the young Prince grew up with this limb almost completely incapacitated. There seems little doubt that the shyness and awkwardness that resulted when he found himself different from other boys induced an 'inferiority complex' which he tried to hide under an insolent self-assertiveness that still remained after he reached manhood. This characteristic was encouraged by a too thorough realization of his own undoubted qualities, for he was quick and clever (though his tutors did not find him easy to manage), and in some ways even brilliant. With great pluck and determination he learned to ride and shoot, and at the age of ten years he was given a commission in the Guards.

The new Kaiser's mother was English, a daughter of Queen Victoria, and had brought to Germany a full measure of Liberal opinions, inherited from her father, the Prince Consort. The influence she exercised over her husband was great, and had he succeeded to the throne in the fullness of his health and strength, the future history of Germany might have been very different. But the new Kaiser's relations with his parents were not good. Between him and his mother there had grown up a mutual antipathy, fanned by her constant praise of all things English, which accorded ill with the ideas of the young Prussian officers with whom the Prince consorted as he grew to manhood. He thus came to have little use for Liberal opinions, admiring Bismarck and his autocratic methods all the more because he realized the bad feeling and distrust that existed between his parents and the Iron Chancellor. Thus it came about that while he loved England in his way, often looked back with pleasure to the days he had spent there as a boy, and had a very real affection and respect for his grandmother, Queen Victoria, the whole was tempered by an envious jealousy that took possession of his unstable mind and grew in intensity as time went on. "Blind and green, wrong-headed and violent on politics as can be," his mother had once described him, and she looked forward with dismay to the time when he should control the destinies of Germany. His father too spoke of his "tendency to overbearingness and self-conceit." No doubt these were very one-sided judgments, but they contained a strong element of truth, none the less.

William II had from the very first no doubt of his own ability as an autocratic ruler: supreme self-confidence, though unconsciously based on an innate timidity and realization of his own weakness, formed the keynote of his earlier attempts to control foreign policy.

Both his grandfather and Bismarck had paid him a great deal of attention of late years, much to the chagrin and annoyance of his father, whom they studiously ignored. The young Prince had been sent on a diplomatic mission to the Tsar of Russia, and had even been initiated by Bismarck into the mysteries of the Foreign Office. He proved an apt pupil, and thus when the Tsar asked the Chancellor if he was sure of retaining his place under the new Emperor, Bismarck replied that he was convinced that he held his master's confidence, adding that he himself was a servant very difficult to replace. In fact, the Austrian Ambassador referred to the relations between Bismarck and the young Emperor as a "honeymoon of reverence and mutual understanding." However, events were soon to prove otherwise. Before long the autocratic old Chancellor deemed it his duty to oppose the new Emperor on affairs of State; questions connected with the royal expenditure, the solution of economic problems, the treatment of the Reichstag, and other matters led to conflicts of opinion between the two. Bismarck was far from popular in Court and Ministry, and there were plenty to hint to the Kaiser that he was not his own master. It became obvious that there was no room for two autocrats in Germany, and William soon determined that there should be only one. When Bismarck began to hint at resignation the Emperor returned no answer, instead of immediately vetoing the suggestion and surrendering his own wishes, as his grandfather had always done.

In 1890 matters came to a head. The Emperor, in pursuance of his determination to take an active part in all affairs of State, began communicating directly with subordinate Ministers and taking their advice. "No Premier can remain responsible if the monarch makes decisions on the advice of all and sundry," said Bismarck, and insisted that all such communications should go through him. The Emperor remained firm; Bismarck realized that he was in effect dismissed, and handed in his resignation, which was accepted. "The duty of officer of the watch upon the ship of state has now fallen to me," wrote the Emperor, and filled the vacant place with Caprivi, one of his generals. The experienced old pilot had been dropped at last.

Relations between Germany and Britain. At the beginning of William II's reign, there appeared to be no reason why relations between Germany and Britain should not continue on a friendly basis. The royal houses of both countries were closely related. Queen Victoria's sympathy with German ideals and aspirations had frequently been manifested during the course of her reign; the new Kaiser had been a constant visitor to England, and though he was far from popular with his uncle, the Prince of Wales, the latter was much too astute a statesman to allow his private feelings to influence his judgment, at any rate until William had had a fair chance of revealing his

qualities as a ruler ; while Queen Victoria had informed her Prime Minister that she thought the political relations of the two Governments should not be affected by " miserable personal quarrels." As we have seen, Britain was in a sense a vague partner of the Triple Alliance, so far as the *status quo* in the Mediterranean was concerned, and not long after the Kaiser came to the throne Bismarck actually suggested a definite alliance. The relations between Britain and her traditional enemy, France, were strained over the British occupation of Egypt, and an alliance with Germany might have had its advantages. But Lord Salisbury did not care for the idea of European entanglements ; at first he would return no definite answer, and then, making up his mind that isolation was the better policy, he replied somewhat vaguely that for the present the German offer must be left 'on the table,' without saying yes or no.

Only one possible cause of friction appeared likely, and that lay overseas. Bismarck had not at first favoured the idea of a colonial empire for this very reason, but the enterprise of German commercial interests soon forced his hand ; for after 1871 there began in Germany a process of rapid industrialization, at the expense of agriculture. Between that date and the dismissal of Bismarck the population rose by $8\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and between 1871 and 1913 German merchant shipping increased from less than a million to more than five million tons. Raw materials for import and foreign markets for the export of manufactures were thus considered vital to German interests ; she was hundreds of years behind Britain and France in the foundation of a colonial empire, but she meant to have her 'place in the sun,' and not even Bismarck himself could have stifled the movement for expansion.

In 1882 a German Colonial Society was formed. The following year saw the establishment of a trading-post in South-west Africa, and soon afterwards the German explorer Nachtigal made agreements with native chiefs in the districts that became known as Togoland and the Kameruns. The President of the Colonial Society himself performed a similar task on the east coast of Africa, opposite the island of Zanzibar. Bismarck thought it best to assume official responsibility for the development of these regions, and in 1884 a European Colonial Conference met at Berlin, in order that potential disputes might be forestalled and frontiers settled. British influence in Nigeria and British East Africa was partly the result of an effort to prevent further German expansion, and it was obvious that friction between Germany and Britain must crop up at times over the colonial question ; past relations between Britain and France had shown such matters to be a very fruitful source of trouble. However, an agreement arrived at in 1890 further demonstrated the friendly relations between Britain and Germany. In 1807, on returning from the Copenhagen expedition,

the British fleet had taken possession of the small Danish island of Heligoland, off the mouth of the Elbe. This was now ceded to Germany in return for a British protectorate over Zanzibar and Witor. There is no doubt that from the naval viewpoint Germany considered the acquisition of this island an event of the greatest importance, and thought she had secured much the better bargain. The casualness of the British attitude shows how far removed at this time seemed the possibility of any conflict between Germany and Britain. The suggestion appears in the first case to have come from this country ; as for Salisbury, he failed to see what possible use the island could be to Germany, and warned her that it was being undermined by the sea.

The Dual Alliance between France and Russia. The accession of William II to the throne of Germany materially hastened the process, already begun some years previously, that was destined to result in an alliance between the most autocratic Government in Europe and the newest republic. For this Dual Alliance, unnatural as it seemed at first, there were several very good reasons.

In the first place, the Tsar Alexander III did not like the new Kaiser. Some years before the latter's accession the Tsar had received him and experienced a taste of his diplomatic methods—the false confidences about other nations and glib offers of friendship and personal assistance that became so characteristic of the Kaiser in later years. But the Tsar was not impressed. “ *Un garçon mal élevé et de mauvaise foi* ” had been his opinion of the heir-apparent to the German throne, and he had had no occasion to modify it since. But although this personal distrust might at last have been sufficient to loosen the bonds between Russia and Germany, it would not alone have thrown Russia into the arms of France, and thus put an end to the isolation of the new republic. This was brought about by other causes, spread over the course of several years. The German military law of 1888, providing for an increase in the army of half a million men, with a vast sum for expenditure on military armaments, seemed a threat not only to France, but to Russia as well, especially since the publication of the terms of the Triple Alliance had made it clear that Germany intended to support Austrian, rather than Russian, ambitions in the Balkans. Then at the very moment that Bismarck, whose policy had been largely based on the maintenance of good relations with Russia, had been forced to resign the Re-insurance Treaty came up for renewal. Even now, according to most German historians, the Russians would have renewed this treaty, and perhaps would even have consented to a formal alliance with Germany. But the dislike between Kaiser and Tsar was mutual ; William, free from the restraining hand of Bismarck, was counselled by his advisers that the benefits offered by the treaty were nebulous, and that if it leaked out bad

feeling might result in Austria and even in England. He therefore decided against renewal, a reversal of policy which Bismarck to the end of his days considered a terrible mistake. Freed from all obligations towards Germany, and convinced that there was a very real possibility of England's joining the Triple Alliance, Alexander III within a short time took the preliminary steps towards a closer relationship with France.

In 1891 the Tsar conferred a decoration on the French President, and a preliminary agreement was made between the two countries. In the following year a French fleet, at the Tsar's invitation, paid a visit to the Russian naval port of Kronstadt, and a military convention was drawn up, by one clause of which it was agreed that France and Russia would both mobilize if any member of the Triple Alliance did so. Such news of this agreement as leaked out was not treated very seriously in Germany, and, indeed, the Tsar himself was at this time rather uneasy about his new-found friend, and not much in love with the convention. But matters ripened between the two countries, for France did not intend to let her opportunity slip. All through 1893 negotiations continued, and at last, on January 4, 1894, the Dual Alliance between France and Russia was signed. As was usual at this time, it was declared by the signatories to be a guarantee of European peace, but a stipulation that it should last as long as the Triple Alliance shows clearly the purpose it was intended to fulfil. French capital became available for the development of railways and industries in Russia, while France had at last obtained a valuable ally in the event of a further conflict with Germany. The second great step in the formation of the pre-War system of alliances was now complete.

The Rise of Antagonism between Britain and Germany. Britain was the only great European Power still in a state of isolation. At first it did not appear likely that she would choose the Dual Alliance, in the event of her joining one of the two rival groups. Russian ambitions and encroachments in the Near and Middle East had been productive of constant bickering and even warfare throughout the century, and the occupation of Egypt had strained relations with France, her hereditary enemy. On the other hand, relations between Britain and Germany were still cordial, which was also the case with Austria and to a still greater extent with Italy, whose national aspirations had received such warm sympathy and support in this country. Yet within a few years the unexpected came to pass, for there arose between Britain and Germany several vital and apparently insuperable difficulties which convinced British statesmen of the necessity of abandoning their isolated position in order to reach a better understanding with France and Russia.

The first of these difficulties is generally known as the Bagdad

Railway question, an important factor in the German 'drive to the East,' which seemed to threaten a vital point in British communications—the Suez Canal. The map shows that two routes are possible from the Mediterranean to India and the Far East: that *via* the Isthmus of Suez and the Red Sea, or an alternative route across Asia Minor to the Euphrates valley, and thence by the waters of the Persian Gulf. During the nineteenth century the British had considered a scheme for a railway from some port on the Mediterranean to the Euphrates, but the idea was at length abandoned, partly because the Suez Canal, safeguarded by the British occupation of Egypt, seemed to render another route unnecessary, and partly because Russia and France eyed the scheme with jealous disfavour. In any case it was felt that the venture was not likely to prove a financial success, while from a strategic viewpoint the extreme heat of the region in question might prevent the use of the railway for troops during certain seasons of the year. The opportunity of obtaining railway concessions in Asia Minor was thus lost by the British at a time when their relations with the Ottoman Empire were still cordial.

It is said that Germany's attention was first turned to Asia Minor by her failure to obtain what she considered an adequate share in the partition of Africa. At all events, her commercial, military, and financial interests in the Turkish Empire increased by leaps and bounds during the last twenty years of the century. There were flourishing German colonies at Haifa, Jaffa, Sarona, and Jerusalem; between 1883 and 1895 a military mission under von der Goltz had reorganized the Turkish artillery and military system generally, while German commerce in the Near East began to expand rapidly. But it was the question of railway concessions that was responsible for strained relations with England.

In 1872 a famous German railroad engineer named Wilhelm von Pressel began to construct, on behalf of the Turkish Government, a short line from Haidar Pasha, on the Bosphorus, to Ismidt. This was completed in the following year. A concession obtained in 1888 led to the extension of this railway as far as Angora, which was reached towards the end of 1892, when the undertaking became known as the Anatolian Railway Company. The extension had been made possible financially by the Deutsche Bank of Berlin, and a sharp hint was now given to the British Government that competition for railway concessions in Turkey must cease. Three years later a further extension prolonged the line to Konia.

At this stage German political circles became really interested in the scheme. Soldiers, as well as engineers and merchants, began to study the possibilities of railway-building in Asia Minor. In 1898 the Kaiser paid a visit to Constantinople, followed by a tour of Palestine,

in the course of which he posed, in a series of flamboyant speeches, as the protector of the Mohammedan races. This alone was sufficient to provide food for thought in Britain and France, but a more concrete result of his conversations with the Sultan Abdul Hamid soon became known. This was a concession, granted in 1899, for the extension by German capital of the railway from Konia to Bagdad, *via* Adana, Haran, and Mosul, and eventually to Basra and the head of the Persian Gulf. After this the Kaiser used to refer to the undertaking as "my railway."

A section of the British public immediately saw in this scheme a direct threat to communications with India. Such a railway would nowhere be vulnerable to attack from the sea, and would provide a speedy, safe, and easy route for operations directed from Berlin against the Suez Canal, or any other objective in the Near East. It would even offer a quicker route to India than that by sea, though in this case some footing in the Persian Gulf would be necessary. Signs that Germany was endeavouring to obtain this footing were not wanting. A certain trader in mother-of-pearl named Wonckhaus had established himself at Lingah, and later on he opened branches at Bahrein and several other ports along the gulf. His evident prosperity and excessive activity struck the British agents as highly suspicious. In 1899 the German cruiser *Arcona* paid a visit to several ports in the gulf, showing the flag and searching, as the British thought, for a possible naval base for Germany. The creation of a German vice-consul at Bushire, at a time when there were only six Germans in the whole of the gulf, appeared one more instance of the German determination to obtain a footing along this route to India.

At first, however, the British Government, unable in any case to prevent the building of the Bagdad Railway, were inclined to participate in the venture, for the investment of British capital had been invited. But as suspicion grew and it became evident that Koweit would probably be the terminus on the Persian Gulf, they determined to take action. In 1899 an agreement was entered into with the Sheikh of Koweit, under which he promised to cede no territory to any Power without consulting Britain first. Thus in 1900 the Germans failed in their attempt to obtain permission for the railway to terminate at that port, and the German Government protested to the British. The matter came up for discussion in Parliament in 1903, when the tension between the two Governments became clear. It could no longer be said that no cause of dispute existed between Britain and Germany. No agreement was reached, and suspicion grew as the years went on and the Bagdad Railway neared completion. Just before the War an effort to settle the matter resulted in an agreement to allow the final section of the railway to be completed by the British, though

of course this never came into operation. Soon after the War began the railway was practically completed as far as Bagdad.

It is possible to see now that many of the German activities detailed above may not have been intended as an active threat to Britain. Much of the German expansionist movement towards the East was purely commercial, and in any case the financial operations of the Deutsche Bank did not equal those of French and British concerns in Turkey. But we are dealing at the moment with the effect produced on British opinion at the time, and there is no doubt that the Kaiser's speeches seemed to point to the idea of a Holy War of the Mohammedans against the British. Some German writers did not hesitate to give a very direct meaning to the German friendship with Turkey. An example of this occurs in the writings of a certain authority on colonial affairs, Dr Paul Rohrbach, who pointed out that as a direct invasion of England by Germany was manifestly impossible, she must be attacked instead at some vulnerable spot in her communications, and that the importance to Germany of the Bagdad Railway lay in this direction—a hint full of meaning, which it was impossible to mistake.

Before apprehension over the railway question had become acute an incident occurred that demonstrated sharply the ill-feeling that was arising between Britain and Germany. On December 31, 1895, Dr Jameson perpetrated his celebrated raid across the Transvaal frontier, only to be surrounded by the Boers at Krugersdorp a few days later. For some time past the uneasy relations between British and Boers in the Transvaal had been a matter of great interest to the Kaiser, and the news threw him into a state of intense excitement. Apparently he outlined to a small group of his Ministers a scheme to send troops to the Transvaal *via* Portuguese East Africa, to ensure the independence of the Boers, under the special protection of Germany. When it was pointed out that this would almost certainly involve him in war with England, with the insuperable difficulty of maintaining the German troops in spite of the British Navy, it was decided instead to send a congratulatory telegram to Kruger, who was complimented on safeguarding the independence of his Government against an alien attack.

According to the Kaiser himself, he was forced by his Ministers to send this telegram against his better judgment. But wherever responsibility rested is of little moment now. As soon as the text of the telegram became known the outcry in England against such unwarrantable interference was immediate. It would have been greater still had the English newspapers known that the German Ambassador in London had been instructed to ask for his passports if the British Government expressed approval of the raid. As it was, Germany was suspected of an intrigue with the Boers against Britain, and this view

of the situation was strengthened by the widespread approval of the Kaiser's action in Germany. A strong protest from the British Government, which denied any previous knowledge of the raid, was backed up by a personal letter from Queen Victoria to her grandson. The result was an explanatory letter, couched in apologetic vein, into the exact truth of which Lord Salisbury advised the Queen not to inquire too deeply. A flying squadron was formed in the North Sea, the British newspapers hinted at warlike measures, and the Mediterranean agreement was not renewed with the Triple Alliance. From this time onward England began rapidly to drift away from the group of central states. If, as Salisbury thought, the Kaiser had intended to frighten the English into a closer union he had overreached himself with a vengeance.

The Kruger telegram was the first of several incidents that bred distrust between the two countries during the troublous years that marked the turn of the century. During this period the Kaiser was particularly active in his policy of aggressive interference and expansion. No quarter of the globe was too remote to escape the claim that German interests were vitally involved. Thus in November 1897, following the murder of two German missionaries, the unfortunate Chinese were compelled to grant Germany a long lease of Kiao-Chow. The German expedition which sailed to ensure the retention of Kiao-Chow furnished the Kaiser with occasion for a somewhat remarkable speech. Referring to the rights of his countrymen abroad, and his determination to protect them with the power of Germany wherever they might be, he commanded his brother, the leader of the expedition, in the event of anyone attempting to affront the German race or to infringe its good rights, to "strike out with mailed fist." The speech was so alarming that it caused some trepidation even in Germany. The Kaiser's wish may have been for nothing more than a trading and coaling station in the Far East, but taken in conjunction with the Russian occupation of Port Arthur, it caused serious disquiet in British circles. The result was a demand by Britain for a lease of Wei-Hai-Wei in compensation, and since it was thought that this would be insufficient to secure British interests, an alliance was eventually made with Japan. The "mailed fist" speech was never forgotten, more especially as the Kaiser, having found this method so successful in the first instance, did not hesitate to use it again. A very similar speech of his, when addressing German troops departing for China on the occasion of the Boxer Rising, made an unfortunate reference to the methods of Attila the Hun, whose name of old had stood as a byword for terrorism. Language such as this could not fail to impress other European nations with some measure of alarm, when coming from the ruler of such a formidable military Power. But it must not

for a moment be supposed that it was endorsed at this time by the German nation as a whole.

Britain now made a sincere overture for better relations with Germany. Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, had actually thrown out a suggestion for an Anglo-German alliance in 1898. But almost immediately a fresh cause of dispute arose between the two countries. Germany was anxious for a partition of the Samoan Group, in the Pacific, and laid claim to the islands of Apia and Upolu, a claim which was hotly contested by the British Government. The Kaiser was furious, and wrote bitterly to Queen Victoria about this dispute over "a ridiculous island which can't be worth a pin to England compared with the thousands of square miles she annexes right and left every year without encountering any protest." Eventually the matter was settled peacefully by the withdrawal of the British claims, and the Samoan Islands were divided between Germany and the United States. Chamberlain was able once more to put forward his scheme for an alliance with Germany. There seemed all the more reason for this since England had now become involved in the South African War, and her consequent unpopularity in Europe had convinced the Government that its policy of isolation was more dangerous than splendid. In 1901 an Anglo-German Convention was actually put on paper, but it was now the turn of Germany to hang back. Such a Convention would undoubtedly have been highly unpopular in Germany at this time, and before long the frequent attacks on England in the German Press made this very evident. The British were accused of committing all manner of atrocities on the hapless Boers, and an angry retort from Chamberlain, made in the course of a public speech in which he referred to the alleged action of Prussia in her war with France, provoked another outburst from the Kaiser. The crisis over Koweit and the Bagdad Railway, which occurred immediately afterwards, showed the impossibility of any alliance between the two countries. By now all likelihood of England's joining the group of Central Powers seemed definitely past.

But the project might have been renewed in the future with some chance of success had it not been for the one great stumbling-block that was destined steadily to increase the tension between England and Germany right up till 1914—the German naval programmes. This is by far the most important reason for the antagonism between Britain and Germany. Isolated incidents such as the 'Kruger Telegram' could be settled and forgotten, but the presence of the constantly expanding German battle-fleet appeared to grow more and more menacing as the years went on. The whole story is a long one of complicated technicalities; it will suffice to record here the main outlines.

When the Kaiser came to the throne he found that his little fleet was administered by a department of the War Office. Germany had never yet looked upon herself as other than a purely military Power. The Kaiser very promptly changed this state of affairs by creating an independent Admiralty, but notwithstanding his expanding commitments abroad, the creation of a really strong navy did not become a part of German policy until after the affair of the Kruger Telegram. It will be remembered that on that occasion the Kaiser had been forcibly reminded that the British fleet made him powerless to interfere in South Africa, and the party in Germany that advocated the building of a bigger navy did not hesitate to make capital out of the incident. Perhaps the ablest member of this party was a certain Captain von Tirpitz. The Kaiser was deeply impressed ; in 1897 we find him asserting that the trident must be in Germany's fist, and Tirpitz was summoned to put the new policy into effect. The latter wrote in his memoirs that the Kruger Telegram " contributed more than anything else to open the eyes of large sections of the German people to their economic position and the necessity for a fleet." At the same time a Navy League was founded in Germany.

But the programme of naval reconstruction embodied in the Bill of 1898 was small compared with that set forth in the Bill of 1900. In the previous year three German mail-steamers had been stopped by British warships on suspicion of carrying war material to the Boers, and one of these, the *Bundesrath*, was not released for some time. A very sharp protest from Berlin resulted, and once more the big navy party in Germany found an opportunity to push forward their claims. The new Bill doubled the strength originally laid down in 1898, and would have made Germany the fourth or fifth naval Power in the world. The preamble to the Bill included a significant clause, stating that Germany needed a fleet of such power that " war with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening that Power's supremacy."

" The mightiest naval Power " could only refer to Britain. It was evident that her position on the seas was about to be challenged, and thus the naval competition between the two countries can be dated from this German Navy Bill of 1900. Britain was not long in making her reply. The scheme for a naval base at Rosyth was outlined in 1903. In the following year King Edward, while on a visit to his nephew, the Kaiser, inspected the new ships and dockyards at Kiel. He returned to England seriously disquieted by what he had seen. Admiral Sir John Fisher was made First Sea Lord, and began a complete reorganization of the Navy, bringing home capital ships from far-distant stations in order to strengthen the Channel Fleet. The significance of this move was not lost on the Germans, and Fisher's policy of scrapping out-of-date vessels in order to replace them with

the new Dreadnought type, the first of which was laid down in 1905, further convinced them of the need for strengthening their own navy. There is no doubt that some of Fisher's pronouncements, extolling the virtues of his new ships (which, it was thought, would render all others obsolete), his hints that the North Sea would be the probable scene of the next naval battle, and even that it might be as well to repeat the methods employed by the British at Copenhagen a hundred years previously, seriously alarmed the Germans, and materially aided Tirpitz in carrying through his schemes. In 1906 he had no difficulty in obtaining six cruisers which the Bill of 1900 had denied him, and it was decided at the same time to widen the Kiel Canal to enable it to accommodate the largest battleships. Meanwhile the new Liberal Government in England was contemplating a reduction in its programme of naval construction, in an effort to call a halt in the expensive naval race.

Before long, however, the Liberal Government was continuing the policy of its predecessor. In 1908 a further great increase in the German programme provoked something like a political crisis in Britain, and there was open talk of the possibility of war. Alarming estimates of the rate at which German capital ships were increasing were discussed, and the Government increased its annual programme of capital ships accordingly. For the first time it was openly admitted in this country that the size of the British Navy must be governed primarily by the size of the German. Then the outcry in Germany after the rebuff at Agadir in 1911 led to a supplementary estimate for the German Navy in 1912. A visit by Lord Haldane to Berlin, in which he proposed to place no obstacle in the way of German expansion in Africa provided Germany would agree to a two-Power naval standard for Britain and suspend competitive building, brought no results, because Germany wanted the insertion of a clause guaranteeing British neutrality if war were "forced on Germany." It was quite evident that she was merely seeking a safeguard in case of war with the Dual Alliance.

So it came about that in 1914 Germany owned the second largest navy in the world. In view of German expansion abroad Britain could hardly have grudged her cruisers to protect her new trade-routes and growing mercantile marine. But a battle-fleet is only intended for use against another battle-fleet, and there seemed ample evidence that the German one was intended for use against Britain. Hence the British uneasiness and efforts to arrive at an agreement, if only for the sake of relieving taxation. The German attitude, however, was that their fleet was their own concern; in fact, in the later stages the Kaiser usually flew into a rage if anyone attempted to explain the English point of view. As time went on he became increasingly

obsessed with the idea that Europe as a whole was paralysed by the British control of the sea, and all the efforts of Count Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, failed to convince him that Britain must keep pace with the German building programme from necessity rather than from choice. Naval policy formed the one insuperable difficulty between the two countries, leading inevitably to war.

Finally, we must not forget the mutual antipathy that existed between the Kaiser and his uncle, Edward VII. Although the Prince of Wales, as he then was, had at first thought his nephew a "nice boy," he got an early taste of the young Prince's arrogance when he visited England in 1880, well primed with the doctrines of Bismarck and the Prussian Guards. In 1888, when the Prince of Wales was attending the funeral of the Emperor Frederick, he somewhat tactlessly inquired of Herbert Bismarck whether some part of Alsace and Lorraine would have been restored to France if Frederick had lived. The new Kaiser, on hearing of this, was so angry that formal complaint was made to Lord Salisbury, and the Kaiser refused to meet his uncle when the latter was on a visit to the Emperor of Austria. Queen Victoria dealt firmly with the matter, and William was not allowed to visit England for a time. When he did come his conduct at the Royal Yacht Club did not tend to improve matters. His arrogant behaviour and slighting references to his uncle led the latter to refer to him as "the boss of Cowes."

Unfortunately Edward VII did not himself become a monarch until years after his nephews in Germany and Russia had acceded to their respective thrones, and the personal influence that he might have wielded over them could not therefore assume its full effect until the course of events was already moving in a very definite direction. Throughout his reign the Kaiser never desisted from his efforts to wean the Tsar Nicholas from his alliance with France, and one of his favourite methods took the form of repeated warnings against the supposed machinations of the "arch intriguer and mischief-maker," King Edward. There were times when the Tsar was almost convinced of the truth of these stories. For example, in 1905, catching the Tsar in the depths of despair after the disasters of his war with Japan, William arranged a meeting of the royal yachts at Björkö, and actually persuaded his cousin to sign a treaty with Germany. Of course, the Russian Ministers soon pointed out that no such agreement could be entered into without the knowledge of France, and the Kaiser's triumph, of which he was inordinately proud, was short-lived. In 1908 a document appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* in which the Kaiser violently attacked the English for repeatedly refusing his friendship, and the result was another tremendous outburst of ill-feeling. In this case he had once more gone too far even for his own countrymen, and

something very like a political crisis occurred in Germany. Characteristically the Kaiser departed on a hunting expedition and left his Chancellor Bülow to deal with it.

But we must beware of attaching too much importance to the personal factor, for it is unlikely that the sincere efforts made by King Edward for a better understanding with the Kaiser could have prevented the antagonism between Britain and Germany, in view of the deeply rooted causes already outlined above. Nevertheless it is as well to remember that the Kaiser's control over the foreign relations of his country was much more direct and more powerful than that of King Edward in England. In the opinion of the German historian Dr Emil Ludwig the Kaiser "bore, and bears, the responsibility for Germany's isolation and encirclement in the decade immediately before the World War. Never, but for William's provocations, would Edward VII and his people have joined the enemies of Germany." As time wore on that "encirclement" became to the Kaiser a nightmare of crushing intensity, in which above everything he affected to discern the hand of his uncle. The whole is epitomized in his own words, written at the opening stage of the great catastrophe, in the agony of realization that his worst fears had come to pass: "The dead Edward is stronger than the living I!"

The Entente Cordiale (1904). The Boer War showed England that a policy of isolation could prove extremely unpleasant. Moreover, the German naval programme, already clearly foreshadowed, might make a two-Power navy difficult to maintain. By 1903 the drifting apart of England and Germany had become a clearly marked process, and the time seemed ripe for a better understanding with France. On their side the French also were beginning to adopt a more moderate tone towards England, for the trouble brewing in the Far East between Russia and Japan was temporarily lessening the value of their ally so far as the European situation was concerned. King Edward and his Ministers were therefore increasingly disposed towards a general settlement of the many points at issue between the two countries, and, in fact, before the Boer War ended Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, had begun tentative conversations about various African questions.

But the biggest bone of contention lay in Egypt, outside Chamberlain's province. For many years French and English had competed for influence in that country. The purchase of the Suez Canal shares had caused some resentment in France; the Dual Control had broken down over the measures resulting from Arabi Bey's rebellion, and Frenchmen began to think that the landing of British troops was merely a prelude to annexation. Efforts to secure French co-operation in the administration of Egypt failed. In 1887 a Convention was drawn up with Turkey, under which the British military

occupation of Egypt would have come to an end in 1890, but since the Convention provided for re-entry in certain circumstances the French put pressure on the Sultan, which led him to refuse ratification of the agreement. In consequence the British occupation continued. In 1892 France formally requested the British Government to state when they intended to evacuate Egypt, and similar inquiries made from time to time were a constant source of irritation between the two countries.

Several other disputes were still outstanding. In 1890 Britain had recognized the claim of France to a protectorate over Madagascar, though in British opinion this had been declared in defiance of certain treaties with the native rulers, and had involved violent measures against British settlers. Annexation followed, accompanied by legislation aimed at British trading rights, mainly in the form of prohibitive customs duties, against which the British had never ceased to protest. In 1893 France had declared war on Siam, in virtue of a claim to extend French influence as far as the river Mekong. This was contested by Britain; two warships were sent to Bangkok, and for a time feeling on both sides ran high. Then in 1898 the French tried to establish a coaling-station near Muscat, and more excitement resulted when Britain forced them to withdraw, under an agreement previously made with the Sultan. Another cause of dispute was still outstanding in Newfoundland, where the French "right to catch and dry fish" on the "French shore" had been a fruitful source of argument ever since the Treaty of Utrecht. In addition to all this the famous 'Fashoda Incident,' when Captain Marchand had hoisted the French flag on the upper waters of the Nile after a march of 2800 miles from the coast of West Africa, and the reluctant French withdrawal in the face of pressure from London, had produced a degree of bad feeling that almost brought France and Britain to the verge of war.

The deaths of Queen Victoria and Lord Salisbury removed two powerful advocates of Anglo-German friendship. King Edward was anxious, from personal as well as from political motives, to end the ill-feeling between Britain and France, and to establish better relations for the future. In 1903, on his way home from a tour in the Mediterranean, he broke his journey in order to pay an official visit to Paris, where in the course of a speech at the British Chamber of Commerce he spoke of his hopes for Franco-British friendship. "The days of hostility between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent. There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the past; but that is all happily over and forgotten." The apathy and even hostility with which the King had been received by the French people gave way to enthusiasm before his departure,

and although too much importance must not be attached to this, it is never safe to underestimate the personal factor in foreign politics. The King played his part, and played it as few but he could have done. Three months later President Loubet returned the visit, accompanied by his Foreign Secretary, Delcassé. Similar cordial speeches were made in London, and conversations began that resulted eight months later in the Franco-British Agreement of 1904. Much to the delight of Lord Cromer, the disagreements over Egypt were smoothed away, for, in the words of the treaty, "The Government of the French Republic declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation," and in return "His Britannic Majesty's Government recognizes that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all . . . reforms which it may require." These clauses relating to Egypt and Morocco form much the most important part of the treaty, and to ensure that they should be carried out the two countries promised each other "diplomatic support." Other questions at issue were also discussed and settled: the British ceased their complaints against the new customs duties in Madagascar, and made concessions in West Africa when the French gave up some of their fishing-rights in Newfoundland. Similar amicable agreements were made elsewhere as the new spirit of conciliation gained strength.

Thus the policy of isolation was abandoned by Britain, but not, as the Kaiser had undoubtedly hoped, by a drift into the arms of the Triple Alliance. However, the Entente Cordiale with France was not a military alliance, though the Kaiser's suspicion that it was directed against Germany and her allies was destined to be greatly strengthened within a very short time.

Morocco and the Algeciras Conference. For France to make an agreement with Britain about the future of Morocco was one thing; to carry these plans into effect without opposition from elsewhere was another. Germany had not been consulted, and she felt that her commercial interests (or the prospects of such interests in the future) were at stake so far as North Africa was concerned. The Kaiser blames his Ministers for what follows, and it seems likely that the idea of intervention originated with Bülow and Holstein, the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, though William was soon closely identified with the plan.

In February 1905 a French Mission was sent to Fez. In March the Kaiser himself landed at Tangier. He was received by the Sultan's uncle, and in the course of his speech on that occasion he laid down the German position in no uncertain terms. "My visit," he said, "is

to show my resolve to do all in my power to safeguard German interests in Morocco. Considering the Sultan as absolutely free, I wish to discuss with him the means to secure these interests." Following on this visit a German envoy was sent to Fez, and instead of the Sultan agreeing to the French proposals for administrative reform, demand was made for a general conference at Tangier.

Delcassé was strongly in favour of a firm attitude. He wanted to reject this demand out of hand and to test the strength of the Entente Cordiale at once, even pretending that he had the promised support of a British army and fleet in the event of war. But the French Cabinet, more cautious than its Foreign Secretary, was not to be persuaded, and Delcassé resigned. The opening round had gone to Germany, and Bülow was made a Prince.

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1905 the diplomatic wrangling continued. Germany made it known that "she would stand beside the Sultan with all her forces," and the Kaiser unleashed some of his customary oratory about "well-sharpened swords." His uncle, Edward VII, retaliated in somewhat outspoken fashion, and refused an invitation to Berlin. In December Campbell-Bannerman succeeded Balfour, and Grey replaced Lansdowne at the Foreign Office.

The conference was to meet at Algeciras in January, and from the French point of view it was vital to know exactly what they could expect from Britain under the terms of the Entente. The new Liberal Government had affirmed its adhesion to the agreement, but the "diplomatic support" specifically mentioned therein was not likely to be effective in the face of the German attitude, unless it was backed by a hint of something more material. Early in the new year the French Ambassador Cambon saw Grey, and made tentative inquiries as to the British action in the event of war. It was suggested that Britain should furnish an army of 100,000 men to guard the Belgian frontier. Grey pointed out that he was not at liberty to enter into a defensive alliance on his own authority: only Parliament could sanction that. But he authorized naval and military conversations between French and British experts, though it was understood that the British Government retained its freedom of action. At the same time it was made clear to the German Ambassador in London that he could not count on British neutrality in the event of a war with France.

In these circumstances the conference at Algeciras resulted in a diplomatic rebuff for Germany. After all her threats and menaces the only important modification she obtained of the French programme of administrative reforms in Morocco was that all the great Powers were to share in financing the State Bank. President Roosevelt, who had been negotiating with both sides for a settlement, congratulated

the Kaiser. But the latter felt that he had been defeated by a combination of the Latin races, and wrote one of his famous marginal notes, in which he referred to his group of opponents as "this emasculated rubbish-heap of the old Roman stock."

From our viewpoint the importance of the Moroccan crisis lay in the significant turn it gave to the Entente Cordiale. Officially that agreement may only have established "friendly understanding," but the military conversations, which also included the Belgians, continued without interruption up to 1914.

The Completion of the Triple Entente (1907). It was only natural that the energies of France now became bent on securing an understanding between her new friend, England, and her old ally, Russia. That country, its conflict with Japan ended and best forgotten, was once more prepared to play a part in European politics, and had stood by France at the Algeiras Conference. The Liberal Government in England was more than ready to bring about a better understanding, and the Tsar began conversations with the British Ambassador shortly after the Kaiser's attempt to obtain some definite promise of alliance at Björkö.

The causes of friction between Britain and Russia all lay in Asia. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, intended to strengthen the position of Britain in Asia generally, was at first a very sore point, but since the Far Eastern question for the time being was definitely closed, this matter did not specifically arise. The most fruitful cause of trouble had lain during the past century in Constantinople and the Near East. Grey was prepared to discuss this, but at the moment this question also was dormant, and the Russians did not see fit to bring it up. Discussions were therefore confined to the Middle East. Russian encroachments towards Afghanistan had already provoked warfare, and still seemed a potential source of danger on the Indian frontier; similar Russian action was apprehended in Tibet. In Persia the growth of Russian commercial concessions, and especially the control of the telegraph system in Seistan, was also provoking alarm.

In 1906 Sir Arthur Nicolson became British Ambassador at Petrograd, and he immediately began conversations with the Tsar and his Foreign Secretary, Isvolsky. Notwithstanding the scepticism of the Indian Government, an agreement was arrived at and signed on August 31, 1907. Russia declared that she recognized the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. In Persia itself zones of influence for Russia and Britain were demarcated, bordering their respective frontiers. Neither nation was to seek concessions in the other's zone, and both were free to act in the 'no man's land' between. Afghanistan was recognized as "outside the sphere of Russian influence," and political relations with the Amir were to be conducted

through the British Government, which promised not to countenance any measures threatening Russia, or to annex any part of Afghanistan. As regards Tibet, both Powers agreed to recognize the suzerainty of China, and not to interfere with Tibetan internal administration.

The new agreement was cemented by a meeting between King Edward and the Tsar at Reval. So far as the actual terms were concerned, it had no direct bearing on the European situation at all. But, as in the case of France, it was followed by a friendly spirit of diplomatic co-operation in other fields, though the Russian Entente was never so popular in England as that with France. But France saw in it the natural development of her policy, and as matters had now broadened into a Triple Entente, the third and final step in the grouping of pre-War Europe had at last been taken. Though Germany at first pretended to welcome the new agreement, the Kaiser's anger and dismay at the completion of the "encirclement" of Germany showed only too clearly that he recognized the importance of what had taken place. Where he had failed Britain had succeeded. The unbelievable had come to pass: Britain and Russia were friends. There was no hope now of calling a halt in the German naval programme, which, as we have already seen, was immediately strengthened.

The Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908). By the Treaty of Berlin the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been entrusted to Austria, as compensation for the supposed Russian influence in the Balkans resulting from the creation of a semi-independent Bulgaria. The Concert of Europe had been responsible for this arrangement, and it was supposed in British circles at least that no modification of the Balkan situation would take place without the consent of the signatories to the treaty.

In January 1908 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, obtained from the Sultan a concession for a railway through the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar. Russian jealousy was immediately provoked, and Grey thought the matter a bad precedent. "Once they lose touch with one another," he wrote, "you cannot tell what misunderstandings may creep in and how far they may go."

But Aehrenthal and Isvolsky did not "lose touch" immediately. In the summer of 1908 the Young Turk Party rose in rebellion and forced Abdul Hamid to grant a constitution. The time now seemed ripe for Austria to incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of her empire, and Isvolsky secretly intimated his agreement, provided the Straits were opened to Russian warships. This could certainly not be done without the agreement of the other signatories to the Treaty of Berlin, but before Isvolsky could obtain this Bulgaria proclaimed her complete independence, and, using this as an excuse, Austria proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russia felt that she had been tricked. The annexation was a *fait accompli*, and it was no longer possible to use the question of the Straits as a lever for bargaining. Isvolsky visited London, but could get no satisfaction from Grey, who thought the whole business savoured of sharp practice and strongly deprecated the alteration of treaties without mutual discussion and consent of all concerned. Consequently all members of the Triple Entente demanded a conference, but Austria refused unless the annexation were recognized beforehand. In this action she was supported by her ally, Germany. At first the Kaiser had been angry at being kept in the dark. "So I am the last person in Europe to know anything whatever about it!" he wrote. "Such are my thanks from the house of Habsburg!" But Bülow talked him round, and his attitude towards Russia became threatening in defence of his ally.

So for the time being Austria had her way, though the resulting feeling in Europe was of grave significance. Serbia felt that her turn would come next; she demanded at first a corridor to the sea as compensation, and talked of war with Austria. But Russia was in no condition to help her at the expense of a war with Germany as well, especially as France and Britain were obviously unwilling to help. All co-operation between Russia and Austria in the Balkans was now definitely at an end. The rivalry of those two countries in Eastern Europe, one of the principal causes of the Great War, was thus thrown sharply into relief. And still Britain talked about the sanctity of treaties, without, apparently, either the intention or the means of backing her arguments with force. Grey considered the Entente a diplomatic arrangement, not an alliance. But what interpretation were his two partners likely to put upon it? In their view a direct threat of war, at the very least, was an essential weapon in major diplomatic operations.

The Agadir Crisis (1911). Once again the action of the French in Morocco was destined to provoke a European crisis of the first magnitude, and actually to bring hostilities within measurable distance. The result of this crisis was to crystallize British plans for helping France in the event of war, notwithstanding the fact that the connexion between the two countries was officially an 'Entente' only.

By an agreement made in 1909, supplementary to the settlement at Algeciras, Germany had apparently become reconciled to the French position in Morocco. But it was difficult to deal with a Sultan whose authority was very indifferently obeyed outside his own capital, and in the spring of 1911, when the situation appeared more than usually threatening, the French announced their intention of occupying Fez with troops in order to protect their nationals. This did not appear to Grey a contravention of the former treaties, so he raised no objection.

France recognized, however, that Germany was not likely to take the same view, and was quite prepared to grant some concessions on the Congo. With this intention conversations were begun with Kiderlen-Wächter, the German Foreign Minister.

On the first day of July an apparently peaceful situation was suddenly changed when Kiderlen-Wächter announced that the German gunboat *Panther* had been dispatched to the port of Agadir. It is true that she was only a small vessel, with a complement of 150 men (though she was afterwards replaced by the cruiser *Berlin*), but in Britain and France the move was held to be significant. Germany claimed that since the Agreement of Algeciras had been violated by the French expedition to Fez, she also was quite within her rights in affording protection to German commercial interests on the Moroccan coast. But in French opinion these interests were non-existent, while Britain feared an attempt by Germany to seize a naval base near the South African and South American trade-routes. The immediate result was a note from Sir Edward Grey, which was really intended as an invitation to Germany to make her intentions clear. But Grey did not definitely ask for a reply, and in the meantime the Kaiser had not approved of Kiderlen-Wächter's threatening gesture. "The French *will* have it. So let us get out of the affair with decency!" had been his comment. In this state of affairs no reply was sent to Britain. Negotiations were still proceeding between Germany and France, and the British Cabinet remained in suspense for three weeks. The rumours that found a vent in the European Press helped during this time to make the situation increasingly tense. Germany appeared determined to challenge the Franco-British agreement regarding North Africa, and the Liberal Cabinet contained a Radical pacifist element, of which the most influential member was Mr Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

On July 21 Lloyd George was to make a speech as guest of the Bankers' Association Dinner at the Mansion House. Thinking it advisable to say something about the European situation, and having made up his mind that the German failure to answer the British note demanded a united front in the British Cabinet, he consulted Grey, and then in the course of his speech he delivered himself to the effect that if Britain were to be treated in European consultations as "of no account . . . peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."

An answer came from Germany at once. There the speech was construed as a deliberate threat—an attempt by Britain to influence negotiations in which she had no direct concern. So serious was the turn taken by affairs at this juncture that both the Admiralty and the War Office were warned that a war with Germany might ensue at any

moment. Nevertheless the Germans began to adopt a more reasonable tone in their demands, for, as we now know, it was never their intention to provoke a war over the Moroccan question. It is said that Kiderlen-Wächter had hoped some German might get killed in Morocco, and thus give him an excuse for active interference, but as it happened, no German proved quite so accommodating.

In October France and Germany came to an agreement which recognized the French interference in Morocco. In the following month a treaty was signed which granted compensation to Germany on the Congo. Actually she had not come out of the affair too badly, but on the face of it it looked as though France had once more achieved her ends, and there is no doubt that the warlike element in Germany experienced deep humiliation, adopting an attitude very akin to the Russian one after the Bosnian crisis. Germany wanted 'room to breathe,' and considered that a ring of hostile nations was determined to thwart her lawful attempts at expansion and commercial development.

Most important of all was the repercussion in Britain. In August a meeting of the Imperial Defence Committee revealed a serious difference of opinion between the War Office and the Admiralty. General (later Sir Henry) Wilson, the Director of Military Operations, who was steeped in the French plans for defeating the German scheme for a war on two fronts, with its possibility of a wide flanking movement through Belgium, advocated the dispatch of six British divisions to operate on the left of the French. The Admiralty, on the other hand, favoured a naval war, with a military striking-force kept in hand for use as opportunity offered. But the Franco-British military conversations had already reached an advanced stage, and the committee finally decided upon the military plan. The result was that Churchill replaced McKenna at the Admiralty.

For the time being danger had been averted, but opinion was growing all over Europe that crises of this nature could not continue without sooner or later ending in war. Grey himself keenly felt and deplored the danger. "So much suspicion and gossip have collected," he said, "that it is exciting men's minds and corroding their tempers to a greater extent than ever before. Some people take delight in suggesting how near we were to war. It is as if the world were indulging in a fit of political alcoholism."

The Effect of the Balkan Wars (1912-13). The great European struggle which Sir Edward Grey both feared and anticipated was provoked eventually by the long-expected break-up of the Turkish power. The process in its final stages had begun in 1908, and was continued by the Italian seizure of Tripoli in 1911. This caused some embarrassment to the Kaiser. The deposition of Abdul Hamid had not altogether displeased him, for there had been a distinct cooling of

the Sultan's friendship for Germany. But the Kaiser was now anxious to establish his influence with the Young Turks, and the action of his Italian ally was not easy to explain away.

The moment was evidently ripe for a combined attack on Turkey by the Balkan Slavs. The result was the making of two treaties, in one of which at least the hand of Russia can be traced, that led to the formation of the Balkan League of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. The last-named began the attack in October 1912, and within a very short time the League had defeated Turkey with an effectiveness that left the rest of Europe bewildered. Early in the following year the Powers were engaged in effecting a peace settlement when Bulgaria, fearful of the Serbian claims for compensation, since she was not to be allowed an outlet to the sea, suddenly attacked her old ally, and the Second Balkan War began. Serbia, Greece, and Roumania consequently united in stripping Bulgaria of a great deal of territory, while the Turks seized their opportunity and recaptured Adrianople.

These wars once more revealed the conflicting aims of Russia and Austria in the Balkans. The former had hoped to exercise a guiding hand over the League, to arbitrate between its members at the peace, and perhaps to plead its cause before the Great Powers. But the League had shown itself in no need of obligation to any Great Power for its success, and quite unwilling to submit to any arbitration by the Tsar. Austria had secretly hoped for the defeat, or at any rate the weakening, of Serbia. Instead Serbia was jubilant and triumphant, and after the second war much enhanced in size and power, actually at the expense of Bulgaria, the friend of Germany and Austria. Anti-Serbian feeling ran high in the Austrian Press, and it was thought at the time that only the influence of her two allies prevented an attack on Serbia there and then. If such an eventuality had occurred it might have been difficult to restrain Russia.

To prevent the embroilment of other European nations, and especially of Austria and Russia over the question of Serbia, a conference of ambassadors sat in London under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Grey. It played its part successfully, and for the time being danger was once more averted. But the Austrian Empire contained a large Slav population, overjoyed at the success of the Serbs. It was not likely that the latter could escape strong action on the part of Austria in the event of a third crisis arising, though no one could foresee how near at hand that crisis was.

In Germany keen disappointment was felt at the failure of the Turkish armies. As late as 1910 von der Goltz had again been at Constantinople, and the Young Turks had received German financial aid. Now that the war was over, a new German military mission

under General Liman von Sanders was sent to Constantinople at the request of the Turks. Russia, affecting to see in this all hopes of a Russian-controlled Bosphorus slipping away, succeeded with some difficulty in persuading Britain and France to join in protesting, and von Sanders became officially the Inspector-General of the Turkish Army, instead of Commander of its First Army Corps.

The Immediate Causes of the War. So far as Britain and Germany were concerned, the situation seemed easier in the months immediately preceding the War. Both nations had collaborated in preventing the spread of the Balkan conflict; certain colonial differences had been amicably adjusted; an agreement was even reached over the Bagdad Railway, though it was never ratified. But in Eastern Europe, although it was not generally realized at the time, the situation was becoming ever more threatening. Austria was determined that a final reckoning was necessary with Serbia, if the integrity of the Dual Monarchy was to be preserved. Military counsels were in the ascendancy, and, if the support of Germany could be guaranteed, the conflict with Russia that would inevitably ensue was viewed with equanimity, provided it came before the Russian military reforms were complete. The strength of both German and Austrian armies was increased. In October 1913 the Kaiser intimated to the Austrian Minister Berchtold that a return of the old Dreikaiserbund was now impossible. Apparently he agreed that a conflict between Austria and Russia over the Balkans was bound to come, and promised his support. In view of this the murder at Serajevo becomes merely a convenient opportunity to force the issue, though it must not be thought that Serbia was free from blame.

In June 1914 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor and heir to the Austrian throne, was attending Army manœuvres in Bosnia. On the 28th, as he and his wife drove through the streets of Serajevo, the capital, they were shot by Gabriel Princip, a Serbian student, acting with the connivance and help of the Black Hand secret society of Serbia. The heat of European fevers, so hardly suppressed on so many previous occasions, was about to be relieved by the greatest blood-letting the world had ever known, and the thin red trickle that came from the Archduke's mouth as he sat immobile in his car was the first sign of it.

Opinion in Europe was, of course, shocked at the murder, and when it became known that Serbian nationalists were involved Europe began to speculate on what demands Austria would make from the Serbian Government. Yet nearly a month elapsed before the Austrian ultimatum was forthcoming. During this time the Austrian Emperor had written to the Kaiser to the effect that any reconciliation with Serbia was now out of the question. The Kaiser, having promised

Austria complete support, went for a cruise in his yacht, which appeared to relieve the tension for the time being. Grey agreed with the German Ambassador, who suggested that he should use his influence with Russia in persuading Serbia to submit to the Austrian demands, but when at last he learned that Austria had prepared an ultimatum to which a time-limit was attached he realized the grave turn events were taking. "I could not," he said, "help dwelling on the dreadful consequences involved."

On July 24 Grey received the text of the Austrian ultimatum. All the Austro-Hungarian Ministers, with the exception of the Hungarian Minister-President, Count Tisza, were determined that a war with Serbia was necessary, and the document was therefore a catalogue of most humiliating demands, involving the suppression of nationalist societies, dismissal of Army officers, admission of Austrian officials, and a public admission of Serbian misdeeds. Grey did his best to prevent even a localized conflict. Deeming the actual cause of quarrel no concern of his, and recognizing that Austria was the aggrieved party, he endeavoured to exert a conciliatory influence through Berlin. At first he tried unsuccessfully to get an extension of the dangerously short time-limit of forty-eight hours. His next proposal was for a joint mediation by Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, for he saw already that the real danger lay in the possible action of Russia, and had already told the German Ambassador that this was his only concern in the quarrel. France and Italy were agreeable to such a mediation, but Germany thought it unnecessary to interfere, at any rate until the result of the direct communications between Russia and Austria became known. Meantime the representatives of the Triple Entente were urging the Serbians to submit to the Austrian demands if possible, and the result was that the Serbian reply of July 25 agreed in substance to nearly all the Austrian demands. Nevertheless Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28. It is said that the Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade did not even bother to read the Serbian reply before asking for his papers.

Meanwhile the British Admiralty had stopped the dispersal of the Fleet, which had just carried out a test mobilization, and Grey had informed the House of Commons of the serious turn events were taking. "The moment the dispute ceases to be between Austria and Serbia," he said, "it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen Europe at one blow." This speech was made the day before the Austrian declaration of war, but Grey's view of the situation was correct, for mobilization was ordered in South Russia immediately news of the declaration was received in Petrograd. Evidently there was nothing to be gained by direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd now.

July 29 dawned with the initial stages of the situation Sir Edward Grey had feared already an accomplished fact. Austria had begun war with Serbia, and Russia was on the point of putting a partial mobilization into effect. Yet the British Cabinet was still uncertain what course to pursue in the event of Germany and France becoming involved on behalf of their respective allies. Grey told the French Ambassador that he could not say what action Britain would take, and in a further appeal to Berlin he left it to Germany to suggest any form of mediation she chose, by which the four Powers might get together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. But on the same day a telegram was received from the British Ambassador in Berlin, stating that the German Chancellor had asked for British neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France, offering in return to take no territory from France if Germany were victorious, and to respect the neutrality of Holland. He had refused to make similar promises regarding the French colonies and the neutrality of Belgium. Grey, of course, refused to promise neutrality on these terms, and warned the German Ambassador not to be misled by the friendly tone of the Anglo-German conversations.

Since it was now evident that Germany was considering the possibility of an attack on France, it appeared to Grey that matters had assumed a still more serious aspect. But at the same time, so far as the original quarrel was concerned, chances of a settlement suddenly became more hopeful. The Kaiser, alarmed at the turn events were taking, intimated to Austria that in view of the Serbian attitude every reason for war had disappeared, and Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, forwarded a similar warning to the Austrian Government. Austria accordingly intimated that subject to certain reservations she would be prepared to consider mediation between herself and Serbia. But it was too late. On July 31 general mobilization came into effect in Russia, in spite of the fact that the Kaiser and the Tsar were corresponding in a personal endeavour to prevent the conflict which they saw looming before them. Military considerations had taken charge, for the elaborate machinery for mobilizing huge armies cannot be checked without involving serious loss of time in the event of war actually supervening, and the belated efforts of mid-European statesmen towards a peaceful settlement were thus invalidated. The result was a demand from Germany that the Russian mobilization (which now seemed to threaten her as well as her ally) should cease within twelve hours. The original quarrel had given rise to a situation of deadly menace between Russia and Germany, and in the latter country a state of *Kriegsgefahr*, or 'imminence of war,' was proclaimed.

On learning this Sir Edward Grey at once inquired of both German

and French Governments whether they would be prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium. France gave the desired assurance ; Germany, mindful of the requirements of the Schlieffen Plan, with its wide flanking movement directed at Paris, refused a direct answer.

On the following day (August 1) general mobilization was ordered in France. It had been agreed in Germany that in the unlikely event of France remaining neutral when her ally Russia was attacked, her fortresses of Toul and Verdun should be demanded as a pledge. Such a demand was certain to be refused, and therefore would in any case have involved France in the war ; but it was never necessary to make it.

Europe was now obviously heading towards a general war. Throughout the anxious consultations of the past week the French Ambassador in London had tried repeatedly to obtain some definite statement of what the British attitude would be in such a contingency. Neither France nor Russia had much belief in the efficacy of Grey's efforts for a peaceful settlement, and both thought (as, indeed, the French still think) that a determined stand by Britain on the side of her two partners in the Entente would have been a better guarantee of peace. The French President had even appealed directly to King George, but the fact was that the British Cabinet was divided and Grey himself was quite uncertain what the attitude of his Government would be. He could only tell France that he was unable to "pledge Parliament in advance," and warn Germany that she could not count on British neutrality even if the integrity of Belgium were respected.

On August 2 the Cabinet met. It was evident that some kind of decision could no longer be delayed, and the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament was already urging the Government to support France and Russia. We have seen how past crises had in every case strengthened the bond between France and Britain, while the military conversations had made it extremely difficult for Britain to stand out in the event of France becoming involved in war. To allow her to be crushed by Germany for the second time in less than fifty years would in any case have seriously disturbed the balance of power in Western Europe. But there was a more practical consideration to face. Two years previously, in view of the Entente with Britain and the presence of the Austrian and Italian navies in the Mediterranean, France had decided to concentrate all three, instead of only two, of her battle-squadrons in that sea, leaving only some destroyers and a few old cruisers in the Channel. Grey had written to the French Ambassador at the time that the disposition of the French and British Fleets was "not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war," but now that war was imminent it did not seem possible to leave the French Channel ports at the mercy of the German Navy, the second largest in the world. This forms the first reason for the entry of Britain into the European

War. France was promised the conditional support of the British Navy. "My own feeling," said Grey, in his famous speech before Parliament on the following day, "is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside."

On the same day that this momentous decision was taken, sufficient in itself to involve Britain in hostilities, it was learned in London that Germany and Russia were in a state of war, and that a force of Germans had invaded Luxemburg. The latter piece of news made the question of Belgian neutrality acute. This had been guaranteed by the Powers in the Treaty of 1839, which finally settled the independence of Belgium, and to which Prussia was a signatory. Bismarck had formally recognized this neutrality during the war of 1870, but in view of the unsatisfactory German reply to the British question regarding the matter, and the news of the invasion of Luxemburg, there was little room for doubt that Belgian neutrality was about to be violated. Yet even at this stage the Cabinet was undecided what course to pursue, for the treaty of 1839 did not impose an obligation to defend Belgium. None the less this question formed the second, and principal, reason for British participation in the War, since it rallied Parliament and nation strongly to the cause of intervention.

On August 3 Germany declared war on France, and orders were issued for the mobilization of the British Army. Grey made a lengthy statement in the House of Commons, in which he dealt first with the relations between Britain and France, the intentions behind the military conversations, and the reasons for granting conditional naval support. He then read a telegram just received by King George from the King of the Belgians, voicing "a supreme appeal" for diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. Although maintaining that the real decision lay with the House, Grey left the members in no doubt of what, in his opinion, that decision must be. "If, in a crisis like this," he said, "we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost." In a further statement made on the same day Grey informed the House that Belgium had refused, and was about to resist, the German demand for free passage through her territory.

On August 4 the British Ambassador at Berlin presented an ultimatum, to expire at midnight, demanding that Germany should respect the neutrality of Belgium. Bethmann-Hollweg was greatly agitated at the collapse of his recent efforts for Anglo-German friendship, just for the sake of "a scrap of paper," and likened the British

action to striking a man from behind when he was fighting for his life against two assailants. But no answer was returned to the ultimatum, and on the following day the British Ambassador left Germany. Eight days later a state of war was declared between Britain and Austria. Italy, deeming the War an act of aggression on the part of her allies, did not consider herself bound to support them under the terms of the Triple Alliance. Her extensive seaboard and ancient friendship with Britain, no less than her conflicting interests with Austria regarding the future of the Adriatic seaboard, had for some years past made her a doubtful partner of that alliance.

On August 6, in asking for a vote of credit, the Prime Minister summarized the reasons for the entry of Britain into the War. "If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, which, if it had been entered in between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle . . . that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power." The nation at large did not doubt then that those reasons were good and sufficient. Although there is some justification for the view that since 1904 Great Britain had in effect been unwittingly tied to the side of France in the sphere of European politics, those reasons remain good and sufficient to-day.

SUMMARY

(1) *The Triple Alliance*

- (a) Predominance of Prussia and Kaiser in new German Cabinet.
- (b) Bismarck kept France isolated; 'Dreikaiserbund' collapsed and Triple Alliance substituted (Austria, 1879; Italy, 1882).
- (c) Anglo-German relations cordial (Colonial Conference, 1884; Heligoland, 1890).

(2) *The Dual Alliance*

- (a) Accession of William II (1888); dismissal of Bismarck (1890); Reinsurance Treaty with Russia discontinued.
- (b) Agreement between France and Russia (1891); formal alliance (1894).

(3) *Causes of Anglo-German Antagonism*

- (a) Bagdad Railway (Anatolian Railway Co. (1892); concession for extension Konia-Bagdad (1899)).
- (b) Kruger Telegram (1896); "mailed fist" methods *re* China and Samoa.

- (c) German battle-fleet (Navy Bills of 1900, 1906, 1908, 1912).
- (d) Mutual antipathy between Kaiser and Edward VII. (Policy of 'encirclement.')

(4) *The Triple Entente*

- (a) 1904. Entente Cordiale between Britain and France.
- (b) 1907. Agreement between Britain and Russia.

(5) *The Preliminary Crises*

- (a) 1906. Algeciras Conference.
- (b) 1908. Bosnia and Herzegovina annexed by Austria.
- (c) 1911. Agadir Crisis.
- (d) 1912-13. Balkan Wars.

(6) *Immediate Causes of the War (1914)*

- (a) June 28. Murder of Austrian Archduke at Serajevo.
- (b) July 24. Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. July 28. Declared war.
- (c) July 31. General mobilization in Russia; German ultimatum to Russia.
- (d) August 1. Mobilization in France. August 3. Germany declared war on France.
- (e) August 4. British ultimatum to Germany.
- (f) Britain entered the War because
 - (i) French fleet was in Mediterranean.
 - (ii) Violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany (Treaty of London, 1839).

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The building of two rival groups in Europe.
- (2) The reasons for Anglo-German hostility.
- (3) The stages by which a Balkan dispute involved all Europe in war.
- (4) The work of Grey in the cause of peace.

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(B) RESULTS

By October 1918 the failure of the final German offensive on the Western Front, followed by an Allied advance that met with overwhelming success, made it evident that the end of the War was at last in sight. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had been a serious blow to the Allies. By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in spite of her acceptance of the principle, "No annexations, no indemnities," Germany had detached from Russia her Baltic provinces and the rich lands of the Ukraine, all of which became for the time practically dependent on her. But the accession of Italy, and later of the United States, to the Allied cause rendered this a less serious matter than it would have been earlier in the War. Italy hoped to round off her frontiers at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; to obtain the entire coastline of Dalmatia and a protectorate over Albania, thus converting the Adriatic into an Italian lake; and to secure a share of the German colonial empire in Africa. The United States joined in the effort to crush Prussian militarism, mainly on account of the submarine campaign against merchant shipping. President Wilson had drawn up Fourteen Points, embodying his conception of the Allied aims, and on November 5 the Allies agreed to make these points the basis for peace negotiations. They included the abolition of secret diplomacy, freedom of the seas, reduction of armaments, the evacuation of Belgium, the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine to France, self-government for the subject races of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, an independent Poland with a secure access to the sea, and "a general association of nations" to guarantee the integrity of great and small states alike. In fact, the Allies were determined to make a settlement that should render the dangerous situation of Europe in 1914 impossible for the future. So much is heard in retrospect of the horrors of the War period that one sometimes forgets the common sympathy and ideals that in times of mutual distress bind allied nations and the individuals of which they are composed. Such bonds are apt to wear thin in the easier days of peace.

On November 11 Germany was granted an armistice. It is usual now to think of the Allies, like their defeated enemies, as reeling exhausted from the struggle, each nation suffering severely from the dreadful depression that always follows a protracted war. But actually in the months that immediately succeeded the Great War nothing could have been farther from the truth. Popular feeling in the Allied countries was triumphant; demobilized men were returning to civil life, filled with enthusiasm for the new 'homes for heroes' they felt competent to create. Britain was united in aim and feeling as at no

previous period of her history. The War was followed by a tremendous boom in all departments of the national life, and no one seemed to foresee the depression that was soon to come. No sympathy was felt for the defeated enemy ; victory had come to the cause of righteousness, and now was the time to dictate—not to negotiate—the terms of peace. All these factors had their effect on the men who went to Paris to bring about the settlement.

Lloyd George, the British Premier, decided that a general election was necessary at once. The electorate, now increased by the introduction of manhood suffrage and a limited suffrage for women, sent him back to office with a large majority, but it left him in no doubt as to what the nation expected. Germany was to be held responsible for the War ; the Kaiser and his chief instruments were to be punished ; every penny of the expense to which Britain and her allies had been put was to be extracted from her defeated enemies. The Premier promised to associate himself with these demands.

The Different Points of View. On January 11, 1919, the British representatives, Lloyd George, Balfour, Bonar Law, and Barnes, arrived in Paris, and a week later the first Plenary Session was held. All the Allied and associated countries sent representatives, who were accompanied by an army of experts and secretaries. Most of the latter were constituted as commissions, fifty-six in all, to deal with specific questions, for the number and complexity of matters requiring attention were far too great for detailed settlement by the small body of men at the head of affairs. Meanwhile the blockade of Germany continued ; commissions were appointed to deal with the chaotic state of affairs that had supervened in Central Europe, and to decide on a course of action in Russia, where civil war was still in progress.

The actual task of drawing up the general terms of the peace treaties was entrusted to a Council of Ten, consisting of the two principal delegates from each of the five allied Great Powers—Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan—under the presidency of the aged Clemenceau. Before long this body was reduced to a Council of Five ; but as the Japanese delegate only attended when matters directly affecting his own nation were under discussion, and the Italian Signor Orlando absented himself for long periods, since Italy was only interested in securing the territory for which she had entered the War, this number was again reduced to the 'Big Three'—Clemenceau, Wilson, and Lloyd George—who were really responsible for the settlement. The governing impulse in Clemenceau's mind was fear of Germany ; remembering the defeat of his country in 1871, he thought mainly of the time when Germany might be strong enough to take her revenge, and aimed at reducing her to the status of a second-class

Power, or at any rate putting off the evil day of her recovery for as long as possible. Wilson was actuated by higher ideals. His first wish, as shown in the Fourteen Points, was to remove the causes that had led to the War, and he hoped to secure this end by a policy of "self-determination," allowing men of common nationality (of which language was to be the criterion) to govern themselves, and to preserve the integrity of the new system by some kind of international league. Lloyd George was in full sympathy with this, and therefore inclined to ally himself with Wilson in opposing the aims of Clemenceau; but he represented a democratic nation and was hampered by his election pledges. Wilson also represented a democratic nation, and had made the mistake of treating the Peace Conference as a party matter. He belonged to the Democratic Party, and had not troubled to avail himself of the assistance of his rivals, the Republicans. In this he made a serious mistake, for matters of foreign policy really lie in the hands of the United States Senate, and in that body the Republican Party had a majority.

Clemenceau's first demand was that all territory west of the Rhine should be taken away from Germany. He did not necessarily want to add it to France, but argued that unless Germany were confined to the east bank of the Rhine, and control of the bridge-heads taken from her, France would never be safe. In conjunction with Marshal Foch and other military experts, he tried to persuade Wilson and Lloyd George to agree to this measure. But the territory in question was peopled by seven million Germans, and Lloyd George was afraid of creating another Alsace-Lorraine and so repeating the German mistake of 1871. France also tried to recover some of the districts round Landau and along the eastern boundary of Lorraine that had been assigned to her by the Treaty of Paris of 1814, and taken away again after the Waterloo campaign. In the earlier days of the conference these French claims formed the principal subjects of dispute between the Big Three, but Clemenceau found himself in the minority and was forced to give way. In return, Wilson and Lloyd George offered to safeguard France by a joint guarantee of military assistance in the case of unprovoked aggression by Germany. But when Wilson laid the terms of the treaty before the United States Senate, fighting for its acceptance from a party platform, the Republicans were too strong for him. The old American doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of Europe, which might have to be abandoned under the terms of this guarantee or by participation in the League of Nations scheme, brought about a refusal to ratify the treaty by the necessary two-thirds majority. The United States therefore officially ended the war with Germany by a separate treaty, and in these circumstances Britain refused to take up the military guarantee alone. France was left with-

out the safeguards she considered essential, and a heavy blow was thus delivered at the general principle of disarmament.


The Treaty of Versailles (1919). The terms imposed by the treaty as eventually drawn up were extremely hard. In the first place, Germany was declared responsible for the War. The Kaiser was publicly arraigned "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." Conscription was abolished, and the Army reduced to a long-service force of 100,000 men, to ensure that Germany's days as a great military nation were over. Fortresses on the western frontier were to be dismantled; all surplus guns, munitions, aeroplanes, and military stores were to be destroyed or handed over to the Allies; a commission was appointed to see that these terms were carried out. All German territory west of the Rhine, and the right bank of the river to a depth of fifty kilometres, was demilitarized. Certain areas were to be subjected to an allied occupation for a maximum period of fifteen years. A military Air Force was forbidden. The German Fleet was to be surrendered; when it arrived in Scapa Flow it was sunk by its own officers, which incidentally solved the problem of what to do with it. In future Germany was to be allowed six battleships of 10,000 tons each, a limited number of cruisers and destroyers, and no submarines. She had also to surrender most of her merchant fleet, and to make great payments in kind of cattle, timber, and coal. The last-named was intended to compensate France for the destruction of her coalfields during the War. The French wanted the German coalfield of the Saar, to ensure delivery of the consignments, so the Saar district was placed under a Commission of Five, controlled by the League of Nations, for fifteen years.

Territorially Germany's losses were considerable. All colonies were taken from her. Alsace and Lorraine, of course, returned to France, and two small Prussian districts, Eupen and Malmédy, were lost to Belgium. A plebiscite was held in Schleswig, which resulted in the northern part of the province being restored to Denmark. The state of Poland was re-created, mainly at the expense of Russia and Germany. Its eastern boundary could not be definitely laid down until settled conditions once more prevailed in Russia, but the Polish-German frontier was demarcated by the treaty. Access to the sea was obtained by the 'Polish Corridor,' a strip of territory separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany, at the end of which the seaport of Danzig, the population of which was predominantly German, became a Free City under a High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. Poland was to possess certain economic rights in Danzig, control of the docks and railways, and the right to occupy the town with troops if the civil police were in need of assistance. Poland thus once more became a nation, numbering about thirty million inhabitants.

France, deprived of her old alliance with Russia, was determined that this new state on Germany's eastern frontier should be strong, and would have placed many Silesian Germans under Polish rule if it had not been for the opposition of Lloyd George. As it was, a part of the valuable Silesian coalfield went to Poland. On the Baltic coast the district round Memel was soon seized by the new state of Lithuania, although (as in the case of Danzig) the population of the port itself was almost entirely German. Altogether Germany lost thirteen per cent. of her former territory and about twelve per cent. of her population.

The defeated nations were not invited to the peace conference. When, after six months' discussion, the Treaty of Versailles was ready it was presented to the German Government. On November 9, 1918, the old imperial *régime* had come to an end in Germany, and the moderate Socialists under Ebert had assumed control—if such a word could be held to apply. The delegates representing this new Germany strongly opposed the clauses relating to war guilt and the Kaiser, and wanted alterations in the proposed eastern boundaries. Germany had naturally expected the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, but to find herself stripped of some of the conquests of Frederick the Great was a different matter. Certain adjustments were made on this frontier, and a new German Cabinet came into being, formed especially to agree to the treaty and ensure peace for Germany. Even now the German delegates attempted to get the obnoxious war-guilt clauses omitted. The Allies replied with an ultimatum, and on June 28, 1919, the treaty was signed under protest in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The Kaiser was never punished, for he had taken refuge in Holland, and the Dutch flatly refused to surrender him. Germany would not deliver for trial a number of accused persons demanded by the treaty, though some of these were tried in German courts.

In a comprehensive memorandum drawn up during the course of the conference Lloyd George wrote: "You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate Power; all the same, in the end, if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors." There is prophetic foresight in these words, but to blame the 'Big Three' for mistaken policy in the part they played is not entirely fair. Treaties ending wars are drawn up under peculiarly unfavourable conditions, and after such a war as the last this factor was magnified to an extraordinary extent. The negotiators were obliged more or less to carry out the wishes of the countries they represented. No treaty can stand for ever, particularly a treaty that is imposed by force rather than agreement. Most Great Powers reveal within themselves a



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constant process of rejuvenation that leads to rapid recovery after defeat. The imposition of humiliating terms merely serves to foster a sense of injustice that forms an excellent basis for the rise of any leader who will promise once again to make his country strong. It was this state of affairs that enabled the Nazi Party to obtain its grip on the imagination of the German people.

Reparations. The exact sum required from Germany as a war indemnity was not mentioned in the Treaty of Versailles. The original intention was that she should be made to pay the whole cost of the War, and responsible experts actually assessed the figure at £24,000,000,000. It soon became evident that the other defeated states were not in a position to contribute much, and to exact such a fantastic figure from Germany alone was manifestly impossible. Cooler judgments prevailed as soon as the heat of war died down and men began to see that in these days of economic interdependence to cripple the greatest state in Central Europe would be to nobody's benefit. Accordingly in 1921 the Reparations Commission fixed the sum at £6,000,000,000, which was considered the maximum amount that Germany could pay. Of this 52 per cent. was to go to France, 22 per cent. to the British Empire, 10 per cent. to Italy, 8 per cent. to Belgium, and the rest to the other allies. But even the annual payments due from Germany under this arrangement proved too much. In 1923, when Germany protested that she could not pay the full amount due that year, the French marched into the Ruhr coalfield, intending to take payment in kind. They met on all sides with passive resistance from the Germans; factories and mines stood idle; the German mark, already standing at 35,000 to the pound, collapsed with such startling suddenness that by the end of the year it stood at 16,000,000,000,000. A financial crisis followed in France, and in these circumstances it became evident that a revision of the debt settlement was essential. Between 1924 and 1926 the Dawes and Young Committees lowered the total sum demanded to £2,000,000,000. Then in 1932 Germany refused further payment, after which reparations practically disappeared.

The Subsidiary Treaties. Austria complained bitterly of the impossibility of performing the economic demands which it was proposed to inflict upon her, and consequently terms were settled by a separate treaty, signed at Saint-Germain on September 10, 1919. The break-up of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was already an accomplished fact, and the principal task was therefore the settlement of the new frontiers. The Czechs of Bohemia and the Slovaks to the east of them formed the new state of Czecho-Slovakia. Serbia and Montenegro combined with the Croats and Slovenes to found the state of Jugoslavia. Istria, the Trentino, and Southern Tyrol were ceded to Italy.

Austria was thus left as a small republic numbering only six millions, with a very small territory and a very large capital, but no access to the sea. The erection of tariff barriers by the countries surrounding her soon produced an economic crisis of the first magnitude, and, so far from exacting war indemnities, it was found necessary for the League of Nations to arrange a loan to prevent a complete collapse. By the terms of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, Austria was forbidden to unite with Germany except by the unanimous consent of the League of Nations.

The Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, reduced Hungary also to a small republic cut off from the sea. Part of her former territory went to Czecho-Slovakia and part to Jugo-Slavia, while Roumania took the province of Transylvania, as well as Bessarabia from Russia. Hungary therefore experienced economic troubles similar to those of Austria, and for the same reasons. In her case also it was soon necessary for her Government to seek foreign loans.

By the Treaty of Neuilly, which was signed on November 27, 1919, Bulgaria was denied access to the Ægean Sea and stripped of some territory on her western frontier. It was originally proposed to exact from her an indemnity of £80,000,000.

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks, after a lengthy struggle for mastery in which their opponents were actively assisted by British, American, and Japanese troops, succeeded in establishing their system throughout the greater part of Russia, setting up a government of 'soviets,' or group-councils of workers, which together form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Actually power is vested solely in the Communist Party and its officials. The Poles, recognized as an independent nation and treated with exceptional favour at the Peace Conference, received West Prussia, Posen, and parts of Silesia from Germany, Galicia from Austria-Hungary, and the provinces of Russian Poland, most of which had been lost to them since the partitions at the end of the eighteenth century. The collapse of Tsarist Russia also made possible the independence of a number of other races on the shores of the Baltic, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all setting up Governments of their own. In 1920 the last-named lost Vilna, its capital; to an 'unofficial' Polish army, and a few years later the Polish claim to this city was recognized by the League.

The Treaty of Saint-Germain left Italy bitterly disappointed. For her share in the War she received little beyond a strategic northern frontier that now gave her control of three passes across the Alps. Neither the Dalmatian coast nor a share in the German colonies of tropical Africa came her way. Economic conditions were difficult; strikes and scenes of violence became common, and the Italians began with some justification to accuse their former allies of breaking pledges

given in 1915. Thus there arose in Italy a situation not unlike that in Germany, a desire for strong government, even at the expense of self-government, taking root in the minds of most Italians. The result was the rise of Fascism under a constitutional cloak, dating from the famous March on Rome of October 1922.

Arbitrary frontiers, particularly where they do not follow natural barriers such as mountain ranges, are always difficult to adjust fairly in regions where warfare and confiscation of territory have been frequent. In spite of the desire of the peace negotiators to adhere to the principle of self-determination, it was soon found impossible to avoid placing some 'minorities,' as they were called, under alien rule. Nor was the criterion of language necessarily a good test of nationality: for example, Alsace-Lorraine was restored to France although most of the inhabitants were German-speaking.

The new frontiers therefore left Germans or Austrians in France, Poland, Danzig, the Italian Tyrol, Czecho-Slovakia, the Danish part of Schleswig, and Memel. Hungary, bereft of several millions of her former subjects, lost among them about 600,000 Magyars, who were placed under the rule of Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Roumania. Turks and Bulgarians were left in the newly acquired territories of Jugo-Slavia and Greece, Russians in Bessarabia, and Ukrainians in Poland. In all, it was estimated that nearly thirty million people still remained under alien rulers.

To safeguard the rights of citizenship, language, religion, and customs of these minorities treaties were imposed on Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, and Greece, for observance of which they were made responsible to the Council of the League. Italy was not required to sign such a treaty. Since the War there have been many complaints of injustice from the minorities, notably from the Ukrainians and Bulgarians, and it has often proved impossible for the League Council to secure justice. On the other hand, minorities are usually a source of trouble and danger to their rulers, as they tend to agitate repeatedly for reunion with their own nationals. Thus we see that one of the primary causes of the catastrophe of 1914 had not been altogether removed, though after the peace settlement was concluded only about 3 per cent. of Europe remained under alien rule.

As the question of rewarding Russia by satisfying her ambitions in the Near East no longer arose, the following settlement with Turkey was proposed by the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920): Turkey in Europe was to be restricted to Constantinople; the Straits were to be placed under a League Commission; Greece was to have Smyrna and the surrounding district for five years, after which a plebiscite was to settle its future government; Italy was to take the Dodecanese, and French and Italian spheres of influence were to be created in Asia

Minor. The other provisions of the treaty dealt with Turkey's former Arab dominions.

This treaty was never ratified. The actions of the weak Government at Constantinople were repudiated by the new Nationalist leader in Asia Minor, Mustapha Kemal, who made a new capital at Angora and set up an independent Government. When the situation became threatening the French and Italians withdrew their claims under the Treaty of Sèvres, but the over-confident Greeks remained in Smyrna, and deeply committed to the hinterland. In 1922 they were completely overwhelmed by the Turkish nationalists, who then began to threaten the British position at Chanak, on the neutral zone of the Straits. In these circumstances Lloyd George was in favour of reopening the campaign against the Turks in defence of the treaty settlement, but Canada and South Africa were unwilling to interfere in a conflict that did not directly concern the British Empire, and public opinion in England was not vitally interested. In the end the fall of Lloyd George resulted.

The final settlement with Turkey was therefore made by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923. Turkey in Europe was to extend to the left bank of the river Maritza; a demilitarized zone was created on either side of the Straits, the passage of which became absolutely free for all nations in time of peace; and Greece, Italy, and France recognized the right of the Turks to Anatolia, the frontier defining the Syrian mandate being settled directly between France and Turkey. Mustapha Kemal forced the Sultan to abdicate and declared Turkey a republic, with himself as first president.

Mandates. By the Treaty of Versailles Germany lost "all the rights and titles over her overseas possessions." It was agreed in the League Covenant that these territories should in future be administered strictly with regard to the well-being and development of their inhabitants, under the tutelage of such "advanced nations" as were best fitted to carry out the task. Most of these mandates were therefore entrusted to the two great colonizing Powers, Britain and France. In addition to the German colonies, the future of the Arab lands in Asia, formerly under the rule of Turkey, also had to be settled.

The territories in question were divided into three classes. 'A' mandates referred to the Arab lands, which it was hoped would very soon be able to take their place as independent nations. Britain received the mandate for Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. The last-named became independent in October 1932, and was then admitted to membership of the League of Nations, though Britain still advises and assists in the defence of the new state. Syria and Lebanon were subjected to a French mandate.

Class 'B' mandates comprise the old Central African colonies of

Germany, peopled by races as yet quite unfitted to exercise self-government. Of these Britain received mandates for German East Africa (now called Tanganyika) and small portions of Togoland and the Cameroons, added to the Gold Coast and Nigeria respectively. The major part of Togoland and the Cameroons was placed under the mandate of France. Belgium received Ruanda-Urundi, formerly a part of German East Africa.

Other German colonies, so thinly populated or so scattered that they could best be governed as part of the existing territory of the mandatory itself, were placed in Class 'C.' Of these German Southwest Africa was handed over to the Union of South Africa, Western Samoa to New Zealand, and New Guinea to Australia. Kiao-Chow and the German Pacific islands north of the equator went to Japan.

These mandates were conferred by the Supreme Council that administered the peace treaties after the War was over. Eventually the Council of the League of Nations set up a Permanent Mandates Commission of eleven members, drawn principally from disinterested Powers. To this body the mandatory Powers are required to render an annual report of their trusteeship. From this a report is prepared for the Council and the Assembly. Thus the mandatory Powers are compelled to recognize that their task is not to be performed primarily for their own benefit, and to receive advice and even censure in the event of trouble, such as has occurred in the case of Syria and Palestine.

The League of Nations. President Wilson's desire for a general association of nations which should abolish secret diplomacy, settle international disputes, and at the very least render precipitate warfare unlikely found fruit in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the twenty-six articles of which were inserted at the head of each of the peace treaties. The League itself, which originally numbered forty-two states, most of them Allied and associated Powers (since the defeated states were at first denied admission), came into force on January 10, 1920. Though weakened from the start by the defection of the United States, it declared itself competent to deal with "any matter affecting the peace of the world." For the administration of the treaties in their initial stages the Supreme Council of the Allies remained in existence till 1921, and it was not until some time after this date that the League became really effective.

The League itself is divided into a number of different bodies, each with special functions. The first of these is the Assembly, or general meeting of all the constituent members, which takes place in September every year and in which each member, small or great, has an equal vote. Its decisions must, with a few exceptions, be unanimous. All nations are jealous of their individual sovereignty, and these two

provisions tend to prevent the League from becoming a super-state with power to override any member by means of a majority decision.

The second, or executive, body of the League, is the Council, which consisted originally of the four allied Great Powers—Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—together with four other members selected from time to time by the Assembly, the first of which were Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece. The number of additional Powers can be increased by the Council if necessary ; by 1936 it had risen to ten. Each member sends one representative and has one vote. In normal circumstances the Council meets four times a year, and in most matters the voting must be unanimous. It is competent to deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League, and also has various administrative duties under the peace treaties, such as the right of appointing arbiters and commissioners. Through the action of the Council the League has dealt with mandates, minorities, disarmament, the Saar, and Danzig.

The permanent staff at Geneva is known as the Secretariat, and is under the control of a Secretary-General, who has the right of appointing his staff, with the approval of the Council. The Secretariat numbers nearly 600 people, representing fifty nationalities.

There are two other important bodies. The International Labour Organization (of which the United States is now a member) recognizes the economic interdependence of the League members and aims at applying international rules with regard to conditions of labour. The Permanent Court of International Justice, which has its seat at The Hague, came into force in 1921, and consists of judges elected by the Council and Assembly to hear and determine disputes of an international character, and to give advisory opinions to the Assembly or Council on request. The League has also set up a number of auxiliary organizations to deal with such matters as health, child-welfare, traffic in opium and dangerous drugs, and slavery.

The framers of the League Covenant had in mind the prevention of a European situation such as had grown up prior to 1914. One of the evils of this situation had been the armaments race. The forcible disarmament of Germany was intended as the prelude to disarmament all round, and by one of the articles of the Covenant all members agreed to reduce their armaments to "the lowest point consistent with national safety," and to exchange frank information as regards the scale of them. Unfortunately the realization that Communist Russia (at first not admitted to membership) had remained fully armed, that there were dissatisfied minorities in some of the new central and Balkan states, and that France had failed to secure her military guarantees made disarmament difficult in the early stages after the War. Hence every conference was doomed to end in failure.

The Covenant of the League also contains a number of articles

intended to prevent the outbreak of war over matters capable of settlement by arbitration, or at any rate to delay the actual declaration. In this way it was hoped to prevent a situation similar to that of the last two weeks of July 1914. All members of the League agree to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other members, to submit to arbitration or judicial settlement any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, or else to bring it before the Council, and in no case to resort to war until three months after the decision of the arbitrators or Council has been published. But the Covenant goes much further than this. By Article 16 it is declared that any nation resorting to war without first satisfying these conditions shall be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which undertake to sever all personal, commercial, and financial relations with the offending State, and, if the Council so recommends, to take active military steps to enforce the League Covenant. This is the famous 'sanctions' clause, by which it was hoped that the actuality, or perhaps even the threat, of economic pressure would suffice to prevent hostilities. But in practice a single leak in the system invalidates the whole, so the fact that there are Great Powers outside it can destroy the sanctions weapon. Moreover, some League members are economically dependent on others, and may therefore be virtually unable to apply sanctions without destroying themselves, while the defaulting nation may declare that it will consider stoppages of vital materials, such as oil, as a *casus belli*, in which case sanctions would merely extend, instead of limiting, the conflict. Thus we see that immediate military measures are the only ones that can really be effective, and to start a general war over quarrels in which they are not directly concerned is beyond the power of any of the League representatives, who would certainly not receive the support of their peoples if they proposed any such course. It is unfair to talk of the ineffectiveness of the League, without recognizing the fact that it obviously has no power to act without the full concurrence of the nations of which it is formed. It sounds anomalous to say that the world must fight in order to ensure peace, but at present the fact is that while nations are genuinely concerned in desiring peace for themselves, they do not really care enough about peace in the abstract. When a nation proposing to default against the Covenant is *certain* of immediate retribution from all its fellow-members, whether concerned in the actual quarrel or not, then, and then only, can the sanctions clause become an effective instrument for world peace. The French saw this when the League was in process of formation, and suggested a kind of international police force; but practical difficulties and the old fear of creating a super-state led to the rejection of the proposal.

Conclusion. The Chanak affair revealed the fact that the British

Empire had really become the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Dominions joined the League on an independent footing, and after 1924 they began in some cases to send their own representatives to foreign capitals. An attempt was made in 1926 to define the new position. In that year an Imperial Conference met to discuss the question of Dominion status, and agreed on equality for all. This was specially laid down in the Statute of Westminster of 1931 :

The Dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by common allegiance to the Crown.

The mandates system has greatly increased the territory under the British flag, but at the same time the spread of nationalist aims to the races of Asia and Africa bids fair to reduce it eventually. Egypt, still nominally a part of the Sultan's dominions on the outbreak of war, was temporarily declared a British Protectorate in 1914, and still remained under British influence after the peace settlement. But the Nationalist Party, or Wafd, grew in strength until in 1922 an attempt was made to satisfy its aspirations by declaring the country nominally independent, under its own King. By the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 the British agreed to withdraw their troops, except so far as defence of the Suez Canal zone is concerned. In India also a similar movement has led Britain to introduce a measure of self-government, in spite of the difficulties of ignorance and religious antagonism that prevent the mutual tolerance without which no democracy can hope for success.

Few treaties have ever stood the test of time for long. The negotiators of 1919 hoped that the old causes of national quarrels had at last been eliminated from the sphere of European politics. They hoped in vain. The principle of self-determination could not be granted everywhere ; general disarmament did not follow the peace settlement ; the League of Nations gained ridicule and unpopularity rather than prestige. Consequently the good fruits of the peace settlement have become obscured, making it stand forth principally as a treaty of conquest imposed by superior force. The two Great Powers that felt themselves the worst treated, Germany and Italy, accordingly surrendered themselves to a form of totalitarian government that sets the well-being of the State above the rights of the individual, in an effort to gain the position they feel to be their due. A return to the old principle of collective security with all its evils of secret diplomacy, was the inevitable result, until the European situation paralleled that of the days immediately prior to the War of 1914-18, with the same catastrophic result.

SUMMARY

(1) *Attitude of the Peace-makers*

- (a) Lloyd George hampered by election promises.
- (b) Clemenceau aimed at reducing Germany to a second-class Power, by taking all her territory west of the Rhine.
- (c) Wilson wanted to remove causes of future wars ('self-determination' and the League Covenant).

(2) *Treaty of Versailles with Germany (1919)*

- (a) Germany declared responsible for the War.
- (b) West bank of Rhine and 50 kilometres of right bank demilitarized and occupied by Allies.
- (c) Military stores, coal, timber, cattle, and merchant ships taken.
- (d) Army : 100,000 men ; no conscription.
- (e) Navy : six capital ships not exceeding 10,000 tons each ; no submarines.
- (f) Air Force : none.
- (g) Territory : Saar under League Commission for 15 years ; Alsace and Lorraine to France ; Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium ; Northern Schleswig to Denmark ; West Prussia and part of Silesia to Poland.
- (h) Treaty signed by Germany under protest.

(3) *Reparations*

- (a) Original figure, 24 billion pounds.
- (b) 1921. Reparations Commission reduced sum to 6 billion.
- (c) 1923. French invaded Ruhr.
- (d) 1924-26. Dawes and Young Committees reduced sum to 2 billion.
- (e) 1932. Germany refused further payments.

(4) *The Subsidiary Treaties*

- (a) Austria : Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919) (republic of six million, forbidden to unite with Germany).
- (b) Bulgaria : Treaty of Neuilly (1919).
- (c) Hungary : Treaty of Trianon (1920).
- (d) Turkey : Treaty of Lausanne (1923) (Straits demilitarized).
- (e) New States : Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Poland ; from Soviet Russia, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

(5) *Mandates*

- (a) Class 'A' : Arab lands of the Turkish Empire (Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan to Britain ; Syria and Lebanon to France).
- (b) Class 'B' : German possessions in tropical Africa (German East Africa to Britain ; most of Togoland and Cameroons to France ; Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium).
- (c) Class 'C' : Thinly peopled territories (South-west Africa to Union of South Africa ; islands in North Pacific to Japan, in South Pacific to Australia and New Zealand).

(6) *The League of Nations*

- (a) Covenant formed first part of all peace treaties.
- (b) Assembly : general meeting of all members every September.
- (c) Council : originally the four allied Great Powers.
- (d) Permanent Court of International Justice ; International Labour Organization.
- (e) Note clauses in Covenant intended to effect disarmament and to impose sanctions.

(7) *The New Problems*

- (a) Pan-Germanism.
- (b) Italian desire for Adriatic coast and tropical colonies.
- (c) Minorities.
- (d) Economic weakness of the new small states.
- (e) Dictatorships, the usual result of political chaos.
- (f) Future of the British Commonwealth (Treaty of Westminster, 1931).
- (g) National movements among non-Christian peoples—e.g., Jews, Arabs, Egyptians, Indians.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

- (1) The differences between the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the Treaty of Vienna (1815).
- (2) The reasons why the settlement of 1919 proved an unsatisfactory peace.

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